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ABSTRACT 
 
This research project stems from a single puzzle: how can constitutional amendments be 
unconstitutional? Adopting a combination of theoretical and comparative enquiries, this 
thesis establishes the nature and scope of constitutional amendment powers by focusing 
on the question of substantive limitations on the amendment power, looking at both 
their prevalence in practice and the conceptual coherence of the very idea of limitations 
to amendment powers. 
The thesis is composed of three parts. The first part is comparative. It examines 
substantive explicit and implicit limitations on constitutional amendment powers through 
manifold descriptions of a similar constitutional phenomenon across countries, 
demonstrating a comprehensive pattern of a constitutional behaviour. This process is 
theory-driven, and the second part of the thesis constructs a general theory of 
unamendability, which explains the nature and scope of amendment powers. The third 
part explains how judicial review of amendments is to be conceived in light of the theory 
of unamendability, and further assesses the possible objections to the theory of 
unamendability.   
The theory of unamendability identifies and develops a middle ground between 
constituent power and pure constituted power, a middle ground that is suggested by the 
French literature on ‘derived constituent power’. Undergirding the discussion, therefore, 
is a simple yet fundamental distinction between primary constituent (constitution-
making) power and secondary constituent (constitution-amending) power. This 
distinction, understood in terms of an act of delegation of powers, enables the 
construction of a theory of the limited (explicitly or implicitly) scope of secondary 
constituent powers. This distinction is supplemented by a further one, between various 
shades of secondary constituent powers along a ‘spectrum’, a theoretical construct that 
links amendment procedures to limitations on amendment powers. The theory of 
unamendability explicates the limited nature of amendment powers and the practice of 
judicial review of amendments, thus clarifying the puzzle of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ~6 ~ 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. The Meaning and Importance of Constitutional Amendments 
II. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments 
III. Research Methodology 
IV. An Outline 
 
PART I. LIMITATIONS 
 
Chapter 2: Explicit Limitations 
I. Unamendable Provisions 
II. Origins and Development 
III. Examining Unamendable Provisions 
A. Structure 
B. Content 
C. Characteristics 
1. Preservative 
2. Transformative 
3. Aspirational 
4. Conflictual 
5. Bricolage 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 3: Implicit Limitations 
I. The Genesis of the Theory of Implicit Limitations 
II. The Indian ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’ 
III. The ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’: A Tour d’Horizon 
A. Bangladesh: Implicit Limitations 
B. Pakistan: Implicit Limitations Without Judicial Enforcement 
C. Africa 
1. Kenya – Acceptance of the Doctrine 
2. South-Africa: Towards Acceptance? 
3. Tanzania – One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? 
D. South-East Asia 
1. South Korea, Japan, and China – Voices from Academia 
2. Taiwan and Thailand – Recognition 
3. Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Singapore: Rejection 
E. Central and South America 
1. Argentina – A Limited Constituent Assembly 
2.  Belize – Basic Structure Doctrine 
3. Colombia – Constitutional Replacement Doctrine 
4. Peru – Principios Juridicos and Valores Democraticos Basicos 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 ~7 ~ 
 
PART II. TOWARDS A THEORY OF UNAMENDABILITY 
 
Chapter 4: The Nature of Amendment Powers 
I. Constituent Power and Constituted Power 
II. The Amendment Power as Sui Generis 
III. The Secondary Constituent Power 
A. The Distinction Between ‘Original’ and ‘Derived’ Constituent 
Powers 
B. The Formal Theory 
C. The Substantive Theory 
D. Integration: A Theory of Delegation 
E. Terminological clarifications 
1. Primary and Secondary Constituent Powers 
2. Power and Authority 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5: The Scope of Amedment Powers 
I. Explicit Limits 
A. The Validity of  Unamendable Provisions 
B. An Unamendable Amendment? 
C. Amending Unamendable Provisions 
II. Implicit Limits 
A. Foundational Structuralism 
B. Hierarchy of Constitutional Values 
C. Constitutional Identity 
D. Textualism 
III. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 6: The Spectrum of Amendment Powers 
I. The Re-emergence of Primary Constituent Power 
A. Unamendability and Primary Constituent Power 
B. Conceptions of Primary Constituent Power 
1. Immanent Conception 
2. Transcendental Conception 
3. Primary Constituent Power and Demcoracy 
II. The Constitutionalisation of Primary Constituent Power 
A. The Fallacy of Prescribed Constitution-Making Procedures 
B. We The ‘Limited’ People? 
III. The Spectrum of Amendment Powers 
A. Strong and Weak Constitutional Amendment Powers 
B. Linking Amendment Procedures and Unamendability 
IV. Conclusion 
 
PART III. IMPLICATIONS 
 
Chapter 7: Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments 
I. The Rationales Behind Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments 
A. Separation of Powers 
B. The Essence of Judicial Duty 
C. The Rule of the Constitution 
D. The Supremacy of the Constitution 
 ~8 ~ 
 
E. Political Process Failure 
II. Legitimacy of Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments 
   A. Authority to Review Constitutional Amendments 
B. Existence or Absence of Unamendable Provisions 
C. Different Procedures for Constitutional Amendments 
III. Exercising Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments 
A. Interpretation of Constitutional Amendments and of 
Unamendable Principles 
1. Identification of Unamendable Principles or Rules 
2. Developing a Theory of Unamendable Principles 
3. Identifying the Prohibition 
4. Interpreting the Constitutional Amendment 
B. Standard of Review 
1. Minimal Effect Standard 
2. Disproportionate Violation Standard 
3. Fundamental Abandonment Standard 
C. Judicial Restraint 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 8: Assessing Objections to Unamendability 
I. General Objections to Unamendability 
A. The ‘Dead Hand’ Objection 
B. The Revolutionary Means Objection 
II. Objections to Implicit Limitations 
A. The Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius Objection 
B. Reply: Reductio ad Absurdum 
III. Objections to Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments 
A. The Logical Subordination Objection 
B. The Undemocratic Objection 
C. The Enhancing Judiciary’s Power Objection 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
I. A Theory of Unamendability 
II. Ramifications for Future Research 
III. Solving the Paradox 
  
Appendix: Explicit Substantive Limitations on Constitutioinal Amendments 
 
Bibliography 
 ~9 ~ 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
I. THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS  
This thesis concerns the nature and scope of the power to amend constitutions. 
‘Constitution’, in this thesis, is used to denote the narrow sense of the term, i.e. the 
cluster of supreme principles and rules, typically set in a written legal document (or a set 
of such documents), which establish and regulate the state’s basic institutional 
arrangements and practices and express the nation’s most enduring values.1 Not every 
state that has a constitution (in that sense) is a constitutional state. Some constitutions are 
façade/sham constitutions, in that they exist for ‘cosmetic’ purposes only and have no 
effect in reality. Others are in line with the political reality but do not impose binding 
rules upon it; on the contrary, they reinforce governmental power.2 Thus, this thesis 
focuses on constitutional systems in the modern context of ‘constitutionalism’. 3 
Constitutionalism is nowadays commonly identified by certain conditions, such as: the 
recognition of the people as the source of all governmental authority; the constitution is 
supreme law (in the sense that it carries the highest normative status within the legal 
hierarchy); the constitution regulates and limits the power of government; demanding 
adherence for the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights.4 It also focuses on 
national constitutions rather than state constitutions within a Federal system due to the 
important theoretical distinctions between the two.5 
Constitutions change with time. Such change can take place in various ways. It 
can occur outside of constitutional law, in the social sphere, for instance ‘by gradually 
shifting the rank and importance of constitutional factors … and norms’.6 Constitutions 
may also be modified according to a procedure stipulated within them. This is the 
constitutional amendment procedure, by which textual changes to a constitution may 
occur.7 By the term constitutional amendment,8 I refer to formal constitutional amendments 
                                                          
1 For wide and narrow senses of constitutions, see Perry (2001, 103); Tully (2002, 204-5); Elkins, Ginsberg 
and Melton (2009, 38-51).  
2 See generally Loewenstein (1972, 174); Sartori (1962, 853); Murphy (1993A, 8-9); Law and Versteeg 
(2013, 863).  
3 McIlwain (1975, 132).  
4 See, for example, Henkin (1994, 40-42); Grimm (2010B, 9). 
5 See Saunders (2010-2011, 853). 
6 Smend (2002, 248).  
7 Schwartzberg (2009, 5). 
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enacted through the amendment procedure and not to any constitutional changes.9 Of course, 
important constitutional changes may also take place outside of the formal amendment 
process,10 for instance, through judicial interpretations or practice.11 Some have claimed, 
for example, that certain judicial interpretations of the U.S. Constitution are better 
viewed as amendments.12 Indeed, a modification of a constitutional text’s meaning may 
often carry a greater effect than its formal modifications. 13  Nonetheless, formal 
constitutional amendments remain an essential means of constitutional change. 14  For 
some, such as Georg Jellinek, the issue of constitutional amendments is less interesting 
than that of transformation, which occurs outside of the constitutional text.15 However, 
as this thesis demonstrates, constitutional amendments raise imperative questions about 
constitutional theory and are far from being tedious.  
The modern phenomenon of constitutionalism emerged in the late years of the 
eighteenth century, first in the North American colonies and then in Europe.16 In North 
America, the first state constitution – of Virginia – did not include any amendment 
provision. However, between the years 1776 and 1783, great advances occurred in 
constitutional design as state constitutions provided special amendment procedures. 17 
Indeed, soon after the Declaration of Independence, six of the first thirteen constitutions 
included amendment provisions.18 At the Federal level, from the commencement of the 
1787 Constitutional Convention, it was clear that it would be necessary to include within 
the Constitution an amendment provision. The ‘Virginia Plan’, introduced by Edmund 
Randolph, contained a provision allowing for amendments ‘whensoever it shall seem 
necessary’. When doubts were raised as for the need to include an amendment provision, 
George Mason replied that ‘amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better 
to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 Earlier constitutional literature drew a distinction between major and minor constitutional alterations, 
calling the former revisions and the latter amendments. See Willoughby (1921, 128); Lutz (1994, 356). I use 
amendments to describe any formal changes to the constitution, whether major or minor. 
9 See, for example, Oliver and Fusaro (2011); Contiades (2012). 
10 There is a great deal of work regarding constitutional change outside of the formal amendment process. 
See mainly the project of Ackerman (1991); Ackerman (1995, 63); Ackerman (2000A). 
11 Llewellyn (1934, 1); Strauss (2000-2001), 1457.  
12 Coudert (1904, 331); Levinson (1995B, 33). 
13 Grimm (2011, 27). 
14 Vermeaule (2006, 229). 
15 Jellinek (2002, 54). 
16 Henkin (1988-1989, 1023). 
17 Loughlin (2010, 280-81).  
18 Delaware Const. (1776), Pennsylvania Const. (1776), Maryland Const. (1776), Georgia Const. (1777), 
Vermont Const. (1777), and Massachusetts Const. (1780). See Martig (1937, 1254). 
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and violence’.19 An amendment formula was thus considered as a ‘healing principle’ that 
would allow the Constitution to stand the test of time.20 Such a mechanism was required, 
especially in light of the Articles of Confederation’s almost impossible amendment 
process – the requirement of states’ unanimity. 21  The chosen mechanism for 
amendments in Art. V of the Constitution, 22  as James Madison described in the 
Federalist No. 43, ‘guards equally against that extreme facility which would render the 
Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty which might perpetuate its 
discovered faults’. 23  Art. V was described as ‘the keystone of the Arch’, 24  the 
constitution’s ‘vis medicatrix’.25 Moreover, it was claimed that the idea of including within a 
constitution a special provision for its amendment is ‘one of America’s principal 
contributions to political science’.26 This is now a universally recognised constitutional 
method. 27  In most constitutional systems, the constitutional amendment process is 
different (and more difficult) than ordinary law-making, and usually involves either (or a 
combination of) a qualified majority in parliament, numerous decisions, time delays, etc. 
Bodies other than parliament are often involved. For instance, some constitutions require 
ratification by popular referendum or by states (in federal systems). In some constitutions, 
there are diverse procedures within the constitution for different subject matters (see 
Chapter 6).  
There are several main rationales for why amendment mechanisms are deemed 
imperative. First, constitutions ought to be sufficiently flexible to allow future generations 
to respond to various political, economic, social, and other changes, as well as changes in 
                                                          
19 See Vile (2005, 13); Vile (2003, 300). 
20  Wood (1998, 613).  
21 Articles of Confederation, art. XIII (U.S. 1781). See Prince (1867, 105-6); Thompson (1913, 17).  
22 U.S. Constitution, art. V: ‘The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of 
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid 
to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths 
of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of 
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to 
the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in 
the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate’. For the history of the drafting of art. V, historical views on it, and of some of the 
prevailing theories surrounding it, see Denning (1997-1998, 155); Vile (1991B), 44. 
23 Madison (1817, 239).  
24 Martig (1937, 1284). 
25 Calhoun (1851, 295). 
26  Sheips (1951, 48). See, much earlier, Jameson (1867, 484): ‘The idea of the people thus restricting 
themselves in making changes in their Constitutions is original…’  
27  Lutz (1994, 356) (‘The innovation of an amendment process … has diffused throughout the world to 
the point where less than 4% of all national constitutions lack a provision for a formal amending process’) 
(referring to van Maarseveen and van der Tang (1978, 80)). According to the data of the Constitutional 
Design Group (2008), in 2000, 96% of world constitutions included amendment provisions.  
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the society’s system of values.28 Constitutions that do not allow for such adaptations are 
in peril of becoming irrelevant and eventually avoided: ‘a constitution totally unsuited for 
changes sooner or later is doomed to become an instrument incapable of serving its 
purpose, bound therefore to be superseded’.29Second, an amendment procedure is a means 
to correct imperfections in the existing instrument.30 Constitutions are made by ‘men, not 
gods’.31 The amendment process enables the correction of flaws or shortcomings that are 
revealed by time, practice, and experience, thus reflecting the fallibility of human nature.32 
Third, the amendment process assists in fulfilling people’s right to alter their form of 
government, and by providing a peaceful method for change without recourse to a 
forcible revolution, it serves as ‘the safety-valve to a nation’.33 Fourth, the amendment 
process preserves the government’s legitimacy, for an unamendable constitution 
established in the past can hardly be regarded as manifesting the consent of the 
governed.34 Lastly, the amendment process provides flexibility, and constitutions that are 
flexible are likely to endure through time.35  
 Just as constitutions should allow for changes, they should not be too easily 
amended. First, in setting the ‘rules of the game’, the constitution must be sufficiently 
stable in order to allow participants to anticipate their acts’ consequences. An overly 
flexible constitution that allows frequent changes might cause instability, uncertainty, and 
undermine faith in the political order. 36  Second, an easy amendment process places 
fundamental principles and institutions at risk of being swept away by majorities 
momentarily fascinated with a new idea.37 Third, an overly flexible amendment process, 
together with short-term political interests and the danger of qualified majorities, give 
rise to fears of abuse of the amendment power.38 Fourth, a constitution that could be 
easily and carelessly amended might lose its authority – its value as the supreme law of 
the land – ultimately subverting any authentic constitutionalism. 39  Lastly, extreme 
                                                          
28 Mueller (1999, 387); Lutz (1994, 357). 
29 Fusaro and Oliver (2011, 433). See also Grimm (2010A, 33). 
30 Levinson (1995A, 3).  
31 Pitkin (1987, 168). 
32 Lutz (1994, 356); Fombad (2007, 31); Schwartzberg (2009, 27, 115, 122-125). 
33 Williams (1928, 530-536). 
34 Dellinger (1983-1984, 386-7). 
35 Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton (2009, 81-103, 221).  
36 On the requirement that law must maintain certain stability, see Fuller (1969, 79-81). On the need for the 
law to be stable but not completely still see Pound (1960, 23). 
37 Suber (1999, 31-32). 
38 Conrad (1970, 415); Gatmaytan (2010, 38); Landau (2013A, 226). 
39 Wright (1994, 52); Fombad (2007, 52); Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton (2009, 82, 100); Akzin (1956, 337); 
Vermeaule (2006, 254). 
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constitutional flexibility is empirically associated with increased risk of constitutional 
demise.40 
Since ‘the ultimate measure of a constitution is how it balances entrenchment and 
change’,41 the importance of the amendment formula is clear.42 This is why the debate on 
amendment rules has attracted the interest of constitutional economics and public choice 
theorists. 43  However, the ‘rule of change’ 44  is not merely a technical mechanism of 
balancing constitutional stability and flexibility – the great ‘antinomies’ of law.45 It directly 
implicates the nature of the constitutional system.46 Mads Andenas suggests that ‘each 
country’s amending formula … provides an insight into the intricacies and peculiarities 
of that country’s social and political culture’. It is, after all, ‘the space in which law, 
politics, history and philosophy meet’.47 It was therefore argued, in the American context, 
that the amendment procedure contains ‘a microcosm the most fundamental principles 
of our constitutional structure’.48 Raising practical issues as well as theoretical concerns, 
the amendment process touches the very core of any legal system.  
II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS  
Constitutions can be formally changed through the amendment procedure. Are there any 
substantive limitations on the ability to amend constitutions? 49  Is the scope of the 
amendment power sufficiently broad to permit any amendment whatsoever, even one 
that violates fundamental rights or basic principles? 50  In June 2008, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court annulled Parliament’s amendments to the Constitution regarding 
the principle of equality and the right to education. 51  Parliament’s intention was to 
abolish the headscarf ban in universities. The Court ruled that because the amendments 
infringed upon the constitutionally protected principle of secularism they were 
                                                          
40 Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton (2009, 22, 31-32, 140).  
41 Chemerinsky  (1998, 1561). 
42  McKay (1963-1964, 203); Wheare (1966, 7). See contra Williams (1963-1964, 237): ‘It is not the 
constitution-amending power that plays the major role in the American system in resoving the dilemma of 
stability and change in constitutional law. It is the Supreme Court.’   
43 See, for example, Giovannoni (2003, 37); Boudreaux and Pritchard (1993, 111). 
44 Hart (1961, 93-94).  
45 Cardozo (2000, 1-7). 
46 Dorfman (2007, 429).  
47 Andenas (2000, xii-xiii).  
48 Markman (1989, 115).  
49 This thesis does not focus on procedural limitations on constitutional amendment powers.  
50 Imagine Ackerman’s scenario of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution repealing the 1st Amendment 
and establishing Christianity as state religion. Ackerman (1991, 14-15).     
51 Turkish Constitutional Court Decision of June 5, 2008, No. 2008/16; 2008/116.   
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‘unconstitutional’. 52  The idea that amendments that were enacted according to the 
amendment procedure could be declared ‘unconstitutional’ on the grounds that their 
content is at variance with the existing constitution is perplexing. After all, is it not the 
purpose of amendments to change the existing constitution’s content?53 
 At first glance, the very idea of an ‘unconstitutional constitutional amendment’ 
seems puzzling.54 The constitution is the highest positive legal norm.55 The power to 
amend the constitution presupposes the same kind of power as the one to constitute a 
constitution.56 It is a supreme power within the legal system, and as such, it can reach 
every rule or principle of the legal system.57 If this power is indeed supreme, how can it 
limit itself?58 If it is limited, how can it be supreme? This is the legal equivalent of the 
‘paradox of omnipotence’: can an omnipotent entity bind itself? 59  Both positive and 
negative answers to these questions lead to the conclusion that it is not omnipotent.60 
Moreover, if the amendment power is a kind of constituent power, then it remains unclear 
why a prior manifestation of that power prevails over the later exercise of a similar 
power.61 Quite the reverse: according to the lex posterior derogat priori principle, a later 
norm should prevail over a conflicting earlier norm of the same normative status. 62 
Finally, the constitution, which expresses the people’s sovereign power, binds and guides 
ordinary law, which expresses the parliament’s ordinary power.63 The common meaning 
of ‘unconstitutionality’ is that an ordinary law, inferior to and bound by the constitution, 
violates it.64 How can ‘unconstitutionality’ refer to an act carrying the same normative 
status as the constitution itself?65 Arguably, as equal components of the same constitution, 
constitutional amendments simply cannot be unconstitutional. 66 As Kathleen Sullivan 
writes, a ‘properly enacted constitutional amendment cannot literally be 
                                                          
52 See Özbudun (2009, 533); Saygili (2010, 127); Roznai and Yolcu (2012, 175).  
53 Preuss (2011, 431).  
54 Jacobsohn (2010A, 34) calls it a ‘conundrum’ and Harris (1993, 169) writes that it is a prima facie ‘riddle, a 
paradox, or an incoherency’.  
55  Kelsen (2006, 115-116). 
56 Weill (2007, 483-84).   
57 Suber (1999, 31). 
58 Rousseau (2008, 130) (claiming that limitation of sovereignty results in its destruction). 
59 Mackie (1955, 210); van den Brink (1993, 135). 
60 Mackie (1955, 210); Anonymous (1995-1996, 1751). 
61 Tushnet (2012-2013, 2005). 
62 Broom (2000, 26-270); Kelsen (1967, 206). 
63 Rawls (1993, 231-33). 
64 Dicey (1982, 371-72). 
65 Compare McDonald (1998, 259): ‘…there is no conceptual inconsistency between constitutionalism and 
allowing for constitutional amendment.’ 
66 Dietze (1956, 21). 
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unconstitutional’.67 Therefore, the idea of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment 
seems prima facie paradoxical.68 Is it an actual paradox, or merely an ostensible one caused 
by an imprecise understanding of certain presuppositions? This thesis argues that 
clarifying the main concept – the constitutional amendment power, its nature, and its 
scope – is the first step for undoing this apparent paradox.69  
The issue of the nature and scope of amendment powers raises important 
questions. Are there any constitutional principles so fundamental that they carry a supra-
constitutional status in the sense that they cannot be amended?70 What can and should 
courts do when they face a fait accompli in the form of a constitutional amendment 
adopted according to the amendment procedure but that changes the constitution’s basic 
structure?71 Does a radical constitutional change brought about through an amendment 
cease to be ‘an amendment’ and become an act of revolution or coup d’état by those 
holding the amendment power?72 This thesis focuses on the nature and scope of the 
amendment power.73 Its main enquiries are therefore:  
 1. What is the nature of amendment powers?  
 2. If amendment powers may be limited, which limitations are applicable to them?  
3. What is the role of courts in enforcing limitations on amendment powers? 
It seems that the puzzle surrounding the possibility of an ‘unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment’ concerns a deeper conflict between substantive versus procedural 
                                                          
67 Sullivan (1995, 24).  
68 The relationship between the problems of amendments and logical paradoxes are well known. See Ross 
(1969, 1); Hart (2001, 170); Suber (1990). 
69 This thesis deals exclusively with constitutional amendments. It does not deal with the possibility of an 
original constitution being itself unconstitutional. See e.g. Security Council (SC) Resolution 554 of 1984, 
regarding the new Constitution of South Africa of 1983 that entrenched apartheid. In that resolution, the 
SC declared that it ‘strongly rejects and declares as null and void the so-called “new constitution”’, due to 
its contradiction of the principles of the UN Charter, mainly racial equality; see also Paleveda (1992).  
70 By the term supraconstitutional, I refer to principles or rules that might be placed ‘above’ the constitutional 
amendment power. See, for example, Arné (1993, 461); Vedel (1993, 76). Favoreu (1993, 74-6) 
distinguishes between ‘internal supraconstitutionality’ – those constitutional principles with which the 
amendment power must comply – and ‘external supraconstitutionality’– those international or 
supranational standards with which the constitutional standard must comply. This thesis focuses on the 
former, i.e. it examines limitations on amendment powers that derive implicitly or explicitly from within 
the constitutional order and not from external sources such as international law. On possible limitations of 
international law on amendment powers see Valdés (2008, 121) (the globalization of fundamental rights 
and jus cogens norms set new limits on the amendment powers); Schnably (2007-2008, 417) (certain 
emerging international and supranational legal rules address matters such as constitutional amendments); 
Samar (2008, 667) (limitations on constitutional amendment must include human rights, which are 
universally recognised). My own thoughts on this issue were published in Roznai (2013A, 557). 
71 Barak (2002-2003, 89). 
72 Cf., Chatterjee (1976, 70). 
73  This work does not deal with constitutional provisions that aim to block, in advance, political 
associations which are ‘non-democratic’ or strive for a revolutionary change in the nation’s identity, 
restricting them from participating in the elections for parliamentary bodies. See, for example, Navot 
(2008, 91); Macklem (2006, 488); Mersel (2006, 84); Kremnitzer (2004, 157); Murphy (1993B, 173).  
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approaches to constitutionalism; the former focuses on the constitution’s fundamental 
principles and the latter on the constitution’s procedures.74 A proceduralist might claim that 
a ‘revolution’ only requires a change to or a replacement of the constitution in a way that 
is incompatible with the amendment procedure, as understood by Hans Kelsen. 75  A 
substantivist might claim that a revolutionary change can also occur through legal means.76 
The thesis advanced here might be described as a substantive constitutionalist one. It 
proposes to read a country’s constitution in a foundational structuralist way, according to 
which each constitution has to be regarded as a structure in which all of its provisions are 
related. But structuralism itself is not enough; this structure is built upon certain pillars, 
foundations that fill its essence - hence foundational structuralism. Accordingly, the focus is 
not merely on the constitution’s procedures, but also on its substance. Substantively, a 
constitutional change may be deemed unconstitutional, even if accepted according to the 
prescribed constitutional procedures, if it conflicts with unamendable constitutional 
provisions, or collapses the existing order and its basic principles, and replaces them with 
new ones thereby changing its identity.77  
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Whereas the definition of the nature of the amendment power is among the most 
abstract questions of public law,78 the question of its scope is not purely of academic 
interest; it has practical importance. The issue has already been adjudicated in various 
countries, including India, Turkey, Germany, and Brazil, and is likely to arise, sooner or 
later, in other countries as well. The number of proposed constitutional amendments 
worldwide also makes this topic highly relevant.79 Moreover, any study on the nature and 
scope of the amendment power has practical importance since nowadays ‘constitutional 
reform is neither taboo nor an extraordinary process, but part of normal constitutional 
                                                          
74 Tulis (1988, 548). Others might describe it as a conflict between positivism and natural law approaches: 
the former focuses on the constitution’s wording views the amendment power – unless otherwise stated – 
as unlimited, wheares the latter, which focuses on the constitution’s spirit, would argue that the 
amendment power is never sovereign thus always limited. See Jayadevan (2010, 249); Michelman (1995, 
1297). 
75 Kelsen (1967, 209); Kelsen (2006, 117). 
76 Cf., Colón-Ríos and Hutchinson (2012, 593). But see Green (2004-2005, 333): ‘If Article V procedures 
were used to pass an amendment to the United States Constitution that prohibited private property, only a 
political, not a legal, revolution would have occurred’. 
77 Thus it could be deemed a revoluationary constitutional change. Cf., Preuss (1995, 81); Kuo (2010, 398). 
Albert (2009, 5) designates such a constitutional change as ‘nonconstitutional’.    
78 Klein (1978, 203).  
79 For instance, Sullivan (1995) has diagnosed the unwarranted desire to amend the U.S. Constitution as 
‘constitutional amendmentitis’, and Smith (1927, 18) criticised the ‘craze for tinkering with the 
constitution.’ This phenomenon is not unique to the American constitutional discourse.  
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life, reflecting that constitutions are no longer perceived as mystical, sacred documents 
but as indispensable tools used regularly and interminably’.80 However, even though this 
issue has attracted increased attention in recent years,81 it suffers from the lack of a 
comprehensive and coherent theoretical framework that is globally applicable. 82 
Therefore, much could be gained by wider comparative and theoretical research.83 
This project is both comparative and theoretical. It is comparative, not in the 
traditional sense of conducting case studies of one or two foreign legal systems, but in 
seeking more comprehensive patterns of ‘constitutional behaviour’. It thus uses a 
method of comparative law at a high level of abstraction.84 As such, this research reviews 
various constitutional provisions limiting amendments and analyses the rich vein of 
relevant jurisprudential writings and case law dealing with limitations on the amendment 
power from jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue. It examines the concept of 
‘unconstitutional constitutional amendments’ through ‘multiple descriptions of the same 
constitutional phenomena across countries’.85 This process is theory-driven in the sense 
that it aims to draw an explanatory theory from this comparative practice.86 
Indeed, the framework which contextualises the theoretical approach of this 
thesis is constitutional theory. As an endeavour to apprehend constitutionalism as ‘a 
form of political practice’ and to evaluate how such practice ‘works against its own 
                                                          
80 Contiades (2012, 2). As Peterson (1919: 189) commented, ‘constitutional amending is now an established 
vocation’. 
81  See, for example, Halmai (2012, 182); Pfersmann (2012, 81); Bezemek (2011, 517); Barak (2011A); 
Weintal (2011, 449); Omejec (2010); Albert (2009, 5); Samar (2008, 667); Colon-Rios (2008, 207); 
Jacobsohn (2006A, 460); Mazzone (2004-2005). 1747; Da Silva (2004, 454); O’Connell (1999, 74); Wright 
(1990-1991, 741). 
82 To give just a few examples: Gözler (1995) calls for an extreme positivistic approach that rejects any 
implicit limits and accepts only expressed limits on amendment powers. This approach seems erroneous 
both theoretically and practically, as it appears that the global trend is moving towards accepting the idea of 
implied limitations. Rigaux (1985) focuses on substantive limits in the interrelationship between different 
legal orders, but draws mainly from three European states (Belgium, France and Germany), which might 
cause difficulties for common-law scholars (See White (1988, 647)). Weintal (2005) has made an ambitious 
effort in providing a theory of ‘eternity clauses’. Nonethelss, Weintal seems to give short shrift to 
important issues; he touches only briefly the issues of implicit limits and ignores the phenomenon of 
‘unamendable amendments’. Moreover, Weintal’s theory justifies unamendable provisions as a mechanism 
for setting the rules of the game for accepting revolutionary changes in the foundations of the nation’s self-
determination. However, this focus solely on ‘constitutive principles’ fails to explain the existence of other 
unamendable provisions. More importantly, Weintel (intentionally) pays minimal attention to institutional 
issues such as judicial review, which is one of the most burning and relevant topics regarding limitations on 
amendment powers. Contrary to Weintal, Schwartzberg (2009) argues against constitutional entrenchment 
primarily on the ground that it is undemocratic and grants too much power to the judiciary. This approach, 
while grounded, overlooks some important arguments to the contrary, as elaborated in this thesis. Finaly, 
Krishnaswamy (2010) has done an excellent work in analysing the Indian ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’. 
However, as he clarifies early on (xxxii–xxxiii), he does not propose a general theory of judicial review of 
constitutional amendments. 
83 Cf., Andenas (2000, ix). 
84 Pfersmann (2009, 85).  
85 Hirschl (2008, 26). 
86 On theory-driven methodology in comparative law, see generally Adams and Bomhoff (2012, 7-8). 
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internal logic’,87 constitutional theory aims to ‘identify the character of actual existing 
constitutional arrangements’ and ‘offer an explanation of character of the practice’.88 The 
theoretical framework through which the problem of limitations on the amendment 
power is examined establishes the theoretical presuppositions of the subject area, i.e. the 
nature and scope of the amendment power.89 The theoretical study’s approach is mainly 
explanatory, aimed at describing and explaining the legal behaviour of amendment powers, 
and how we should conceive amendment powers and judicial review of constitutional 
amendments, with some normative proposals such as guiding principles for the future.90  
This thesis constructs a general theory of limits on amendment powers, which 
relates different concepts such as power, authority, rights, democracy, and judicial review 
to each other in a coherent form.91 True, one may be inclined to share Joseph Raz’s 
scepticism about the potential of grand constitutional theories. Perhaps there really is ‘no 
room for a truly universal theory of the subject’. 92 However, due to the foremost 
theoretical nature of this research, it does not focus on any specific jurisdiction and 
confronts the research questions from a more general perspective. Its enquiries transcend 
any specific boundaries insofar as they present phenomena common to all contemporary 
constitutional democracies. The global approach taken in this thesis is intended to allow 
the drawing of broad conclusions about limits to constitutional amendments, which may 
apply across many countries and areas. It offers fresh insights into the topic under 
examination and constructs a theoretical framework that addresses the puzzle of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments. 
IV.  AN OUTLINE  
This thesis is comprised of three parts. Part I is comparative. It demonstrates the 
different ways that various countries limit the amendment power. Chapter 2 (‘Explicit 
Limitations’) enquires into explicit limitations on constitutional amendment powers, 
providing a conceptual framework for understanding ‘unamendable provisions’. Based 
upon an original collection of 735 national Constitutions from 1789 until 2013 (which is 
presented in the Appendix to this thesis), it describes the structure, content and 
                                                          
87 Tierney (2012, 2).  
88 Loughlin (2005A, 186). 
89 Seeking to elucidate the concept of the amendment power and set its boundaries, the theory relied upon 
might be understood as a conceptual legal theory. Cf. Bix (1999, 17). 
90 On explanatory and normative theories see Kelsen (2002, 58).  
91 Cf., Loughlin (2005B, 62-64). 
92 Raz (1998A, 152). See also Poole (2007, 504). 
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characteristics of unamendable provisions, which exists (and existed) in national 
constitutions. Chapter 3 (‘Implicit Limitations’) describes the idea that even if a 
constitution is silent with regard to any explicit limitations on the amendment power, this 
does not necessarily mean that the amendment power is unlimited. Certain implied 
limitations, this chapter demonstrates, may be imposed upon it in order to preserve that 
constitution’s identity.  
Part II formulates a theory of the nature and scope of amendment powers, aimed 
at explaining the phenomena of unamendability described in the previous chapters. 93 
Chapter 4 (‘The Nature of Amendment Powers’) addresses the thorny problem of the 
nature of the amendment power: is it an exercise of constituent power or constituted power? 
Reviving the old French doctrine distinguishing between original constituent power and 
derived constituent power, it argues that the amendment power is sui generis: it is neither a pure 
constituted power, nor an expression of original constituent power. It is an exceptional authority, 
yet a limited one. I term it a secondary constituent power and apply a theory of delegation in 
order to illuminate its unique nature. While Chapter 4 explains why the amendment 
power is limited, Chapter 5 (‘The Scope of Amendment Powers’) explains how it is 
limited. Following the delegation theory presented in Chapter 4, it is argued that the 
primary constituent power may explicitly limit the inferior secondary constituent power. Moreover, 
any organ established within the constitutional scheme to amend the constitution, 
however unlimited it may be in terms of explicit language, nonetheless cannot modify the 
basic pillars underpinning its constitutional authority so as to change the constitution’s 
identity. A constitution, according to this chapter, has to be read in a foundational 
structuralist way – as a certain structure that is built upon certain foundations. Chapter 6 
(‘The Spectrum of Amendment Powers’) analyses the theory of unamendability in light 
of the primary constituent power. It argues that unamendability can limit only the secondary 
constituent power, but cannot limit the primary constituent power, perceived as the people’s 
democratic constitution-making power. This chapter thus calls to conceive constitutional 
democracies in a ‘three-track’ way, i.e. as encompassing ordinary lawmaking; 
constitutional lawmaking enacted by the limited secondary constituent powers and 
extraordinary constitutional lawmaking enacted through the reemregence of primary 
constituent powers. It is this understanding which leads to the examination of the link 
between the limitations upon constitutional amendment powers and the amendment 
                                                          
93 I use the term unamendability to describe the resistence of constitutional subjects (provisions, principles or 
institutions) to their amendment; such subjects are described as impervious to constitutional amendment, 
either explicitly or implicitly. See Albert (2008, 37-44).  
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procedures. I develop a spectrum theory according to which the constitutional system is 
polymorphic: the more similar the democratic characteristics of the amendment powers 
are to those of the primary constituent power, the less it should be bound by limitations; and 
vice versa: the closer it is to a regular legislative power, the more it should be fully bound 
by limitations. This examination is the final step towards a theory of unamendability.  
Part III deals with the implications of a theory of unamendability. Chapter 7 
(‘Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments’) addresses the role of the courts in 
enforcing limits on the amendment power. It is one thing to claim that the amendment 
power is limited, yet it is quite another to claim that such limits are enforceable through 
substantive judicial review by courts. On the grounds of the forgoing theoretical analysis 
conducted in part II, this chapter provides theoretical explenations for the practice of 
judicial review of constitutional amendments. It also sketches a legitimacy scale of judicial 
review of constitutional amendments based upon several criteria, and proposes guidelines 
for the exercise of judicial review of constitutional amendments, in light of the theory of 
unamendability. Chapter 8 (‘Assessing Objections to Unamendability’) identifies the main 
objections to the theory of unamendability and its judicial enforcement, and evaluates 
them based upon the theoretical groundwork of previous chapters. Chapter 9 concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2: EXPLICIT LIMITATIONS 
 
In Chapter 1, it was argued that the amendment process is a method for reconciling the 
tension between stability and flexibility. ‘A state without the means of some change’, 
Edmund Burke wrote, ‘is without the means of its conservation’.1 One way in which 
constitution-makers balance stability and flexibility is by designing different amendment 
processes for different provisions.2 They separate the constitutional subjects so that the 
majority of ordinary provisions require a simple amendment procedure, whilst a minority 
necessitate a different, more difficult procedure or are considered ‘unamendable’. In 
other words, their amendment would be prohibited.3  
This chapter deals solely with the latter type of cases. In order to conceptualise 
‘unamendable provisions’, the Appendix presents a collection of explicit substantive 
limitations that were and are stipulated in 735 former and current written national 
constitutions. Thus, this chapter unavoidably focuses on constitutional texts. Though this 
approach has the disadvantage of telling only part of the story, the constitutional text 
itself matters for both practical and symbolic reasons.4 Moreover, while formulating such 
a general conceptualisation carries with it certain drawbacks relating to its minimal 
intention,5 the collecting of worldwide constitutions is necessary for the development of 
a general theory – as presented in this work – which can explain the broad and diverse 
types of unamendable provisions.  
The chapter is developed in the following way: the first part examines 
unamendable provisions. In order to do so, it reviews the origins of unamendable 
provisions and supplies a general overview of this constitutional phenomenon. It then 
describes the structure and content of unamendable provisions, seeking any content-
based or material links among them. Finally, it analyses the characteristics of 
unamendable provisions. It is not the aim of this chapter to argue whether unamendable 
provisions are necessarily good or bad, but rather to study explicit limitations on the 
amendment power. These limitations will be further explained in Part II of the thesis in 
light of the theory regarding the nature and scope of amendment powers. Furthermore, 
any substantive limitations on the amendment power, and as such unamendable 
                                                          
1 Burke (2004, 16). 
2 Eisgruber (2001, 14).  
3 Ducháček (1973B, 32-36); Bezemek (2011, 528-541). 
4 Breslin (2009, 9).   
5 Sartori (1970, 1044).   
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provisions as well, raise objections. This chapter does not attempt to deal with any 
objections to unamendability; they are treated separately in Chapter 8. This is because the 
main objections to unamendability are only relevant if unamendable provisions are 
deemed enforceable in courts (see Chapter 7), and because these objections are not 
unique to explicit limitations on constitutional amendment, but rather apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to implicit limitations on the amendment power as well.  
The importance of this investigation is two-fold: first, since a large percentage of 
world constitutions now include unamendable provisions, this practice has become an 
important element of modern constitutional design. Second, in recent decades 
unamendable provisions have expanded both in terms of their numbers and their detail, 
currently covering a wide range of topics. This growing phenomenon demands careful 
attention.  
I. UNAMENDABLE PROVISIONS  
John Locke, who in 1669 wrote ‘The Fundamental Constitution’ of the colony of 
Carolina, provided that it ‘shall be and remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule 
of government of Carolina forever’.6 Treating the entire constitution as unamendable 
derives either from ascribing it to a super-human source, or from the constitution-maker 
being afflicted with exceptional arrogance and belief that he has achieved the apex of 
perfection. 7  Nowadays, such ‘delusions of unamendable grandeur’ no longer exist. 8 
However, whereas completely rigid constitutions are presently uncommon, in many 
constitutions the amendment of certain provisions is strictly prohibited.   
In the literature, provisions that prohibit amending certain subjects are referred 
to as ‘immutable’, ‘unchangeable’, ‘unalterable’, ‘irrevocable’, ‘perpetual’, or – drawing 
from the German term ewigkeitsgarantie – ‘eternal’.9 I prefer the term ‘unamendable’. The 
terminology should not be dismissed as mere semantics; it bears normative implications. 
The other terms imply everlasting provisions, but this implication is inaccurate. These 
provisions are neither eternal nor unchangeable. While they serve as a mechanism for 
limiting the amendment power, they do not – and cannot – limit the primary constituent 
power. Even unamendable provisions are subject to changes introduced by extra-
constitutional forces. Moreover, their content can also ‘change’ through judicial 
                                                          
6 Locke (1823, 198); Scheuerman (2004, 73). See generally Armitage (2004, 602). 
7 Akzin (1966, 43).     
8 Levinson (2001, 272). 
9 See Kokott (1999, 109).   
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interpretation. The Brazilian terminology – which refers to these provisions as ‘petrous 
clauses’ (cláusula pétrea10) to express their rigidity – is more accurate in that respect since 
even rocks cannot withstand the volcanic outburst of the primary constituent power. 
Therefore, in order to describe the legal situation more accurately, I refer to these 
provisions throughout this thesis as ‘unamendable’.  
 Unamendable provisions function as a ‘barrier of change’ (veränderungssperre).11  
They reflect the idea that certain constitutional subjects ought to be protected from 
alteration. Different motives for the creation of unamendable provisions can be 
suggested. First, each polity wants to preserve its own existence and identity. Presumably, 
constitution-makers regarded the content of specific provisions to be so pivotal to the 
essence of the constitution or to the state’s existence and identity that they should endure 
for generations.12 Unamendable provisions are meant to provide ‘hermetic protection’ 
and block even the constitutional amendment process, thereby preventing violations of 
certain basic constitutive principles via the majoritarian procedure. Thus they reflect the 
idea that a nation’s identity and constitutive narrative should not be subjugated to the 
majority’s caprices.13 Second, constitution-drafters need to design constitutional provisions 
so as to work exactly against the features of a state’s tradition and culture which would 
probably cause damage through the ordinary political process.14 Hence, some values that 
are material to the constitutional order might be considered as open to abuse, especially 
in light of prior experience, and thus be deems unamendable. Arnold Brecht, writing in 
the context of post-WWII Germany, suggested that: 
For preventing the possibility the majority rule will be abused to authorize 
barbaric measure ... it would be advisable for the new German constitution (and 
for any other democratic constitution to be enacted in the future) to contain 
certain sacrosanct principles and standards [which] ... could not be impaired even 
by constitutional amendments. They should include fundamental principles 
regarding respect for the dignity of man, the prohibition of cruelties and tortures, 
the preclusion of ex post facto laws, equality before the law, and the democratic 
principle that the law itself cannot validly discriminate for reasons of faith or 
race.15  
 
                                                          
10 Mendes (2005, 451).   
11 Muth (2004, 157).  
12 Fassbender (1998, 142); Albert (2010, 672); Pinto (2007, 4).     
13 Weintal (2005, 11, 28). For example, the unamendability of fundamental rights reflects the idea that 
‘unlike ordinary legislation which is governed by the majoritarian principle, human rights alone are not 
subject to the will of the majority’; See Beck (2006-2007, 615).   
14 Sunstein (1991, 385).  
15 Brecht (1945, 138).  
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Unamendable provisions thus reflect a kind of distrust of those who wield the 
amendment power. Third, constitution-makers are motivated by their personal desires 
and beliefs.16 They also have individual and institutional interests in seeing their power 
protected. Unamendable provisions can function as a useful tool for political actors to 
preserve power asymmetry.17 Lastly, constitution-makers have an interest in protecting 
certain constitutional subjects that threaten to tear society apart if opened to political 
debate [see infra Section IIIC.].  
It is told that after implementing extensive reforms, Lycurgus, Sparta’s great 
lawgiver, administered an oath that his laws would be observed without alterations until 
his return from a journey to the oracle. After the oracle reassured him that his laws were 
good for the people, he sent her words to Sparta and sacrificed his life to perpetuate his 
laws, which indeed lasted for 500 years.18 The contemporary relevance of this story is not 
only due to the idea of ‘immutable’ laws, but also because of the lawmaker’s motives. Just 
as Lycurgus wanted his laws to last forever since he believed they were good for his 
people, so too modern unamendable provisions largely reflect a kind of paternalistic idea 
according to which constitution-makers know ‘what is best’ for the people and ‘enshrine’ 
those well-esteemed principles or institutions. The environment in which constitutions 
emerge profoundly influences the character and composition of any unamendable 
provision included in the text. This chapter shows, however, that there are similarities in 
the content, aims, and characteristics of many of the world’s unamendable provisions. 
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
The idea of entrenched laws is not novel.19 One notable example is the Pennsylvania 
Charter of Privileges of 1701, which declared in Art. VIII that:  
Because the Happiness of Mankind depends so much upon the Enjoying of 
Liberty of their Consciences as aforesaid, I do hereby solemnly declare, promise 
and grant, for me, my Heirs and Assigns, That the First Article of this Charter 
relating to Liberty of Conscience, and every Part and Clause therein, according 
to the true Intent and Meaning thereof, shall be kept and remain, without any 
                                                          
16 Elster (1995, 376-386).  
17 See Schwartzberg (2009, 24).  
18 Plutarch (2009, 113-14). 
19 Ancient Athenians entrenched certain financial decrees, treaties and alliances in order to enhance their 
credibility in the eyes of potential allies. See Schwartzberg (2009, 32, 101-103). The Cromwellian 
Constitution of 1653 recognised fundamental and unchangeable laws. See Dicey (2009, 103); Friedrich 
(1968, 136); Schwartzberg (2009, 101-3). In Hungary, the Act VIII of 1741 on the liberties and privileges of 
noblemen was declared to be unamendable. See Szente (2007, 239).  
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Alteration, inviolably for ever.20 
 
This unamendability, Gerhard Casper remarks, ‘posed the ultimate conundrum of 
constitutionalism – the possibility of unconstitutional constitutional amendments’.21  
The modern constitutionalist form of unamendability emerged at the end of the 
18th century. According to the 1776 Constitution of New Jersey, members of the 
Legislative Council, or House of Assembly, had to take an oath not to ‘annul or repeal’ 
the provisions for annual elections, the articles opposing church establishment and 
conferring equal civil rights on all Protestants, and trial by jury (Art. 23). The 1776 
Delaware Constitution prohibited amendments to the declaration of rights, the articles 
establishing the state’s name, the bicameral legislature, the legislature’s power over its 
own officers and members, the ban on slave importation, and the establishment of any 
one religious sect (Art. 30).22 Explicit limits on amendments were included in Art. V of 
the U.S. Federal Constitution, which originally forbade abolition of the African slave 
trade prior to 1808, and prohibits, without time limits, the deprivation of a state of its 
equal representation in the Senate without its consent.23  
In France, the 1791 Constitution’s Preamble stated that the National Assembly 
‘abolishes irrevocably the institutions which were injurious to liberty and equality of 
rights’. Moreover, Title VII, section 7, stated that the members of the Assembly of 
Revision individually take an oath to maintain the constitution with all their power. The 
terminology of irrevocability and maintenance implies eternity. In 1798, the Constitution 
of the Swiss Helvetic Republic, imposed by the French and which was based on the 
French revolutionary model, 24  declared that ‘the form of government, whatever 
modifications it may undergo, shall at all times be a representative democracy’ (Art. 2).25 
Yet, it was in 1884 when the idea that the amendment power should be substantially and 
explicitly limited first appeared in a French constitution. On 14 August of that year, the 
French Parliament assembled as the National Assembly in order to revise the 
constitutional law of 1875, which represented the Third Republic and marked the end of 
monarchism and Bonapartism.26 By then, it was clear that France desired a republican 
                                                          
20 Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges 28 October 1701, 
http://www.constitution.org/bcp/penncharpriv.htm 
21 Casper (1987, 10).  
22 See Kruman (1999, 56). For studies on amending the U.S. State Constitutions see Dodd (1910); White 
(1951-1952, 1132).  
23 Orfield (1942, 83-87).  
24 Suksi (1993, 47); Lerner (2004, 50).  
25 Palmer (1953, 219); Palmer (1969, 18). 
26 Bates (2005, 69).  
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form of government.27 The constitutional law of 1875 was then amended, adding to Art. 
8(3) the following: ‘The republican form of government cannot be made the subject of a 
proposition for revision’. 28  This marked the triumph of the republicans over the 
monarchists, 29  and its object was to ‘prevent the destruction of the republic by 
constitutional means’.30 This formulation repeated itself in the Constitution of 1946 (Art. 
95) and, with different wording, in the Constitution of 1958: ‘The republican form of 
government shall not be the object of any amendment’ (Art. 89).   
Another early constitution which included an unamendable provision is the 
Constitution of Norway of 1814, which stipulated that amendments ‘must never ... 
contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution, but solely relate to modifications 
of particular provisions which do not alter the spirit of the Constitution’ (Art. 112).31 The 
idea of ‘shielding’ certain subjects from amendments enjoyed growing popularity both in 
America and in Europe. During the first half of the 19th century, Latin American states in 
particular, influenced by ideas from the American and French revolutions, widely used 
unamendable provisions in order to protect certain principles. The Mexican Constitution 
of 1824 stated that ‘[t]he Religion of the Mexican Nation is, and shall be perpetually, the 
Apostolical Roman Catholic’ (Art. 3), and that the provisions which establish the ‘Liberty 
and Independence of the Mexican Nation, its Religion, Form of Government, Liberty of 
the Press, and Division of the Supreme Power of the Confederation, and of the States, 
shall never be reformed’ (Art. 171). 32  It was later suggested that this provision was 
inserted into the constitution in order to guard against ‘popular levity and legislative 
caprice’.33 The technique of prohibiting the amendment of certain state features, such as 
the form of government, separation of powers, and state religion, spread like a fire in a 
thistle field: the Constitution of Venezuela of 1830, again influenced by American and 
French ideas,34 protected the form of government; and the Peruvian Constitution of 
1839 (Art. 183), Bolivian Constitution of 1839 (Art. 146), Ecuador’s Constitution of 1843 
(Art. 110), Honduras’ Constitution of 1848 (Art. 91), the Dominican Republic’s 
                                                          
27 Klein (1999A, 61). 
28 Anderson (1908, 640). 
29 Valeur (1938, 281). 
30 Lowell (1918, 103). 
31 Smith (2011, 369). 
32 The original basis of the Mexican Constitution was the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which Mexico 
departed from by adopting a federal republican form of government, influenced by the U.S. Constitution; 
albeit some evident distinctions exist between the two constitutions, such as the establishment of a state 
religion. See Dealey (1900, 168); Mecham (1938, 177-179); Smith (1962, 113); Bishop (2009, 17).   
33 Kennedy (1841, 307).  
34 Pierson (1935, 3). 
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Constitution of 1865 (Art. 139) and El Salvador’s Constitution of 1886 (Art. 148) have all 
explicitly limited the amending of certain constitutional subjects. 
As can be seen in the Appendix, Claude Klein was correct to claim that ‘the idea 
of protecting the regime through a limitation of the amendment power had great 
successes’,35 at least in the sense that unamendable provisions have become a popular 
constitutional design that cross continents and different legal systems.36  
As my research demonstrates, between 1789 and 1944, only 17% of world 
constitutions enacted in this period included unamendable provisions (52 out of 306), 
whereas between 1945 and 1988, 27% of world constitutions enacted in those years 
included such provisions (78 out of 286). Out of the constitutions which were enacted 
between 1989 and 2013 already more than half (53%) included unamendable provisions 
(76 out of 143). In total, out of 735 examined constitutions, 206 constitutions (28%) 
include or included unamendable provisions.37  It seems that just as having a formal 
constitution virtually became a symbol of modernism following the American and 
French revolutions,38 so too nowadays having an unamendable provision is becoming a 
universal fashion. 
Not only did unamendable provisions grow in numbers; they grew also in length, 
complexity, and detail. Before WWII, the average length of an unamendable provision 
was 29.4 words, but after WWII, the average number of words in an unamendable 
provision is 39.5. Whereas in the past, unamendable provisions protected mainly the 
state’s form of government, after WWII, with the new wave of constitutionalism and the 
emergence of new states, unamendable provisions were extended to protect many 
features of a democratic government, including fundamental rights and freedoms. 39 
Indeed, before WWII, only three constitutions included explicit limits on amending 
rights,40 while after WWII, nearly 30% of unamendable provisions referred to basic rights. 
Perhaps the most famous example is Art. 79(3) of the German Basic Law (1949). Written 
against the background of the Weimar Constitution’s experience, Art. 79(3) prohibits 
amendments affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, human dignity, the 
                                                          
35 Klein (1999A, 61). 
36 Hourquebie (2007, 3) estimated that nearly 40% of world constitutions include explicit limitations on 
constitutional amendments.   
37 One has to be cautious that these numbers include those multiple constitutions of a same state. In other 
words, if State X had Y Constitutions – all included unamendable provisions – all Y Constitutions were 
included in the database and in the counting. This might lead to a standard deviation.  
38 Akzin (1967, 1). 
39 Mohallem (2011, 767).   
40 Honduras Const. (1848), art. 91; Mexico Const. (1824), art. 171; Panama Const. (1841), art. 163.  
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constitutional order, or basic institutional principles describing Germany as a democratic 
and social federal state.41   
III. EXAMINING UNAMENDABLE PROVISIONS 
A. Structure 
 
Unamendable provisions limit the holder of the constitutional amendment power. They 
prohibit the amendment power from exercising its power with regard to certain 
constitutional subjects. They create a space in which that power is not permitted to enter. 
Different techniques for protecting constitutional subjects from amendments exist. As 
can be seen in the Appendix, the majority of constitutions explicitly protect certain 
constitutional subjects (principles or institutions). Some constitutions refer specifically to 
certain constitutional provisions, prohibiting any amendments to them.42 Others combine 
these two approaches to unamendability. 43  Albeit rarely, some constitutions do not 
protect specific constitutional subjects from amendments, but rather a more general 
‘spirit of the constitution’, 44  ‘spirit of the preamble’, 45 ‘fundamental structure of the 
constitution’,46 or ‘the nature and constituent elements of the state’.47 Most unamendable 
provisions are located within the amendment provision, but unamendability can also 
appear as an independent provision48 or inferred from a provision declaring the subject’s 
‘eternal’ character.49 Moreover, provisions that stipulate extraordinary conditions for their 
amendment may also be regarded as unamendable. For example, Iran’s ‘Supplementary 
Fundamental Laws’ of 1907 specified that Art. 2, which stated, generally, that laws must 
never be contrary to the sacred precepts of Islam, ‘shall continue unchanged until the 
appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!)’,50 
thus requiring the intervention of a super-human factor (the advent of the Twelfth 
                                                          
41 On the German unamendable clause, see Goerlich (2008, 397); Schwartzberg (2009, 153-183). 
42 See, for example, Armenia Const. (1995), art. 114; Azerbaijan Const. (1995), art. 158; Ghana Const. 
(1969), art. 169(3); Honduras Const. (1965), art. 342.  
43 See, for example, Bahrain Const. (1973), art. 120c; Greek Const. (1975), art. 110(1); Guatemala Const. 
(1985), art. 281.  
44 Norway Const. (1814), art. 112(1). 
45 Nepal Const. (1990), art. 116(1).  
46 Venezuela Const. (1999), arts. 340, 342.  
47 Ecuador Const. (2008), art. 441. 
48 See, for example, Turkish Const. (1982), art 4.   
49 See, for example, China Const. (1923), art.1: ‘The Republic of China shall be a unified republic forever’; 
Venezuela Const. (1999), art. 6: ‘The government … is and shall always be democratic, participatory, 
elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible and pluralist, with revocable mandates’. See Brewer-Carías  
(2004, 25). 
50 Davis (1953, 118). 
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Imam) in order to allow its amendment. Similarly, Art. V of the U.S. Constitution, 
according to which ‘no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage 
in the Senate’, seems to be a de facto unamendable provision, as it is hard to imagine a 
state giving its consent for such an act.  
The act that is prohibited by unamendable provisions varies among different 
constitutions. While most constitutions simply prohibit ‘amending’ or ‘revising’ certain 
constitutional subjects, some state that amendments must ‘respect’ or ‘safeguard’ certain 
constitutional subjects.51 Often, the prohibited act is not ‘amending’ certain subjects, but 
rather the mere ‘proposal’ of amendments.52 Whereas the ultimate result of these two 
limitations seems similar, presumably the latter limitation positions the barrier to the 
prohibited change at an earlier phase than the actual act of amendment, i.e. at the 
beginning of the political process, so that the proposed change cannot even be debated.  
 
B. Content 
 
The content of unamendable provisions varies, but as can be seen in the Appendix, 
despite some minor exceptions, one can identify several common components.53 The 
first notable protected group is the form and system of government. More than 100 
constitutions protect the ‘republican’ form of government. A ‘monarchical’ form of 
government is also protected, 54  as well as ‘amiri’, 55  ‘a crowned democracy’, 56 
‘constitutional monarchy’, and ‘a democratic regime of government with king as head of 
the State’.57  
The second notable group is the state’s political structure. Some constitutions 
explicitly protect the state’s federal structure,58 the equality of representation of states in 
the Senate, 59  the unitary structure, 60  the bicameral system 61  or local autonomy. 62 
                                                          
51 See, for example, Angola Const. (2010), art. 236; Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288.  
52 See, for example, the difference between the French protections of the republican form of government 
in the Constitutions of 1958, art. 89(5) and 1946, art. 95.   
53 For an analysis, see the works of Rigaux (1985, 46-51); Weintal (2005, 62-108).  
54  Bahrain Const. (1973), art. 120c; Cambodia Const. (1993), art. 153; Kyrgyzstan Const. (1993), art. 
85(3)(5), 98; Laos Const. (1947), art. 43; Libya Const. (1951), art. 197; Moroccan Consts.  (2011), art. 175, 
(1992), art. 100, (1972), art. 106. 
55 See, for example, Kuwait Const. (1962), art. 175. 
56 See, for example, Greece Const. (1952), art. 108. 
57 See, for example, Thailand Const. (2007), art. 291(1). 
58 See, for example, Brazil Const. (1891), art. 90(4); Germany Const. (1949), art. 79(3); Iraq Const. (2005), 
art. 126(4). 
59 See, for example, Brazil Const. (1891), art. 90(4); Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288; Timor-Leste Const. 
(2002), art. 156.  
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Provisions upholding the democratic order are often unamendable,63 and unamendable 
provisions also protect other principles such as ‘separation of powers’,64 ‘rule of law’,65 
‘independence of courts’ 66  and ‘judicial review of statutes’. 67  Some unamendable 
provisions protect the ‘sovereignty of the people’,68 while many constitutions stipulate 
that the government is ‘elective’ and ‘representative’, 69  protecting the modes and 
characteristics of elections and representation, such as ‘multiparty or pluralistic system’,70 
and ‘universal’, ‘direct’, ‘secret’, ‘free’ or ‘equal’ suffrage.71 Others protect constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                                      
60 See, for example, Guineau-Bissau Const. (1984), art. 102; Angola Const. (2010), art. 236; Kazahkstan 
Const. (1993), art. 91(2); Laos Const. (1947), art. 43. 
61 See, for example, Bahrain Const. (1973), art. 120(c). 
62 See, for example, Angola Consts. (2010), art. 236; (1975), art. 159; Armenia Const. (1995), art. 114; Cape 
Verde Const. (1992), art. 313; Madagascar Const. (2010), art. 163; Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292; 
Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288; Sao Tome and Principe Const. (1975), art. 154. On different levels of 
entrenching autonomy see Suksi (1998, 151). 
63 See, for example, Algeria Const. (1989), art. 178; Armenia Const. (1995), art. 114; Cameroon Const. 
(1972), art. 63; Czech Republic Const. (1992), art. 9; Dominican Republic Consts. (2002-2003), art. 119; 
(1994), art. 119; (1966), art. 119; (1961), art. 114; (1960), art. 117; (1955), art. 117; (1947), art. 111; (1942), 
art. 111; (1934), art. 106; (1929), art. 106; (1924), art. 107; (1908), art. 110; (1907), art. 109; (1896), art. 111; 
(1887), art. 112; (1881), art. 110; (1880), art. 107; (1879), art. 120; (1878), art. 118; (1875), art. 107; (1874), 
art. 106; (1866), art. 103; (1865), art. 139; Ecuador Const (1967), art. 258; Equatorial Guineau Const (1991), 
art. 104; Eritrea Const (1952), art. 91(2); Ethiopia Const. (1952), art. 91(2); Gabon Const. (1990), art. 72; 
Germany Const. (1949), art. 79(3); Guatemala Const. (1985), art. 281; Haiti Const. (1987), art. 284(4); Iran 
Const. (1979), art. 177; Morrocon Const. (2011), art. 175; Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292; Rwanda 
Consts. (1991), art. 96(2); (1978), art. 91; (1962), art. 107; Sao Tome and Principe Const. (1975), art. 154; 
Somalia Const. (1960), art. 105; Tajikistan Const. (1994), art. 100; Thailand Const. (2007), art. 291(1); 
Timor Leste Const. (2002), art. 156; Turkey Const. (1982), art. 4. 
64 See, for example, Angola Consts. (2010), art. 236; (1975), art. 159; Brazil Const. (1988), art. 60(4); Cape 
Verde Const. (1992), art. 313; Chad Consts. (1996), art 223; (1989), art. 202; Guinea Consts. (2010), art. 
154; (1990), art. 91; Madagascar Const. (2010), art. 163; Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292; Portugal 
Const. (1976), art 288; Sao Tome and Principe Const. (1975), art. 154; Timor-Leste (East Timor) Const. 
(2002), art. 156. 
65 See, for example, Angola Consts. (2010), art. 236; (1975), art. 159; Armenia Const. (1995), art 114; 
Turkey Const. (1982), art. 4. 
66 See, for example, Angola Const. (2010), art. 236; Cape Verde Const. (1992), art. 313; Mozambique 
Const. (2004), art. 292; Peru Const. (1839), art. 183; Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288; Romania Const. 
(1991), art. 148; Sao Tome and Principe Const. (1975), art. 154; Timor-Leste Const. (2002), art. 156. 
67 See, for example, Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288. 
68 See, for example, Azerbaijan Const. (1995), art. 158; Guatemala Const. (1985), art. 281. 
69 See, for example, Dominican Republic Consts. (2002/2003), art. 119; (1994), art. 119; (1966), art. 119; 
(1961), art. 114; (1960), art 117; (1955), art. 117; (1947), art. 111; (1942), art. 111; (1934), art. 106; (1929), 
art. 106; (1924), art. 107; (1908), art. 110; (1907), art. 109; (1896), art 111; (1887), art. 112; (1881), art. 110; 
(1880), art. 107; (1879), art. 120; (1878), art. 118; (1875), art 107; (1874), art. 106; (1865), art. 139; Ecuador 
Consts. (1869), art. 115; (1861), art. 132; (1851), art. 139; Guatemala Const. (1985), art. 281; Laos Const. 
(1947), art. 43; Libya Const. (1951), art. 197; Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292; Peru Const. (1839), art. 
182; Switzerland Const. (1798), art. 2; Venezuela Consts. (1858), art. 164; (1830), art. 228. 
70 See, for example, Burkina Faso Const. (1991), art. 165; Cambodia Const. (1993), art. 153; Dijbouti Const. 
(1992), art. 88; Mali Const. (1992), art. 118; Niger Consts. (2010), art. 177; (2009), art. 152; (1996), art. 125; 
(1989), art. 108. 
71  See, for example, Angola Consts. (2010), art 236; (1975), art 159; Brazil Const. (1988), art. 60(4); 
Guatemala Const. (1965), art. 267; Mozambique Const. (2004), art 292; Niger Const. (2010), art. 177; 
Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288; Sao Tome and Principe Const. (1975), art. 154; Timor-Leste Const. 
(2002), art 156. 
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rules regarding the head of state’s term limits (number and duration) or eligibility criteria 
for election.72   
The third prominent component is the state’s fundamental ideology or ‘identity’. The 
state’s religious character is often protected from amendments. Some protect Islam as 
the state’s religion,73 while others protect the ‘Roman Catholic Apostolic’.74 In contrast, 
many constitutions protect the ‘secular’ nature of the state 75  or the principle of 
‘separation between the state and churches’. 76  With regard to ideology, some 
constitutions explicitly prohibit amendment to their ‘social’ or ‘socialist character’ or to 
their ‘social justice’ or ‘socialist’ foundations.77 In some states, formal lineaments that are 
strongly connected to collective identity are protected from change, such as the official 
language, 78  the flag, 79  the national anthem, 80  the capital, 81  or even the date of the 
proclamation of independence.82   
 The fourth notable group is that of basic rights. Many constitutions protect 
‘fundamental rights and freedoms’.83 Others protect a more specific set of rights, such as 
‘human dignity’,84 ‘freedom and equality’,85 ‘liberty’,86 ‘liberty of the press’87 and ‘the right 
of workers and trade unions’.88   
                                                          
72  See, for example, Central African Republic Const. (2004), art. 108; Dominican Republic Consts. (1881), 
art. 110; (1880), art 107; El Salvador Consts. (1945), art. 171; (1886), art 148; Guatemala Consts. (1985), art. 
281; (1965), art. 267; Guinea Const. (2010), art. 154; Honduras Const. (1982), art 374; Madagascar Const. 
(2010), art 163; Niger Consts. (2010), art. 177; (1999), art. 136; Qatar Const. (2004), art. 147; The Republic 
of Congo Const. (2002), art 185; Rwanda Const. (2003), art 193. 
73 See, for example, Afghanistan Const. (2004), art. 149; Algeria Const. (1989), art. 178; Bahrain Const. 
(1973), art. 120(c); Iran Const. (1979), art. 177; Iran Const. (1907), art. 2; Morroco Consts. (2011), art. 175; 
(1992), art. 100; (1972), art 106; (1970), art. 100. 
74 See, for example, Ecuador Consts. (1869), art 115; (1869), art. 115; (1861), art 132; Mexico Const. (1824), 
art. 3. 
75 See, for example, Angola Consts. (2010), art. 236; (1975), art. 159; Burundi Consts. (2005), art. 299; 
(1992), art. 182; Central African Republic Const. (2004), art. 108; Chad Const. (1996), art. 223; The 
Republic of Congo Consts. (2002), art. 185; (1992), art 178; Cote d’Ivoire Const. (2000), art. 127; Guinea 
Consts. (2010), art. 154; (1990), art. 91; Mali Const. (1992), art. 118; Sao Tome and Principe Const. (1975), 
art. 154; Tajikistan Const. (1994), art 100; Togo Const. (1992), art. 144; Turkey Const. (1982), art. 4.  
76 See, for example, Angola Consts. (2010), art. 236; (1975), art. 159; Niger Consts. (2010), art. 177; (2009), 
art. 152; (1996), art. 125; (1992), art. 124; Portugal Const. (1976), art 288. 
77 See, for example, Algeria Const. (1976), art. 195; Armenia Const. (1995), art. 114; Cuba Const. (1976); 
Madagascar Const. (1975), art. 108; Somalia Const. (1979), art. 112(3).  
78 See, for example, Algeria Const. (1989), art. 178; Bahrain Const. (1973), art. 120(c); Romania Const. 
(1991), art. 148; Turkey Const. (1982), art. 4. 
79 See, for example, Timor-Leste Const. (2002), art. 156; Turkey Const. (1982), art. 4. 
80 See, for example, Turkey Const. (1982), art 4. 
81 See, for example, Turkey Const. (1982), art 4. 
82 See, for example, Timor-Leste Const. (2002), art. 156 
83 See, for example, Afghanistan Const. (2004), art. 149; Algeria Consts. (1989), art. 178; (1976), art. 195; 
Angola Consts. (1975), art. 159; (2010), art. 236; Central African Republic Const. (2004), art. 108; Chad 
Consts. (1996), art. 223; (1989), art. 202; The Republic of Congo Const. (1992), art. 178; Ecuador Const. 
(2008), art. 441; Moldova Const. (1994), art. 142; Morrocan Const. (2011), art. 175; Mozambique Const. 
(2004), art. 292; Namibia Const. (1990), art. 131; Romania Const. (1991), art. 148; Russian Federation 
Const. (1993), art. 135; Somalia Consts. (1979), art. 112(3); (1960), art. 105.  
84 See, for example, Angola Const. (2010), art. 236; Germany Const. (1949), art 79(3).  
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The fifth notable group is that of the state’s integrity. Many constitutions89 protect 
one or more of the following principles: ‘national unity’, ‘territorial integrity’, the ‘state’s 
existence’, ‘sovereignty’, or ‘independence’. These principles commonly appear in the 
constitutions of states that were former colonial territories in order to claim their 
independence and sovereignty. Also, unamendable provisions regarding territorial 
integrity might express a state’s prioritisation of national integrity over self-determination 
claims that may arise.90  
 Lastly, some constitutions protect unique constitutional subjects, such as 
immunities, amnesties, reconciliation and peace agreements, 91 mandatory international 
law norms,92 the institution of chieftaincy,93 taxation,94 or rules governing nationality.95   
One can identify two types of protected principles: universal and particular. Such 
protected principles are universal not in the sense that they are common to all world 
constitutions, but rather, that they are considered common to all modern democratic 
societies, such as separation of powers and human dignity. Others, such as federalism, 
official language, and religion, might be regarded as particular because they reflect 
specific ideals and values of a distinct political culture.96 
  
C. Characteristics 
 
This part analyses the characteristics of unamendable provisions – their functions and 
meanings – following and advancing the works of mainly Richard Albert and Beau 
                                                                                                                                                                      
85 See, for example, Bahrain Const. (1973), art. 120(c); Kuwait Const. (1962), art. 175; Laos Const. (1947), 
art. 43. 
86 See, for example, Tonga Const. (1875), art. 79. 
87 See, for example, Mexico Const. (1824), art. 171. 
88 See, for example, Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292; Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288.  
89 See, for example, Angola Consts. (1975), art. 159; (2006), art. 206; Azerbaijan Const. (1995), art. 158; 
Burundi Consts. (2005), art. 299; (1992), art. 182; Camaroon Const. (1972), art. 63; Cape Verde Const. 
(1992), art. 313; Chad Consts. (1996), art. 223; (1989), art. 202; Cote d’Ivoire Const. (1960), art. 73; Cuba 
Const. (1940); Djibouti Const. (1992), art. 88; Equatorial Guinea Const. (1991), art. 104; Kazakhstan 
Const. (1993), art. 91(2); Madagascar Const. (2010), art. 163; Mauritania Const. (1991), art. 99(3); 
Guatemala Const. (1985), art. 281; Mexico Const. (1824), art. 171; Moldova Const. (1994), art. 142; 
Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292; Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288; Romania Const. (1991), art. 148; 
Rwanda Consts. (2003), art. 193; (1991), art. 96(2); Sao Tome and Principe Const. (1975), art. 154; Somalia 
Const. (1979), art. 112(3); Tajikistan Const. (1994), art. 100; Timor-Leste Const. (2002), art. 156. 
90 Cop and Eymirlioglu ( 2005, 124).  
91 See, for example, Fiji Const. (1990), art. 164(5); Niger Consts. (2010), art. 177; (2009), art. 152; Burundi 
Const. (2005), art. 299; Sudan Const. (2005), art. 224(2). 
92 See, for example, Switzerland Const. (1999), arts. 193(4), 194(2). 
93 See, for example, Ghana Const. (1969), art. 169(3).  
94 See, for example, Ghana Const. (1969), art. 169(3). 
95 See, for example, Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292. 
96 Weintal (2005, 20-25, 62-108). 
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Breslin.97 It identifies five features of unamendability, which are not necessarily exclusive 
and often overlap. The perspective through which unamendable provisions are examined 
is therefore a combination of both functional and expressive approaches.98 I directly link 
the two terms, as there are qualities between them that overlap. An unamendable 
provision can have a certain function to fulfil, but at the same time that unamendability 
reflects certain cultural values. Also, the mere expression of unamendability itself fulfils a 
certain educational and symbolic function. Just as constitutions carry out expressive 
functions serving as important symbols for the polity,99 the unamendability of a principle 
or an institution conveys its symbolic value.100 It sends a message to the citizens and to 
external observers regarding the state’s basic constitutional principles. Jon Elster notes 
that ‘the purpose of … unamendable clauses is … mainly symbolic’.101 If nothing else, it 
creates the appearance of respect for that principle or institution and ‘makes a statement’ 
regarding its importance to the constitutional order.102 
  
1. Preservative  
 
Preservation of core constitutional values is the most common aim of unamendable 
provisions. As every political order is established with a clear ambition to preserve itself, 
the first identified and central goal of unamendable provisions is to preserve the primary 
constitutive values (‘universal’ or ‘particular’) of the constitutional order.103 Unamendable 
provisions thus protect an inviolable core that ensures the constitution’s stability and 
permanence, and preserve it against changes that might annihilate its essential nucleus or 
cause disruption to the constitutional order itself.104   
[Unamendable provisions] define the essential elements of the foundation myth. 
In other words, they define the collective “self” of the polity―the “we the 
people.” If the “eternal” normative stipulations were changed, the collective 
self—or identity—of the polity as embodied in the constitution would 
collapse.105 
 
                                                          
97 Albert (2010, 678-69) identifies 3 characteristics of entrenchment: preservative, transformational and 
reconciliatory. Breslin (2009) identifies various roles of constitutions, such as trasnformative, aspirational, 
empowering and limiting, and as managing political conflicts.  
98 For an explanation of expressivism and functionalism in comparative constitutional law see Tushnet 
(1999, 1225). 
99 Ginsburg (2011, 118); Přibáň (2007, 4). 
100 On the expressive function of amendment provisions see Albert (2013B, 225).  
101 Elster (1991, 471). See also Albert (2010, 699-702). 
102 On the function of law in ‘making statements’ see Sunstein (1995-1996, 2024-25). 
103 Albert (2010, 678-685). 
104 Pedra (2009, 222).  
105 Preuss (2011, 445).  
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 One can identify different kinds of preservative unamendability. When 
unamendable provisions protect democracy or human rights, their basic underlying idea 
is that of a ‘militant democracy’106 – evincing the fear that unfettered democracy will 
allow its own destruction.107 Unamendable provisions, as one commentator notes, ‘are 
the outcome of the experience of western constitutionalism to create safeguards to the 
preservation of constitutional democracy against the authoritarian encroachments or 
totalitarian takeover’.108 Thus, they reflect some kind of what I term ‘amendophobia’: the 
fear that the amendment clause would be abused to abrogate the core values of society.109
 In this sense, unamendable provisions aim not only to prevent abuse of the 
system by leaders who wish to fulfil their own ambitions,110 but also to serve as a pre-
commitment mechanism of the ‘people’ to protect itself against its own weaknesses and 
passions. 111  We limit ourselves so that in times when we might lose control of our 
reasonable judgment we will not be able to amend the constitution in a way that we will 
later regret.112 Ulysses and the Sirens is often the metaphor used to illustrate this idea:  
‘[w]hen Ulysses bound himself to the mast and had his rowers put wax in their ears, it 
was to make it impossible for him to succumb to the song of the sirens’.113 Making certain 
subjects immune to amendment, Elster notes, is ‘a perfect protection against impulsive 
rashness’.114 However, Elster reminds us that unamendable provisions ‘do not bind in a 
strict sense, because extraconstitutional action always remains possible’.115  
Unamendable provisions can not only limit governmental power, but also 
empower it. When unamendable provisions protect the rights of a monarch, the principle 
of inherited rules, and succession to the throne, they serve as a mechanism to preserve 
the existing power of the rulers rather than limit it. The Constitution of Albania of 1928, 
for example, stipulates that Art. 50, according to which ‘The King of the Albanians is His 
Majesty Zog I, of the illustrious Albania family of Zogu’ cannot be amended (Art. 224). 
                                                          
106 See the classical articulation of Loewenstein (1937, 417, 638). For contemporary debates see Sajó (2004); 
Thiel (2009). 
107 Schwartzberg (2009, 7, 21) terms this ‘democratic autophagy’. Fox and Nolte (1995, 1) call it ‘intolerant 
democracy’.  
108 Tanchev (2000, 81).   
109 Albert (2010, 663); Landau (2013A, 189). For the use of term ‘amendophobia’ see Jackson (2010, 433-
453).   
110 Fombad (2007, 57). 
111 Holmes (1995, 135). 
112 This is often termed ‘Peter when sober imposes chains on Peter when drunk’. However, it is doutable 
whether a constitution drafted in times of crises was indeed drafted by ‘sober’ constitution-makers. See 
Elster (1997, 135). 
113 Elster (2000B, 94). See also Elster (1979, ch II); Klarman (1997A, 496). 
114 Elster (2002, 146).   
115 Elster (2000B, 94).   
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The unamendability of the throne is also common in some of the Arab countries’ 
constitutions.116 This is a manifestation of the more general character of the Arab world’s 
constitutionalism in which written constitutions enhance rather than limit governmental 
power.117 
Political actors can also use preservative unamendability as a tool in order to 
preserve power asymmetry. Parties enshrine existing political majority preferences in the 
constitution in such a way that it cannot be amended in order to protect against future 
alterations of the decisions that they advocated for if they subsequently become a 
minority.118 Examples of such unamendability could be the French unamendability of 
republicanism, which preserved the superiority of the republicans in their conflict with 
the monarchists, or the Mexican unamendability of confederalism, which marked the 
victory of the Mexican federal party over the Centralists after a long struggle that existed 
between the two parties over the country’s formation.119  
 
2. Transformative  
 
Unamendability aims to assist in transforming political communities.120 In its extreme 
form, it is used to assist creating and maintaining a wholly new political entity. For 
example, a unique type of unamendable provision appears in constitutions of 
independent entities created as part of multilateral agreements. For example, by the 
Zurich treaty of February 1959, Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain guaranteed Cyprus’s 
independence, territorial integrity, and security. The treaty was then incorporated within 
the Constitution of 1960 (Art. 181),121 and its basic articles were declared unamendable 
(Art. 182.1). The treaty’s provisions have been constitutionally nationalised, and 
simultaneously the basic constitutional principles have been internationalised so that they 
can only be amended by an agreement between the parties to the Zurich treaty. 122 
Likewise, Hong Kong’s Basic Law of 1990 (effective as of 1997), which can be amended 
by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, prohibits in Art. 
                                                          
116 See, for example, Bahrain Const. (1973), art. 120(c); Jordan Const. (1952), art. 126(2); Libya Const. 
(1951), art. 197; Qatar Const. (2004), art. 145; Morocco Consts. (1970, 1972, 1992), arts. 100, 106, 100, 
respectively. 
117  Brown (2002). Elsewhere, Brown (2003, 74) notes that the Arab world, though generous with 
constitutional text, suffers from weak enforcement of the provisions that relate to human rights.   
118 Cf., Knight (2001, 367).   
119 On this struggle see Dealey (1900, 163-164); Guerra (2007, 134-135). 
120 On constitutional transformation see Breslin (2009, 30-45). 
121 Papastathopoulos (1965, 139).  
122 Alptekin (2010, 8-9); Özersay (2004-2005, 34); Polyviou (1980, 21).  
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159(3) amendments that contravene the established basic policies of China regarding 
Hong Kong as formulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and in the Basic 
Law’s Preamble.123 This self-limitation provision not only forms a bridge to connect 
Hong Kong and Beijing, but also safeguards Hong Kong’s key elements of autonomy.124  
The more dominant character of unamendable provisions, however, is its ability 
to transform polities. New constitutions aim to mark a dividing line between the past and 
the future, representing a new era and an attempt to cultivate a distinct political 
community. Reacting to past events, constitution-makers mainly have in mind the 
previous regime’s failures, atrocities and abuses.125 Constitutions ‘reflect fear, originating 
in, and related to, the previous political regime’, and their guarantees reflect ‘the 
institutional negation of the oppression recently endured’.126 Emerging out of previous 
and dysfunctional regimes, new constitutional unamendable provisions largely react to 
the faults of past political leaders as an attempt to undo historical injustice. Unamendable 
provisions therefore have much to teach us about a country’s past (and often grave) 
experiences. The technique of explicitly limiting the amendment power, which migrated 
among different jurisdictions, at time retained its original expression, whereas on other 
occasions it absorbed local content, primarily as a response to prior events and past 
experiences, reflecting the drafters’ ambitions to direct the nation away from past 
tragedies into a more ‘just’ future.127  
There are many examples of this ‘negative’ role that unamendable provisions play, as 
a lasting reminder of recent past devastations, and as an attempt to transform – and 
never return to – ‘legacies of past injustice’. 128  The post WWII constitutions, Carl 
Friedrich claimed, were motivated by ‘a negative distaste for a sordid past’.129 Elsewhere, 
Friedrich described the constitutional efforts to block the option of reverting to a grave 
past: 
Since the experience of totalitarian dictatorship proved more terrible, the 
antagonism aroused by it was correspondingly more fanatic. From this 
experience there arose a constitution-making sentiment, a constituent power, so 
to speak, which was very strongly determined to bar the recurrence of any such 
                                                          
123 Ghai (2007, 7). Fiss (1998, 497-498) argued that since the Basic Law is a statute, this provision itself can 
be repealed or amended by simple legislation.  
124 Mushkat (1992, 135). On the Basic Law as a bridge to connect Hong-Kong and China see Hualing and 
Cullen (2006, 3). 
125 Scheppele (2008, 1377).  
126 Sajó (1999, 13).  
127  Albert (2010, 685-693). Teitel (2009, 2014) was right to claim that ‘the conception of justice that 
emerges is contextual: What is deemed just is contingent and informed by prior injustice’.  
128 Schwartzberg (2009, 158); Teitel (2009, 2057); Scheppele (2009, 233).   
129 Friedrich (1968, 151).   
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transformation of a free society into voluntary servitude.130 
 
Indeed, the German Basic Law’s unamendability of democracy and human 
dignity must be understood against the background of the Weimar Constitution, Nazi 
rule and the Holocaust. 131  Even the German unamendability of federalism can be 
understood not only as a result of insistence by the allied forces, but also due to the 
German drafters’ realisation that one of the Weimar’s constitutional failures was the 
suspension of federalism.132 Another example is the new constitutional orders in Central 
and Eastern Europe upon the collapse of communism, which protect human rights and 
recognise the practice of judicial review.133 Although some have argued that it would be a 
mistake for these new democracies to import the German ‘fondness for unamendable 
provisions’, since the vexing questions that they face ought to be resolved in the political 
sphere rather than in constitutional courts, 134  many of them adopted unamendable 
provisions.135 In the post-communist states, unamendability is to be understood in light 
of a ‘bitter experience’ and as a rejection of the past when constitutions were utilised as 
political weapons. 136  Greece could be another example for how the country’s past 
impacted unamendable provisions. Greek Constitutions have traditionally been 
characterised by a high degree of rigidity.137 Whereas the Constitution of 1844 did not 
include any revision procedure,138 the Constitutions of 1864 (Art. 107), 1911 (Art. 108) 
and 1927 (Art. 125) prohibited revisions of the entire constitution, allowing revisions 
only of non-fundamental provisions. The Constitution of 1952 prohibited the revision of 
the entire constitution along with those provisions: ‘which determine the regime as that 
of a crowned democracy as well as its fundamental provisions’ (Art. 108). Between the 
years 1967-1974, Greece was ruled by a dictatorship, an experience that strongly 
influenced Greek constitutional limitation on the possibility of parliamentary 
obstruction.139  Consequently, the Constitution of 1975 specified certain unamendable 
                                                          
130 Friedrich (1971, 124).  
131 Benda (2000, 445); Haupt (2008, 208); Currie (1994, 9). 
132 Scheppele (2003, 300-301).  
133 See generally Schwartz (2002); Sadurski ( 2007); Osiatynski (1994, 111). 
134 Holmes (1993A, 22).  
135 See, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina Const. (1995), art. X(2); Czech Republic Const. (1992), art. 9; 
Kazakhstan Const. (1993), art. 91(2); Kosovo Const. (2008), art. 144(3); Moldova Const. (1994), art. 142; 
Romania Const. (1991), art. 148. On constitutional revisions in Eastern Europe see Holmes and Sunstein 
(1995, 275).  
136 Sajó (1996, 72).   
137 One might suggest that this is due to the historical Athenians’ respect for the ‘fundamental principles 
that animated their law’ as described by Sundahl (2008-2009, 483).  
138 Venizelos (1999, 99). 
139 Trantas, Zagoriti, Bergman, Müller and Ström (2006, 377).  
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principles, such as the form of government as a parliamentary republic, separation of 
powers, and certain fundamental rights and freedoms (Art. 110.1). Lastly, in Africa, 
during the continent’s first few decades of independence, African leaders frequently 
amended their constitution in order to further their own political agendas, which 
undermined constitutionalism and constitutional stability.140 In an effort to break from 
the past, many African states’ constitutions now include unamendable provisions 
protecting human rights141 and limiting presidential terms.142 A similar unamendability of 
term limits exists in some Latin American states in response to a problematic history of 
military coups, authoritarian rule, and leaders’ efforts to seize control of the state. 143 
Constitutional unamendability of presidential term limits not only highlights their 
normative importance,144 but also raises the political costs of trying to abrogate them.145  
 All these are examples of what Kim Lane Scheppele terms the ‘negative meaning 
of constitutions’:  
The evils of the prior regime ... are highlighted, condemned, and publicly 
displayed as exactly what the new regime is against, and these evils define by 
negative example the core of what the new democratic transformation is for. ... 
The new state stands first and foremost as a repudiation of its own immediate 
past. And the negative content of that asserted identity – whatever we are, the 
new state indicates, we are wholly different from the regime immediately before 
us – provides the point of the new state’s constitutive identity.146 
The transformative feature of unamendability wears ‘multifocal lenses’; It is 
simultaneously short-sighted and long-sighted; both backward and forward-looking.147 It 
plays two conflicting roles: positive and negative. On the negative side, unamendable 
provisions represent the destruction of an existing political design. On the positive side, 
unamendable provisions represent the birth of a new and different version of the polity –
the aspirational feature of unamendability. 
                                                          
140 Fombad (2007, 28).   
141 See, for example, Democratic Republic of Congo Const. (2005), art. 220; Namibia Const (1990), art. 
131; Albert (2010, 686-687). 
142 See, for example, Central African Republic Const. (2004), art. 108; Mauritania Const. (2006), art. 99. See 
generally Fombad and Inegbedion (2010, 1).  
143 El Salvador Const. (1983), art. 248; Guatemala Const. (1985), arts. 165(g), 184, 280; Honduras Const. 
(1982), art. 374; see Albert (2010, 687-689). On the prohibition of re-election in Latin America see Kantor  
(1992, 102).  
144 Based upon the unamenable provision prohibiting any amendment concerning presidential term limits, 
in 25 May 2009, the Constitutional Court of Niger declared as unconstitutional a call for a referendum, 
which would have suspended the constitution and allow the President to continue in office as an interim 
president for a period of three years. See Cour Constitutionnelle AVIS n. 02/CC of 26.05.2009, 
http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/avis/2009/avis_n_002_cc_2009.pdf   
145 Maltz (2007, 141). 
146 Scheppele (2009, 242).     
147 Cf., Scheppele (2008, 1379); Teitel (2009, 2057). 
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3. Aspirational  
 
Unamendable provisions offer a ‘shorthand record’ of the memories and hopes of their 
framers.148 They both ‘reflect the birth pangs of that particular society’,149 and promise a 
brighter future.150 They imagine a more perfect polity, the kind that the citizenry aspires 
to become and preserve. If a constitution ‘reflects the triumphs and disappointments of a 
nation’s past and embodies its hope for the future’,151 this is properly illustrated by the 
constitution’s unamendable provisions.  
  A notable example is the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. This constitution, which 
includes broad unamendability of federalism, suffrage, separation of powers, and 
individual rights (Art. 60.4), functioned as a transition to democracy after twenty-one 
years of military rule from 1964 to 1985. As a direct response to the military junta’s 
government, the Brazilian Constitution not only represents recommitment to 
constitutionalism,152 but also ‘points to the future and it shows where it wants to get 
to’.153  
András Sajó explains that when constitutions affirm an emerging national identity, 
they aim, inter alia, to make selections that will cause the people to feel good, in contrast 
with the feelings of fear and outrage about past abuses.154 Aspirational unamendability, as 
Richard Albert writes, ‘endeavours to repudiate the past by setting the state on a new 
course and cementing that new vision into the character of the state and its people’.155 
The constitutional aspirations for a fresh design, as we have seen, are inevitably informed 
by the faults and mistakes of the past.156 Therefore, the aspirational and transformative 
aspects of unamendability are strongly connected.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
148 Cf., Ducháček (1968, 93).  
149 Issacharoff (2007, 1430). 
150 On constitutional aspiration see Breslin (2009, 46-68).    
151 Cutler and Schwartz (1992, 512).   
152 Maia (2000, 54).  
153 Mendes (2005, 452-453). 
154 Sajó (2010, 362-363, 383).  
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4. Conflictual  
 
Unamendable provisions can be used to manage certain conflicts, for example, by 
functioning as ‘gag rules’ for silencing contentious issues.157 Even in democratic societies 
– where the desire is to publicly debate disputes and to use political mechanisms for 
decision-making – there might be strong rationales not to openly debate certain disputes. 
A dispute might be so severe that a public debate would not bring about an accepted 
solution, but rather, might excite negative feelings and deepen social divisions. 158  As 
Stephen Holmes explains, ‘by tying our tongues about a sensitive question, we can secure 
forms of co-operation and fellowship otherwise beyond reach’.159 In such cases, silencing 
can play a positive role.  
Contrary to preservative unamendability, conflictual unamendability does not 
protect grandiose values. Rather, it protects issues that are a ‘bone of contention’ in 
society, such that if they were open to constitutional debate might tear the bonds of 
community. They anchor compromises that no one really likes; yet the society can agree 
about their necessity under the existing circumstances. 160  The best example of this 
function could be Art. V of the U.S. Constitution, which originally prohibited abolishing 
the African slave trade before 1808.161 The unamendability of this provision was the 
result of a compromise because South Carolina and Georgia would not consent to an 
immediate prohibition of slave trafficking. Insisting on ending slavery at the 
constitutional convention might have resulted in the collapse of the entire constitutional 
enterprise.162 The unamendability of equal suffrage in Art. V also reflects a compromise 
rather than a constitutive principle, aimed to moderate the smaller states’ fear that they 
would be overrun by larger states. 163  As Adam Samaha notes, ‘the most entrenched 
textual norm is equal representation in the Senate for every state, but no one appears to 
believe this provision is the most central moral value in our law’.164 In that respect, James 
Fleming was correct in observing that American unamendability ‘hardly looks like 
                                                          
157 On the function of constitutions as managing conflicts see Breslin (2009, 87-112). 
158 Sapir (2010, 223).  
159 Holmes (1993B, 19).   
160 Sapir (2010, 224).  
161 Balkin (1996-1997, 1708). For the background of the constitutional accommodation with regard to 
slavery see Finkeman (2001, 413).  
162 Schwartzberg (2009, 129-139).  
163 Id., 139-143. 
164 Samaha (2008, 619). A strong indication of the fact that art. V did not express any acceptance of slavery 
can be found in Madison (2008, 170). 
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constitutive principle of a constitutional order’, and in offering the alternative role of Art. 
V as reflecting ‘deep compromises with our Constitution’s constitutive principles’.165   
A much less known example comes from the Kingdom of Tonga. 166  Tonga’s 
Constitution of 1875, which is still in force, prohibits amendments that ‘affect the law of 
liberty, the succession to the Throne and the titles and hereditary estates of the nobles’ 
(Art. 79).167 This unamendability should be understood from a historical perspective. The 
Constitution of 1875 transformed the prior chieftainship into a kingship and established 
a new aristocracy, which was composed of selected former chiefs. The aristocracy was 
actually established in an attempt to settle the on-going conflicts over power and keep 
peace between the king and the former chiefs, who would otherwise have remained 
without any authority. The unamendability of nobility both reflects this compromise and 
perpetuates the traditional privileges of chiefs in Tonga’s modern day aristocracy.168  
Importantly, along with their advantages, unamendable provisions as gag rules 
carry the risk that whatever is silenced might explode in the future.169 The silencing tactic 
thus has the practical disadvantage of intensifying the tension with regard to delicate 
issues, a process that might end in an uncontrolled revolutionary explosion, which the 
gag rule was originally intended to prevent.170 One might argue that it is perhaps better to 
use a ‘sunset provision’, a temporal unamendability, which allows the removal of the 
contentious issue from the public agenda for a while without long-term restraints.171 The 
risk of using revolutionary forcible means to override unamendability is not unique to 
gag rules and is discussed in Chapter 8. 
The second way through which unamendable provisions can assist in managing 
conflicts is by serving as a tool for reconciliation in post-conflict societies. Constitution-
building can play a vital role in post-conflict societies,172 as can unamendable provisions. 
This can be attempted by ensuring that peace agreements, immunities that have been 
                                                          
165 Fleming (1994-1995, 362-363). See also Balkin (1995, 147). 
166 Tonga is an independent state compromising approximately 150 islands, with a population of about 
100,000 people. See Powels (1993, 286). 
167  In 2004, the Supreme Court of Tonga faced a challenge to a constitutional amendment carving 
exceptions to freedom of speech and press which are, as the Supreme Court held, included within ‘the law 
of liberty’ which is protected by art. 79. Since some of the justifications for restricting expression were 
excessively wide and vague (such as ‘the public interest’ or ‘cultural traditions of the Kingdom’), they were 
declared unconstitutional and void. See Taione and Others v Kingdom of Tonga, [2004) TOSC 48, [2005] 4 LRC 
661; 32 Commw. L. Bull. (2006), 156. 
168 Salomon (2009-2010, 376). See generally Marcus (1977A, 220) and Marcus (1977B, 284).    
169 Kolarova (1993, 51).  
170 Holmes (1993B) 56.  
171 Sapir (2010); Holmes (1993B) 25-26. On temporal limits and sunset provisions see Eule (1987, 384-
385); Varol (2014).  
172 Samuels (2009, 173). 
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granted, or the principle of reconciliation itself are protected from amendment. Burundi, 
a country which has constantly suffered from internal civil wars and major political 
instabilities,173 prohibits in its Constitution of 2005 amendments which would undermine 
reconciliation (Art. 299), probably in order to support the efforts undertaken by 
Burundians to bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the 2000 Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. In Sudan, a country that since its independence has 
been suffering from internal wars over its national identity,174 the second major civil war 
(1982-2005) ended with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which initiated a six-year interim 
period at the end of which the people of southern Sudan were given opportunity to 
exercise their right of self-determination through a referendum.175 In order to protect the 
peace agreement, the Constitution of 2005 prohibited amendments that affect the peace 
agreement without the approval of both signatory parties (Art. 224.2). 
As a way of leaving the past behind and starting anew, reconciliation could also 
be fostered through unamendable provisions by protecting immunities granted for prior 
wrongful acts by members of conflicting groups. 176 For example, both Niger’s 
Constitutions of 1999 (Art. 139) and 2009 (Art. 152) protect amnesties granted to the 
perpetrators of human rights violations, which occurred during the coups of 27 January 
1996 and 9 April 1999. Although it was argued that this impunity has undermined the 
rule of law,177 this technique was repeated in the Constitution of 2010 (Art. 177), which 
prohibits amendments to the amnesty granted to perpetrators of the coup of 18 February 
2010. This provision was meant to guard the ruling junta and its military backers from 
being hunted down once they quit power. 178  Another example is Fiji, in which the 
Constitution of 1990 granted immunity to all members of the security forces involved in 
the military coup in 1987, and prohibited any amendments to the granted immunity (Art. 
164.5).179 Whereas the grant of amnesties is a recognised (albeit divisive) mechanism in 
post-conflict transformation,180 establishing amnesties as unamendable principles raises 
them to the highest level of entrenchment.  
 
                                                          
173 See Vedirame (2000, 302); Akwanga and Ewusi (2010, 8-20).    
174 Deng (2006, 155).   
175 Dagne (2010, 15). 
176 On entrenchment as a tool for reconciliation see Albert (2010, 693-698). 
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179 On the role of the military in Fiji see Firth and Fraenkel (2009, 117).  
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5. Bricolage 
 
Anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss coined the term ‘bricolage’, meaning borrowing 
from what is readily at hand.181 Mark Tushnet uses ‘bricolage’ in the constitution-making 
context: ‘[a] constitution is assembled from provisions that a constitution’s drafters 
selected almost at random from whatever happened to be at hand when the time came to 
deal with a particular problem’. 182  Since constitution-makers use whatever available 
materials are at hand to solve urgent problems, ‘bricolage’ shifts the focus from 
constitutional harmony to constitutional compromise and contingency,183 and reflects the 
tendency of constitutional borrowing in the modern constitutional design.184 
It must be emphasised that unamendable provisions do not necessarily reflect the 
basic principles of that political regime. Some do, but as the conflictual characteristic of 
unamendability demonstrates, the protected values could simply be indicative of a 
compromise and therefore ought to be viewed within the historical context of 
contingency. Others are simply the result of constitutional borrowing. An historical 
review of unamendable provisions strengthens the argument that they exemplify the 
wider phenomenon of constitutional ‘borrowing’ or ‘migration’,185 most notably in post-
colonial constitutions.186 Africa is the clearest example for this. While certain African 
states include in their constitutions unamendable provisions,187 the influence of French 
and Portuguese origins is evident, as unamendability appears especially in Francophone188 
and Lusophone189 countries, with minimal Anglophone exceptions.190  
Portugal and Brazil are notable examples of both ‘recipients’ and ‘donors’ of 
unamendable provisions. Portugal’s Constitution of 1911 abolished the monarchy and 
                                                          
181 Lévi-Strauss (1966, 16-17).  
182 Tushnet (1999) 1287.   
183 Schneiderman (2002, 401-402). 
184 Friedman and Saunders (2003, 177). 
185 On this phenomenon see Choudhry (2007); Perju (2012, 1304). The ‘migration’ and ‘borrowing’ of 
constitutional ideas are not identical terms. See Choudhry (2007, 20-22).   
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189 Equatorial Guinea Const (1991), art. 104; Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292; Angola Consts. (1975), 
art. 159; (2010), art. 236; Burundi Const. (2005), art. 299.  
190 Namibia Const. (1990), art. 131.  
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established its first republican government.191 Fearing the monarchists’ counter-reaction 
and remembering the monarchy’s abuse of power, the constitution-makers stipulated that 
amendments which purport to abolish the republican form of government cannot be 
admitted to discussion (Art. 82.2). This limitation, which was omitted in the Constitution 
of 1933, is similar to earlier French and Brazilian limitations. Indeed, the Brazilian and 
French constitutional models played a vital role in the making of the Portuguese 
Constitution of 1911, which, as one commentator noted, ‘resembled a conglomeration of 
Republican systems in France, Brazil, and Switzerland’.192 The current Constitution of 
1976 is exceptional insofar as it includes the most detailed unamendable provision, 
protecting no less than fourteen subject matters from amendment, and some of them, 
like the rights of workers and trade unions, are unique (Art. 288).193 The only countries 
that have similarly detailed and unique unamendable provisions are those that were 
formerly Portuguese colonies.194  
Brazil also has a long history of explicitly limiting the amendment power.195 The 
Constitution of 1891 was a democratic constitution enacted soon after the abolition of 
the Unitarian monarchy.196 Inspired by the French and U.S. Constitutions,197 it prohibited 
amendments ‘tending to abolish the republican federal form or the equality of 
representation of the states in the senate’ (Art. 90.4). Both the 1934 and 1946 
Constitutions prohibit amendments which tend to abolish the federal or republican form 
of government (Arts. 178 and 217 respectively). Additionally, during the 1988 
constitution-making process, three major Portuguese constitutionalists visited the 
country, bringing the experience of the Portuguese constitutional process.198 Influenced 
by Portugal, the current Brazilian Constitution includes a broad unamendable provision. 
These events demonstrate the borrowing of explicit limits on amendment powers.   
In addition, a quick look at the Appendix reveals that many of the unamendable 
provisions simply repeat themselves (often with slight changes) in a nation’s subsequent 
constitutions. This again demonstrates the ‘bricolage’ idea of using unamendable 
provisions that ‘are at hand’. An obvious example is the Dominican Republic in which 
                                                          
191 Solsten (1994, 51). 
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194 See Mozambique Const. (2004), art. 292; Angola Const. (1975), art. 159, (2010), art. 236; Cape Verde 
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the exact same unamendable provision repeats itself in thirteen constitutions from 1907 
to 2002, and a similar (but not identical) provision repeats itself in ten constitutions from 
1865 to 1896. Such repetition seems more like an expression of historical or cultural 
convention than necessarily reflecting the result of a constructive, rational constitution-
making process. Therefore, one should be cautious in imputing unamendable provisions 
a high degree of productive prudence.199   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unamendability is undeniably a ‘complex and potentially controversial constitutional 
instrument, which should be applied with care, and reserved only for the basic principles 
of the democratic order’.200 Indeed, alongside the legal issue rests the policy question of 
whether adopting unamendable provisions as a constitutional strategy in order to protect 
the constitutional order is favourable. There is no clear answer to that question. The 
proverb ‘Malum est consilium quod mutari non potest’ (‘a plan that is incapable of change is a 
bad plan’) may apply with great force to constitutional design. Whereas for some states 
unamendable provisions could form a protective shield for the constitution’s nucleon to 
remain essential, 201 for others, unamendability might lead to dangerous extra-
constitutional means in order to force a change. The difficulties created by 
unamendability are dealt with separately in Chapter 8. 
 Moreover, as the Venice Commission maintained, explicit limits on constitutional 
amendments are not a necessary element of constitutionalism.202 Nonetheless, ‘the core 
notion’, Richard Kay correctly notes, ‘that there is something wrong with the idea that an 
“amendment” might alter the essential character of a constitution while simultaneously 
invoking its authority – has been embraced by many modern constitution-makers’.203 
Indeed, an increasing number of constitutions contain explicit material limitations on the 
constitutional amendment power in order, inter alia, to protect essential characteristics of 
the constitutional order or principles perceived as being at great risk of repeal via the 
democratic process, in light of historical circumstances.204 Neil Walker was thus correct 
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in asserting that unamendability ‘tells a story about a people and its common purpose 
that not only resonates with more general and powerful myths of peoplehood but which 
is partly vindicated by the historical record that constitutional law itself creates’.205 A 
nation’s constitutional identity is defined by the intermingling of universal values with the 
nation’s particularistic history, customs, values and aspirations. 206 It is never a static thing 
but dynamic and can evolve with time, for example through constitutional 
amendments.207 Regardless of how the constitutional identity can be modified, a nation 
usually remains faithful to a ‘basic structure’ that comprises its constitutional identity.208 
Unamendable provisions assist in remaining true to that basic structure. They tie the past, 
present, and future, and carry out expressive functions serving as important symbols for 
the polity. Therefore these noli me tangere provisions are utilised, in a way, for creating and 
maintaining a polity’s constitutional identity.  
 In Chapter 5 I explain how explicit limits should be understood in light of the 
theory distinguishing between the primary constituent power and the constitutional 
amendment power. In general, these limitations reflect the idea that the amendment power 
can be substantially limited. Yet, they function as a manifestation of the delegation theory 
according to which the delegated amendment power must abide by the rules established 
in the constitution, including the material ones, and as such, those limits should be 
considered valid. As a delegated power, the amendment power must be conceived as 
implicitly limited even in the absence of any explicit limits. This issue is dealt with in the 
following chapter.  
 
                                                          
205 Walker (2010A, 23). 
206 Jacobson (2006B, 316).  
207 Rosenfeld (2010, 209); Dixon (2011-2012, 1847). 
208 Jacobsohn (2010A). 
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CHAPTER 3: IMPLICIT LIMITATIONS 
 
In the previous chapter, we have studied explicit limitations, which may be imposed on 
the constitutional amendment power in the form of unamendable provisions. A more 
complicated issue concerns the question of whether any implicit limitations on the 
amendment power exist, regardless of the existence or absence thereof of any 
unamendable provisions. This issue is more contentious than explicit limitations. In the 
latter case, the existence of clear constitutional provisions may ease and simplify the 
courts exercise in enforcing any such limitations by substantially reviewing constitutional 
amendments. As argued in Chapter 7, when explicit limits exist, judicial review of 
constitutional amendments usually enjoys greater legitimacy and suffers less from 
institutional difficulties than when the constitution is silent with regard to any limitations.  
 This chapter begins with studying the theoretical genesis of the idea of implicit 
limits. It then uses a comparative study to demonstrate manifold accounts of similar 
constitutional occurrences across countries – the phenomenon of courts holding that 
even in the absent of any explicit limits, the amendment power is implicitly and 
substantively limited. In Chapter 5, it will be argued that this phenomenon rests upon a 
solid theoretical ground.  
I. THE GENESIS OF THE THEORY OF IMPLICIT LIMITATIONS 
It appears that the genesis of the modern idea of implicit limitations on the amending 
power originated in the U.S. As noted in Chapter 2, Art. V of the U.S. Constitution 
originally contained two explicit limitations on the amending power: a prohibition on 
abolishing the African slave trade prior to 1808, and, without time limits, prohibiting the 
deprivation of a state of its equal representation in the Senate without its consent. The 
more intense controversy regarding the scope of the amending power did not concern 
these explicit limitations, but rather the existence of any implicit limitations on the 
amendment power. In the first American Congress, Roger Sherman – whom Thomas 
Jefferson described as ‘a man who never said a foolish thing in his life’1 – argued that 
there is a difference between the authority upon which the constitution rests and that 
upon which amendments rest:  
                                                          
1 Anonymous (1824, 450).   
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The Constitution is the act of the people, and ought to remain entire. But the 
amendments will be the act of the State Governments. Again, all the authority 
we possess is derived from that instrument; if we mean to destroy the whole, 
and establish a new Constitution, we remove the basis on which we mean to 
build.2  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court case Dodge v. Woolsey adopts a somewhat similar position in 
Justice Wayne’s majority opinion, ruling that the amendment power is a delegated power 
because it is exercised by agents and, therefore, is limited. 3  This approach was later 
abandoned. 4  Edward Everett gave one of the more vibrant arguments in favour of 
implicit limitations on the amendment power in a speech delivered in the House of 
Representatives in 1826:  
The distinction still recurs, that to amend is one thing, essentially to change 
another. To amend is to make changes consistent with the leading provisions of 
the Constitution, and by means of which those leading provisions will go into 
happier operation. Can this be the same thing as to change … those essential 
provisions themselves? 
After examining the unamendability stipulated in Art. V, Everett continued to ask:  
One of two propositions must be maintained: either that these two expressed 
limitations are the only limitations of the amending power, or, that there is a 
prior limitation of the amending power, growing out of the nature of the 
Constitution as a compact. Unless we admit the latter proposition, there is 
nothing to prevent [the majority required for amendments] … from depriving 
the remainder of the States of any advantage they possess in these provisions of 
the Constitution, which guaranty the Federal equality, which was not to be 
touched without unanimous consent. Nay, sir, without this prior limitation of 
the amending power, there is nothing to prevent the only express limitation 
which not exists from being itself removed by way of amendment … I am, 
therefore, strongly inclined to think, that the principle of this implied limitation 
must always be consulted; that this must show us in each case how far alterations 
may go, and that it does dictate to us that amendments must be confined to 
those changes which are necessary, not to alter the essential provisions of the 
constitution, but to carry them into more perfect operation.5  
  
This notion led to the recurring argument that even the amending power cannot lead 
to the destruction of the Union or the States, or interfere with their sovereignty.6 In his 
Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, published shortly after his 
death in 1850, John Calhoun advocated for implicit limits on the amendment power, 
                                                          
2 Annals of Congress (1789, 735).  
3 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 347-348 (1885), http://supreme.justia.com/us/59/331/case.html. 
4 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921), see Corwin and Ramsey (1950-1951, 
189). 
5 Everett (1826, 3-6).  
6 See Haines (1930, 228). 
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writing that if an amendment is ‘inconsistent with the character of the constitution and 
the ends for which it was establishes, - or with the nature of the system’, or ‘radically 
change the character of the constitution, or the nature of the system…’, then the 
amendment power transcends its limits.7 Not everyone, of course, accepted this view. 
Others regarded the amendment power as ‘absolutely unlimited’. 8  In 1893, Thomas 
Cooley, perhaps the foremost advocate of the doctrine of implicit limitations on 
legislatures in order to protect rights, believed that there are certain inherent limitations –
principles which underlie the Federal Constitution and which prevent its radical 
amendment. Amendments, he insisted, ‘cannot be revolutionary; they must be 
harmonious with the body of the instrument’.9 A similar argument was made by George 
Curtis in 1896 that the amendment power ‘was intended to apply to amendments which 
would modify the mode of carrying into effect the original provisions and powers of the 
Constitution, but not to enable three fourths of the states to grasp new power at the 
expense of any unwilling state’.10 
 The debate regarding implicit limitations to the amendment power flourished 
during the first three decades of the 20th century, when some scholars argued, for 
example, that amendments cannot fundamentally change the scheme of government,11 
while others strongly defended the view that the amendment power knows no inherent 
limits, at least apart from those expressly provided in the constitution.12 The scope of the 
amendment power became especially relevant to the debates regarding the Eighteenth 
Amendment. 13  E.V. Abbot, for example, asserts that there are certain natural and 
inalienable rights that cannot be abrogated, not even through the amendment power. 
Thus, the Eighteenth Amendment, which established the prohibition of alcoholic 
                                                          
7 Calhoun (1851, 300-301). 
8 Pomeroy (1868, 72). 
9 Cooley (1893, 109). In his 4th edition to Story’s Commentaries of 1873, Cooley wrote that the Union is 
‘indissoluble’ through constitutional means and ‘can only be overthrown by physical force effecting a 
revolution’. See Story and Cooley (2008, 216). 
10 Curtis (1896, 160-161). 
11 See, for example, Wheeler (1921, 75); Child (1926, 28); Brown (1924, 33); Holding (1923, 484-489); 
Bacon (1929-1930, 777-778). 
12 Coleman (1910, 424); Frierson (1919-1920, 659); Orfield (1929-1930, 550); Williams (1928, 529). 
13  E.g, White (1920, 113); McGovney (1920, 499); Pierson (1925, 54); Emery (1920, 122). The briefs 
presented before the Supreme Court against the validity of the Eighteenth amendment (see the briefs in 
the case of Rhode Island v. Palmer, pp. 29, 66; Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory, p. 41; and 
Feigenspan v. Bodine, p. 64), are extremely interesting as they present various arguments in favour of implicit 
limitations on the amending power based upon the nature of the federal system. See most notably Mr. 
Root’s brief in the Feigenspan Case, at p. 92: ‘It is inconceivable that both the nation and the states may to 
all practical intents have their fundamental characters changed or destroyed whenever it pleases two-thirds 
of the houses of Congress, and three-fourths of the legislatures of the states, which latter may readily 
represent only a minority of all the people of the United States. The possibility of any such outcome should 
condemn any rule that would permit it’. For a summary of these arguments see Dodd (1921, 330-332).  
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beverages, might violate the natural right to pursue happiness.14 Others have argued that 
repealing the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment may be considered so 
fundamental in nature that it is beyond the amending power. 15  Most notably, three 
American scholars, branded by some as ‘conservative’, 16  expounded on the idea of 
intrinsic limitations on the amendment power. Arthur Machen contends that an 
‘amendment must be a real amendment, and not the substitution of a new constitution’, 
since ‘a wholly new constitution can be adopted only by the same authority that adopted 
the present constitution’.17 George Skinner asserts that amendments cannot depart from 
the scheme and purpose of the original constitution and that ‘the essential form and 
character of the government being determined by the location and distribution of powers 
cannot be changed’.18 Lastly, William Marbury claims that the amendment power does 
not include the power to destroy the Constitution nor does it include the power to enact 
ordinary legislation.19 In contrast, others have argued that even significant constitutional 
provisions may be amended, as part of the people’s right to ‘revise the scale of values 
handed down to it from the past’.20 
Around that same period, French scholars developed the idea of ‘supra-
constitutionality’. Pierre Guillemon argued that ‘supra-constitutional laws’ exist above 
constitutional laws, such as the principles of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen of 1793, which are beyond the scope of the amendment power. 21  Another 
defender of such a view was Léon Duguit, who claimed that the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen of 1789 simply recognised and proclaimed pre-existing rights and 
thus gave it a supra-constitutional status, imposing limits on constitutional legislation and 
a fortiori ordinary legislation. 22  The famous French institutionalist Maurice Hauriou 23 
argued not only that the explicit limitation on amending the republican form of 
government of 1884 was valid and that an amendment revising the ‘republican form of 
government would be unconstitutional’, but also claimed that ‘above the written 
constitution’ there must be certain ‘fundamental principles’ even if these are not written 
                                                          
14 Abbot (1920, 183). Such a claim was rejected in United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 717 (1931). 
15 Jessup (1927). 
16 Vose (1972, 343).  
17 Machen (1909-1910, 170). 
18 Skinner (1919-1920, 223).  
19 Marbury (1919-1920, 225). 
20 Rottschaefer (1926, 393); See also Frierson (1919-1920, 659); Orfield (1942, 99, 103). 
21 Guillemon (1921, 10-11), cited in Haines (1930, 270-271).  
22 Duguit (1930, 603-7), cited in Laquièze (2007, 267). 
23 On Hauriou’s work see Broderick (1970).  
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in the constitutional text.24 According to Hauriou, such principles are unamendable and 
justiciable:  
The Constitutional Law itself does not escape before the judge, there are 
occasions where the check could be conducted on it. For example, in essence, an 
amendment to the Constitution in conflict with the constitutional legitimacy ... 
which is above the superlégalité itself because it consists of principles and the 
principles that are always above the text.25 
 Drawing on the writings of Hauriou,26 the German Scholar Carl Schmitt claimed, 
for example, that the certain basic freedoms contain: 
… a “superlegalite constitutionelle”, which is raised not only above the usual 
simple laws, but also over the written constitutional laws, and excludes their 
replacement through laws of constitutional revision. … it is not the intent of 
constitutional arrangements with respect to constitutional revisions to introduce 
a procedure to destroy the system of order that should be constituted by the 
constitution. If a constitution foresees the possibility of revisions, these revisions 
do not provide a legal method to destroy the legality of the constitution, even 
less a legitimate means to destroy its legitimacy.27  
  
According to Schmitt, the constitution’s basic substantive principles, such as the state’s 
character, cannot be set aside by the constituted powers, not even through the amending 
procedure, which was designed to effectuate the essence of the constitution. Thus, the 
constitution contains a core of implicitly unamendable principles that embody the 
constitution’s identity. 28 Schmitt became the most famous proponent of implicit 
limitations on the amendment power and I return to his theory throughout this thesis.  
 The notion of principles that carry a supra-constitutional status was revived after 
WWII. German jurisprudence in the post-Nazi regime era was characterised by the 
rejection of pure positivism and the endorsement of natural law ideas, 29  raising the 
possibility that even the constitutional amendment power is limited by certain 
principles.30 Of particular interest is Gustav Radbruch, the leading jurist, who argued 
after WWII that certain minimum standards of justice exist which positive law cannot 
violate.31 ‘Where there is not even an attempt at justice’, Radbruch wrote, ‘where equality, 
                                                          
24 Hauriou (1923, 297). 
25 Hauriou (1929, 296) [my translation]. 
26 Balakrishnan (2000, 162). Schmitt claimed that Hauriou’s work was the ‘first systematic attempt of a 
restoration of concrete-order thinking since the dominance of juristic positivism’, cited in Bates (2006, 
424).  
27 Schmitt (2004, 58-60). 
28 Schmitt (2008, 150-153).  
29 See Bodenheimer (1954, 379); Cole (1958, 302-4); Rommen (1959, 1). 
30 See Dietze (1956, 1); Rommen (1959, 17-19); Herdegen (1994-1995, 591). 
31 Radbruch (2006A, 14). See Cole (1958, 302); Bodenheimer (1954, 382); Paulson (2006, 17). 
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the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then the statute 
is not merely “flawed law”, it lacks completely the very nature of law’.32 The idea of 
supra-constitutional limitations on the constitutional amendment power was best 
summarised and developed by Otto Bachof in his book Verfassungswidrige 
Verfassungsnormen?, published in 1951.33 According to Bachof, ‘above’ positive law exists 
natural law, which limits even constitutional legislation. A constitution is valid only with 
regard to those sections within the integrative and positivist legal order that do not 
exceed the predetermined borders of ‘higher law’. 34 An amendment that violates ‘higher 
law’, as recognised by Art. 79(3) of the German Basic Law, would contradict both 
‘natural law’ and the constitution, and it should be in the power of the courts to declare 
such an amendment as unconstitutional and thus void.35 This was the accepted approach 
in German courts at that time. In 1950, the Bavarian Constitutional Court famously 
declared: ‘There are fundamental constitutional principles, which are of so elementary a 
nature and so much the expression of a law that precedes the constitution, that the 
maker of the constitution himself is bound by them. Other constitutional norms … can 
be void because they conflict with them.’36  
 The Federal Constitutional Court in the 1951 Southwest case involving equal rights 
of men and women later cited this paragraph with approval.37 Two years on, in the Article 
117 case, the Federal Constitutional Court acknowledged the possibility of invalid 
constitutional norms in the extreme case where positive constitutional laws severely 
transcend the limits of justice.38 However, these statements were mere obiter dictum. As 
elaborated in Chapter 7, in later years, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to refer 
                                                          
32 Radbruch (2006B, 7).    
33 Bachof (1951).  
34 Id., 29-32. 
35 Id., 47-57. Bachof’s book, which was translated into Portuguese, was quite influential in Portuguese-
speaking countries. On Bachof’s influence see the following experience in post-dictatorship Portugal. In 
1975, the Council of the Revolution issued a constitutional Law (8/75) which declared the dictatorship 
political police (abolished after the revolution) to be a terrorist organization. On this basis, former prime 
ministers and home ministers were incriminated. Law 8/75 had a constitutional status which allegedly 
prevented any claim of unconstitutionality. However, in one case, a military court (which had an authority 
to adjudicate crimes based upon this law) invoked Bachof’s theory to find that the law, due to its 
retroactive nature, contradicted supra-constitutional norms. This argument was nevertheless rejected by the 
Supreme Military Court. See Opinion no. 9/79 from the Constitutional Commission (Pareceres da 
Comissão Constitucional), vol. 8, 3 ff. This is taken from Teles (2009, 430-31).     
36 Decision from April 4, 1950, 2 Verwaltungs-Rechtsrechung No. 65, quoted in Dietze (1956, 15-16) and 
Bachof (1951, 15). Interestingly, based upon this para., Judge Sussman of the Israeli Supreme Court 
recognised the existence of supra-constitutional norms steaming from natural law which are supreme to 
any law. See Yeredor v. Chairman, Central Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19(2) PD 365, 390 [1965] (Isr); 
Guberman (1967, 458). 
37 1 BverfGE 14, 32 (1951); see Gözler (2008, 84-86). 
38 3 BverfGE 225, 234 (1953), see Dietze (1956, 17-19); Gözler (2008, 86-87); Kommers (1989, 55). 
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to supra-constitutional principles, concentrating on the unamendable provision as stipulated 
in Art. 79(3) of the Basic Law.  
 The argument in favour of implicit limitations on amendment powers did not 
remain a theoretical debate. It ‘migrated’ from Germany to India in the 1960s, where, 
due to stormy political events, it was applied practically and most notably elaborated. 
II. THE INDIAN ‘BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE’ 
The Indian Constitution excludes any unamendable provisions. Likewise, Indian 
jurisprudence, rooted in British tradition, initially rejected the notion of implicit 
limitations on the amendment power. That position, however, was revised in the 1960s 
and 1970s following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s far-reaching attempts to amend the 
constitution, which eventually led to the judicial development of ‘the basic structure 
doctrine’, according to which the amendment power is not unlimited; rather, it does not 
‘include the power to abrogate or change the identity of the Constitution or its basic 
features’.39 This doctrine was used by the Indian Supreme Court to review and even 
annul constitutional amendments several times. Since much has been written on this 
doctrine and its development – both within India40 and abroad41 – I shall only give a 
relatively brief account of the events.  
 Events leading to the development of the ‘basic structure doctrine’ began already 
in the early days of the Indian republic, when the government attempted to pursue vast 
land reforms which affected landowners’ constitutional right to property.42 In Shankari 
Prasad v. India of 1951, 43 facing a challenge to the 1st Amendment that abridged the right 
to property, the Supreme Court held that fundamental rights were not beyond reach of the 
amendment power. Again, in Singh v. Rajasthan of 1965, 44  facing a challenge to the 17th 
Amendment, the majority of the Supreme Court rejected the argument that amendments 
cannot violate fundamental rights. With two judges dissenting from this view, another 
challenge was brought before a large bench of eleven judges in 1967 in Golaknath v. State 
                                                          
39 See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.   
40  See, for example, Krishnaswamy (2010); Lakshminath (2011); Garg (1975, 243); Baxi (1974, 45); 
Palkhivala (1973); Rao (2002, 463); Sathe (1969, 33); Tripathi (1974); Desai (2000, 90); Chopra (2006). See 
also the NUJS Law Review (2008).  
41 See, for example, Morgan (1981, 307); Jacobsohn (2006A, 460); Abraham (2000, 195); O’Connell (1999, 
48); Buss (2004, 23); Mate (2010, 175); Randhawa (2011); Sathe (2007, 215); Singh, (2011A, 169).  
42 For an account of these events see Merillat (1960, 616).  
43 AIR 1951 SC 458.  
44 AIR 1965 SC 845. 
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of Punjab.45 Overruling its previous decisions, the majority of a divided court (six to five) 
held that Parliament’s power to amend the constitution could not be used to abridge the fundamental 
rights since an amendment was deemed to be a ‘law’ under Art. 13, which prohibited 
Parliament from making any law abridging fundamental rights. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the Court delivered a prospective judgment and did not invalidate the amendments 
in question, this judgment triggered a powerful political reaction. It signified the opening 
shot of a ‘great war …over parliamentary versus judicial supremacy’.46  
 One noteworthy element of the case was the introduction in the hearings of the 
‘basic structure’ concept by M. K. Nambyar, one of the counsels for the petitioner in the 
GolakNath case.47 Apparently, a German Professor who was an expert on South Asian 
law – Dietrich Conrad – had influenced Nambyar. In February 1965, Conrad visited 
India and delivered a lecture on ‘implied limitations of the amending power’ at the law 
faculty of Banaras Hindu University. The paper upon which the lecture was based was 
brought to the attention of Nambyar. In October 1966, Nambyar asked Conrad’s 
permission to use his lecture’s manuscript when arguing before the Supreme Court. It is 
told that Conrad ‘readily and enthusiastically agreed’, stipulating ‘that the whole 
manuscript may be presented to the Court’. 48 Based upon Conrad’s paper, Nambyar 
argued before the Supreme Court that implied limitations exist on the amendment power 
so that amendments cannot destroy the permanent character or ‘basic structure’ of the 
Constitution.49 In its decision, the Court stated that ‘there is considerable force in this 
argument’; however, focusing its attention on the narrower question of the scope of the 
amendment power vis-à-vis fundamental rights, deemed it unnecessary to express any 
opinion in that regard.50  
 As a consequence of the GolakNath case, Indira Gandhi sought to re-establish 
parliamentary sovereignty. In light of the political desire for social reforms, and after a 
decisive win of Gandhi’s congress party in the elections, granting it two-thirds of the 
Parliament’s seats, in 1971 the Parliament passed the 24th and 25th Amendments. The 25th 
Amendment was aimed at allowing property reforms, while according to the 24th 
                                                          
45 AIR 1967 SC 1643. 
46 Austin (1999, 198).  
47 Id., 198-199. 
48 A correspondence of 20 and 27 October 1966 between Nambyar and Conrad, cited in Divan (2009, 70). 
See generally Noorani (2010); Noorani (2001); Austin (1999, 201); and also Singh (2001): ‘by bringing [the 
doctrine] to the notice of the lawyers in India and by convincing them about its natural existence in the 
Indian Constitution, or for that matter in any constitution, Conrad bridged the common law and the civil 
law.’ 
49 Sorabjee (2007, 22) claimed that this argument was ‘Nambyar’s most significant contribution in the field 
of constitutional law’.  
50 1967 SCR (2) 762, 805.  
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Amendment, in exercise of its constituent power, Parliament may amend by way of addition, 
variation or repeal any provision of the constitution, including those protecting fundamental 
rights. These amendments were challenged before thirteen judges of the Supreme Court 
in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala of 1973.51 The Supreme Court overruled GolakNath, 
holding that the term ‘law’ does not refer to constitutional amendments; hence, 
Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution. More importantly, seven of the 
judges held that the amendment power does not include the power to alter the basic structure, or 
framework of the constitution so as to change its identity, creating what has come to be known the 
‘basic structure doctrine’.52 Six judges dissented, arguing that all parts of the Constitution 
have an equal status and thus all can be amended. The Kesavananda case did not provide a 
precise list of unamendable features that constituted the Constitution’s basic structure, 
thus forming a sort of common-law doctrine that develops on a case-by-case basis. Some 
of the judges, however, offered examples of such features, such as the supremacy of the 
Constitution; the democratic form of government; federalism; the separation of powers; 
and secularism. The Kesavananda judgment created a ‘constitutional quicksand’.53 A day 
after the announcement of judgment, the furious Indira Gandhi, appointed a new Chief 
Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Sikri. But instead of appointing the most 
senior judge as was the accepted custom, she appointed Justice Ray, the most senior 
member of the minority judges.54 But this was merely the beginning.  
 In June 1975, a High Court invalidated Gandhi’s 1971 election due to electoral 
fraud, barring her from elections for six years. Gandhi’s reacted by proclaiming a state of 
emergency, after which Parliament used its amending power to enact two astonishing 
amendments: according to the 38th Amendment, the President’s decision to issue a 
Proclamation of Emergency and any laws adopted during the emergency were immune 
from judicial review; and the 39th Amendment altered, retroactively, the laws under which 
Gandhi was convicted and prohibited any court from adjudicating any issue on the 
election of the President, Vice-President, Parliament Speaker and Prime Minister, even if 
such a matter was already pending before a court.55 Thereafter, Gandhi’s appeal came 
before the Supreme Court. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain in 1975, 56 five judges 
                                                          
51 AIR 1973 SC 1461. For the story behind the case see Andhyarujina (2012).      
52 It is important to note that it is very difficult to extract a coherent ratio from this 800 pages judgment, as 
the judges were severally divided and offered different views and separate judgments.    
53 Baxi (1974, 45). 
54 Scheppele (2002, 254). 
55 O’Connell (1999, 71) cynically remarked that ‘one must appreciate the tact of Mrs Gandhi in not limiting 
the exception just to the office of Prime Minister!’  
56 AIR 1975 SC 2299. 
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unanimously confirmed the basic structure doctrine. Whereas the Court validated 
Gandhi’s election in the 1971 election, it held that by excluding judicial review the 39th 
Amendment violated three essential features of the constitutional system: fair democratic 
elections, equality, and separation of powers, and was therefore invalid.  
 In an effort to put an end to judicial intervention, in 1976 the Parliament retaliated 
and enacted the 42nd Amendment. This amendment, comprised of 59 sections, declared, 
among other things, in section 55 that: ‘No amendment of this Constitution … shall be 
called in question in any court on any ground’, and ‘for the removal of doubts, it is 
hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of 
Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this 
Constitution…’.57 Meanwhile, in the 1977 elections, Gandhi’s party lost to the Janata 
party. The Janata party reduced the powers of the Government during the emergency, 
but was unable to reverse the 42nd Amendment’s sections dealing with Parliament’s 
absolute amendment power. After Gandhi returned to power in 1979, the 42nd 
Amendment was challenged on the grounds that it destroyed the basic structure of the 
Constitution. In Minerva Mills v. Union of India of 1980, 58  four months after Gandhi 
returned to power, five Supreme Court judges held, unanimously, that since section 55 of 
the Amendment removed all limitations on the Parliament’s amendment power, 
conferring upon it the power to destroy the Constitution’s essential features or basic 
structure, it was beyond Parliament’s amendment power and therefore void. By so doing, 
the Court established Parliament’s limited amendment power:   
Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power on the 
Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited power 
enlarge that very power into an absolute power. … Parliament cannot, under 
Article 368, expand its amending power so as to acquire for itself the right to 
repeal or abrogate the Constitution or to destroy its basic and essential features. 
The donee of a limited power cannot by the exercise of that power convert the 
limited power into an unlimited one.59  
The Supreme Court explained that: 
 If by constitutional amendment, Parliament were granted unlimited power of 
amendment, it would cease to be an authority under the Constitution, but would 
become supreme over it, because it would have power to alter the entire 
Constitution including its basic structure and even to put an end to it by totally 
                                                          
57 The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, 
http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend42.htm  
58 AIR 1980 SC 1789. 
59 Id., at para. 22.  
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changing its identity.60  
 In the words of Justice Chandrachud: ‘the theme song of … Kesavananda Bharati 
is: Amend as you may even the solemn document which the founding fathers have 
committed to your care, for you know best the needs of your generation. But, the 
Constitution is a precious heritage; therefore, you cannot destroy its identity’.61 
 The limited nature of the amendment power is now an established constitutional 
principle in India.62 Since Minerva Mills, the basic structure doctrine has been accepted 
and applied in various other cases. 63  It now includes general features of a liberal 
democracy, such as the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, separation of 
powers, judicial review, freedom and dignity of the individual, unity and integrity of the 
nation, free and fair elections, federalism, and secularism.64  
 The ‘basic structure doctrine’ attempts to identify the philosophy upon which a 
constitution is based.65 In Chapter 5, I claim that the basic structure doctrine rests on a 
solid theoretical ground and is in accordance with the general theory advanced in this 
work, according to which the amendment power is delegated and thus implicitly limited 
in scope. But before laying the arguments supportive of the basic structure doctrine, I 
wish to demonstrate how the idea of implicit limitations on amendment powers has 
migrated through different jurisdictions, progressing toward becoming a universal trend 
and an almost globally recognised doctrine.66 This is the aim of the rest of this chapter. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
60 Id., at 1824. 
61 Id., at 1798 para. 21. 
62 Iyer (2004, 68).  
63 See Waman Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271 (the Supreme Court ruled that any addition to the 
Ninth Schedule which is immune from judicial challenge could be challenged for violating the basic 
structure); S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (1981) (the independence of the judiciary is a basic 
structure of the constitution); S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386 (the Supreme Court 
did not invalidate the 42nd Amendment which excluded High Court Jurisdiction, holding that judicial 
forums alternative to the jurisdiction of High Courts may be created by laws, conditioned that such forums 
are no less effective than that of High Courts); P. Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1987 SC 663 
(the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated the 32th Amendment, which granted state governments the 
power to annul orders issued by administrative tribunals, for violating the rule of law which is a basic 
feature of the constitution); Chandra Kumar v. Union if India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 (a seven judges panel of the 
Supreme Court unanimously invalidated a provision of the 42nd Amendment which excluded the Supreme 
and High Courts’ jurisdiction in those cases in which administrative tribunals had jurisdiction, holding that 
judicial review is a basic feature of the constitution).  
64 Jacobsohn (2003-2004, 1795); Kashyap (2006, 103-105); Klein (1999B, 36). 
65 Khurshid (2006, 98). 
66  See Roznai (2012, 240); Roznai (2013B, 657). 
 ~59 ~ 
 
III.   THE ‘BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE’: A TOUR D’HORIZON  
A. Bangladesh: Implicit Limitations 
After India adopted the basic structure doctrine, it migrated to its neighbouring countries, 
most notably to Bangladesh. 67  The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh adopted the Indian basic structure doctrine in its 1989 case, Anwar Hossain 
Chowdhury v. Bangladesh,68 which expressly refers to the Indian Kesavananda case. In that 
case, the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act 1988, which had affected the judicial 
review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by means of the decentralisation of its High 
Court Division, was declared unconstitutional and void. The majority in the Appellate 
Division endorsed the basic structure doctrine, ruling that although the amendment 
power is not an ordinary legislative power, but rather a constituent power, it is nevertheless 
merely a power granted to parliament by the constitution and is thus limited. As Judge 
B.H. Chowdhury wrote:  
Call it by any a name - ‘basic feature’ or whatever, but that is the fabric of the 
Constitution which cannot be dismantled by an authority created by the 
Constitution itself-namely, the Parliament. … Because the amending power is 
but a power given by the Constitution to Parliament, it is a higher power than 
any other given by the Constitution to Parliament, but nevertheless it is a power 
within and not outside the Constitution.69 
  Judge Shahabuddin Ahmed reasoned that constituent power  – as the power to make 
a constitution – belongs to the people alone. The constitutional power that is vested in 
the Parliament is a ‘derivative’ power, and thus limited.70 Judge Ahmed listed a number of 
principles, such as the peoples’ sovereignty, supremacy of the constitution, democracy, 
unitary state, separation of powers, fundamental rights, and judicial independence, which 
he contends are the structural pillars of the Constitution and therefore beyond the 
amendment power. According to Ahmed, if the amendment power transgresses its limits, 
                                                          
67 See generally Hoque (2011, Ch.  4); Conrad (2003, 187-191); Talukder and Ali Chowdhury (2009); for a 
summary of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh decisions, see also Siddique Ahmed v. Bangladesh, (2010) 39 
CLC (HCD) (26.08.2010), pp. 107-14, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/images/text/7th%20Amendment_full%20text_The%20Daily%2
0Star.pdf. 
68 41 DLR 1989 App. Div. 165.  
69 Chowdhury, J, id., para. 195. At paras 292-293 Chowdhury listed 21 ‘unique features’ of the constitution, 
some of which are basic features unamendable by the amending power of the Parliament.   
70 Shahabuddin, J, id., para. 381. 
 ~61 ~ 
 
it is in the power of the court to strike down even constitutional amendments.71 This line 
of reasoning was reaffirmed in subsequent cases.72  
In 2005, the High Court Division of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 
the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1979. In a 391-page long decision, J. Khairul 
Huq ruled that the Fifth Amendment, which was enacted to ratify, confirm, and validate 
the Martial Law Proclamations, regulations, and orders, was illegal and void.73 The Court 
repeated and affirmed that Parliament may amend the Constitution, but it cannot 
abrogate it, suspend it, or change its basic feature or structure. ‘The power to destroy’ 
according to the court, ‘is not the power to amend’. The amendment provision ‘confers 
enabling power for amendment but cannot swallow the constitutional fabrics. The 
fabrics of the Constitution cannot be dismantles even by the Parliament which is a 
creation of the Constitution itself’, and while the amendment power is wide, it is ‘not that 
wide to abrogate the Constitution or to transform its democratic republican character 
into one of dictatorship or monarchy’. Lastly, ‘the Court has got power to undo an 
amendment if it transgresses its limit and alters a basic structure of the Constitution’.74 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court upheld this ruling. 
In a recent decision of 2011, Abdul Mannan Khan v. Government of Bangladesh,75 the 
Supreme Court Appellate Division faced a challenge to the Constitution (Thirteenth 
amendment) Act, 1996 (Act 1 of 1996), which mandated elected governments, on 
completion of their term, to transfer power to an unelected non-partisan caretaker 
administration to oversee new parliamentary elections. Due to its violation of democratic 
values, which are basic features of the Constitution, this amendment was prospectively 
declared ultra vires the Constitution and void. Thus, even in the absence of unamendable 
provisions, in a series of cases it was decided that the amendment power under the 
Constitution of Bangladesh is implicitly limited. Consequently, substantive judicial review 
of constitutional amendments, vis-à-vis implicit limits in the form of the ‘basic structure’ 
doctrine, has developed into an accepted practice.76  
 
                                                          
71 Shahabuddin, J, id., paras. 416-417. 
72 See, for example, Alam Ara Huq v. Government of Bangladesh, 42 DLR (1990) 98; Fazle Rabbi v. Election 
Commission, (1992) 44 DLR 14; Dr. Ahmed Hossain v. Bangladesh, (1992) 44 DLR (AD) 109, 110; Mashihur 
Rahman v. Bangladesh, 1997 BLD 55. See also Fazal (1996, 499). 
73 Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd v Bangladesh, (2006) 14 BLT (Special) (HCD) 1; (2010) 62 DLR (HCD) 
70 (29.08.2005), p. 317, 335.  
74 Id., pp. 187-188.  
75 Civil Appeal No. 139 of 2005 with Civil Petition For Leave to Appeal No. 569 of 2005 (10.05.2011). I 
thank Saifuz Zaman for this reference.  
76 Hoque (2011, Ch. 4); Talukder and Ali Chowdhury (2009).   
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B. Pakistan: Implicit Limitations Without Judicial Enforcement  
The ‘basic structure doctrine’ has also reached Pakistan, where it has been addressed in 
the courts under the title: ‘salient features of the Constitution’. 77  In the 1970s, the 
Supreme Court held on several occasions that it has a limited authority with regard to 
constitutional provisions.78 In the case of Darvesh M. Arbey v. Federation of Pakistan, Justice 
Shameem Hussain of the Lahore High Court stated that ‘the Parliament is not sovereign 
to amend the Constitution according to its likes and dislikes much less than changing the 
basic structure of the Constitution’.79 The Supreme Court later relaxed this position, for 
example in Fouji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman, where the Court indicated that ‘the 
learned Judge failed to notice that the amending power, unless it is restricted, can amend, 
vary, modify or repeal any provision of the Constitution’.80 In Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation 
of Pakistan,81 the Supreme Court nearly recognised a ‘basic structure doctrine’ when it 
held that in order to resolve a conflict between a constitutional provision and a later 
amendment, the Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole, taking into account the 
spirit and ‘basic features of the Constitution’.82 In the case of Mahmood Khan Achakzai v. 
Federation of Pakistan of 1997, 83 the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Sajjad Ali 
Shah, observed that Pakistan’s Constitution has salient features – ‘federalism, 
parliamentary form of Government blended with Islamic provisions’ – which are beyond 
the amendment power.84 However, in the final order the Court remained ambiguous on 
the question of implicit limits to the amendment power, stating that ‘what is the basic 
structure of the Constitution is a question of academic nature which cannot be answered 
authoritatively with a touch of finality’. 85  In Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafaz Dastoor v. 
Federation of Pakistan,86 it was claimed that an amendment is void since it violated the 
Constitution’s basic structure. While Justice Akhtar left the applicability of the basic 
                                                          
77 See generally Newberg (2002, 237-45); Lau (2006, 81-88); Conrad (2003, 191-192). 
78 See Asma Jilani v. Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139; Saeed Ahmed Khan v. Federation of Pakistan, 
PLD 1974 SC 151; Brig. (Ret’d.) F.B. Ali v. The State, PLD 1975 SC 506; Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul 
Wali Khan, PLD 1976 SC 57; Federation of Pakistan v. United Sugar Mills Ltd., PLD 1977 SC 397. See in 
Houlahan (2008).  
79 PLD 1980 Lah. 846, quoted in Lau (2006, 82).  
80 PLD 1983 SC 457, 627. See also Pir Sabir Shah v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1994 SC 738. 
81 PLD 1996 SC 367. 
82 Id., 410, 516, 537. Conrad (2003, 192) notes that using an extraordinary ‘interpretation’ in order to bring 
to the result of an original constitutional provision prevailing over a later amendment, albeit an expressed 
stipulation to the contrary, is ‘but a veiled manner of striking down a later amendment – on very legitimate 
grounds – for inconsistency with basic principles of the Contitution as originally enacted.’   
83 PLD 1997 SC 426, 458, 479-80.  See Lau (2006, 81-85). 
84 Id., 458. 
85 Id., 446.  
86 PLD 1998 SC 1263. 
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structure doctrine open, Chief Justice Ajmal Mian noted that, despite Achakzai, 
Pakistan’s courts had not accepted the basic structure doctrine:   
… in Pakistan instead of adopting the basic structure theory or declaring a 
provision of the Constitution as ultra vires to any of the Fundamental Rights, 
this Court has pressed into service the rule of interpretation that if there is a 
conflict between two provisions of the Constitution which is not reconcilable, 
the provision which contains lesser rights must yield in favour of a provision 
which provides higher rights.87   
 Eventually, the Supreme Court declined to decide upon the issue, holding that 
even if the doctrine was recognised in Pakistan, the amendment under review did not 
violate it. Importantly, the dissenting judge, Justice Raja Afrasiab Khan, upheld the basic 
structure doctrine in such a way that the Islamic character of the state, as well as its basic 
constitutional rights, could not be repealed by Parliament.88 Similarly, Justice Mamoon 
Kazi asserted that the basic structure doctrine exists in Pakistan, noting that the Court, as 
the guardian of the Constitution, has a right to annul amendments that violate the basic 
structure or fundamental rights.89  
 In Syed Masroor Ahsan and others v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and others,90 the Supreme Court 
observed that Parliament could not transgress its limits by affecting the Constitution’s 
basic structure. If it does so, the judiciary enjoys ultimate judicial review authority. In its 
ruling in Zafar Ali Shah v Pervez Musharraf, 91  the Supreme Court approved General 
Musharraf’s military coup on the basis of the doctrine of state necessity.92 Importantly 
for our matter, in the operative part of the order, the Court emphasised the following: 
‘that no amendment shall be made in the salient features of the Constitution i.e. 
independence of Judiciary, federalism, parliamentary form of government blended with 
Islamic provisions’.93  
 Notwithstanding these statements, the Supreme Court did not invalidate any 
amendment. Moreover, it appears that the Supreme Court is distinguishing between 
implicit limits on the amending power and judicial enforcement of these limits. In the 
                                                          
87 Id., at 1313.   
88 Id., at 1423.  
89 Id., at 1436.   
90 PLD 1998 SC 823,  
91 PLD 2000 SC 869. 
92 See Qureshi (2009-2010, 491). 
93 [2000] 52 PLD SC 869, 1221, section 6(iii). See Pattanaik (2004, 277). On federalism as a salient feature 
of the Constitution see Chaudhry (2011).  
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Seventeenth Amendment Case of 2005,94 the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the 17th 
Amendment, which, inter alia, allowed the President to hold both the office of President 
of Pakistan and the Chief of Army Staff, exempting General Musharraf from the 
Constitution’s explicit ban on maintaining the dual offices. The Supreme Court limited 
its scope of judicial review, holding that review of constitutional amendments can only 
be made on procedural grounds and that it had no jurisdiction to invalidate amendment 
on substantive grounds.95 The Court stated that:  
There is a significant difference between taking the position that Parliament may 
not amend salient features of the Constitution and between the position that if 
Parliament does amend these salient features, it will then be the duty of the 
superior judiciary to strike down such amendments. The superior courts of this 
country have consistently acknowledged that while there may be a basic structure 
to the Constitution, and while there may also be limitations on the power of 
Parliament to make amendments to such basic structure, such limitations are to 
be exercised and enforced not by the judiciary … but by the body politic, i.e., the 
people of Pakistan.96 
The Court concluded this point by ruling that:  
No constitutional amendment could be struck down by the superior judiciary as 
being violative of those features. The remedy lay in the political and not the 
judicial process. The appeal in such cases was to be made to the people not the 
courts. A constitutional amendment posed a political question, which could be 
resolved only through the normal mechanisms of parliamentary democracy and 
free elections.97 
 In a recent case before the Supreme Court regarding the 18th Amendment, it was 
argued that sections of the amendment concerning the appointment of judges violate the 
judiciary’s independence, which is a salient feature of the Constitution, and that the 
Supreme Court has the power to review amendments if the Constitution’s basic features 
or the core values have been tinkered with.98 In response, it was argued that the concept 
of ‘basic structure’ as a touchstone to strike down constitutional provisions is alien to 
Pakistan jurisprudence.99 The Supreme Court admitted the petition; however, it decided 
in its order not to express its opinion on the merits of the issues raised at this stage, but 
                                                          
94 Judgment on Seventeenth Amendment and President’s Uniform Case (2005) [Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. 
Federation of Pakistan, reported as PLD 2005 SC 719]. 
95 Id., 27, paras. 32, 35, 41.  
96 Id., 42, para. 56. 
97 Id., 42-43, para. 57. 
98 Constitution Petitions No. 11-15, 18-22, 24, 31, 35, 36, 37 & 39-44/2010, Nadeem Ahmed and others v. 
Federation of Pakistan and others (order delivered on October 21, 2010), p. 9-10, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/18th_amendment_order.pdf.   
99 Id., 10.  
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rather, to refer the matter first to Parliament for reconsideration.100 It thus remains to be 
seen whether the Supreme Court will override three decades of jurisprudence according 
to which even if the amendment power is limited by the Constitution’s ‘salient features’, 
it is not the role of the judiciary to decide whether a certain amendment impinges these 
limits or not. This is especially intriguing in light of the judiciary’s independence and the  
Supreme Court’s activism in the post-Musharraf era and since the restoration of Chief 
Justice Chaudhry in 2009 after his 2007 suspension.101     
C. Africa 
In Africa, case law concerning the judicial review of constitutional amendments is still 
scant.102 Nonetheless, there have been a number of interesting developments with regard 
to the scope of amendment powers in several notable judgments and academic writings, 
which are based upon the Indian basic structure doctrine.103   
1. Kenya – Acceptance of the Doctrine 
 
In Kenya in 1991, the High Court was confronted with the question of whether the 
constitutional amendment power is limited while reviewing an amendment that 
transformed Kenya into a one-party state. The High Court held that the constitutional 
amendment was valid. 104  The question arose again during the constitution-making 
                                                          
100 Id., 11-15.  
101See Waseem (2012, 19). Chief Justice Chaudhry was forced to resign for begin ‘overly independent’ and 
‘unreliable’ from governmental point of view. See Hirschl (2010, 99). 
102 For an analysis see Muigai (2003, 7-8).  
103 To give one example, in Zimbabwe, the amendment procedure is weak, as the dominant political party 
can easily achieve the required majority for amendments (Hatchard (2000, 19)). At the opening of the High 
Court in 1991, the Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, in what seemed to some as ‘preparing the ground to 
adopt the basic structure doctrine’, asserted that certain basic principles enshrined in the Declaration of 
Rights are not subject to curtailment. See Hatchard and Slinn (2009, 55); Hatchard (1991, 96). Gubbay 
(1997, 252) (2003, 61) repeated this idea years later in his academic writings where he argued that ‘there are 
certain immutable, fundamental aspects of a constitution that cannot, and may not, be altered under any 
circumstances whatsoever, no matter how express the purported amendment.’ See also Gubbay (2001, 52) 
stating that if the ‘structural pillars of the Constitution are damaged or destroyed the whole constitutional 
edifice will crumble. Therefore it is the duty and function of the judiciary to protect the Constitution 
against such damage’. But see Van Horn (1994, 154-160) (arguing that the ‘basic structure doctrine’ is 
unsuitable for Zimbabwe, due to the lack of constitutional preamble or reference to the people’s 
sovereignty. Moreover, ‘In an infant nation where the judiciary has yet to establish its legitimacy and the 
fear of freewheeling judicial activism is excessive, the doctrine is destined to fail; and if pressed, it may be 
with devastating and destructive consequences for the Supreme Court’). 
104 See Gitobu Imanyara v. Attorney General, Misc. Civil Application Number 7 of 1991 (unreported); Salim 
Damwe and others v. Attorney General, HCCC 253 of 1991 (unreported); cited in Muigai (2003, 7). 
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process in 2004.105 In the case of Njoya v. Attorney General,106 the High Court rejected the 
claim that the amendment power includes the power to make changes which amount to 
the replacement of the Constitution: ‘the [amendment] provision’, it was held, ‘plainly 
means that Parliament may amend, repeal and replace as many provisions as desired 
provided the document retains its character as the existing Constitution’, and that 
‘alteration of the Constitution does not involve the substitution thereof with a new one 
or the destruction of the identity or existence of the Constitution altered’.107 Based on the 
Indian ‘basic structure’ doctrine, the Court held that fundamental constitutional change 
could solely be made by the exercise of original constituent power.108 
 
2. South Africa: Towards Acceptance?  
India was a great source of inspiration for the drafting of the South African Constitution, 
and South African judges have been profoundly influenced by Indian judgments. As 
former South African Constitutional Court Judge Albie Sachs remarked:  
We look to the Indian Supreme Court which had a brilliant period of judicial 
activism when a certain section of the Indian intelligentsia felt let down by 
Parliament. They were demoralized by the failure of Parliament to fulfil the 
promise of the constitution, by the corruption of government, by the 
authoritarian rule that was practiced so often at that time. Some of the judges felt 
the courts must do something to rescue the promise of the constitution, and 
through a very active and ingenious interpretation bringing different clauses 
together they gave millions of people the chance to feel “we are people in our 
country, we have constitutional rights, we can approach the courts…”109 
 Despite such a positive approach towards Indian jurisprudence, the Indian basic 
structure doctrine has not been formally accepted as a fundamental element of South 
African constitutionalism.110 One can extend the issue back to the Interim Constitution 
of 1993. In the case of Premier of KwaZulu-Natal v. President of the Republic of South Africa,111 
Mahomed DP, in a judgment to which all of the members of the Court concurred, 
declared: 
                                                          
105 The 2005 draft Constitution was rejected in a referendum. Only later, the Constitution of 2010 replaced 
the Constitution of 1963. See Stacey (2011, 597). 
106 Njoya & Others v. Attorney General & Others, [2004] LLR 4788 (HCK), high Court of Kenya at Nairobu, 
25 March 2004, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-subject/336-kenya-njoya-and-others-v-
attorney-general-and-others-2004-ahrlr-157-kehc-2004-.html 
107 Id., paras. 59-60.  
108Id., para. 61. See Stacey (2011, 603-606). 
109 Sachs (1999, 10). 
110 See Govindjee and Kruger (2011); Devenish (2005, 243). 
111 1996 (1) SA 769 (CC), 1995 (12) BCLR 1561 (CC). 
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There is a procedure which is prescribed for the amendment to the Constitution 
and this procedure has to be followed. If that is properly done, the amendment 
is constitutionally unassailable. It may perhaps be that a purported amendment 
to the Constitution, following the formal procedures prescribed by the 
Constitution, but radically and fundamentally restructuring and reorganizing the 
fundamental premises of the constitution, might not qualify as an ‘amendment’ 
at all.112  
 In contemplating that an extreme amendment could not be deemed an 
‘amendment’ at all, the Court not only followed the line of reasoning of the Indian basic 
structure doctrine, 113  but also ‘left open the possibility that it may subsequently 
incorporate a basic-structure doctrine into South African law’.114 In Executive Council of the 
Western Cape Legislature v. President of the Republic,115 Justice Sachs noted: 
There are certain fundamental features of Parliamentary democracy which are 
not spelt out in the Constitution but which are inherent in its very nature, design 
and purpose. Thus, the question has arisen in other countries as to whether there 
are certain features of the constitutional order so fundamental that even if 
Parliament followed the necessary amendment procedures, it could not change 
them. I doubt very much if Parliament could abolish itself, even if it followed all 
the framework principles mentioned above. Nor, to mention another extreme 
case, could it give itself eternal life – the constant renewal of its membership is 
fundamental to the whole democratic constitutional order. Similarly, it could 
neither declare a perpetual holiday, nor, to give a far less extreme example, could 
it in my view, shuffle off the basic legislative responsibilities entrusted to it by 
the Constitution.116 
 The idea of fundamental principles as limiting constitutional politics received 
interesting treatment during the establishment of the new Constitution. The interim 
Constitution of 1994 stipulated that the constitution-making process would take place 
within a framework of thirty-four agreed-upon principles.117 These principles ensure that 
political parties publicly pledge themselves to a definite vision, clarifying the direction of 
the constitution-making process. 118  The Constitutional Court of South Africa was 
empowered to review the draft Constitution’s compliance with those principles. In its 
review (the famous Certification case), the Court declared that the Constitution, although 
establishing democratic institutions and protecting human rights, failed to comply with 
                                                          
112 Id., para. 47.  
113  Robertson (2010, 236). Indeed, in his judgment, Mahomed DP specifically referred to Indian 
jurisprudence. See KwaZulu-Natal case, 1996 (1) SA 769 (CC), 1995 (12) BCLR 1561 (CC), paras. 47-48. 
114 Henderson (1997, 553). 
115 1995 10 BCLR 1289 (CC).   
116 Id., para. 204, cited in Devenish (2005, 249); see also Govindjee and Kruger (2011).  
117 Chaskalson (2003, 153). 
118 Brooke (2005, 3-10). 
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certain agreed-upon principles, and was therefore unconstitutional. 119  Only after the 
amendment of the draft Constitution did the Constitutional Court declare that it 
complied with the principles. 120  Against that background, the entire notion of 
unconstitutional constitutional norms should not come as a surprise. As Heinz Klug 
remarks with regard to the Certification case: 
Significantly, at least two Justices of the Constitutional Court have made 
reference to the notion of the basic structure of the Constitution used by the 
Indian Supreme Court in its jurisprudence striking down validly enacted 
Constitutional Amendments. To this extent the Constitutional Assembly and the 
Court have left open the future of the Court’s role in the formal constitution-
making or amending process under the final Constitution.121 
In line with Klug’s conclusion, the Court has continued to leave this issue open. In a case 
of 2002, United Democratic Movement v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,122 the 
Constitutional Court assumed, for the sake of argument, the application of the basic 
structure doctrine, but then found that no basic feature was violated. Consequently, the 
precise status of the basic structure doctrine in South Africa remains ambiguous.123 
3. Tanzania – One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? 
 
The basic structure doctrine also travelled to Tanzania, where, the Constitution of 1977 
(as the 1965 one) does not include unamendable provisions. The case of Christopher 
Mtikila v. Attorney General of 2006,124 concerned a constitutional amendment that banned 
the participation of no-party candidates in the general elections. The High Court of 
Tanzania stated that ‘it may of course sound odd to the ordinary mind to imagine that 
the provisions of a constitution may be challenged for being unconstitutional’, however, 
it later declared that ‘this Court may indeed declare some provisions of the Constitution, 
unconstitutional’. 125  The High Court, borrowing heavily from Indian jurisprudence, 
                                                          
119 Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South-Africa, 1996(4) SALR 744 (CC); Sachs (1996-1997, 
1249). 
120 Re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South-Africa 1997(2) SALR 97 (CC); 
Brooke (2005, 23-24). 
121 Klug (1997, 202). 
122  (11) BCLR 1179 (October 4, 2002(, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/21.pdf; see also 
Devenish (2005, 249-250). 
123 See Devenish (2004, 55-56). For a review of constitutional amendments in South-Africa see Corder 
(2011, 261). 
124  Mtikila v Attorney General (10 of 2005) [2006] TZHC 5 (5 May 2006), 
http://www.saflii.org/tz/cases/TZHC/2006/5.pdf/ 
125 See id., 27-29.  
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expressed the proposition that Parliament’s powers were limited, citing Professor Issa 
Shivji’s article ‘Constitutional Limits of Parliamentary Powers’,126 according to which: 
[T]he power to amend the Constitution is also limited. While it is true that 
parliament acting in Constituent capacity ... can amend any provision of the 
Constitution, it cannot do so in a manner that would alter the basic structure or 
essential features of the Constitution. 
 The High Court then examined whether the infringement of the fundamental right 
to join a political party was proportionate. After deciding that the infringement was 
substantial and unjustified, the court again cited Shivji’s article that ‘this is very dangerous.  
Where can we stop?  If one section of the Bill of Rights can be amended, what is to stop 
the whole Bill of Rights being made meaningless by qualifications of and amendments to 
all its provisions?’ 127  It then declared the constitutional amendment to be 
unconstitutional.128  
However, in the appeal of that decision in June 2010, the Court of Appeal of 
Tanzania reversed the 2006 judgment, holding that Parliament can alter any provision of 
the Constitution.129 After noting that Kesavananda was influenced by the German scholar 
Dietrich Conrad, the court pointed out that ‘even Professor Conrad himself conceded 
that there is no litmus test as to what constitutes basic structure’, and that this lack of 
precision carries its own distinct dangers. 130  After examining the Constitution’s 
provisions regarding amendment, the Court of Appeals took a rather formalistic view 
and stated that ‘there is no Article which cannot be amended. In short there are no basic 
structures’, concluding that: ‘It is our considered opinion that the basic structures 
doctrine does not apply to Tanzania and we cannot apply those Indian authorities, which 
are in any case persuasive, when considering our Constitution’.131  
 
 
 
                                                          
126 Shivji (2003, 39), cited id., 32.  
127 Id., 42-43, citing Nyerere (1995, 9).  
128 Id., 43. For the history of the case see also Ellett (2008, 371-374).  
129 The Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2009, The Attorney Gerneral v. Christopher 
Mtikila (17 June 2010), 
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130 Id., 57-61. The rejection of implicit limitations based upon this passage is unconvincing, as Conrad was 
mearly advocating for ‘tightening judicial scrutiny’. For such criticism of the court’s reasoning see Samatta 
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D. South-East Asia 
 
1. South Korea, Japan, and China – Voices from Academia 
 
Modern constitutionalism is developing in East-Asian countries, 132 and with it the 
recognition of the doctrine of implicit limitations on amendment powers. In South 
Korea, the 1948 Constitution does not explicitly include any substantive limits on the 
amendment power;133 yet in scholarly writing it has been suggested that it is commonly 
accepted that the amendment power is substantially limited.134 In the same vein, the 
Japanese Constitution of 1946 does not contain any explicit prohibition on amendments. 
However, many scholars believe that the three basic principles upon which the 
Constitution is built – popular sovereignty, the guarantee of fundamental human rights, 
and pacifism135 – cannot be altered through the process of constitutional amendments.136 
This argument finds some textual support, as according to the Preamble, the Japanese 
people reject all constitutions which conflict with the principle that ‘sovereign power 
resides with the people’, and in Art. 9 the Japanese people pledge to ‘forever renounce 
war…’137 The argument is particularly convincing with regard to the guarantee of rights, 
since Art. 97 (which is positioned immediately after Art. 96 that regulates constitutional 
revision) states that: ‘the fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to 
the people of Japan … are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held 
for all time inviolate.’  
 Lastly, in China, the Constitution of 1923 explicitly prohibited amendment to the 
republican form of government (Art. 138). While the Constitution of 1982 does not 
include any explicit limitations, scholars in China have suggested that some implied 
principles limit the amendment power.138  
 Whereas in these countries, the voices from academia have not (yet) reached the 
courts, it is in Taiwan where the idea of implicit limitations on the amendment power 
was judicially recognised. 
  
                                                          
132 On East-Asian Constitutionalism see Yeh and Chang (2010); Symposium (2010, 766-987). 
133 See generally Yoon (1988, 1).  
134 Gatmaytan (2010, 25). On the Constitutional Court in Korea see generally Park (2008-2009, 62).  
135 Maki (1990, 73).  
136 Fassbender (1998, 144); for a useful review of this notion, see Ofuji (2004, 619). 
137 On this provision see Beer (1998, 815).  
138 See in Liangliang (2007, 48). 
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2. Taiwan and Thailand – Recognition  
 
On 4 September 1999, the Third National Assembly of Taiwan, fearing abolishement, 
ratified a 5th Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that the Fourth National 
Assembly shall be appointed from the various political parties according to the ratio of 
votes each party received in the corresponding Legislative Yuan election. In other words, 
the Amendment turned the National Assembly into an unelected body. It also extended 
the National Assembly term to two additional years. This was challenged by a group of 
Legislative Yuan lawmakers as inconsistent with Art. 25 of the Constitution, which 
requires the Assembly to exercise its powers ‘on behalf of all citizens of the nation’.139 On 
24 March 2000, the Council of Grand Justices 140 announced Interpretation No. 499, 
which declared the Amendment unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated certain 
basic constitutional principles.141  The Council of Grand Justices stated: 
Although the Amendment to the Constitution has equal status with the 
constitutional provisions, any amendment that alters the existing constitutional 
provisions concerning the fundamental nature of governing norms and order 
and, hence, the foundation of the Constitution’s very existence destroys the 
integrity and fabric of the Constitution itself.  As a result, such an amendment 
shall be deemed improper.  Among the constitutional provisions, principles such 
as establishing a democratic republic under Article 1, sovereignty of and by the 
people under Article 2, protection of the fundamental rights of the people under 
Chapter Two as well as the check and balance of governmental powers are some 
of the most critical and fundamental tenets of the Constitution as a whole.142 
 In its decision, the Council of Grand Justices cited the Turkish and German 
Constitutional Courts’ jurisprudence regarding judicial review of constitutional 
amendments.143 It was especially interested in the Italian Constitutional Court decision 
recognising basic constitutional principles as limits to constitutional amendments,144 and 
worked hard to get it translated into Chinese.145 One month after this judgment, the 
National Assembly re-amended the Constitution accordingly. 146 It was thus argued that 
                                                          
139 Ip (2011). For a history of constitutional revisions in Taiwan see Yeh (2001, 55-58).  
140 The Taiwanese Council of Grand Justices is a special body established by the Constituton, within and as 
the head of the judiciary (art. 79II), with the special competence to ‘interpret’ the constitution (art. 78).   
141  J. Y. Interpretation No. 499 (2000/03/24); an English version of the interpretation is available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=499. See also Yeh (2009, 188); Lo 
and Luo (2006, 31). 
142 J. Y. Interpretation No. 499, id., para. 2.  
143 Trone (2008, 302). 
144 Corte Cost., 29 dicembre 1988, n. 1146, Giur. it. 1988, I, 5565 (It.)). On this case see further Chapter 
8.II.B. 
145 Law and Chang (2011, 564). 
146 Yeh and Chang (2009, 170). 
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with this judgment the Council of Grand Justices not only ‘gained trust from the 
Taiwanese public’,147 but also became the most significant organ for fulfilling the rule of 
law. 148  Moreover, it was claimed that this judgment was essential in preserving the 
democratic constitutional order in Taiwan.149  
 In Thailand, the 2007 Constitution prohibits amendments that affect ‘the 
democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State or changing the 
form of the State’ (Sec. 313).150 In a recent decision of July 2012, the Thai Constitutional 
Court declared that it has jurisdiction to review amendments to the Constitution, ruling 
that a re-write of the entire Constitution, which had been approved by the people in a 
referendum, is impossible by way of constitutional amendments. Amendments can only 
amend certain articles but not the whole Constitution. Such an act would require a 
national referendum.151 
 
3. Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Singapore: Rejection  
 
The Indian basic structure doctrine migrated to other neighbouring states as well, 
although in certain states, it faced difficulties in ‘crossing the borders’. In Sri Lanka, the 
Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether the constitutional amendment power 
is limited with regard to the 13th Amendment, which established Provincial Councils and 
granted them decentralised powers (and recognised Tamil as an official language). 
Relying on decisions of the Supreme Court of India, it was argued before the Court that 
the scope of amendment power is limited and that there are certain basic features of the 
Constitution that cannot be altered, not even through the amendment process. In its 
judgment of 1987, the Supreme Court rejected this argument based upon the wording of 
the Constitutions of both 1972 and 1978, which expressly provide for the amendment or 
repeal of any provision of the constitution or of the entire constitution. The Supreme 
Court held that due to this exhaustive language, there is no basis for the contention that 
some fundamental principles or provisions are unamendable, thereby refusing to apply 
the basic structure doctrine in Sri Lanka.152 
                                                          
147 Wang and Chou (2010, 23). For an analysis of judicial behaviour in Taiwan see Garoupa (2011, 1). 
148 Chen (2000, 111). 
149 See Sheng-Wen (2005). 
150 Harding (2001, 256). 
151 Limsamarnphun (2012); Yoon (2012); Johnson (2012).  
152 In Re the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill, (1987) 2 Sri LR 312, 329-
330, http://www.lawnet.lk/docs/case_law/slr/HTML/1987SLR2V312.htm. For elaboration see 
Jacobsohn (2010, 61-69); Halmai (2012, 187-188).  
 ~72 ~ 
 
 The Indian basic structure doctrine was also presented in Malaysia in several cases; 
however, in what seemed to some an abandonment of its responsibility to guard 
constitutional rights,153 the Malaysian Federal Court rejected the Indian basic structure 
doctrine, granting Parliament an unlimited power to amend the Constitution.154 In the 
Loh Kooi Choon case, Justice Raja Azlan contended, with direct reference to Kesavananda, 
that, in contrast with Indian jurisprudence, any provisions of the Malaysian Constitution 
could be amended.155 In Phang Chin Hock,156 again with direct reference to Kesavananda, 
the Federal Court held that the basic structure doctrine does not apply in Malaysia due to 
the differences between the Indian and Malaysian Constitutions – mainly historical 
differences and the fact that in contrast with the Indian Constitution, the Malaysian 
Constitution of 1957 has no preamble.157  
 Following the Malaysian cases, the basic structure doctrine was also presented – 
and rejected – in Singapore.158 In the case of Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs,159 
constitutional amendments that established the non-justiciability of detaining persons 
without a trial on security grounds were contested. Relying on the Indian basic structure 
doctrine, counsel argued that Parliament’s amendment power was implicitly limited,160 an 
argument which was rejected by the Supreme Court. Justice Chua, writing for the 
majority, reasoned that an amendment, being part of the Constitution itself, could never 
be invalid if it was enacted in compliance with the amendment procedure. Had a 
Constitution’s framers intended to prohibit certain amendments, one could reasonably 
expect them to have included a provision to that effect. Furthermore, judicially imposing 
limitations on the amendment power would thwart Parliament’s legislative function.161 In 
his rejection of the basic structure doctrine, Justice Chua specifically drew upon both 
Indian and Malaysian judicial opinions.162 Relying on the Malaysian case Phang Chin Hock, 
Justice Chua claimed that considering the differences between the Constitutions of India 
                                                          
153 See Hegde (2005, 564). 
154 Government of the State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya and Anor (1963) MLJ 355; Loh Kooi 
Choon v. Government of Malaysia (1977) 2 MLJ 187; Phang Chin Hock v. PP (1980) 1 MLJ 70; see Kaur (1994, 
248); Harding (1979, 368); Harding (2000, 255-57). 
155 Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia (1977) 2 MLJ 187; see Harding (1979, 369).   
156 Phang Chin Hock (1980) 1 MLJ 70.  
157 See Harding (1979), 371.  
158 See, for example, Kaur (1994, 266). 
159 (1989) 2 MLJ. 449, 456-7. 
160 Id., 471, 474–75.   
161 Id., 456-57; see also Penna (1990, 207); Kaur (1994, 248-250). 
162 Justice Chua cited Justice Ray’s dissent in Kesavananda to support the premise that ‘fundamental or 
basic principles can be changed,’ and Justice Raja Azlan Shah’s majority opinion in the Malaysian case of 
Loh Kooi Choon that ‘a constitution has to work not only in the environment in which it was drafted but 
also centuries later.’ (1997) 2 MLJ 187, 189, cited in Kaur (1994, 250). 
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and Singapore – mainly the different processes by which the two were constituted and 
the lack of a preamble in Singapore’s Constitution of 1963 – the application of the basic 
structure doctrine in Singapore should be rejected. 163  Following Teo Soh Lung, the 
doctrine was rejected in another case.164  
 
E. Central and South America 
As elaborated in Chapter 2, Latin American states were some of the first to contain 
unamendable provisions in their constitutions. Nowadays as well, many state 
constitutions include unamendable provisions, whether expressed or implicit in 
provisions that imply a principle’s ‘eternal’ character.165 More importantly to this chapter, 
even in the absence of any explicit limits, some courts in Central and South America 
have ruled that the amendment power is inherently limited by implicit limits.166  
1. Argentina – A Limited Constituent Assembly 
 
In Argentina, the Constitution of 1994 allows for a total or partial reform of its contents, 
which must be declared by at least two-thirds of members Congress and carried out by a 
special constituent assembly assembled for that purpose (Art. 30). When initiating a 
reform, Congress must specify which provisions demand revisions and the assembly 
cannot introduce amendments to provisions other than those specified by Congress. In 
other words, the summoned assembly is a limited one.167 In the Rios case of 1993,168 the 
Supreme Court stated in an obiter dictum that ‘the authority of a constituent convention is 
limited solely to the review of those matters submitted to them for resolution and within 
the principles of the Constitution’ [emphasise added].169 Put it differently, it added implicit 
limits on the convention’s power to act within the Constitution’s principles.  
                                                          
163 (1989) 2 MLJ 449, 457.  
164 Vincen Cheng v. Minister for Home Affairs (1990) 1 MLJ 449. 
165  See generally Brewer-Carías (2004, 22). 
166 In other states, courts made obiter dicta statements in this spirit. See, for example, case Berríos Martínez v. 
Roselló González II, 137 d.p.r. 195 (1994), 201, 221, in Puerto Rico (which is of course unique due to its 
character as an unincorporated territory of the United States), in which the Supreme Court states that it 
starts from the premise that, in the exercise of its sovereign power, the people included in art. vii(3) of the 
Constitution expressed and implied limitations on the scope of amendments (not to alter the republican 
form of government or to abolish the bill of rights). Such limitations can be explicit in the Constitution or 
implicitly when their existence can only be deduced indirectly, as a logical consequence of the assumptions 
upon which the constitutional system – considered as a whole – rest. See Colón-Ríos (2013B, 227-228). 
167 Gomez (2000, 103). 
168 ‘Rios’, [1994-C] L.L. 46, 48. 
169 Id., 48, cited in Gomez (2000, 107-108). 
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 It is interesting to note that the Court does not regard the constitutional 
amendment process as a political question and regards itself as competent to adjudicate 
the process of amendments. For instance, in the Fayt case of 1998, 170 a district court, for 
the first time in Argentina’s history, partially invalidated a constitutional amendment 
enacted by a constituent convention, on the basis that the convention exceeded its 
delegated authority.171 
 
2. Belize – Basic Structure Doctrine 
 
The Indian basic structure doctrine has also migrated to the Caribbean, where it was 
recently adopted and applied by the Supreme Court of Belize.172 In Bowen v. Attorney 
General of 2008,173 the constitutionality of the Sixth Amendment Bill 2008 was challenged. 
The Bill was aimed to allow the government to exploit a recent oil discovery, and 
therefore it excluded certain natural resources such as petroleum and minerals from the 
constitutional protection of property rights.174 Defending the amendment, the Attorney 
General’s argument was that since the amendment was adopted according to the 
procedure prescribed in s. 69 of the Constitution, its constitutionality cannot be 
challenged. This argument was rejected by Chief Justice Conteh, who held that s. 69 is a 
mere ‘procedural handbook’, and that any amendments to the constitution must conform 
with s. 68 according to which all laws enacted by Parliament must be ‘subject to the 
Constitution’.175 Any view to the contrary would subject constitutional supremacy to 
parliamentary supremacy.176 Therefore, Parliament’s law-making powers are limited so 
that it cannot enact laws which are contrary to the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution 
itself. According to Conteh CJ, the basic structure of the Constitution of Belize includes 
the characteristics of Belize as a sovereign and democratic state; the supremacy of the 
Constitution; the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that are enumerated in 
the Constitution; the limited sovereignty of Parliament; the principle of separation of 
                                                          
170 ‘Fayt’, Suplemento de Derecho Constitucional, L.L., 18 de Agosto de 1998, at 1. 
171 Id., 8-9. This decision was affirmed by the appellate court, but on different grounds. See Gomez (2000, 
111-112).  
172 See Colón-Ríos (2013A, 521); O’Brien (2013); Bulkan (2013, 81). 
173 Barry M Bowen v. Attorney General of Belize (Claim No. 445 of 2008), BZ 2009 SC 2, 
http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/civil-judgments/2008/ 
174 See Clause 2 of the Sixth Amendment: ‘petroleum minerals and accompanying substances, in whatever 
physical state located on or under the territory of Belize…the entire property and control over which are 
exclusively vested, and shall be deemed always to have been so vested, in the Government of Belize.’ 
175 Barry M Bowen v. Attorney General of Belize (Claim No. 445 of 2008), BZ 2009 SC 2, paras. 101, 105-107. 
176 Id., para. 120. 
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powers; and the rule of law.177 According to the Supreme Court, by obstructing access to 
the courts in order to challenge alleged infringements of the right to property, the 
amendment violated the principles of separation of powers, the rules of law and the 
protection of the right to property, thus offending the basic structure of the Constitution. 
It therefore declared the Sixth Amendment to be unconstitutional and void. 
 In reaction to Bowen v. Attorney General, the Sixth Amendment was amended to as 
to include a provision according to which nothing in the amendment would affect the 
royalty rights of the owner of any private land, beneath which any petroleum deposits are 
located. However, as in India, the adoption of the basic structure doctrine triggered a 
conflict between the court and the government. 
 As a direct response to Bowen v. Attorney General, the Eighth Amendment Act 
2011 stipulated, among others, that s. 2 of the Constitution, according to which ‘this 
Constitution is the supreme law of Belize and if any other law is inconsistent with this 
Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency be void’ does not 
apply to ‘a law to alter any of the provisions of this Constitution which is passed by the 
National Assembly in conformity with s. 69 of the Constitution.’ Moreover, it declared, 
‘for the removal of doubts’, that the constitutional amendment provision is ‘all-inclusive 
and exhaustive and there is no other limitation, whether substantive or procedural, on 
the power of the National Assembly to alter this Constitution.’  
In British Caribbean Bank Ltd v AG Beliz of June 2012, 178  the Supreme Court 
upheld a challenge to the constitutionality of the Eight Amendment. In its judgment, 
Judge Oswell Legall held that there are implied limitations on the National Assembly’s 
amendment power so that it cannot destroy or remove the basic structure of the 
constitution.179 Referring to the Indian basic structure doctrine, Legall J held that ‘though 
the Constitution of Belize is different in several respects from the Indian Constitution, 
both Constitutions have basic features such as the Judiciary, Rule of Law, fundamental 
rights and separation of powers,180 adding that he has ‘no doubt that the basic structure 
doctrine is a feature or part of the Constitution of Belize.’181 For the reason that the 
                                                          
177 Id., para. 119. 
178 British Caribbean Bank Ltd v AG Beliz (Claim No. 597 of 2011),                  
http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/supreme_court/judgements/Legal2012/EIGHTH%20AMENDME
NT.pdf 
179 British Caribbean Bank Ltd v AG Beliz (Claim No. 597 of 2011), para. 44.  
180 Id., para. 47. 
181 Id., para. 50. Referring to Kemal Gözler’s argument that in the absence of explicit limitations on the 
substance of constitutional amendments, the court cannot review the substance of amendments, Legall J 
notes at para. 52 that ‘the views of the author are not consistent with the several decisions quoted above on 
the basic structure doctrine.’ 
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Eighth Amendment was contrary to the principle of separation of powers and the basic 
structure doctrine of the Constitution, it was declared null and void.  
 
3. Colombia – Constitutional Replacement Doctrine 
In Colombia, Congress, a Constituent Assembly, or a referendum can reform the 
Constitution of 1991 (Arts. 374-378).182 The Constitution empowers the Constitutional 
Court to review constitutional amendments ‘only for errors of procedure in their 
formation’ (Arts. 241 and 379). In addition, the Constitution excludes any unamendable 
provisions. However, the Constitutional Court gave a wide definition of the concept of 
‘procedural error’. In opinion C-551/03, the court noted that the amendment power 
does not extend to the replacement of the constitution with a different one. Procedure and 
substance are thus related since when the amending power ‘substitutes’ the constitution it 
acts in ultra vires. It is only the constituent power, acting through extraordinary mechanisms 
such as a constituent assembly, which can constitute a new constitution. This is known 
by the Court as ‘substitution’ or ‘replacement’ theory. 183  The Constitutional Court 
repeated this proposition in its opinion C-1040/05 regarding presidential re-election, in 
which it upheld an amendment permitting presidential re-election, but invalidated an 
amendment empowering an unelected body – the Council of State (the highest 
administrative court) – with a temporary authority to legislate without being subject to 
any form of judicial review. This amendment, according to the Court, contradicted the 
principles of separation of power and of constitutional supremacy, and amounted to the 
formation of a new constitution:  
There is a difference, then, between the amendment of the Constitution and its 
replacement. Indeed, the reform that is incumbent upon Congress may 
contradict the content of constitutional norms, even drastically, since any reform 
implies transformation. However, the change should not be so radical as to 
replace the constitutional model currently in force or lead to the replacement of 
a “defining axis of the identity of the Constitution,” with another which is 
“opposite or completely different”.184 
                                                          
182 See Banks and Alvarez (1991-1992, 89-90). 
183 Sentencia 551/03, 09.07.2003, cited in Colón-Ríos (2011A). See also judgments C-1200/2003 and C-
970/2004; Bernal (2013, 339); Cepeda-Espinosa (2013, I27-I32). More generally on the replacements of 
constitutions in Latin America see Negretto (2012, 749).  
184 Opinion C-1040/05, cited in Bonilla and Ramirez (2011, 99 fn 10). See also Colón-Ríos (2010B, 1); 
judgment C-588/2009 in which the court, for the second time, invalidated an amendment which granted 
tenure to certain employees of the Public Administration without passing the necessary merits exams. The 
Court held that this amendment replaced the principle of equality and the principle of merit which are 
essential elements of the Constitution. See Bernal (2013, 345).  
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 According to the Court:  
Congress derives its power to reform the Constitution from the constitution 
itself. It has a derivative or secondary status as a constituent force. Therefore, it 
can reform or amend the Constitution, but it cannot replace it or substitute it for 
another constitution. If Congress crosses the line between amending the 
Constitution, and replacing it, it violates its constitutional powers and 
competence. If that happens, the Court can overturn Congress´s decision, not 
on the grounds of content review, but based on the fact that a branch of 
government has ignored its constitutional competence, and therefore, violated 
constitutional procedural rules.185 
 Modifying an essential clause that transforms the nature of the constitutional 
regime can be considered a ‘constitutional substitution’, a change that can only be 
decided by a constitutional assembly convened extraordinarily to review the 
constitutional regime.186  
 Again, in judgment C-141/2010 in 2010, the Constitutional Court, in a 7-2 vote, 
invalidated a law that called for a referendum on a constitutional amendment which 
would allow the President to run for a third term of office. Such a reform, according to 
the Court, violates a basic principle of democracy, which would affect the entire 
constitutional order.187 The substitution doctrine has been used since then in several 
other occasions.188 
 
4. Peru – Principios Juridicos and Valores Democraticos Basicos 
 
In Peru, the Constitution of 1993 does not include any unamendable provisions. Yet, in a 
series of cases regarding ‘reform of the pensionary system’, decided in 2005, 189  the 
Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal declared that it is competent to invalidate constitutional 
amendments that violate basic legal principles (principios juridicos) and basic democratic 
values (valores democraticos basicos). While upholding the amendment at issue, the Court 
                                                          
185 Taken from the English summary of the decision which is available on the website of the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia, http://english.corteconstitucional.gov.co/sentences/C-1040-2005.pdf 
186 Id.  
187 Opinion C-141/2010, cited in Bernal (2013, 345-346); Brewer-Carías (2010, 42-44).  
188 The Colombian Constitutional Court has used the constitutional replacement doctrine twice recently. In 
the Judgment C-1056/2012 (Colom.) of 6 December 2012, the Court declared that an amendment 
prescribing that rules about conflict of interests of congressmen would not be applicable in the discussion 
and passing of constitutional amendments was a constitutional replacement. The Court held that this 
amendment infringed basic constitutional principles concerning the respect of public morality in a 
democracy. Furthermore, in the Judgment C-10/2013 (Colom.) of 23 January 2013, the Court declared that 
an amendment modifying certain rules concerning the distribution of income from mining taxes between 
administrative regions was not a replacement of the constitution. See Bernal (2013, 346 fn 16).  
189 Opinion No. 050-2004-AI/TC, 004-2005-PI/TC, Sentencia No. 007-2005-PI/TC, and Opinion No. 
009-2005-PI/TC (03.06.2005).  
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refuted the argument that the control of a constitutional reform bill could be seen as a 
‘non-justiciable political question’. It found that such a proposition yields under the 
consideration that the Court, as the main guarantor of the Constitution, has to ensure 
that the Supreme Norm is not in itself violated by amendments that could harm basic 
legal principles and basic democratic values on which it is based, as against the 
established procedures for constitutional reform.190 
 In another case in 2005, the Court emphasised the material limits of a reform, i.e., 
what it considered the fundamental principles that give identity to the Constitution. 
These are the principles of human dignity, the republican form of government, the 
democratic rule of law, people’s sovereign power, or any other evaluative component 
that Charter recognises as a matter of fundamental.191  
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The notion of implicit limitations entails the idea that even in the absence of explicit 
limitations on the amendment power, there are certain supra-constitutional principles 
beyond the constitutional power. At first look, it is thus closely connected with a natural 
law approach. As Roscoe Pound explains: ‘there are rights in every free government 
beyond the reach of the state, apparently beyond the reach even of a constitution, so that 
there might be a constitutionally adopted but unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment’.192 If natural law constitutes a superior and autonomous set of norms, it is 
thus above the constitutional amendment power.193 Therefore, it has been argued that the 
Indian basic structure doctrine is linked to the concepts of natural law and natural 
rights.194 However, as I explain later in this thesis, the two approaches are not identical. 
True, the doctrine of implied limitations posits that certain principles have a supra-
constitutional status, in the sense that they are superior to the constituent will,195 but that 
                                                          
190 Id., para. 3, http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2005/00050-2004-AI%2000051-2004-AI%2000004-
2005-AI%2000007-2005-AI%2000009-2005-AI.html; See Colón-Ríos (2010B, 1); Jacobsohn (2010A, 37); 
León (2005, 38). 
191 Opinion No. 0024-2005-PI/TC, (02.11.2005), para. 12, 
http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2005/00024-2005-AI.html 
192 Pound (2008, 498-99 fn 92). See also Rice (1999, 115): ‘… although it is the highest enacted law of the 
nation, the Constitution is itself a form of human law and is therefore subject to the higher standard of the 
natural law. That standard is supra-constitutional. It sets limits to what the legal system, however it is 
structured, can do even through constitutional provisions’; Rosen (1990-1991, 1073) (arguing that 
constitutional amendments may only be used to secure rather than restrain individual’s natural rights). 
193 Garlicki and Garlicka (2011, 355). 
194 Samanta and Basu (2008, 516); Jayadevan (2010, 268-280). 
195 Rials (1986, 64).  
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does not necessarily mean that they derive from natural law, i.e. from a source external to 
the constitutional order; rather, they derive from within the constitutional order.196  
 What is clear, as demonstrated in this chapter, is ‘that the international trend is 
moving towards accepting the Basic Structure doctrine’.197 Even in those states where 
constitutions lack unamendable provisions, various courts from different legal traditions, 
inter alia in Asia, Africa and Latin America, have identified a certain constitutional core, a 
set of basic constitutional principles which form the constitutional identity and which 
cannot be abrogated through the constitutional amendment process. Importantly, such 
identification does not necessarily carry with it judicial review of constitutional 
amendments. Some courts have acknowledged that even if the amendment power is 
implicitly limited, it is not their role to enforce these limits (e.g., Pakistan). On the other 
hand, other courts have rejected the entire notion of implicit limits, claiming that, in the 
absence of any explicit limits, the amending power is unlimited (e.g., Sri Lanka, Malaysia, 
and Singapore). 
 This chapter coveres some of the main jurisdictions in which courts have 
confirmed that certain constitutional principles implicitly limit the constitutional 
amendment power. Yet, it is important to remark that even in countries in which the 
constitution lacks any limitations on amending certain principles, and courts have not 
recognised implicit limits – such as in Hungary,198 Slovakia,199 and Finland200 – recent 
scholarship has begun to argue that certain fundamental principles should be implicitly 
unamendable, drawing mainly from comparative experience.  
 The next part of this thesis develops a theory that explains the limited (explicitly 
and implicitly) scope of amendment powers. The first step in understanding their limited 
scope must begin with considering their nature, which is the theme of the next chapter. 
 
  
                                                          
196 I elaborate on this point in Roznai (2013A, 557). 
197 Dlamini (2009, 10).   
198 Legény (2006, 129); Scheppele (2013); See also Halmai (2012, 182) in which he criticises the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court decision of July 2011 for not recognising its authority to substantively review 
constitutional amendments. In that respect, it is important to mention Judge Laszlo Kiss, who held in his 
dissenting opinion that the court has jurisdiction to review the substance of constitutional amendment 
based on the ‘essential core’ of the republican constitution such as the rule of law and fundamental human 
rights. It is also important to note that in Hungary, the parliament is considered to be the holder of the 
constituent power and often incorporates to the constitution laws which were previously declared 
unconstitutional. See Szoboszlai (2000, 183-85).  
199 Val’o (2010, 30-31). 
200 See in Suksi (2011, 105). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE NATURE OF AMENDMENT 
POWERS 
 
This chapter examines the nature of constitutional amendment powers. It serves as a 
base for developing a theory of unamendability since the theoretical path for 
comprehending any limitation on the amendment power must commence by explaining 
the nature of that power. The hypothesis is that perceptions regarding limitations on the 
amendment power must be rooted in the distinct organisation of the state’s powers and 
of the relationship between governmental institutions. The manner in which we grasp 
the nature of the amendment power affects our thinking about its scope. In other words, 
a basic inquiry into the nature of amendment power simultaneously develops into an 
inquiry into its limits.1 
The Chapter begins by illuminating the theoretical distinction between constituent 
power and constituted power. It then explores possible understandings of the amendment 
power, both as a constituent and a constituted power. It proposes that the amendment power 
has to be regarded as sui generis, a unique power situated in a grey area between the two 
powers. It is distinguished from constituent power in that it ought to be comprehended in 
terms of delegation, but it is also a distinctive form of a constituted power. Understanding 
the exceptional nature of the amendment power as a secondary power serves as the 
theoretical starting point for understanding its limited nature and scope.  
I. CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTED POWER 
In 1792, Thomas Paine articulated that ‘all power exercised over a nation, must have 
some beginning’. 2  What is this beginning? ‘The generative principle of modern 
constitutional arrangements’ is that of constituent power.3 Constituent power is the power to 
establish the constitutional order of a nation. The definition of constituent power is among 
the most elusive terms within constitutional theory. Julien Oudot best illustrated this in 
1856: ‘What is constituent power? Everything you please, reader! Given the multiple 
definitions, history has more to tell than what a priori logic reasons’.4 Oudot explained 
                                                          
1 In that respect, a theory of limitations on the amendment power is connected to a larger theory of 
constitutionalism and how the constitution is conceived. See Linder (1981, 718).   
2 Paine (2008, 238).  
3 Loughlin (2004, 100). 
4 Oudot (1856, 397-398) [my translation].  
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that ‘sometimes it is the act of a skilful and strong dictator, winning the power due to 
his genius, and then bearing by the recognition or the habit of governed. Sometimes it is 
a partial riot, a beginning of a revolution that the general citizens accept’.5  
It is often argued that the concept of constituent power is relatively modern, 
emerging almost simultaneously in French and North America revolutionary thinking.6 
In order to understand the features of that principle, one has to return to Abbé 
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, who stated in a speech before the National Assembly in 1789: 
‘Une Constitution suppose avant tout un pouvoir constituant’. 7  Sieyès distinguished between 
constituent power (pouvoir constituant) and constituted power (pouvoir constitué). In his famous 
political pamphlet Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état?, he writes that ‘in each of its parts a 
constitution is not the work of a constituted power but a constituent power’.8 The latter 
is the extraordinary power to form a constitution – the immediate expression of the 
nation and thus its representative. It is independent of any constitutional forms and 
restrictions. The former is the power created by the constitution, an ordinary, limited 
power, which functions according to the forms and mode that the nation grants it in 
positive law. 9  Egon Zweig proposed that Sieyès managed to apply Montesquieu’s 
concept of separation of powers to Rousseau’s notion of sovereignty.10 
Georges Burdeau explains that these two powers exist on different planes: 
constituted power is inseparable from a pre-established constitutional order, while constituent 
power is external to a constitutional order and exists without it.11 Hence, contrary to 
constituted powers, constituent power is free and independent from any formal bonds of 
positive law created by the constitution. ‘The nation’, Sieyès wrote, ‘exists prior to 
                                                          
5 Oudot (1856, 398-99) [my translation]. 
6 Dippel (1996, 26); Klein (1996, 31); Palmer (1959, 215-216). In a letter to the settlers of Vermont of 
1777, Thomas Young calls the people ‘the supreme constituent power.’ See Young (1873, 394-395); 
Adams (2001, 63). The terms ‘constituent’ and ‘constituted’ power appear in English writings in the end 
of 18th century. See Anonymous (1770, 730): ‘That the house of commons was not a self-constituted 
power, acting by an inherent right; but an elected body, restrained within the limits of a delegated 
authority’; Anonymous (1795, 50): ‘The constitution of England has never protected nor preserved the 
constituting power of the people’. 
7 Sieyès (1789, 18).  
8 Sieyès (2003, 136).   
9 Id., 134-37; See Negri (1999, 216-7). French journalist Prudhomme (1790, 23) wrote that the distinction 
between the constituent power and legislative power is ‘childish’ and it is as a result of ‘the silly vanity of 
some of our politicians who invented this nonsense, in purpose to prevent legislatures from discovering 
their mistakes. It is a vile and despicable jealousy that makes them aspire to infallibility’. Although he 
himself admitted that ‘it would be frightening if every legislature has the right to make alterations to the 
constitution’.    
10  Zweig (1909, 116-117, 135-137), cited in Vishniak (1945, 361). On the relation between Sieyes’ 
constituent power and Rousseau’s social contract see Baczko (1988, S98-S125). Barshack (2003, 1161) 
writes that ‘through separation of powers the Political expels omnipotence — the sacred communal body, 
the constituent power which transcends separated powers — to the corporate, absent realm.’  
11 Burdeau (1983, 173), cited in Agamben (1998, 39).   
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everything; It is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal. It is the law itself’.12 
Whereas Sieyès is famous for his contribution to the refinement of the distinction 
between constituent and constituted power, 13  he was not the first to articulate this 
distinction.14 It can be traced back to Bodin’s distinction between sovereignty – the 
locus of authority – and the government – the instituted form through which the 
sovereign rules.15 Bodin’s idea of sovereignty (majestas) was further developed into the 
idea of a ‘double sovereignty’: a personal sovereignty (majestas personalis) held by the ruler 
and ‘real sovereignty’ (majestas realis) held by the people.16 Johannes Althusius wrote:  
… if sovereignty is therefore twofold, of the realm and of the king, as Bodin 
says, I ask which is greater and superior to the other? It cannot be denied that 
the greater is that which constitutes the other and is immortal in its foundation, 
and that this is the people. 17 
 
Likewise, in his Politica Sacra et Civilis (1657), George Lawson claimed that a clear 
distinction exists between the power of the constituted commonwealth to make a law 
(‘personal Majesty’) and the superior power of constitution – the power ‘to constitute, 
abolish, alter, reform form of governments’ (‘real Majesty’).18 For Lawson, ‘real Majesty’, 
which was invested in the community, cannot be exercised at any given moment, but 
only once the government has dissolved itself by breaching the people’s trust.19 This 
resembles John Locke’s claim that the people possess ‘a supreme power to remove or 
alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in 
them…’.20 Locke claimed that there is a ‘supreme power’ to established, alter and even 
overthrow an existing form of government, possessed by the original constituting 
community, which is a superior power to the ‘constituted commonwealth’.21 This notion 
re-appeared in Daniel Defoe’s writings, roughly eighty years before Sieyès elaborated on 
the distinction between constituent and constituted powers. Defoe wrote that ‘the Peoples 
Right, to preserve their own Liberties in case of failure in any, or in all the Branches of 
                                                          
12 Sieyès (2003, 136). 
13 Klein (1996, 15). 
14 According to Colón-Ríos (2012C, 96 fn. 12), this distinction can be traced earlier to Kirchner (1608). 
Of course, the idea of ‘original sovereignty of the people’ has appeared even earlier, for instance, in de 
Bèze (1574) as cited in Loughlin (2010, 65). 
15 Loughlin (2010, 58, 70). 
16 See Loughlin (2010, 71-72); Loughlin (2013, 3). 
17 Althusius (1964, 73).  
18 Lawson (1992, 47-48). See also Loughlin (2010, 3 fn 7); Loughlin (2007, 40); Yack (2012, 99).  
19 Lawson (1992, 48): ‘As the community hath the power of constitution, so it hath of dissolution, when 
there shall be a just and necessary cause’. 
20 Locke (1821, 317). 
21 Id. 
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the Constituted Power’,22 ‘all Constituted Power is Subordinate, and Inferior to the 
Power Constituting’, and the inferior body ‘cannot have the power to alter its own 
foundation or act against the power which formed it’.23  
Understanding the community’s constituent power to create and alter constitutional 
regimes is important, yet it was limited to explaining the right of resisting an oppressive 
regime. 24  Sieyès’ conception of constituent power seems to be different. It was not 
restricted to those circumstances where the government was dissolved by breaching 
trust or tyranny. For him, constituent power can be legitimately reclaimed at any time.25 The 
constitution, as a positive law, emanates ‘solely from the nation’s will’.26 For Sieyès, the 
constituent power was unlimited for ‘it would be ridiculous to suppose that the nation itself 
could be constricted by the procedures or the constitution to which it had subjected its 
mandatories’.27 The nation is free from constitutional limits: ‘not only is the nation not 
subject to a constitution’, Sieyès insists, ‘it cannot be and should not be…’. 28  The 
sovereign people, according to his idea of constituent power, are exterior to their 
institutions.29  
What is ‘the nation’? For Sieyès, it is ‘a body of associates living under a common 
law, represented by the same legislature, etc.’30 This could mean that the political will of the 
people to be linked to each other (politically and legally) is what creates a national 
bond.31 It is ‘the people’, rather than a divine Monarch, who is the subject and the 
holder of the constituent power.32 Indeed, in the modern era, a nation’s constitution is 
regarded as receiving its normative status from the political will of ‘the people’ to act as 
a constitutional authority,33 and through which ‘the people’ manifest itself as a political 
and legal unity.34 The ultimate source of legitimacy is bottom-up, originating in ‘the 
                                                          
22 Defoe (1702, 12).  
23 Defoe (1709, 37). See also MacCormick (2010, 154). 
24 Colón-Ríos (2012C, 80-82). 
25 Cristi (2011, 358).  
26 Sieyès (2003, 136). 
27 Id. 
28 Id., 137.  
29 Jaume (2007, 67-8). According to Whitt (2010, 159-160), Sieyès positions the constituent power in a 
state of nature, thus trying to avoid the paradox of sovereignty. 
30 Sieyès (2003, 97). This definition appears to be contradictory to Sieyes’ claim that the nation is to be 
conceived as a ‘pre-political entity’. This is part of the circularity problem of ‘we the people’ idea behind 
the constituent power. As Ivison (1999, 84) wrote: ‘constitution constitutes the People who in turn constitute 
it’. On this dilemma see Oklopcic (2005, 134).  
31 Van De Putte (2003, 61); Brubaker (1992, 7).    
32 Corrias (2011A, 31).  
33 On ‘the people’ as the subject of constituent power see Preuss (2007, 211-22). 
34 Barents (2004, 89-90). 
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people’.35 This idea of ‘the people’ as a collective of individuals, standing as a distinct 
force behind all constituted forms of sovereignty, can be traced to Hobbes’ Leviathan.36 
The notion that all powers originate from the people – which Tocqueville believed lies 
‘at the bottom of almost all human institutions’37 – is now explicitly stated in various 
constitutions.38  
Giorgio Agamben raises the concern that identifying constituent power with the 
people’s constituent will makes the distinction between constituent power and sovereign 
power ambiguous. 39  For Antonio Negri, the concepts are not identical; sovereignty 
arises upon the establishment of the constituent power – it is ‘a summit, whereas 
constituent power is a basis’.40 It appears that to better understand this debate, one has 
to distinguish between two conceptions of ‘sovereignty’. One is the juristic expression 
of sovereignty, which concerns supreme power within institutional arrangements that 
were constituted during or after the formation of the state (which is compatible with 
Negri’s idea). Another is political sovereignty, which is the power to establish a state, 
synonymous with the idea of constituent power. 41 This latter conception is compatible with 
Andreas Kalyvas’s definition of that term: ‘the sovereign is the one who makes the 
constitution and establishes a new political and legal order’. 42  To minimise confusion, 
this thesis employs the term ‘constituent power’ throughout and avoids the word 
‘sovereignty’. However, where ‘sovereignty’ is utilised, it is with reference to Kalyvas’s 
definition of the term.  
How may the nation exercise its constituent power? According to Joseph de Maistre, 
‘the people are the sovereign which cannot exercise their sovereignty…’. However, if 
the people are said to ‘exercise their sovereignty by means of their representatives’, this, 
de Maistre believed, ‘begins to make sense’. 43  Indeed, according to Sieyès, since 
‘members of the association will have become too numerous and occupy too widely 
dispersed to be easily able to exercise their common will themselves’ there is a need for 
                                                          
35 Wintgens (2001, 274).  
36 See Forsyth (1981, 191).  
37 Tocqueville (1835, 64). 
38 A survey of 1978 revealed that 53.6%, of states’ constitutions referred explicitly to the sovereignty of 
the people. See van Maarseveen and van der Tang (1978, 93). Interistingly, the Constitution of Armenia 
(1995) stipulates in art. 114 that the people’s sovereignty is an unamendable principle. On how 
constitutions portray the people’s sovereignty see Galligan (2013, 1). On how the U.S. Supreme Court 
refers to the phrase ‘we the people’ see Anonymous (2013, 1078). 
39 Agamben (1998, 42). See also Borislavov (2005, 177). 
40 Negri (1999, 13). 
41 Loughlin (2004, 80-5). 
42 Kalyvas (2005, 226).  
43 de Maistre (1965, 93).  
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representation. 44  This representation is extraordinary, since it is holds ‘whatever new 
powers it pleases the Nation to give’ it.45 These representatives should not be confused 
with the ‘ordinary representatives of a people’, who possess only limited powers, 
confined to those granted to them by the positive constitution; whereas extraordinary 
representatives are free from any prior constitutional restrictions or procedures. They 
serve as ‘a surrogate for the Nation in its independence from all constitutional forms’.46 
Sieyès’ conception of constituent power is thus attached to representation.47 
Carl Schmitt developed the doctrine of constituent power almost 140 years later. 
Like Sieyès, Schmitt declared in his 1928 book Verfassungslehre that ‘the constitution does 
not establish itself’.48 It ‘is valid because it derives from a constitution-making capacity... 
and is established by the will of this constitution-making power’.49 This constitution-
making power (verfassungsgebende Gewalt) ‘is the political will, whose power or authority is 
capable of making the concrete, comprehensive decision over the type and form of its 
own political existence’.50 For Schmitt, the constitution is created through the act of 
political will and is composed of fundamental political decisions regarding the form of 
government, the state’s structure, and society’s highest principles and symbolic values.51 
This represents ‘the core constitutional identity of a democratic political order’. 52 
Schmitt accepted Sieyès’ distinction between constituent and constituted power, and 
conceived constituent power to be unlimited and unrestricted by positive constitutional 
forms or rules. 53  By conceiving constituent power as external to (and above) the 
constitution, and as never exhausted within the positive juridical constitution, 54 
Schmitt’s rejects ‘juridicial normativism’.55 However, contrary to Sieyès, Schmitt rejects 
the theory of the ‘representation of the people’, deeming it ‘antidemocratic’: ‘the 
constitution-making will of the people cannot be represented without democracy 
                                                          
44 Sieyès (2003, 134). 
45 Id., 139.  
46  Id. Soboul (1974, 54) interpreted these ‘extraordinary representatives’ as those ‘who embody the 
constituent power’. But of course, they are not ‘the constituent power’ but only its representatives. See 
Somek (2008A, 28 fn 54).  
47 Loughlin (2003, 58).  
48 Schmitt (2008, 76). 
49 Id, 64. 
50 Id, 125. 
51 According to Schmitt, one has to distinguish between ‘the constitution’ which is the fundamental 
political decisions of the constituent power and ordinary ‘constitutional laws’ which are constitutional 
norms or provisions but which lack any true fundamental character. See id, 76-77. 
52 Kalyvas (2008, 139).  
53 Schmitt (2008, 126-27): ‘The constitution-making power is… the comprehensive foundation of all 
other “powers” and “divisions of powers.”’  
54 Id, 125.  
55 Cristi (1997, 198). 
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transforming itself into an aristocracy’. 56  The belief that constituent power cannot be 
represented is a notable distinction between Sieyès and Schmitt.57 This could be seen as 
Schmitt’s acknowledgment of democratic sovereignty.58 However, William Scheuerman 
cautions that one must not overemphasise the people’s democratic constituent power in 
Schmitt’s theory, which is limited to a mere acclamation: ‘The people’s constitution-
making will always expresses itself only in a fundamental yes or no and thereby reaches 
the political decision that constitutes the content of the constitution’.59 This conception 
of constituent power can be criticised for its lack of any rational deliberations or 
discourse.60 This important criticism is elaborated in Chapter 6, and ought not to worry 
us at this stage. For now, the focal point is that constituent power was understood by 
Schmitt as an ‘unmediated will’, which cannot be regulated or restricted by legal 
procedures or process.61 Any attempt to formalise it would be ‘akin to transforming fire 
into water’.62  
Expounding upon the concept of constituent power, Antonio Negri explained that 
constituent power could not be understood from the perspective of constitutionalism since 
the latter is fundamentally a theory of limited government.63 For Negri, constituent and 
constituted powers are not only strictly separate, but contrasting, concepts. 64  Any legal 
approach to constituent power fails since: ‘the radical quality of the constituent principle is 
absolute. It comes from a void and constitutes everything’. 65 Negri proposes to 
understand constituent power as a ‘creative work of strength’ – a purely creative and 
revolutionary power of the multitude, which can disrupt constituted boundaries.66 
Contrary to such a somewhat optimistic view of constituent power, some scholars 
regard the conception of a formless and limitless power of ‘the people’ to break any 
                                                          
56 Schmitt (2008, 128). Therefore, Arato (1995-1996, 203) notes: ‘Schmitt considers it a fatal omission that 
… the [1791 constituent] assembly did not consider it essential to have its constitutional product ratified 
in a popular referendum…’   
57 See Kalyvas (2008, 116-117, 155); Colón-Ríos (2012C, 88). For Schmitt’s theory of representation see 
generally Kelly (2004, 113). 
58 Norton (2011, 389); Kalyvas (1999-2000, 1536-7). 
59 Schmitt (2008, 128). See Scheuerman (1999, 71-72).  
60 Burchard (2006, 13); Cohen (1999-2000, 1591).  
61 Schmitt (2008, 132). 
62 Scheuerman (1999, 71). 
63 Negri (1999, 10): ‘constitutionalism’s claim of regulating constituent power juridically is nonsense not 
only because it wants to divide this power but also because it seeks to block its constitutive temporality’. 
64 Id., 3, 11. 
65 Id., 14, 16.  
66 Id., 333.  
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constitutional bounds at any time as a dangerous idea, open to abuse.67 Hannah Arendt 
wrote about:  
The extraordinary ease with which the national will could be manipulated and 
imposed upon whenever someone was willing to take the burden or the glory 
of dictatorship upon himself. Napoleon Bonaparte was only the first in a long 
series of national statesmen who, to the applause of a whole nation, could 
declare: “I am the pouvoir constituant”.68  
 
For Arendt, Scheuerman observes, the legacy of a radical constituent power is ‘a poisonous 
recipe for permanent revolution, for repeated attempts to dismantle legal and 
constitutional forms in the name of any of a diversity of political and social groups likely 
to claim the awesome power of the pouvoir constituant’.69 Indeed, experience teaches us 
that dictators seized governmental powers through revolutionary acts or coups, claiming 
to be the bearers of the constituent power.70 
More recently, David Dyzenhaus has argued that the question of constituent power 
exists outside of normative constitutional theory.71 He urges constitutional theorists to 
avoid the idea of constituent power, which has its basis outside of the legal order, and 
instead to focus on the question of the constitution’s authority as completely internal to 
the legal order, as founded on the intrinsic morality of law. 72  In contrast, Martin 
Loughlin argues that ‘constitutional legality is not self-generating: the practice of legality 
rests on political conditions it cannot itself guarantee. … Consideration of the origins of 
constitutional ordering invariably brings the concept of constituent power into play’.73 
János Kis’s approach to this matter seems lucid.  On the one hand, Kis acknowledges 
the risks carried with the concept of constituent power:  
Since the “people” is a totally undefinable reality, totalitarian leaders and 
organizations may claim themselves, by pointing to the unarticulated mass 
support that manifests itself on the streets, to be the mouthpiece of “popular 
will” and thus abolish democratic institutions and the collective decisions 
                                                          
67 See Parlett (2012, 42): ‘Relying on appeals to the constituent power … magnetic leaders have been able 
to convert a moment of popular endorsement into an opportunity to unilaterally reshape the institutional 
framework of the state and secure constitutional dictatorship’. On the risks of unlimited constituent 
powers see also Landau (2013B, 923).    
68 Arendt (1965, 163). See also Scheuerman (2002, 383): ‘Constitutional dualism reminds us that no single 
political institution can legitimately speak in the name of “the people” as a whole. The executive’s attempt 
to claim the mantle of the constituent power is always especially dubious: Whereas a broadly based, multi-
vocal legislature can sometimes plausibly represent a sizable portion of the diverse views and interests 
found in society, a single univocal executive generally cannot do so.’ 
69 Scheuerman (1997, 151).  
70  Cristi (1999-2000, 1763-1775); Parlett (2012, 1); Landau (2013B, 923).  
71 Dyzenhaus (2007, 143–5). 
72 Dyzenhaus (2012, 229). See also Hasebe (2009, 39) (the mythical concept of constituent power is 
dispensable for constitutional scholarship).   
73 Loughlin (2013, 6). 
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regulated by them.74  
 
However, at the same time, Kis rejects calls to abandon the doctrine of 
constituent power as based on ‘the people’, since there is no other satisfactory answer but 
‘the power of the people’ as the ultimate source of state power. Instead of being 
abandoned, constituent power should be reconceived: ‘it should be given an interpretation 
that, on the one hand, arrests the regress, and on the other, may not be mobilizes for 
the purpose of totalitarian politics’.75 Claims to abandon constituent power give short shrift 
to the connection between constituent power and democracy.76 Interpreting constituent power 
as a mere arbitrary power for establishing and replacing constitutional regimes would 
simply miss its essence.77 ‘To speak of constituent power’, Negri pronounces, ‘is to 
speak of democracy’.78 It is the power of the people – together – to constitute for 
themselves a constitutional regime. As Alexander Somek notes, ‘constituent power 
proper is not exercised by a dictator, a monarch or any other autocrat. Constituent 
power, rather, originates from a collective’.79 Thus, a dictator’s pronunciation that he 
holds or speaks for the constituent power is a sheer act of force, which does not 
represent true constituent power. Constituent power, properly construed, is a democratic 
concept that ‘belongs solely to the context of a democratic constitutional theory’.80 This 
point is elaborated in Chapter 6. 
What is the relationship between constituent and constituted power and why is it 
relevant to our enquiry? The conceptual relationship between constituent and constituted 
powers is that of subordination. Constituted powers are legal powers (competence) derived 
from the constitution (and are limited by it). They owe their existence to the constituent 
power and depend on it; thus, constituent power is superior to them. In contrast to constituted 
power, constituent power manifests unlimited power81 – unlimited at least in the sense that it 
is not bound by previous constitutional rules and procedures.82 On that account, the 
conceptualisation of a certain power as constituent or constituted carries with it significance 
as to its scope. As Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker write, ‘the legal norm remains 
                                                          
74 Kis (2003, 136-7). 
75 Id., 137. 
76 Colón-Ríos (2012C, 122 fn 45). 
77 Id., 110. 
78 Negri (1999, 1). See also Wall (2013): ‘Constituent power is democracy – the force (cracy) of the demos 
– in its most raw and unattenuated of senses’; Wall (2012, 6): ‘at its most basic, democracy suggests that 
power belongs to the people to make and remake the polity’. 
79 Somek (2012, 34). 
80 Böckenförde (1991, 90), cited in Kalyvas (1999-2000, 1538). 
81 Corrias (2011B, 1559); Corrias (2011A, 35-36).  
82 This does not mean that constituent power is not restricted by any principles. See Chapter 9.  
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subject to … the expression of the constituent power of the people to make, and 
therefore also to break, the constituted authority of the state’. 83 However, reducing 
constituent power to the existence of strength or force of a multitude is a materialist fallacy. 
In that respect, one has to grasp constituent power as a more complicated concept than 
sheer power. First, constituent power does not act without purpose, simply as a burst of 
energetic power. As Ulrich Preuss explains, ‘being directed at the creation of an order 
whose structure is, so to speak, anticipated in its actions, the constituent power ceases 
to be mere force’. 84  Constituent power and constituted powers have an internal relation. 85 
Constituent power has a legal aim – the creation of a legal constitutional order. Ultimately, 
this is a juridical exercise.86 As one French commentator wrote in 1851, ‘La constitution est 
une loi; donc le pouvoir constituant est une sorte de pouvoir legislative’.87 An inevitable interaction 
thus exists between power and law.88 Therefore, Andreas Kalyvas is right in his claim 
that ‘the constituent power is a juridical category par excellence’, and that its ‘juridical 
character…, its true finality, is to fulfill the idea of law’.89  
Second, in order to be exercised, constituent power requires a certain 
representational form.90 In a way, it must act as an already constituted power, since the 
constitution-making process necessitates a certain institutionalised framework through 
which the people can express their will (such as a constituent assembly).91 Such an 
understanding seems to be acceptable even to Schmitt, for whom constituent power is 
unlimited and cannot be restricted by a constitutional process. Schmitt distinguished 
between the ‘initiation’ of constituent power (which is unlimited) and the ‘execution and 
formulation’ of the decisions of the constituent power, which undeniably require certain 
procedures and organisation. Otherwise, constituent power would be left powerless and 
ineffective.92 Legal constructs (such as constituent assemblies and referenda) thus aid 
the exercise of constituent power.93  I return to the ways in which constituent power may 
exercise itself in Chapter 6.     
                                                          
83 Loughlin and Walker (2007, 1-2). 
84 Preuss (1995, 4). 
85 Vatter (2007, 66-67). 
86 See Beaud (1994, 207); Kalyvas (2008, 86); Kalyvas (2005, 233). 
87 Saint-Prix (1851, 2).  
88 Cf., Bodenheimer (1948, 233). 
89 Kalyvas (2005, 232-233). See also Colón-Ríos (2012C, 112).  
90 Loughlin (2004, 113).   
91 Loughlin (2010, 227); Hasebe (2009, 41). 
92 Colón-Ríos (2012C, 87).  
93  Somek (2008B, 473). For Negri (1999, 3-4), closing constituent power within mechanism of 
representation is the negation of constituent power’s reality. 
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This distinction between constituent and constituted powers is imperative for any 
investigation regarding possible limitations on the amendment power, since if this 
power is conceptualised as constituent power, then it should be regarded as unlimited, in 
that it is not bound by prior constitutional rules.94 If it is conceptualised as a constituted 
power, it is subordinated to the constitution. As the Luxembourgian scholar François 
Laurent explained in 1869, the ordinary powers established by the constitution 
(including the legislative itself) must obey the superior constituent power. But while the 
ordinary legislature may not change the constitution nor derogate from it, the constituent 
power may do so.95 However, as demonstrated in the next section, this classification 
seems extremely thorny when one has to assess the nature of the constitutional 
amendment power.  
II. THE AMENDMENT POWER AS SUI GENERIS 
The constituent power establishes the constitution, which in turn regulates the ordinary 
constituted powers, such as the executive, legislative, and judiciary, which govern every-day 
political life. Once the constituent power has fulfilled its extraordinary constituting task, it 
‘becomes dormant’ and from that moment public authority is exercised under the 
constitution. 96 Thus, by establishing a constitution, the constituent power is ‘digging its 
own grave’.97 ‘The sovereign himself’, to use James Bradley Thayer’s words, ‘had retired 
into the clouds’.98 However, the constitution also establishes a mechanism for its own 
amendment. What is the nature of this mechanism? Does it express the constituent power 
or an ordinary constituted power assigned with the task of amending the constitution? The 
struggle over concepts should not be regarded as an intellectual exercise divorced from 
any real consequences, since labelling the amendment power as a constituent or constituted 
power bears implications for its scope.  
The amendment power, Carl Schmitt correctly indicated, is an extraordinary 
authority, not like an ordinary law-making faculty. 99  It is ‘peculiar and not fully 
understandable in terms of the hierarchical model of the legal pyramid’.100 The reason 
                                                          
94 See, for example, Kay (2011, 719): ‘constituted powers [are] … exercised within an accepted set of legal 
institutions and procedures. The hallmark of [constituent power] … is exactly its freedom from such 
institutions and procedures’. 
95 Laurent (1869, 216). See also Saint-Prix (1836, 118, 187). 
96 Preuss (2011, 434); Barents (2004, 90-1); Maiz (1990).  
97 Preuss ( 2007, 220).    
98 Thayer (1893, 5). 
99 Schmitt (2008, 150).  
100 Preuss (2011, 430). 
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for that is because, as Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein observe, the amendment 
power: 
does not fit comfortably into either category. It inhabits a twilight zone 
between authorizing and authorized powers. ... The amending power is 
simultaneously framing and framed, licensing and licensed, original and derived, 
superior and inferior to the constitution.101  
 
The amending power possesses characteristics of both constituent and constituted 
power, hence its puzzling nature.  
On the one hand, one might suppose that the amendment power expresses the 
ultimate constituent power, the ‘final controlling power’.102 Sujit Choudhry, for example, 
claims that amendment rules ‘stipulate the ultimate locus of political sovereignty’. 103 
This is a plausible theoretical approach. If ‘the people’ control the government (qua 
constituted powers) through the constitution, then arguably, ‘control over the authority to 
amend the text represents the highest power in the nation’s political life’.104 Viewed in 
that respect, the amendment process serves as a mechanism for constitution-makers to 
‘share part of their authority’ with future generations so that every generation holds a 
part of this constituent power. 105 Ostensibly, if it is permissible for ‘the people’ to re-shape 
their constitution, amending a constitution, like constitution-making, is part of the 
people’s constituent power. 106  This is the prevailing approach of American 
constitutionalism, where it is assumed that after the establishment of the U.S. 
Constitution, Art. V, through which ‘the people’ may amend the Constitution, contains 
the constituent power.107 The concept of constituent power ‘plays no direct role in American 
constitutionalism, other than through the amendment process’. 108  ‘Americans’, as 
                                                          
101 Holmes and Sunstein (1995, 276). 
102 Paine (2008, 245). 
103 Choudhry (2008, 171). See also Choudhry (2005, 939). 
104 Breslin (2009, 106). 
105 Tribe and Landry (1993, 631): ‘a constitution can allocate constitutive power - power to shape and 
reshape political and social reality - in ways that crucially affect the relationship between the founding 
generation and later generations.’ 
106 Recall, Lawson (1992, 47-48) considered ‘real Majesty’ to be the power ‘to constitute, abolish, alter, 
reform form of governments.’  
107 Griffin (2007, 50); Corwin and Ramsey (1950-1951, 188). In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S (378 Dall.) 
(1798), http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=3&invol=378, the U.S Supreme 
Court seemed to hold the view that the amending power is an expression of the people’s constituent 
power and thus unlimited, contra to ordinary legislative powers.  
108  Griffin (2007, 66). This in especially interesting in light of the First Congress’s decision that 
constitutional amendments would appear in a supplementary form to the constitution and not 
incorporated within it. This separation is the ultimate vizualisation of the distinction between 
constitution-making and constitution-amending powers. Indeed, it was this distinction between the two 
sources of authority based upon which Sherman argued that amendments and the original constitution 
should not be intermingled. See Payandeh (2011, 101-105). 
 ~93 ~ 
 
Gordon Wood wrote, ‘had in fact institutionalized and legitimized revolution’.109 This 
approach may be supported by several arguments:  
Supremacy argument: constituted powers are bound by the constitution. By means of 
constitutional amendments, ‘the people’ may alter constituted powers. Therefore, this 
power differs from ordinary constituted powers and is superior over them. It therefore 
must be of a constitutive nature. Not only can it modify other constituted powers, but also, 
contrary to constituted powers, may arguably change its own boundaries since it possess 
‘competence over the competence’ (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).110 
Procedural argument: most constitutions provide different procedures for ordinary 
legislation and constitutional amendments (see Chapter 6). They dedicate a special 
procedure, which emphasises the exceptional process of constitutional amendment. 
Often, it is not merely a matter of a different process, but of organs; the amendment 
power is often exercised by bodies that are separate to the ordinary legislature (for 
example, constituent assemblies) or supplement it (for example, by requiring a 
referendum to ratify amendments). The procedures and organs that are involved in the 
constitutional amendment process are distinct from those that are involved in the 
ordinary legislative process. This distinction strengthens the argument that the 
amendment procedure is not an ordinary constituted power; it is different from and more 
unique than ordinary law making.111 As it is argued below, this claim is built on a fallacy 
since the mere constitutional stipulation of an amendment procedure points to its 
instituted and thus constituted – rather than constituent – nature. 
Consequential argument: from a juridical perspective, constituent power is ‘the source of 
production of constitutional norms’. 112  Through the amendment procedure, the 
amendment power is also the source of producing constitutional norms. If constituent 
power produces constitutional laws that govern constituted powers,113 then amending those 
constitutional laws (or producing new ones through amendments) is an exercise of 
                                                          
109 Wood (1969, 614). See also Palmer (1959, 215): ‘The constituent power went into abeyance, leaving 
the work of government to the authorities now constituted. The people, having exercised sovereignty, 
now came under government’; Willoughby (2009, 219): ‘any provision for the amendment of a 
constitution once established, the action of the sovereign State is henceforth formally limited thereby.’ 
110  This thesis generally rejects this argument. As a delegated power, the amendment power cannot 
change its own terms of delegation. See Sieyès (2003, 136): ‘No type of delegated power can modify the 
conditions of its delegation’.  
111  Preuss (2011, 436): ‘Many of the early―and contemporary―constitutions mark the extraordinary 
character of constitutional revisions by establishing separate institutions or institutional devices in order 
to clearly distance the amendment power from the function of ordinary legislation, as well as to avoid 
conflicts of interest among the members of the legislative bodies.’ 
112 Negri (1999, 2). 
113 Id., 216. 
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constituent power. Based on the legal consequences of the exercise of amendment power, it 
may be argued that amending the constitution is not simply a legislative action, but also 
a constitutive one. Amending a constitutional article creates the same legal product as 
writing a new article. Therefore, amending the constitution is arguably an exercise of a 
power similar to that which created the constitution in the first place – constituent power. 
From this view, it is easy to claim, as some early French authors do, that the 
amendment power is the same as the constituent power: “Le pouvoir de révision est évidemment 
le même que le pouvoir constituant”.114 
On the other hand, the amendment power may simply be regarded as a constituted 
power. Charles Howard McIlwain writes that ‘a constituted authority is one that is 
defined, and there can be no definition which does not of necessity imply a 
limitation’.115 True, the amendment power is unique because of, inter alia, its remarkable 
capacity to reform governmental institutions; yet it is still a legal competence defined in 
the constitution and subject to constitutional limits.116 Even if one applies here the term 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as Rene Barents notes, the constituent power declares the constituted 
power competent to define its competences, but only within the limits set in the 
constitution.117 Accordingly, the amendment power is a legal competence established in 
the constitution and regulated by it. It is a constituted power with a special capability, but is 
still a defined and limited one. As Ulrich Preuss recently remarked, if within a 
constitutional polity all powers derive from the constitution, then the amending power 
must be a constituted power just like the legislative, judicial, or executive powers.118 For the 
reason that it is a legally defined power originating in the constitution, it cannot ipso facto 
be a genuine constituent power.  
The complexity of the nature of the amendment power can be inferred from the 
following paragraph by Grégoire Webber, for whom: ‘amendment formulas are, by 
definition, means according to which a constituted authority may assume the status of 
constituent authority ...’.119 Amending power is multi-faced. It carries dual features of 
both constituent and constituted power. Asem Khalil writes that the amendment power is 
‘constituent power in nature and a constituted power in function’.120 Others might argue 
the complete opposite; it is constituted by nature, but functions as constituent power. 
                                                          
114Anonymous (1819, 225). See also de La Rochefoucauld (1824, 119).  
115 McIlwain (1939, 244). 
116 Suksi (1995, 10-11); Barents (2004, 91). 
117 Barents (2004, 91). 
118 Preuss (2011, 430). 
119 Webber (2009, 49). 
120 Khalil (2006, 25). 
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Accordingly, the question of the nature of the amendment power is a knotty one.121 
This thesis argues that since this power does not fit comfortably into any of these 
categories, it should neither be regarded as another form of constituted power nor equated 
with the constituent power; it is a sui generis power.122  
 
III. THE SECONDARY CONSTITUENT POWER  
A. The Distinction between ‘Original’ and ‘Derived’ Constituent Powers 
  
‘To know how the constitution of a given State is amended’, A. V. Dicey wrote, ‘is 
almost equivalent to knowing who is the person or who are the body of persons in whom, 
under the laws of that State, sovereignty is vested’ (emphasis added).123 Dicey is not 
stating that sovereignty is vested in the amendment authority. Amendment authority is 
‘almost equivalent’ to the sovereign. This terminology of ‘not quite’ – but ‘very nearly’ – 
sovereignty resembles Max Radin’s two notions of ‘sovereignty’. Radin distinguished 
between real sovereignty (‘hundred per cent, simon-pure sovereign’), which can 
materialise only in revolutions, and ‘minor or lesser sovereigns’, created by the real 
sovereign. The amendment power, created by the ‘original sovereign’, is a lesser 
sovereign, almost ‘coextensive in power with itself’. It is ‘almost sovereign’ or ‘pro-
sovereign’, situated between the real sovereign and lesser sovereign, such as 
governmental functions.124 The basic presupposition underpinning Radin’s argument, 
and the one this thesis advances, is that the amendment power is a special power, 
weaker than the constituent power but greater than the ordinary legislative powers. This 
proposition revives and relies upon the French doctrine that distinguishes between 
original constituent power (pouvoir constituant originaire) and derived (or derivative) constituent power 
(pouvoir constituant derive). The first is a power that is exercised in revolutionary 
circumstances, outside the laws established by the constitution, and the latter is the 
power exercised under legal circumstances according to rules established by the 
constitution.125 Where does this idea originate? One could trace indications of the idea 
                                                          
121 Preuss (1994, 158). 
122 Cf., Orfield (1942, 118-119); Conrad (1977-78, 14-15).  
123 Dicey (1895, 388). 
124 Radin (1929-1930, 525-526). 
125 Burdeau (1972, 78-94); Burdeau, Hamon and Troper (1988, 76-84). 
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that the constitution may establish the form for its amendment to Rousseau.126 The 
notion cannot be attributed to Sieyès, who did not distinguish between constituent power 
and amendment power and for whom the sovereign constituent power could not be limited.127  
It appears that this distinction between original and derived constituent powers was 
developed during the debates of the French National Assembly on the 1791 
Constitution, albeit with different terminology.128 At the assembly, debates took place 
on how the Constitution ought to be amended in light of the fragility of the 
constitutional project. It was seriously considered that there should be a prohibition on 
any amendments for thirty years. Eventually, the process that was adopted was that the 
Constitution would be unamendable for ten years, after which amendments could take 
place through an Assembly of Revision, and after approval of three successive 
legislatures.129 This near unamendability was criticised by Jeremy Bentham, who believed 
that the supreme legislature must always remain free to legislate in any way that it 
deemed suitable, rejected the Assembly’s notion of infallibility, arguing that there is 
often a need to correct flaws in the Constitution revealed by time, practice, and 
experience.130 
During the debates of the National Assembly, some argued that the Assembly 
could not limit or even procedurally frame the constituent power, while others sought to 
minimise the likelihood of future constitutional changes. Frochot proposed a solution 
to this conflict, suggesting that there be a differentiation between partial and total 
change to the Constitution. Frochot believed that each involves a fundamentally 
different power; thus, he proposed a certain procedure for partial change and another 
(more complex) for a total change. 131 While his proposal was rejected, the distinction he 
                                                          
126 Rousseau (2011, 204): ‘it is against the nature of the body politic to impose on itself laws that it cannot 
revoke; but it is neither against nature nor against reason for it not to be capable of revoking these laws 
except with the same solemnity it put into establishing them. This is the only chain it can give itself for 
the future’. For such a claim see Khalil (2006, 26). 
127 Sieyès (2003, 136): ‘Can it be said that a nation could, by an initial act of will that is truly free of every 
prescribed form, undertake to will in future only in a determinate manner? In the first place, a nation 
cannot alienate or prohibit its right to will and, whatever its will might be, it cannot lose its right to 
change it as soon as its interests require it. In the second place, to whom might a nation thus offer to bind 
itself? I can see how it can oblige its members as well as those it has mandated and everything connected to 
it. But can it in any sense impose duties on itself? What is a contract with oneself? Since both sides are the 
work of the same will, it is easy to see that it can always withdraw from the so-called engagement’.  See 
also Khalil (2006, 29). 
128 Le Pillouer (2005-2006, 123). 
129 French Constitution of 1791, Tit. VII. See Dicey (1915, 470). 
130 Bentham (2002, 255-6). See Schwartzberg (2007, 576-579). 
131 Le Pillouer (2005-2006, 123). For full details of Frochot’s proposal see Thompson (1952, 112, 158-
161). Similarly, Le Chapelier suggested that the amendment power was limited to a one or more decided 
articles whereas the constituent power is not limited to any article but can extend to all, and change 
everything in the constitution. See Anonymous (1791, 405). 
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made allowed others, including Barnave, to justify the ability to limit and frame 
potential constituent power without forfeiting the idea of an unlimited constituent power. 
Barnave explained that the total change of the Constitution could not be predicted or 
controlled by the Constitution, because it is an unlimited power belonging inherently to 
the nation. However, the possibility of amending the Constitution is of a somewhat 
different nature, which may be limited and circumscribed. Barnave’s discourse reveals 
the distinction between original and derived constituent power. This idea was evident in Title 
VII, Art. 1 of the 1791 Constitution, which, while acknowledging the nation’s 
‘imprescriptible right to change its constitution’, limits the amendment power 
procedurally ‘by the means provided in the constitution itself’, and substantially by 
allowing amendments only to ‘the articles of which experience shall have made the 
inconveniences felt’. 132 To support the argument regarding the limited amending power, 
it is important to draw attention to Title VII, Art. 7, which required members of the 
Assembly of Revision to take an oath, ‘to confine themselves to pass upon the matters 
which shall have been submitted to them … [and] to maintain … with all their power 
the constitution of the kingdom…’.133 Thus, according to the Constitution of 1791, the 
amendment power is conditioned by preserving the entire constitution; amendment power 
is not constituent power, and abrogation of the Constitution is not similar to its 
amendment.134  
Explaining this special, yet legally defined, power, Oudot wrote that some 
‘constitutions have organized aside the constituted power, a regular constituent power; they 
have settled the form in which the nation would be consulted to operate a subsequent 
change in its political mechanism’.135 The amendment process is ordinarily stipulated 
within the constitution through those constitutional provisions that regulate its 
procedure. It is a power established by the superior constituent power. As Claude Klein 
explains, the original constituent power is the power to establish a new legal order (ordre 
juridique nouveau). It is an absolute power, which may set limits for the exercise of 
amendments, such as determining which body has the authority to amend the 
constitution and other conditions (e.g. procedural and substantive limitations).136 The 
derived constituent power acts within the constitutional framework and is therefore limited 
                                                          
132 Cited in Anderson (1908, 94).    
133 Id., 95. 
134 Le Pillouer (2009, 6-8).  
135 Oudot (1856, 398-399) [my translation]. 
136 Klein (1997, 356). 
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under the terms of its original mandate.137 In same vein, Markku Suksi clarifies that 
while amendment powers are ‘the highest normative powers as defined and limited in 
the constitution’, the constituent power is: 
extra-constitutional, pre-constitutional, latent and inalienable authority of the 
people to adopt a constitution for itself in a situation where the people’s power 
of enacting constitutional provisions or revising the current constitution 
completely or drafting a constitution in a constitutional vacuum is not subjected 
to any restrictions of a previous or a current constitution.138 
 
Kemal Gözler recognised two schools of thought, formal and substantive, as 
the basis for the distinction between the original and derived constituent powers, as 
summarised below.139 
  
B. The Formal Theory 
 
According to the formal theory, original and derived constituent powers are distinguished by 
the circumstances and form of their exercise. Raymond Carré de Malberg argued in 
1922 that constituent power is exercised in revolutionary circumstances, outside the 
laws (forms, procedures, and limits) established by the constitution. It is not a legal 
power, but a pure fact. On the other hand, a juridical concept of constituent power is 
exercised in peaceful and legal circumstances according to rules established by the 
constitution.140 In 1930, Georges Burdeau continued this line of thought, distinguishing 
between constituent power in a strict sense, which is the establishment of the very first 
constitution outside of the law, and the revision power, which is the power invested in a 
statutory body to modify constitutional rules through the legal system. 141  Roger 
Bonnard, in 1942, distinguished between original constituent power, which exists outside of 
any constitutional authority, and instituted constituent power (pouvoir constituant institué), 
which requires that a constitution be in force for its exercise,142 a distinction that was 
adopted by Guy Héraud in 1946.143 Georges Vedel in fact used the term derived constituent 
power, which is nowadays employed by French authors, in 1949. According to Vedel, 
when the constituent power is exercised to amend the constitution through the conditions 
                                                          
137 Klein (1970-1971, 51-2).  
138 Suksi (1993, 25-26) (noting that constituent power ‘might be subject to natural law and human rights 
limitations’). 
139 Gözler (1995, 12-32). See also Gözler (1999, 10-28). For a similar distinction, see briefly, Guastini 
(2007, 307-308); Da Cunha (2013, 20).   
140 Carré de Malberg (1962, 489-500). 
141 Burdeau (1930, 78-83). 
142 Bonnard (1942, 48-59).  
143 Héraud (1946, 2-4). 
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stipulated in the constitution, the ‘constituent power of revision’ ceases to be 
unconditional since it is a derived power.144  
 The formal theory can be summarised as follows: original constituent power is 
exercised in a legal vacuum, whether in the establishment of the first constitution of a 
new state or in the repeal of the existing constitutional order, for instance in 
circumstances of regime change.145 In this theory, the nature of the original constituent 
power is extra-legal. This is traditional positivist approach as expressed by Hans Kelsen, 
who does not tackle the question of the constituent power, but rather claims that the 
question of the basic norm or obedience to the historically first constitution is assumed 
or presupposed as a hypothesis in juristic thinking.146 Likewise, for political scientists 
such as Carl Friedrich, constituent power is not a de jure power but a de facto power.147 It is 
not based on a prior legal norm; hence, it is unlimited, independent, and unconditional, 
and in that respect, original. In contrast, derived constituent power, while performing the 
same function of establishing constitutional laws, is a constraint power that acts 
according to the formal procedures as established in the constitution. Gözler makes an 
important clarification: for him, original constituent power does not have to be exercised for 
revising the entire constitution; it may be exercised even for amending a single 
provision (outside of the constitutional amendment process). Similarly, the exercise of 
the derived constituent power may cover the entire constitution.148
 
  
C. The Substantive Theory 
 
For the substantive theory, the main criterion distinguishing between original and derived 
constituent powers is the different scope of their ability to influence the substance of the 
constitution. As noted in Chapter 3, this school of thought flourished in the 1920s and 
1930s in American constitutional writings regarding implicit limits on the amendment 
power. Nonetheless, it was Carl Schmitt who sophisticated this theory. Schmitt 
                                                          
144 Vedel (1989, 115-116), cited in Gözler (1997C, 21 fn 101).  
145 Carrozza (2007, 174). 
146 Kelsen (1957, 261-63); Kelsen (2009, 201-203); Kelsen (1986, 110). See also Raz (1998B, 47).  
147 Friedrich (1937, 113-131) (noting that constituent power ‘is not a juridical power nor is it availed by a 
whole people but by a small and well organized group. Such a power can scarcely be brought under “four 
corners of the Constitution.”’) 
148 Gözler (1999, 39-44). See similarly Willis (1932, 468) (‘if people who have all sovereign power actually 
adopt a new constitution… such new constitution becomes the new fundamental law … and supersedes 
any old constitution, and this result should also be true if only one amendment instead of an entire 
constitution is adopted’) contra Han (2010, 71) (‘Article V is exclusive for purposes of amendments, even 
as the people retain the right to abolish their government outside of Article V and indeed outside of law 
itself’.) 
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distinguished between the constituent power and the amendment power. The first is the 
power to establish a new constitution, whereas the second is the power to amend the 
text of constitutional laws currently in force, which, like every constitutional authority, is 
limited. 149 Schmitt’s doctrine is built upon a distinction between ‘the constitution’ 
(Verfassung) and ‘constitutional laws’ (Verfassungsgesetz). The constitution represents the 
polity’s constitutional identity, which cannot be amended, and constitutional laws 
regulate inferior issues. The amendment process is designed for the textual change of 
constitutional provisions, but not of fundamental political decisions that form the 
substance of the constitution:  
The authority ‘to amend the constitution’ . . . means that other constitutional 
provisions can substitute for individual or multiple ones. They may do so, 
however, only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the 
constitution as an entirety is preserved… The authority for constitutional 
amendment contains only the grant of authority to undertake changes, 
additions, extensions, deletions, etc., in constitutional provisions that preserve 
the constitution itself. It is not the authority to change the particular basis of 
this jurisdiction for constitutional revisions.150  
  
Thus, for Schmitt, an amendment cannot annihilate or eliminate the 
constitution. It cannot abolish the right to vote or a constitution’s federalist elements, or 
to transform the president into a monarch. These matters are for the constituent power of 
the people to decide, not the organs authorised to amend the constitution.151 Thus, an 
amendment that transforms a state that rests on the power of the people into a 
monarchy, or vice versa, would be unconstitutional.152 
 Olivier Beaud, for whom a hierarchical relationship exists between original 
constituent power and the revision power, further developed the substantive theory. The 
original constituent power is sovereign, while the revision power is always limited. The 
difference lies in their purpose: the former deals with fundamental provisions and the 
latter with secondary objects.153 
  
D. Integration: A Theory of Delegation 
 
Kemal Gözler argues that these two schools of thought are fundamentally irreconcilable 
on the grounds that according to the formal theory, as opposed to the substantive one, 
                                                          
149 Schmitt (2008, 150). 
150 Id.  
151 Id., 152.  
152 Id., 151. 
153 Beaud (1994, 315-9, 336-7, 439). On Beaud’s theory see Gözler (1997B, 129).  
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the derived constituent power is limited only by the formal conditions under which it 
operates.154 The thesis presented here rejects this narrow approach. The two theories 
should be regarded as mutually reinforcing, rather than exclusive. In order for the formal 
and substantive theories to coexist, the amendment power needs to be comprehended 
in terms of delegation. Delegation affords the legal framework, even if not always 
consciously articulated, to rationalize this state of affairs surrounding the nature of the 
amendment power. Alf Ross explains that:  
Delegation has, as it were, the character of a process of propagation-a new 
competence is created until further notice alongside the old one. It is precisely 
by reason of these differences that we speak, not of transfer, but of entrusting 
or delegation of competence. Further, in the concept of delegation is implied a 
vague idea that the entrusting of competence is in the nature of something 
exceptional in that it permits the delegatus to ‘appear in the role of legislator.’ 
This means that the delegatus exercises a function which, seen in the light of a 
certain presupposed norm or standard, might be expected to be exercised by 
the delegator himself.155 
 
Through the amendment provision, ‘the people’ allow a constitutional organ to 
exercise a constituent authority – the authority to constitute constitutional laws. When the 
amendment power amends the constitution, it uses a legal competence delegated to it by 
the original constituent power. 156  The amendment power is a delegated authority. This legal 
authority arises directly from the constitution. Regarding the notion of constitutional 
sovereignty, Maurice Hauriou wrote that he has ‘no liking for the theory of delegation in 
that it is a fiction and leads to a denial that governmental power is original’. 157 
Nevertheless, as elaborated in previous sections, the amendment power is not original 
per se. A distinction exists between constituent power and amendment power, the latter 
being a legal competence authorised to exercise a certain legal action – amending the 
constitution. But why does this infer limitability? Surely, one may claim – as Carlos 
Bernal has – that this is a ‘clear case of a non-sequitur’ since it does not follow from the 
distinction between original and derived constituent power that the amendment power is 
limited, ‘for it is conceptually possible for the derivative constituent power to observe 
                                                          
154 Gözler (1995, 35-44); Gözler (1999, 28-30). 
155 Ross (1958, 14).  
156 Msowoya (2013): ‘Constituent power vests in the people. The people can delegate constituent power 
to constituted powers to affect changes to the constituting document that puts constitution amendment 
beyond ordinary law making and which allows constitutional transformations responsive to social change. 
The delegation is carried through the notion of representation. Without conceiving this delegation, there 
would be no juridical means of transforming a constitution in the face of compelling social need.’ 
157 Hauriou (1917-1918, 820).  
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the procedural requirements and, at the same time, derogate the Constitution or replace 
it with a new one’.158 ‘Why does the power to amend the constitution’, Bernal asks, 
not comprise the power to change fundamental political decisions? If the 
foundation of the constitution is only a contingent social fact, namely, the result 
of a political decision, why should it be impossible to change the essential 
elements of the constitution by means of another contingent social fact, that is, 
a political decision made by means of a constitutional amendment?159  
 
Allow me to offer a reply. Modern studies of delegation now adopt the model 
of the ‘principal-agent’ in order to define the act of delegation. The one who delegates 
authority (the original constituent power) is the principal, while the one whom the authority 
is delegated to (the amendment authority) represents the agent. 160  The amendment 
power is a delegated power exercised by special constitutional agents. When the 
amendment power amends the constitution, it thus acts per procurationem of the people, 
as their agent.161 Having a principal-agent relationship, the delegated amendment power 
is subordinated to the principal power from which it draws its legal competency. Hence, 
contrary to the original constituent power, which is unlimited by previous constitutional 
provisions and procedures, the delegation of the amendment power inherently entails 
certain limitations.162  
Since the amendment power is delegated, it ought to be regarded as a trust 
conferred upon the amendment authority. ‘All delegated power is trust, and all assumed 
power is usurpation. Time does not alter the nature and quality of either’, Thomas Paine 
reminds us.163 Brutus (pseud.) repeated this idea by stating that the government’s power 
‘is a delegated power, and all delegated power, we must, as freely admit, is a trust’.164 
True, the amendment authority has the ‘supreme’ amendment power, but it is only a 
                                                          
158 Bernal (2013, 343) [see also at 348]. 
159 Id., 349. 
160 Lupia (2001, 3375-3377).  
161 See, for example, González (2002, 194-219). 
162 Banerjee and Khaitan (2008, 555-556): ‘The view of sovereign authority being vested in the people, the 
members of the body politic, with the discretion to delegate certain sovereign functions for functional 
efficiency is much more practicable for explaining constitutionalism in modern democracies. … Since the 
power to amend the constitution is part of the constitutional form; a function that is mandated to be 
exercised by the governmental functionary, who do not possess any constituent power, by it’s very 
structure, the power to amend is a limited power falling short of the power to reconstitute the 
constitutional form, which falls in the eminent domain of ‘constituent power’. If ever such power to 
amend the constitution assumes unfettered dimensions in the hands of the governmental functionary, it 
would be an unconstitutional exercise for the simple reason of being ultra vires the capacity of such 
functionary.’ 
163 Paine (2008, 238).  
164 Brutus (1827, 104). 
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fiduciary power to act for certain ends.165 The most famous exponent of this idea is John 
Locke, for whom the ‘supreme legislative power’ is ‘only a Fiduciary Power to act for 
certain ends’, and the people possess ‘a Supreme Power to remove or alter the 
Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them’. 166 
In similar vein, Edmund Burke emphasised the very nature of trust: ‘it is of the very 
essence of every trust to be rendered accountable; and even totally to cease, when it 
substantially varies from the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful 
existence’. 167  If we accept this basic premise, then consequently, if the amendment 
power is delegated, it acts as trustee. Trustee of whom? Of ‘the people’ in their original 
constituent power.168  
Delegation and trust are conceptual keys to the nature (and consequently the scope) 
of amendment powers. The trustee (the amendment authority) has a legal right of 
possession of the trust corpus (the amendment power), conditional on his fiduciary 
obligation to comply with the terms of the trust (procedural or any explicit or implicit 
substantive requirements) and pursue the ends it established to advance (‘amend the 
constitution’). Due to its nature, the trustee is always conditional and thus the fiduciary 
amendment power necessarily entails limits.169 As Akhil Amar has argued, within Art. V 
of the U.S. Constitution, the people delegated the amendment power to ordinary 
government, and limitations on the amendment power, as stipulated in Art. V, exist 
only when it is exercised by delegated powers following from the people.170 Likewise, 
William Harris correctly claims that when the sovereign constitution-maker acts as 
sovereign, ‘the notion of limits on constitutional change is inapposite’; however, ‘when 
the machinery of government is acting as the agent of the people in its sovereign 
                                                          
165 Cf., Freeman (1990-1991, 348-349): ‘In a constitutional democracy all political authority is understood 
to derive from the sovereign people who, conceived as equals, exercise their constituent power to create 
and define the nature and limits of ordinary political authority. Legislative authority is among the ordinary 
powers of government that have their source in the peoples’ constituent powers. As such it is subject to 
whatever constraints are placed upon it by the sovereign people in exercising that authority. Like any 
power of government the authority to make laws is then fiduciary and is only to be exercised for the 
public good.’ Cf. Finn (1995, 131); Fox-Decent (2011). 
166 Locke (1689, paras. 149, 367); See generally Purdy and Fielding (2007, 165). 
167 Burke (2000, 291); See Purdy and Fielding (2007, 185-186). 
168 Preuss (1992-1993, 653); Weintal (2013, 290). Compare with Chalmers (2007, 295): ‘Constituent power 
enables law-making and ordinary politics to be conceived of in terms of agency’.   
169 See, for example, Brown (1922, 240-241) (‘The Federal Constitution is not a grant of “sovereignty,” 
but a mere grant of Federal powers to a “common agency,” created to protect and preserve the rights of 
the people and to safeguard in perpetuity their sovereign power … The power of the Amending Agents is 
necessarily limited …) 
170 Amar (1988, 1054-1058); Amar (1994, 458-500); Amar (1995, 90-101). See also Bacon (1929-1930, 
777-778); Ishikawa (1996, 309).  
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capacity, the notion of limits not only makes sense; it is necessary’. 171  The legal 
framework of delegation is by itself characterised by a constraints.172  
However, one may claim that even though the amendment power is delegated, it 
is still limitless since it represents the unlimited sovereign. The representation of an 
unlimited constituent power must logically result in a similar unlimited amendment power. 
Such an argument should be rejected. There is always a hierarchical relationship 
between the grantor and the receiver: ‘creations are always inferior to their makers’.173 
As C. V. Keshavamurthy elaborates, ‘the agent is never equal of the principal… the 
Sovereignty as organised within the Constitution is the smaller and therefore cannot … 
be understood to have been vested with the full amendatory powers which the 
Sovereignty at the back of the Constitution inherently possesses’.174 This is precisely the 
distinction between original and derived constituent powers.175  
How does the theory of delegation manage to integrate the formal and 
substantive theories? First, delegation theory is not restricted to the substance of 
amendments. The amendment power must obey the procedure as prescribed in the 
constitution. Similarly, it is required to observe those explicit (not necessarily procedural, 
but also substantive) limits set upon it, as formally stipulated in the constitution.176 
Explicit limits on constitutional amendments express the idea that exercise of the 
amendment power – established by the constitution and deriving from it – must abide 
by the rules and prohibitions formally stipulated in the constitution. Again, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, these prohibitions can include substantive limits from 
different types. Second, delegation theory is not restricted to form, but also concerns 
substance. The delegated amendment power, as a rational understanding of that 
delegation, must be substantively limited, whether these limits are explicitly stated in the 
constitution or not. This is exemplified in Chapter 3 and further developed in the next 
chapter. Therefore, rather than being exclusive, the formal and substantive theories 
                                                          
171 Harris (1993, 193). 
172 Scott (1966-1967, 555).  
173 Lenowitz (2013, 87). 
174 Keshavamurthy (1982, 13, 50). See also at 78: ‘As the agent can never be the equal of the principle, 
certain limitations ought necessarily to exist regarding the quantum of power available for exercise by the 
agent. For the reason that the power available with the agent is limited, it will have to be conceded that 
the amending power vested with the representatives cannot reach to alter certain aspects vital or basic to 
the constitutional scheme.’ 
175 Interestingly, it is this idea of ‘non-transferability of sovereignty’ which stands behind the modern 
constitutional ‘non-delegation’ doctrine of legislation. See Ross (1958, 11 fn 27). On the doctrine of ‘non-
delegation’ see also Posner and Vermeule (2002B, 1721); Alexander and Prakash (2003, 1297).  
176 See Troper (2008, 11).  
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distinguishing between the constituent power and amendment power mutually reinforce 
one another.  
  
E. Terminological Clarifications  
 
1. Primary and Secondary Constituent Powers 
 
Due to the complexity of the concept of the amendment power and its relations with 
the constituent power, various versions have developed in the literature to describe these 
concepts. In the American literature, it was often common to distinguish between 
framing power and amending power – the first is the power to establish a constitution and 
the latter to amend it. 177  The German often term the amending power 
verfassungsändernden Gesetzgeber, the secondary constitutional lawgiver or amending 
legislature. 178  In French constitutional discourse, various terms have been used. 
Constituent power is often termed simply pouvoir constituant, or alternatively, pouvoir 
constituant originaire, pouvoir constituant initial, or pouvoir constituant stricto sensu. The amending 
power is often termed pouvoir constituant dérivé, pouvoir constituant institué, pouvoir de révision 
constitutionnelle, pouvoir de révision de la constitution, or even pouvoir constituant constitué.179 Some 
of these terms, as Holmes and Sunstein note, are oxymoronic. For them, the term 
derived constituent power is ‘farfetched’.180 In order to elude any confusion, Schmitt plainly 
rejectes the use of the term constituent to describe the amendment power. Similarly, 
Ramaswamy Iyer argues that the amendment power is merely a power granted to 
Parliament under the Constitution: ‘“Amending power” is a good enough term for this’, 
he claims, ‘nothing is gained by calling it “constituent power”’.181   
I agree that the oft-used terms are imprecise. Both the constitution-making and 
constitution-amending powers are constitutive in the sense that these are powers to 
constitute constitutional rules. Nonetheless the two are not identical, as this chapter 
demonstrated. As for the constitution-making power, I reject the use of the term original 
constituent power. A constitution always relates to something. Even the negation of a 
                                                          
177 Klein and Sajó (2012, 422 fn 14). 
178 Reestman (2009, 385). 
179 See Gözler (1999, 7-8). 
180 Holmes and Sunstein (1995, 276).  
181 Iyer (2006, 2065). 
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previous legal order bears a ‘relational account’.182 Moreover, a new constituent process 
must be based upon a certain prior ‘constitution-making moment’.183 It never acts in a 
pure vacuum. 184  Additionally, in practice, constitution making takes many different 
forms. 185  True, some constitutions were formed in revolutionary circumstances, 
breaking the previous constitutional order or during state building. Others were 
constituted through international efforts or imposed by foreign and external forces, 
such as the cases of Japan and Germany after 1945 or post-2003 Iraq.186 Importantly, 
the constitution-making process is often exercised in continuity with historic or existing 
laws or in accordance with pre-determined rules (Post-1989 Eastern Europe and South 
Africa).187 Therefore, constituent power is never purely original.188 It is original only in the 
sense that by its nature it does not necessarily derive from nor is bound to prior or 
existing constitutional rules.189  
Therefore, in the rest of this thesis I generally use the term primary constituent 
power to describe the basic power of constitution making. It is primary not only because it 
is the initial action, but also because it is principal in its relations with the amendment 
power. Congruently, instead of derived constituent power, I use the term secondary constituent 
power to describe the constitutional amendment power. It is secondary not merely 
because it necessarily comes (chronologically) after the constitution-making process, but 
                                                          
182 Barshack (2006, 199) (noting that ‘A moment of foundation cannot close itself to the past or to the 
future that it intends to shape. It cannot be a moment of sheer, stagnant presence, ignorant of past and 
future, a mythical time to the extreme’. For the claim that constitution-makers look to the past no less 
than to the future see Scheppele (2008, 1379). 
183 Klein and Sajó (2012, 422). 
184 Lindahl (2007, 21) (noting that exercising constituent power ‘is never a pure decision that “emanates 
from nothingness”’); Tushnet (2012-2013, 1990) (‘constitution-making does not occur on a desert island 
to which the constitution makers have just arrived. It occurs in real, historical time under real, historical 
circumstances’); Palmer (1959, 215-216) (‘No people really starts de novo; some political institutions always 
already exist; there is never a tabula rasa, or a state of nature, or Chart Blance…’) 
185 Klein and Sajó (2012, 422). 
186 See Arato (2009); Arato (2000); Arato (2006, 535); Dann and Al-Ali (2006, 423); Kemmerer (2008). See 
also Oklopcic (2012B, 81) (claiming that constituent power must be regarded in an ‘enlarged perception 
of the geographical theatre’ to include also political powers which work also externally to the political 
boundaries).  
187 Soltan (2007-2008, 1414-1416) (claiming, at 1419 that ‘If constitution making proceeds in stages … we 
must abandon Sieyes’s idea of the people as the constituent power. We build on what exists and on what 
we inherit from the past’); Arato (2012, 174) (‘the Round Table form is post-(organ) sovereign in that no 
instance, institution or person can claim to fully embody the will of ‘the people’). One may claim that in 
this case, constituent power was effectively reduced to constituted powers. For rejection of such notion 
see Botha (2010, 66).  
188  For an argument that due to the reflexive nature of the constituent power the distinction between 
original and derived constituent power is flawed see Loughlin (2013). See also Preuss (2011, 445): ‘As the 
constituent power presupposes the constituted powers, there is no division of responsibilities between 
constituted powers and constituent power: the constituent power is not an independent agent that can 
exist outside of a constitution. Constituted powers and constituent power are logically interdependent.’     
189 On the various challenges to the idea of constituent power see Oklopcic (2008, 358); Oklopcic (2012B, 
81). On the change of the traditional constitution-making process see Lollini and Palermo (2009, 301).  
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because it is subordinated to the primary constituent power and inferior to it. No doubt, old 
habits are hard to break, but this terminology of primary and secondary constituent powers 
manifests more properly these powers’ unique nature and sharpens the delicate 
distinction between them. 
 
2. Power and Authority  
 
The constitution-making power is the power possessed by the people to form a 
constitution. Therefore, it was suggested that it might be treated as a kind of a right.190 In 
contrast, the amendment power is a power authorised by the constitution. It should be 
understood as a power-in-law, a competence. Competence is ‘the legally established 
ability to create legal norms’. 191  Amendment provision establishes this ability by 
stipulating the necessary conditions (personal, procedural or substantive) for its 
exercise.192 The amendment power is thus the legal power to lay down constitutional 
rules according to an amendment process prescribed within the constitution. It is a legal 
competence conferred upon certain organs, which are empowered with the function of 
issuing constitutional norms.193  
The term power is closely related – though not identical – to authority.194 Authority 
usually refers to a power vested in an office or role, but it is a limited, restricted, and 
contained power. Authority is a power that may only be legitimately activated through 
pre-defined channels. It ‘emerges as a transformation of power in a process called 
“legitimation”’.195 Therefore, there is a correlation between authority and legitimacy (the 
latter is surely a matter of degree and could be subject to negation or denial).196 Hannah 
Arendt claims that since authority demands obedience, it is mistaken for some form of 
power. However, ‘authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where 
force is used, authority itself has failed’. 197  Arendt reminds us that the distinction 
                                                          
190 See Liangliang (2007, 41). For an argument that constituent power has to be regarded as manifestation 
of ‘political right’ see Loughlin (2013, 1). 
191 Ross (1968, 130). See also Somek (2008A, 17 fn 3) (legal power and competence are not identical since 
while legal power is ‘the ability to lay down a rule’ legal competence often extends to the permission to 
act in a certain way without the ability to lay down rules).  
192 Cf., Bulygin (1992, 203). 
193 Cf., Schmill (2000, 286, 294).  
194 See generally De Crespigny and Wertheimer (2009). See, for example, Uphoff (1989, 315): ‘Power and 
authority should not be used interchangeable, because one can have power without authority and, 
conversely, there can be authority with little if any power.’ 
195 Emerson (1962, 38). 
196 Uphoff (1989, 302-3). 
197 Arendt (1961, 93). 
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between power and authority is an ancient one, as the Roman maxim states ‘Cum potestas in 
populo auctoritas in senatu sit’ - the power is in the people and the authority is in the 
senate. 198  This proverb could mutatis mutandis apply to our analysis. While the 
aforementioned primary constituent power is a true power that rests with the people, the 
secondary constituent power – the amendment power vested in a constitutional organ – is an 
authority. It is an empowered legal competence, established by the constitution and may 
be limited by it. Therefore, throughout this thesis, I use the terms ‘amendment power’ 
and ‘amendment authority’ interchangeably. Whenever amendment power is used, it 
should be understood as a legal power.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
To sum up the argument thus far, the amendment power is a constitutional power 
delegated to a certain constitutional organ. Since it is a delegated power, it acts as a 
trustee of ‘the people’ in their capacity as a primary constituent power. As a trustee, it 
possesses only fiduciary power; hence, it must ipso facto be intrinsically limited by nature. 
Conceived in terms of delegation, certain acts by the amendment authority could be 
considered as going beyond permissible bounds, since they would flout the terms of the 
‘delegation’. Put differently, the understanding of the amendment power as a delegated 
power means that a vertical separation of powers exists between the primary and secondary 
constituent powers.199 As in the horizontal separation of powers, this separation results in a 
power-block. 200 The holder of the amendment power is not permitted to conduct any 
amendment whatsoever; he or she may be restricted from amending certain principles, 
institutions, or provisions. 
 Identifying the amendment power as a delegated authority is the first step in 
understanding its limited scope. As a delegated authority, it functions as a trustee and 
must therefore be limited. We now move on to explain how – according to this 
theoretical presupposition – the amendment power is limited. In the next chapter, I 
delve into the question of what might constitute a breach of that trust and therefore an 
impermissible amendment. 
                                                          
198 Arendt (1961, 122). For an historical account see Tuck (1974, 43).  
199  Interestingly, Schützenberger (1850, 19) wrote that there is a separation of powers between the 
constituent and legislative powers. Often, he notes, the special functions of the constituent power are 
exercised by the legislature. This is, for him, the consequent of an imperfect separation of powers.  
200 As Montesquieu (1961, 162) taught us, since ‘c’est une expérience éternelle que tout homme qui a du pouvoir est 
porté à en abuser’, we need separation of powers from preventing abuse of power.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE SCOPE OF AMENDMENT POWERS 
In Part I of this thesis, I have described various explicit and implicit limitations that may 
be imposed on the amendment power. In this part of the thesis, I suggest that such 
limitations rest on a solid theoretical ground. I began the argument in the previous 
chapter, in which it was claimed that the amendment power is not to be equated with the 
primary constituent power. It is a power established by the constitution, delegated with the 
task of amending it. Due to its nature, it was claimed that it must be limited. Based upon 
this theoretical presupposition, this chapter aims to elucidate how the amendment power 
is limited. It provides the theoretical ground that supports various explicit and implicit 
limitations on the amendment power.  
I. EXPLICIT LIMITS  
This section develops a theory for explaining unamendable provisions. First, it outlines a 
framework for understanding unamendable provisions as expressed limits that are set 
upon the amendment power and as part of the delegation theory distinguishing between 
primary and secondary constituent powers. Next, it considers the conundrum of ‘unamendable 
amendments’ and whether unamendable provisions can be circumvented by a ‘double-
amendment procedure’.   
A. The Validity of Unamendable Provisions 
 
The idea of legal entrenchment – in both constitutional and ordinary legislation – is 
debated extensively in the academic literature.1 However, when constitutions expressly 
prohibit the amendment of certain provisions or principles, constitutional entrenchment 
is taken to its extreme, hence it is often described as ‘absolute’2 or ‘indefinite’.3 Is a 
statement that a constitutional provision is unamendable valid?4 ‘There is no law which 
cannot be changed’, Ferdinand Regelsberger argued, adding that ‘a legislator … cannot 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Katz (1995-1996, 251); McGinnis and Rappaport (2003, 102); Posner and Vermeule 
(2002A, 1665); Roberts and Chemerinsky (2003, 1773); Young (2007-2008, 399); Plato (2007, 1470); Sterk 
(2003, 231); Eule (1987, 381); Brookfield (1981-1984, 603); Elkind (1987, 158); Liu (2010, 193). 
2 See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (2009); Albert (2010, 678 fn 42).  
3 Albert (2010, 672). 
4 The question whether such a provision may be enforced in court is a separate one which is dealt in 
Chapter 7. 
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control the unchangeability of a legal norm’.5 For this reason, the French unamendable 
provision of 1884 was widely criticised, with various authors claiming that while its moral 
or political value is evident, its legal effect is disputed.6 It was described as ‘a bit of 
useless verbiage’7 and ‘an empty phrase’.8 Notwithstanding such criticism, Kelsen’s view 
was that there is no reason to suppose that a norm cannot stipulate that it cannot be 
repealed: 
Contrary to a widespread opinion in the field of jurisprudence, the question 
whether norms exist which cannot be derogated must be answered in the 
positive if the question means: whether there are norms whose validity – 
according to their own meaning – cannot be repealed by a derogating norm, and 
if the question does not mean whether not every norm may lose its efficacy, and 
thereby its validity, and be replaced by another norm regulating the same subject 
matter in a different way.9 
For Kelsen, a norm could be declared as unamendable, yet such a declaration cannot 
prevent the loss of its validity by a loss of efficacy.10 Accordingly, a provision prohibiting 
any amendments is not invalid by its very nature. Moreover, since a norm forbidding 
amendment has to be considered valid, in the case of unamendable provisions, it is not 
legally possible to amend the protected provisions.11  
The theory hereby presented supports the validity of unamendable provisions, but it 
relies on questions concerning the sources of constitutional norms, building upon the 
distinction between primary and secondary constituent powers presented in Chapter 4. As 
elaborated in that chapter, a vertical separation of powers exists between primary and 
secondary constituent powers. The delegated amendment power may be restricted from 
amending certain principles, institutions, or provisions. In other words, the primary 
constituent power can place limits on the secondary constituent power. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, the motives for such restrictions and the aims those restrictions are designed to 
accomplish vary. What is clear is that the amendment power, which is a secondary 
constituent power created by the constitution and subordinate to it, is exercised solely 
through the process established within the constitution. The amendment power is bound 
by any explicit limitations that appear in the constitution, if those are set by the primary 
constituent power. I thus accept Gözler’s assertion that:  
                                                          
5 Regelsberger (1893, s. 109), quoted in Kelsen (1962, 343).  
6 Barthelemy (1924, 23).  
7 Burgess (1893, 172).  
8 Valeur (1938, 281). 
9  Kelsen (1962, 343-44). See also Kelsen (1991, 109-110).  
10 Kelsen (1962, 344). 
11 Kelsen (2007, 259).  
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The legal validity of these substantive limits is beyond dispute because they were 
laid down in the constitution by the constituent power. Therefore, the 
amendment power, being a power created and organized by constitution, is 
bound by the limits provided by the constitution.12 
Gözler’s approach is positivistic, resting on a purely textual basis. 13  Indeed, 
viewed from the perspective of the formal theory, explicit limitations on constitutional 
amendments reflect the idea that any exercise of the amendment power – established by 
the constitution and deriving from it – must abide by the rules and prohibitions 
stipulated in the constitution. These prohibitions can include substantive limits.14 In that 
respect, one can understand the claim that unamendable provisions ‘can be seen as a 
procedural constraint which can be surmounted by an entirely new constituent act’. 15 
Viewed from the perspective of the substantive theory (see Chapter 4), 
unamendable principles are an example of the fact that the amendment power may be 
limited with regard to the content of certain amendments, and can amend the 
constitution ‘only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the 
constitution as an entirety is preserved’, to use Schmitt’s words. 16  However, the 
substantive theory can only explain those unamendable provisions that aim to prevent 
fundamental changes in an effort to ensure the constitution’s integrity and the continuity 
of its constitutive principles. But as we have seen in Chapter 2, unamendable provisions, 
often carrying conflictual and bricolage aspects, may simply derive from constitutional 
compromise and contingency and cover a wide range of topics, not necessarily the basic 
principles of the constitutional order. The substantive theory cannot support these 
explicit limitations.  
The theory of delegation manages to support all types of unamendable provisions. 
The secondary constituent power, as a delegated power, acts as a trustee of the primary 
constituent power. It must obey those ‘terms’ and ‘conditions’ stipulated in the ‘trust letter’ – 
the constitution. The delegated amendment power is limited according to the conditions 
stipulated in the constitution, including various substantive limits. 
What are the legal implications of a conflict between a new constitutional 
amendment and an unamendable provision, according to the delegation theory? 
Unamendable provisions create a normative hierarchy between constitutional norms. Just 
                                                          
12 Gözler (2008, 52).  
13 The theory advanced in this thesis, as this chapter elaborates below, is much wider as it supports implicit 
limitations on the amendment power, even if not explicitly written in the constitutional text. 
14 See Troper (2008, 11).  
15 See Rivers (2002, xxi).  
16 Schmitt (2008, 150).  
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as an ordinary law prevails over an administrative regulation, and a constitutional law 
prevails over an ordinary law, 17  a constitutional provision established by the primary 
constituent power prevails over constitutional provisions established by the secondary 
constituent power. When resolving conflicts between constitutional provisions 
(unamendable provisions contrasted with later amendments), the paramount factor is not 
their chronological order of enactment (lex posterior derogat priori), but rather, the sources 
of these constitutional norms. Thus, the constituent power is divided conforming to a 
hierarchy of powers – primary and secondary – governed by the principle lex superior derogat 
inferiori; the constitutional rule issued by a higher hierarchical authority prevails over that 
issued by a lower hierarchical authority. Just as ordinary legislation retreats when it 
conflicts with constitutional norms, so do constitutional amendments retreat when they 
conflict with unamendable provisions. 18 In other words, a future amendment conflicting 
with an unamendable provision is not formulated by the same authority, but rather, by an 
inferior one – the secondary constituent power. Since the primary constituent power is an authority 
that is superior to the secondary one, the normative creations of the latter should withdraw 
when conflicting with that of the former.19  
Unamendable provisions may lose their validity when they face a conflicting valid 
norm that was formulated by the same authority.20 Therefore, as elaborated in Chapter 6, 
unamendable provisions cannot limit the primary constituent power; they ‘invite’ it to be 
resurrected in order to change unamendable subjects.21  
 
B. An Unamendable Amendment? 
 
Unamendable provisions raise a unique difficulty when an amendment stipulates by its 
own terms that it may not be subject to amendments; an ‘unamendable amendment’. 
This is not a hypothetical scenario. The original French unamendability of the republican 
form of government was inserted into the 1875 Constitution through an amendment in 
                                                          
17 Cappelletti and Adams (1965-1966, 1214).  
18 I thus endorse the claim of González (2002, 131,153) that one has to distinguish between the kind of 
popular sovereign-generated and legislature-generated constitutional provisions which are hierarchically 
ordered so that when an irreconcilable conflict between them occurs, the former trump the latter, 
regardless of which norm is of more recent.  
19 This is not merely the question of which constitutional norm takes priority in a conflict between two 
constitutional norms, but the issue can affect the validity of the conflicting inferior constitutional norm. A 
court can declare the constitutional provision that conflicts with an unamendable constitutional provision 
to be invalid. On the distinction between the questions of validity and priority when constitutional norms 
conflict see Feldman (2011, 137-139). On judicial review of constitutional amendments see Chapter 7. 
20 Cf., Kelsen (1962, 344). 
21 Weintal (2005, 12-13, 19).  
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1884, stimulating lively debate among scholars.22 Similarly, in 1861, the original proposal 
for a 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, known as the ‘Corwin Amendment’, 
‘eternally’ prohibited Congress from abolishing slavery: ‘No amendment shall be made to 
the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress power to abolish or interfere, 
within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to 
labor or service by the laws of said State’. 23 The Corwin Amendment was passed by both 
the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate in 1861, and was ratified by Ohio, 
Maryland, and Illinois. The ratification process was only put on hold due to the civil war’s 
intervention, and the final 13th Amendment abolished slavery.24 
The distinction between primary and secondary constituent power provides a simple 
solution to this conundrum. As only the primary constituent power can limit the secondary 
constituent power, unamendable amendments lose their validity when they face a conflicting 
norm formulated by the same authority. Accordingly, provisions created by the amendment 
power could subsequently be amended by the amendment power itself. For that reason, I 
disagree with the argument that as an unamendable amendment, the Corwin Amendment 
could not have been altered. 25  A better argument is that an ‘implicit limit’ exists, 
according to which ‘an amendment cannot establish its own unamendability’. 26 
Limitations upon the amendment power, which is a delegated authority, can be imposed 
solely by the higher authority from which it is derived – the primary constituent power.27  
                                                          
22 For example, Esmein (1928, 545, 549) believed that the national assembly exercises constituent power 
but only according to the conditions stipulated within the constitution itself. Hence, the provision 
successfully limits the amendment power on this matter. Duguit (1924, 538-541), adopted the contrary 
view, according to which the national assembly had all the powers of a constituent assembly, thus it could 
even change the form of government. See also Garner (1935, 537): ‘Such provisions are highly 
objectionable on grounds of public policy and are of doubtful validity. They rest on the assumption that 
their authors are infallible and that they have a right to bind future generations to accept as final what they 
have decreed’; Munro (1938, 393): the provision ‘would be no legal barrier if a future national assembly 
should decide to do what it forbids. There is no way in which a sovereign body can limit its successors’ 
(cited also in Anonymous (1926, 228)); Burgess (1893, 172): ‘there is not power…outside of the Assembly 
to hold it to this pledge. It is, therefore, only a self-limitation, which the Assembly may, at any moment, 
remove through the exercise of the same power by which it was imposed’.   
23 Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1263 (1861). See Vile (2003, 175). According to Albert (2013A), 
another way of reading the Corwin Amendment is not as making slavery absolutely unamendable but only 
as restricting congressional power.   
24 On the Corwin Amendment see generally Bryant (2003, 501); Brandon (1995, 215); Brandon (1998, 136-
38); Vorenberg (2001, 21-22). 
25 Friedman (2011, 80).  
26 Greenawalt (1987, 633). 
27 Da Silva (2004, 460). See also Machado (2012, 288): ‘in principles, the enactment of entrenchment 
clauses is a prerogative of the original constituent power. … it may be possible to introduce secondary 
entrenchment clauses if …their fuction is to declare the previous existence of implictly primary 
entrenchment clauses.’ Here, an interesting question arises; what if an amendment was enacted not through 
the ordinary amendment process, rather through an invocation of the primary constituent power (see Chapter 
6). Then, according to the same logic, since it is a norm enacted by the higher authority, it would be 
possible for it to establish its unamendability.  
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C. Amending Unamendable Provisions 
 
Most of the world’s unamendable provisions are non-self-entrenched provisions, i.e. they 
establish the unamendability of certain constitutional subjects but they are themselves 
not entrenched. 28  Can non-self-entrenched provisions be amended? As a matter of 
practice, the answer is positive. In 1989, the unamendable provision in the Portuguese 
Constitution of 1976 (Art. 288) was itself amended and the unamendable principle of 
collective ownership of means of production was omitted, in order to comply with the 
European Community’s norms and in the the context of the collapse of communism.29 
Da Cunha notes that this amendment ‘has always shocked us because it undermines the 
standard meaning and thus causes the Constitution to lose all of its enforceability.’30 In 
an attempt to solve the complexity produced by this amendment, scholars have 
developed various theories surrounding Art. 288. Recall, Art. 288 is very detailed, 
protecting no less than fourteen subject matters from amendment, not all of which can 
be described as the basic principles of the constitutional order (see Chapter 2). Therefore, 
some have claimed that a distinction has to be drawn between unamendable provisions 
that are connected to the constitution’s identity and those that are not, the former being 
truly unamendable, whereas the latter – unamendable provisions of a second degree – are 
amendable.31 This theory of unamendable provisions of a second degree is incompatible 
with the theory of delegation advocated for in this thesis.32 Importantly, the court was 
never asked to review the validity of this controversial amendment.33  
There are three theoretical approaches for solving the challenge posed by non-self-
entrenched provisions. According to the first approach, if unamendable provisions are 
non-self-entrenched, unamendable principles or provisions may be amended in a double 
amendment procedure. The first stage is to repeal the provision prohibiting certain 
                                                          
28 This is, for example, the situation with regard to Bulgarian Const. (1991), art. 57; the German Basic Law 
(1949), art. 79; the Romanian Const. (1991), art. 14. See Elster (2000B, 102). 
29 Comella (2009, 207 fn 39). On the unamendable provision in the Portuguese Constitution see also 
Machado (2012, 286-287, 296-297). 
30  Da Cunha (2013, 25).  
31  See Miranda (1990, 524); Medeiros (2007, 931); both cited in Pereira (2012).  
32  According to an alternative explanation, the Portuguese amendment provision requires a normally 
waiting period of five years since the previous revision, before amending the Constitution (art. 284.1). This 
waiting period could be waived by a majority of four-fifths of The Assembly of the Republic (art. 284.2). 
Since during this waiting period, at least one mandate-conferring election will normally take place, one may 
claim that this time-consuming process, which ‘encourages the derived constituent power to think twice 
before doing away with a fundamental constitutional provision’ (Machado (2012, 281)), and involves 
popular involvement through elections, is a manifestation of a strong secondary constituent power, which ought 
not to be as limited as ordinary amendment powers. This issue is further elaborated in the next chapter. 
33 In fact, the Portuguese unamendable provision has never been invoked in order to invalidate a proposed 
amendment. See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (2009, para. 213).  
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amendments through an amendment, an act that is not in itself a violation of the 
constitution. The second stage is to amend the previously unamendable principle or 
provision, which is no longer protected from amendments. 34  This approach finds 
supporters in the French,35 Norwegian,36 and American37 debates.  
According to the second approach, there is no need for a two-stage process as the 
unamendable provision and the protected subject could both be repealed in the same act. 
As Douglas Linder puts it, ‘only a hide-bound formalist would contend that the 
difference [between one and two amendments] is significant’. 38  Substantively, the 
outcome is similar.  
The third approach rejects such attempts by the amendment power to circumvent 
limitations that are set upon it. At the outset, it is important to admit that from a purely 
practical point of view, in order to avoid the double amendment procedure tactic, a 
clever constitution-maker would draft self-entrenched unamendable provisions, i.e. 
unamendable provisions that by their express terms not only prohibit amendments of 
certain subjects, but also prohibit amendments to themselves (a ‘double entrenchment 
mechanism’39). True, the unamendable provision cannot, as Vedel puts it, ‘be given to a 
jailer who will guard its intangibility’,40 but it could be self-entrenched. This mechanism, 
which exists in several constitutions,41 could block the aforementioned loophole.42  
I argue that even if unamendable provisions are not self-entrenched, they should 
be implicitly recognised as unamendable. Georges Liet-Veaux famously described the use 
of the French Third Republic’s legal devices in order to form the Vichy regime as ‘Fraude 
a la Constitution’. 43  Whereas the double-amendment procedure, which Walter Murphy 
described as a ‘sleazy escape route’, 44  may be tolerable from a purely formalistic 
perspective, such a legal manoeuvre may also be regarded as ‘fraud upon the 
constitution’. From a practical point of view, if unamendable provisions could be 
                                                          
34 Da Silva (2004, 456-458).  
35 Bermann and Picard (2008, 13); Vedel (1949, 117), cited in Klein (2011).   
36 See debate in Smith (2011, 375). 
37 Tribe (2000, 111-114). For support and opposition of this approach within the American debate see 
Orfield (1942, 85). 
38 Linder (1981, 729).  
39 Lumb (1978, 170). On the logical problems inherent in ‘self-referring laws’ see Suber (1990); Hart (1983, 
170); Ross (1969, 1).   
40 Cited in Klein (2011,  fn 10). 
41 See, for example, Armenia Const. (1995), art. 114; Bosnia and Herzegovina Const. (1995), art. X2; 
Honduras Const. (1982), art. 374; Niger Const. (2010), art. 177; Rwanda Const. (2003), art. 193. 
42 See Joseph and Walker (1987, 159). 
43 Liet-Veaux (1943, 116), cited in Klein (1996, 153-156).    
44 Murphy (2007, 504). See also Amar (2006, 293) (calling it ‘sly scheme’) and Baker (1994, 340 fn.47) 
(calling it ‘disingenuous’).  
 ~116 ~ 
 
amended by means of the same procedure required to amend other provisions, they 
would almost be devoid of meaning.45 Why almost? The declaration of unamendability 
remains important even if conceived as eventually amendable because its removal would 
still necessitate political and public deliberations regarding the protected constitutional 
subject. Such deliberations grant the unamendable provision important role. Moreover, 
the unamendability adds a procedural hurdle – and thus, a better protection – since the 
double amendment process is still procedurally more difficult than a single amendment 
process. Lastly, the unamendability of a provision might have a ‘chilling effect’, leading to 
hesitation before repealing the so-called unamendable subject.46  
It is true that, formally speaking, by amending the non-self-entrenched 
unamendable provision (the first stage), the amendment authority prima facie purports to 
act within the limits of its lawful powers. However, it is clear that substantively, it 
transgresses those limits. In 1867, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that ‘what cannot be 
done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not with 
shadows’. 47  Indeed, this maxim, without which constitutional provisions ‘would be 
meaningless’,48 equally applies with regards to the amendment power. Therefore, Jason 
Mazzone is correct in claiming that unamendable provisions should be given a purposive 
interpretation according to which they are implicitly self-entrenched. 49  The double-
amendment procedure should therefore be rejected on both theoretical and practical 
grounds.50  
II. IMPLICIT LIMITS 
In Chapter 3, we have learned that in many jurisdictions, courts have ascertained a 
certain constitutional core, a set of basic constitutional principles which form the 
constitution’s identity and which cannot be abrogated through the amendment 
procedure. In this section, I argue that the global trend of recognising implicit limits on 
the amendment power rests on a solid theoretical basis and is compatible with the 
general thesis presented in this work. 
                                                          
45 Da Silva (2004, 470); Han (2010, 91).  
46 Mazzone (2004-2005, 1818). 
47 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325 (1867); see also Orfield (1929-1930, 577). 
48 Singh (1966, 278, 286-287). 
49 Mazzone (2004-2005, 1818).  
50 For a similar approach see Klein (1999B, 37-38); Derosier (2007, 5); and Schwartzberg (2009, 9). To 
reiterate, in rejecting the double-amendment procedure, I do not claim that unamendable provisions are 
‘eternal’, since even self-entrenched unamendable provisions can be circumvented by acts of the primary 
constituent power.       
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A. Foundational Structuralism 
The first implied limitation derived from the theory of delegation is the most basic: the 
constitutional amendment power cannot be used in order to destroy the constitution. The delegated 
amendment power is the internal method that the constitution provides for its self-
preservation. By destroying the constitution, the delegated power subverts its own raison 
d'être and achieves nothing.51 As Michael Paulsen notes:  
The Constitution itself embraces an overriding principle of constitutional and 
national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of construction… The 
Constitution is not a suicide pact; and, consequently, its provisions should not be 
construed to make it one, where an alternative construction is fairly possible.52  
 This postulation applies equally to amendment provisions. 53  The amendment 
authority entrusted with the amendment power cannot use this power in order to destroy 
the very same instrument from which its authority streams and on which it is built.54 
Thomas Cooley wrote in 1893 that the U.S. Constitution’s framers abstained from 
forbidding changes that would be incompatible with the Constitution’s spirit and 
purpose, simply because they did not believe that those would be possible under the 
terms of the amendment process itself. An amendment converting a democratic 
republican government into an aristocracy or a monarchy would not be an amendment, 
but rather a revolution. His metaphor with regards to the amending power is 
astoundingly clear:  
The fruit grower does not forbid his servants engrafting the with-hazel or the 
poisonous sumac on his apple trees; the process is forbidden by a law higher and 
more imperative than any he could declare, and to which no additional force 
could possibly by given by re-enactment under this orders.55  
 The amendment power was introduced for the purpose of preserving the 
constitution, not destroying it. This idea is compatible with Schmitt’s claim that 
constitutional amendment is not constitutional annihilation or elimination, 56 and with 
                                                          
51 Child (1926, 28).   
52 Paulsen (2003-2004, 1257).  
53 This was acknowledged in Kesavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, 1426: ‘Article 368 
cannot be construed as to embody the death wish of the Constitution or provide sanction for what may 
perhaps be called as lawful “Harakiri.”’ See Khanna (1977, 11); Keshavamurthy (1982, 86).    
54 Bernal (2013, 353): ‘That the derivative constituent power has the power to modify the constitution 
necessarily presupposes that a constitution must exist prior to and following the exercise of this power.’ 
55 Cooley (1893, 118-120). For a similar argument that the framers of the U.S. Constitution regarded the 
amendment power as limited see Magnusson (2010, 415). 
56 Schmitt (2008, 150).  
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Marbury’s declaration that ‘the power to “amend” the Constitution was not intended to 
include the power to destroy it’.57 Even in the absence of any explicit limitations, the 
amendment power clearly cannot be used in order to abolish the constitution. This 
would be a blatant breach of the trust.  
 The idea of implicit limits on the amendment power might be analogue to Wesley 
Hohfeld’s scheme of jural correlatives. According to Hohfeld, a legal power is the 
correlative of legal liability. Hohfeld notes that upon the creation of an agency power, 
‘the agent is subject to a liability of having his power “revoked” or divested by the 
principal’.58 I claim that not only does ‘the creation of an agency relation involve[s], inter 
alia, the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent, and the creation of correlative 
liabilities in the principal’,59 but also liabilities upon the agent. Put differently, alongside 
the legal constitutional amendment power rests the liability not to undermine the same 
constitution itself. ‘To be sure’, Ulrich Preuss recently wrote, ‘the authority to revise the 
constitution does not include the authority to create a completely new constitution’.60 To 
amend the constitution as to destroy it and create a new constitution would be an action 
ultra vires; a usurpation of the amendment power that ‘the people’ have not delegated to 
the amendment authority.61 ‘It is time’, Upendra Baxi was correct to urge us, ‘that we 
commit ourselves to a categorical assertion that the power to change the Constitution 
cannot be permitted to become the power to destroy it’.62 
 The second limitation derives from the first one, but it is one logical step forward: 
the constitutional amendment power cannot be used in order to destroy the basic principles of the 
constitution.63 The constitution, in that respect, is not the mere formal existence of the 
document, but rather it includes the constitution’s essential features. Each constitution 
has certain fundamental core values or principles, which form the ‘the spirit of the 
constitution’.64 As Gerhard Anschutz wrote in 1922 on the democratic principle that 
guided the Weimar Constitution of 1919, it is ‘the spirit that pervades the whole’.65 This 
is what I term the foundational structuralist perception of constitutions. According to this 
perception, constitutions are not merely ‘power maps’ that reflect the political power 
                                                          
57 Marbury (1919-1920, 225).  
58 Hohfeld (1917, 727). 
59 Hohfeld (1913, 46).  
60 Preuss (2011, 435). 
61 Weintal (2013, 289). 
62 Baxi (1978, 143). 
63 Cf., Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. See Krishnaswamy (2010, 74).  
64 Morse (1948-1949, 199). Skinner (1919-1920, 221-225) terms it the ‘essential form and character of 
government’ and Williams (1928, 536) terms it the constitution’s ‘fundamental elements and principles.’  
65 Anschutz (2002, 146). 
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distribution within the polity.66 They are more than instruments of empowerment and 
restrictions. They reflect certain basic political-philosophical principles, which form the 
constitution’s foundational substance, its essence.67 The constitution is structured upon 
these basic principles and it is no longer the same without them. Just as the amendment 
power cannot destroy the constitution, it cannot destroy the constitution’s fundamental 
principles. Ernst Rudolf Huber, a student of Carl Schmitt,68 is infamous for his support 
of the Nazi regime. At the same time, his claim regarding the ordering of constitutional 
norms is important:   
Every constitution consists essentially of such principles, which determine the 
totality of the constitutional order and make up the “spirit of the constitution.” 
There is no equality of rank among the numerous provisions of a written 
constitutional document. The main principles of the common order have clear 
priority; the remaining legal precepts are derived from them. … One can say of a 
constitution that it is valid only so long as this core of the constitution maintains 
its existence. If the core of the constitution is destroyed, then the entire 
constitution is wiped out, even if individual constitutional precepts of inferior 
rank continue to be legally valid.69  
That is, when the amendment power alters the basic essential principles of the 
constitution, it ‘substantially varies’ from the purpose for which it was originated. It no 
longer amends the constitution but constitutes a new one. Since an amendment cannot 
annihilate or eliminate the constitution, amending its basic elements and principles is 
prohibited, just as eliminating the constitution is prohibited. As Eivind Smith wrote, ‘if 
certain [unamendable] principles, values, and norms … are seriously altered, the life of 
the constitution has actually come to an end. From its ashes, a new political regime 
emerges’.70 The alteration of the constitution’s core results in the collapse of the entire 
constitution and its replacement by another. 71  This is the basic rationale behind the 
Indian basic structure doctrine and the Colombian Constitutional Replacement Doctrine 
(see Chapter 3). As S.P. Sathe explains, a constitutional amendment ‘has to be according 
to the method provided in the Constitution … Total abrogation of the Constitution, 
which is what we mean by destruction of its basic structure, cannot be comprehended by 
                                                          
66 Ducháček (1973). 
67 Note that foundational structuralism is not to be understood in terms of natural law, rather as the ‘”spirit” of 
legality that pervades the forms of constitutionalism to which societies commit themselves.’ See Walters 
(2008, 261). 
68 Although Huber distanced himself from Schmitt. See Mehring (1999-2000, 1654-1655).  
69 Huber (2002, 328). 
70 Smith (2011, 369). 
71 Conrad (1970, 418-419). 
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the Constitution’.72 Thus, Schmitt was right to argue that the amendment process is not 
designed for modifying the fundamental decisions forming the constitution’s substance, 
since such modification results in a new constitution, not in the amendment of the same 
constitution. Such constitutive acts are for the people’s primary constituent power, not the 
delegated authorised organs.73   
 The third limitation is that the amending power, like any governmental institution, must act 
in bona fide.74 Based on the theory of delegation, this section argues that the amendment 
power is not the power to destroy the constitution. Constitutional destruction, Dietrich 
Conrad remarked, can also occur ‘by using the form of amendment to directly exercise 
other constitutional functions in given cases, disregarding constitutional limitations and 
upsetting the constitutional disposition of powers’.75 Conrad states that even Richard 
Thoma, who otherwise opposed any notion of implicit limitations on the amendment 
power,76 maintained that parliament could not, for example, dissolve itself in violation of 
normal prescribed procedures, or pass a bill of attainder.77 A ‘government with limited 
powers of legislation’, A. M. Holding wrote, ‘and at the same time, with unlimited 
powers of legislation, would be an absurdity’, thus claiming that ‘no enactment, in 
substance purely legislative, should be permitted to become a part of the Constitution’.78 
I agree that if the material of an amendment is not commonly ‘constitutional’79– i.e. it is 
ordinarily legislative in nature – this raises suspicions that the provision is being given a 
constitutional status solely in order to ‘shield’ it from judicial review. 80  The overall 
surrounding circumstances that led to the decision to amend the constitution in such a 
way are imperative in the analysis of whether the amending power is being abused or 
not.81 Ravneet Kaur writes with relation to the Constitution of Singapore that:  
                                                          
72 Sathe (1978, 187). 
73 Schmitt (2008, 152). 
74 Rama Rao (1978, 112). 
75 Conrad (1977-78, 17). 
76 Richard Thoma believed that the parliamentary system with proportional representation can create a 
genuine democratic decision-making process. Therefore he argued that theoretically the Parliament had 
unlimited amending power. See Caldwell (2002, 153). Thoma (2002, 163) argued that ‘the opinion that … 
Article 76 cannot be without limits…fails to appreciate the idea…of free, democratic self-determination’.  
77 Thoma (1929, 40ff), cited in Conrad (1977-78, 17). 
78 Holding (1923, 489-490). 
79  Constitutions usually include provisions regarding basic governmental structures and the relations 
between the main powers and functions of government; basic values and commitments; and human rights. 
See Gavison (2002, 89).  
80  See, for example, Friedrich (1963B, 221): ‘the constitutional legislator … has only the one function of 
amending the constitution, in accordance with procedures contained in the constitution. That is the only, 
and therefore very limited, competence of the constitutional legislator. He (or they) can neither make laws 
and ordinances nor take measures, but is limited to his one function.’ 
81 Cf., Israeli Supreme Court decision in HCJ 4908/10 Knesset Member Bar-On v. The Knesset (Apr. 7, 2010), 
regarding a temporary constitutional basic law which deviated from the established rule of annual budget 
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The strongest protection against abuse of the amending power is to freeze the 
Constitution. This, however, is an extreme step which creates an unnecessary 
barrier to progressive future amendments. Yet, it is important that there exist 
certain checks to ensure that Constitutional amendments are not arbitrarily or 
unfairly passed. … the Basic Features Doctrine … reflect[s] attempts by the 
various systems to find a balance between the two.82  
The doctrine of implicit limitations on the amendment power is thus a method to 
protect the constitution against the possibility that ‘the legislature of the day, hijacked by 
individual, group and institutional interests and temporary impulses or permanent 
passions may use its authority to inflict torture on the Constitution’. 83 This fear from 
abuse of the amendment power is not a mere theoretical presupposition. As the lessons 
from India, among other places, teach us, it is built upon historical evidence.  
 
B. Hierarchy of Constitutional Values 
 
The comprehension of the constitution in terms of foundational structuralism necessitates an 
acknowledgment of two notions: that of a hierarchy of constitutional values or principles 
and that of a constitution’s identity.  
 A constitution is ‘a rich lode of principles’.84 But not all constitutional principles 
are equally basic.85 The German jurisprudence on this idea is instructive. The German 
Basic Law is regarded as having an integrated structure and a hierarchical scheme of 
principles, including basic principles of government and human rights, with human 
dignity at the apex. This was recognised by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
early in 1951 in the Southwest case:  
A constitution has an inner unity, and the meaning of any one part is linked to 
that of other provisions. Taken as a unit, a constitution reflects certain 
overarching principles and fundamental decisions to which individual provisions 
of the Basic Law are subordinate.86 
 Drawing from German jurisprudence, Walter Murphy consistently argued that 
constitutions in constitutional democracies present not simply a set of values, but rather 
                                                                                                                                                                      
requirement by permitting a bi-yearly budget for 2011 and 2012. The Supreme Court held that temporary 
requiring a bi-yearly instead of yearly review did not amount to harm of the regime’s basic principles that 
would justify nullification of the basic law.   
82 Kaur (1994, 266). 
83 Guha and Tundawala (2008, 537). 
84 Ackerman (1989-1990, 525). 
85 Macedo (1990, 182). 
86  1 BVerfGE 14, 32 (1951); see Kommers (1989, 54-55); Kommers (1991, 852); Leibholz (1952, 723). 
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a hierarchy or ordering of values. This system of values precludes the possibility of 
adopting an amendment that would infringe human dignity. 87  Elsewhere, Murphy 
claimed that also the right to privacy is so deeply embedded in the constitution that 
removing it would abrogate the constitution altogether.88 Murphy’s claims became central 
to American constitutional debates. John Rawls, for example, defended a similar view, 
according to which amendments are not intended to disassemble the constitution’s 
structure or repeal constitutional essential. For Rawls, the 1st Amendment’s protections 
are ‘entrenched in the sense of being validated by long historical practice. They may be 
amended but not simply repealed and reversed.... The successful practice of its ideas and 
principles over two centuries place restrictions on what can now count as an amendment, 
whatever was true at the beginning’. 89  Relating to Rawls’ proposal, Samuel Freeman 
accepts the existence of 1st Amendment freedoms so basic that their amendment would 
amount to illegitimate constitutional suicide. 90  By the same token, Stephen Macedo 
suggests that amendments that expunge basic guarantees or eliminate fundamental rights 
and freedoms that are essential to the process of free and rational self-government aim to 
revolutionise rather than amend. 91  Even Laurance Tribe, who calls for a reserved 
judiciary role with regard to constitutional amendments,92 seems willing to embrace the 
notion that some principles are so fundamental to the constitutional order and so 
logically central to the system’s coherence that they can be regarded as indispensable to 
the system’s legitimacy. Tribe recently wrote that some amendments, even harsh ones 
such as allowing torture in certain circumstances, while being objectionable could not be 
said to be ‘beyond the pale as a constitutional matter if adopted in accordance with Article 
v’. This might seem to be a rejection of any implicit limits. But then, Tribe continues to 
note that ‘it may well be that some properly adopted formal amendments could 
themselves be deemed “unconstitutional” because of their radical departure from 
premises too deeply embedded to be repudiated without a full-blown revolution’.93   
 These leading constitutionalist and liberal political philosophers seem to share with 
Carl Schmitt the essential notion of substantive implicit limitations on the amendment 
                                                          
87 Murphy (1979-1980, 756-757). See also Murphy (1987, 12-14); Murphy (1992B, 141-146); Murphy (1995, 
163); Murphy (2007, 497-529).  
88 Murphy (1990, 213). 
89 Rawls (1993, 238-239). See further Kelbley (2003-2004, 1503-1506). 
90 Freeman (1994, 663). 
91 Macedo (1990, 183). 
92 Tribe (1983, 433). 
93  Tribe (2008, 33-34) mentions there amendments repealing the republican form of government or 
repudiating the rule of law, as examaples for radical amendments which might be deemed void.  
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power.94 This thesis defends a similar view based on the distinction between primary and 
secondary constituent powers. As aforementioned, being a delegated authority, the amendment 
power must be conceived as inherently limited.  
 The claim for recognition of a hierarchy of constitutional values is not immune 
from criticism. Kemal Gözler, for example, argues that even if there might be a moral 
difference between constitutional norms, there is no hierarchy, since they do not derive 
their validity from one another.95 More recently, Richard Albert criticised any attempt to 
create a hierarchy of constitutional norms:  
Ranking constitutional provisions by irretrievably bestowing extraordinary status on 
one over others is a perilous practice because it threatens to deplete the text of its 
intrinsic value as an institution whose authority applies equally, fairly and predictably 
to citizens and the state.96  
  
These criticisms seem to be based on a misapprehension of the idea behind the hierarchy 
of constitutional values with respect to implicit limitations on the amendment power 
within a foundational structuralist analysis.  
A foundational structuralist analysis of the constitution does not necessary require the 
picking of a certain secluded constitutional provision, as ‘an isolated island’; rather, it 
indeed urges us to look at the constitution as a whole.97 As Conrad writes: ‘there are, 
beyond the wording of particular provisions, systematic principles underlying and 
connecting the provisions of the Constitution ... [which] give coherence to the 
Constitution and make it an organic whole’. 98  In his early writings, which were so 
influential to the Indian endorsement of the basic structure doctrine, Conrad used the 
metaphor of pillars to explain the unamendability of basic constitutional principles: ‘any 
amending body organized within the statutory scheme, however verbally unlimited its 
power, cannot by its very structure change the fundamental pillars supporting its 
constitutional authority’. 99 This sentence was quoted verbatim by Khanna J. in 
Kesavananda,100 and was persuasive in the judgment of Shahabuddin Ahmed in Chowdhury v. 
Bangladesh: ‘The constitution stands on certain fundamental principles which are its 
structural pillars and if those pillars are demolished or damaged the whole constitutional 
                                                          
94 For a comparison between Schmitt and Rawls on this point see Colón- Ríos (2010A, 221-228). 
95 Gözler (1997A, 109). 
96 Albert (2010, 683). 
97  See Tribe (1987, 172): ‘it is, after all, a constitution and not just a disjointed collection of constitutional 
pieces which must be interpreted.’ 
98 Conrad (2003, 186).  
99 Conrad (1970, 379).  
100 AIR 1973 SC 1861, para 1431. 
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edifice will fall down’.101 Conrad later remarked that, ‘the graphical appeal almost by itself 
has the force on an argument’, 102  highlighting the power of metaphors within legal 
argumentation. The powerful metaphor of the pillars that hold the constitutional 
structure corresponds with the foundational structuralism perspective endorsed in this thesis.  
As a matter of fact, even to those who do not regard the constitution as a structure but 
as an organic instrument, the argument of unamendable basic principles, which provide 
meaning for the greater whole, remains coherent. The metaphor of a living constitution is 
usually used in its interpretive meaning, i.e. that the language of the document should 
evolve through judicial decisions according to the changing environment of society.103 A 
constitution’s amendment process provides another mechanism for such evolution, as a 
‘built-in provision for growth’.104 Prima facie, the view that a constitution must develop 
over time supports a broad use of the amendment power. Nevertheless, even if we 
conceive of the constitution as a living tree, which must evolve with the nation’s growth 
and develop with its philosophical and cultural advancement, it has certain roots that 
cannot be uprooted through the growth process.105 In other words, the metaphor of a 
living tree captures the idea of certain constraints: ‘trees, after all, are rooted, in ways that 
other living organisms are not’. 106  These roots are the basic principles of a given 
constitution. See the words of Carl Friedrich:  
A constitution is a living system. But just as in a living, organic system, such as 
the human body, various organs develop and decay, yet the basic structure or 
pattern remains the same with each of the organs having its proper functions, so 
also in a constitutional system the basic institutional pattern remains even 
though the different component parts may undergo significant alterations. For it 
is the characteristic of a system that it perishes when one of its essential 
component parts is destroyed.107  
 Therefore, it is not merely a matter of which principles are more fundamental than 
others. It is not an exercise of ‘ranging over the constitutional scheme to pick out 
elements that might arguably be more fundamental in the hierarchy of values’, William 
Harris correctly claimed, adding that: ‘a Constitutional provision would be fundamental 
only in terms of some articulated political theory that makes sense of the whole 
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Constitution’.108 The idea of a hierarchy of norms within foundational structuralism is to 
examine whether a constitutional principle or institution is so basic to the constitutional 
order that changing it – and looking at the whole constitution - would be to change the 
entire constitutional identity. 
C. Constitutional Identity 
 
‘A constitution’, Peter Häberle states, ‘is not merely a juridical text or a normative set of 
rules, but also an expression of a cultural state of development, a means of cultural 
expression by the people, a mirror of cultural heritage and the foundation of its 
expectations’.109 Constitutions are designed to reflect society’s identity and delineate the 
highest principles shared by the state’s citizens.110 Each constitutional system has its own 
basic principles.111 A constitutional identity, as Gary Jacobsohn shows, represents ‘a mix 
of aspirations and commitments expressive of a nation’s past’.112 It is defined by the 
intermingling of universal values with the nation’s particularistic history, customs, values, 
and aspirations.113 Jacobsohn observes that constitutional identity is never a static thing, 
as it emerges from the interplay of inevitably disharmonic elements. But changes to the 
constitutional identity, ‘however significant, rarely culminate in a wholesale 
transformation of the constitution’. 114 This is because a nation usually aims to remain 
faithful to a ‘basic structure’, which comprises its constitutional identity. ‘It is changeable’, 
he writes, ‘but resistant to its own destruction’.115  
 The identity, for foundational structuralism theory, is ‘the normative identity of the 
Constitution, supported by a coherent interpretation of its core constitutional principles 
or basic features’. 116  Changing this identity would result in the formation of a new 
constitution. The constitutional identity is the constitution’s ‘genetic code’: 
Every constitutional arrangement is based upon a set of core principles which 
cannot be changed and which can be regarded as intrinsic to its specific 
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identity… These superconstitutional provisions could be referred to as the 
genetic code of the constitutional arrangements.117 
 This idea may extend back to Aristotle, who believed that a polis should be 
identified with its constitution.118 Aristotle asked, ‘on what principles ought we to say that 
a state has retained its identity, or, conversely, that it has lost its identity and become a 
different state?’ Aristotle’s answer was that the identity of the polis changes when its 
constitution is altered due to a disruption of its essential commitments: ‘a change in the 
polis’s identity cannot be considered a mere reform, but the birth of a new regime’.119 
This is crucial for the idea of implicit limitations on the amendment power, as Water 
Murphy argues:    
Thus an “amendment” corrects or modifies the system without fundamentally 
changing its nature: An “amendment” operates within the theoretical parameters 
of the existing Constitution. A proposal to transform a central aspect of the 
compact to create another kind of system – for example, to change a 
constitutional democracy into an authoritarian state … – would not be an 
amendment at all, but a re-creation of both the covenant and its people. That 
deed would lie outside the authority of any set of governmental bodies, for all 
are creatures of the people’s agreement.120 
 
 In other words, constitutional changes should not be tantamount to constitutional 
metamorphosis.121 Conversely, one should not confuse constitutional preservation with 
constitutional stagnation. As Joseph Raz writes:  
The law of the constitution lies as much in the interpretive decisions of the 
courts as in the original document that they interpret … But … it is the same 
constitution. It is still the constitution adopted two hundred years ago, just as a 
person who lives in an eighteenth-century house lives in a house built two 
hundred years ago. His house had been repaired, added to, and changed many 
times since. But it is still the same house and so is the constitution. A person 
may, of course, object to redecorating the house or to changing its windows, 
saying that it would not be the same. In that sense it is true that an old 
constitution is not the same as a new constitution, just as an old person is not 
the same as the same person when young. Sameness in that sense is not the 
sameness of identity … It is the sameness of all the intrinsic properties of the 
object. … The point of my coda is to warn against confusing change with loss of 
identity and against the spurious arguments it breeds. Dispelling errors is all that 
                                                          
117 Fusaro and Oliver (2011, 428). See also Da Cunha (2013, 11). 
118 Aristotle (1996, 17).  
119 Aristotle (1962, 98), cited in Colón- Ríos (2010A, 220) and in Jacobsohn (2006A, 478). 
120 Murphy (1993A, 14).   
121 Marasinghe (2006, 178): ‘…it is not desirable that the amendment process be used to effect fundamental 
changes in the constitution thereby destroying its identity or spirit.’ 
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a general theory of the constitution can aspire to achieve.122  
An analogy between a constitution and a house is indeed convenient to explain this: 
‘just as a house does not lose its identity so long as you are decorating and repairing it on 
the same foundations on which it was built, so a Constitution does not lose its identity if 
it changed according to the requirements of changing times so long as its basic 
foundations are maintained’.123  
One may again wonder why is it not the prerogative of the amendment power to 
change even the basic foundations of the system? James McClellan, for example, poses 
the following assertion: 
Strictly speaking, an amendment to the Constitution is part of the Constitution 
itself. It is therefore inherently incapable of being unconstitutional. An 
amendment may nevertheless violate the spirit of the Constitution, overthrow 
established principles of the system, and so drastically alter the structure as to 
create a new form of government. Thus an amendment abolishing the States or 
the separation of powers, though constitutional in a legal sense, would in reality 
be destructive of the American constitutional system as we know it. Even foolish 
amendments, however, are constitutional, and it is the prerogative of the 
American people under Article V to make fools of themselves and to abolish 
their form of government and replace it with a new system if that is their wish.124 
 McClellan is correct that it is the prerogative of the people to change their system 
of government, but this cannot be made through the amendment procedure. This should 
be ‘the people’s exercising their constituent power, not the old constitution’s benediction, 
that validates the new order’.125 This is precisely the distinction between the primary and 
secondary constituent powers, to use Jacques Baguenard’s metaphor; the primary constituent power 
is the power to build a new structure and the secondary constituent power is the power to 
make alterations to an existing building.126 As the constitution’s core cannot be altered 
without destroying the whole constitution,127 the delegated amendment power cannot use 
the power entrusted to it for quashing the constitution or its fundamentals so that it loses 
its identity. 128  Constitutional amendments ‘that touch upon the identity-engendering 
norms of the constitution’, Ulrich Preuss writes, ‘… are “unconstitutional” because they 
                                                          
122 Raz (2009, 370). 
123 Singh (2011A, 183-184); Singh (2011B, 35-36). For a similar analogy see Akzin (1966, 59). The question 
of change and identity is an old one. See, for example, the ‘the ship of Theseus’ debate in the writings of 
Plutarch and Thomas Hobbes. See Swartz (2001, 328-357). 
124 McClellan (2000, 563-566).   
125 Murphy (1993A, 14).   
126 Baguenard (1989, 32), cited in Gözler (1999, 42). 
127 Conrad (1970, 418-419). 
128 Pogliese (1999).    
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destroy the constitution altogether by destroying the founding myth of its constituent 
power’.129 Amending the essential and pivotal principles to the constitution’s identity may 
be viewed as a ‘constitutional breakdown’.130 
D. Textualism   
 
The idea that the amendment power is inherently limited in its scope finds implicit 
textual support in the literal meaning of the term ‘amendment’.131 Literally, the Latin 
word emendere means ‘to remove lies’132 (mendācĭum = lie); ‘to correct fault’ [ē (‘out’) + 
menda (fault)]. This, Walter Murphy reminds us, does not mean ‘to deconstitute and 
reconstitute’.133 Based on this textual meaning, Murphy argues that: ‘amendments that 
would change the basic principles on which the people agreed to become a nation or 
overturn compromises on any principle that made the coming together possible would 
not be amendments at all, but efforts to construct a new constitution’.134 The textual basis 
distinguishes between amendments and revolutionary changes to the constitution. An 
amendment, according to this argument, can alter the existing constitution, but must not 
comprise a change so radical that it has to be regarded as a new constitution: ‘the word 
“amendment” itself implies limitations. It implies construction rather than destruction.’135 
According to the textual rationale, amendments must operate within the boundaries of 
the existing constitutional order and its foundational principles.136  
The textual argument is not novel.137 In 1894, the California Supreme Court held 
that: ‘the term “amendment” implies such an addition or change within the lines of the 
original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for 
which it was framed’. 138  The textual argument also appeared in the briefs presented 
                                                          
129 Preuss (2011, 445). 
130 Freeman (1992, 42). See also Iyer (2003, 3) (terming such amendments as a ‘constitutional harakiri’); 
Harris (1993, 183) (amendments must ‘make sense within the pre-existing scheme of constitutional 
meaning’); Amar (1988, 1045) (this would be a ‘fundamental departure from the pre-existing rule of 
recognition’); Wright (1990-1991, 747) (such a constitutional change would create a ‘logic failure’).   
131 Schweber (2007, 137); Kay (1997, 163).  
132 Calonne (2006, 145). 
133 Murphy (1995, 177). See also Murphy (1993A, 14).   
134 Murphy (1987, 12-13). 
135 Child (1926, 28), who also noted that since amendments become ‘a part of this constitution’, this 
excludes the idea that amendment can make a new or a changed constitution - it has to remain ‘this 
Constitution.’ See also Machen (1909-1910, 169-170); Morris (1909, 85); Marbury (1919-1920, 225); 
Holding (1923, 487).    
136 See McIntosh (2005, 74-75); Barak (2010A, 377); Schaffner (2005, 1493); Han (2010, 82); Murphy (2007, 
506). 
137 See, for example, Davis (1881, 197): ‘the word “amendment” necessarily implies an improvement upon 
something which is possessed, and can have no proper application to that which did not previously exist.’ 
138 Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424,426 (Cal. 1894). 
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before the U.S. Supreme Court against the validity of the 18th Amendment,139 and more 
recently in courts’ decisions that recognised implicit limitations on the amending power, 
for example, in India140 and in Bangladesh.141  
 The textual argument is not exempt from criticism. Dudley McGovney argues that 
‘amendment’ encompasses as an element of euphemism, the assumption that it is an 
improvement. But ‘beyond this euphemistic tinge, amendment as applied to alteration of 
laws, according to current dictionaries means alteration or change’. 142 Hence the term 
‘amendment’ includes any change whatsoever. This claim negates the original and 
everyday meaning of the word. Even ‘in our everyday discourse’, Sotirios Barber notes, 
‘we distinguish amendments from fundamental changes because the word amendment 
ordinarily signifies incremental improvements or corrections of a larger whole’.143 
Kemal Gözler claims that it is difficult to infer legal consequences from the 
grammatical interpretation of the word amendment in the absence of any explicit 
limitations. The amendment provision can be used in order to change several or even all 
of the constitution’s provisions. Some constitutions, for example, that of Austria (Art. 
44), Spain (Art. 168), and Switzerland (Art. 139), explicitly allow for their total revision. 
Lastly, the textual argument may be valid for the English term, but not necessarily in 
other languages. Francophile constitutions use the term revision (e.g. the French 
Constitution, in Art. 89), the Italian Constitution uses revision (Art. 138-139), the 
Portuguese Constitution uses revisao, the Spanish Constitution uses reforma, the German 
Basic Law uses anderung, and the Turkish Constitution uses degisklik. These terms, Gözler 
claims, do not carry the exact same meaning as amendment.144  
 These arguments carry some force, but they are not entirely convincing. From the 
theory of delegation, it can be argued that in those numerous and limited cases in which 
constitutions allow for their total revision, this authorisation is an explicit permissibility 
given to the delegated amending authority to revise the entire document. However, this is 
                                                          
139 See Dodd (1921, 330-332). 
140  Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, J. Khanna, paras. 1426-1427 (‘the word 
“amendment” postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of its identity…the ‘words 
“amendment of this Constitution”… show that what is amended is the existing constitution and what 
emerges as a result of amendment is not a new and different constitution’) contra J. Ray, para. 846 (the 
constitution uses ‘the word “amendment” … in an ambiguous and clear manner’ to so ‘mean any kind of 
change.’)       
141 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, 41 DLR 1989 App. Div. 165 (Judge B.H. Chowdhury, para. 196; 
Shahabuddin, J, paras. 336, 417); Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd v Bangladesh, (2006) 14 BLT (Special) 
(HCD) 1; (2010) 62 DLR (HCD) 70 (29.08.2005), 314-315. 
142 McGovney (1920, 514). See also Orfield (1942, 108): ‘by an amendment is meant an addition as well as 
an alteration.’  
143 Barber (1984, 43). 
144 Gözler (2008, 69-71).  
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the exception rather than the rule. It can also be argued, following Schmitt, that when 
constitutions allow their total revision, this should be regarded as allowing amendments 
of the entire constitution’s provisions, but not of the state’s basic premises.145 What is important 
is the content of the amendment, not its quantum. An amendment of a single provision can 
be considered as a revolutionary change, while revising the entire constitution can still 
maintain its basic constitutional principles. This applies with even greater force for 
constitutions that use the terms revision or reform, rather than total reform. A revision or a 
reform can indeed make dramatic changes, but they still cannot destroy the existing 
constitutional order and replace it with one that denies these basic values.146 The Latin 
meaning of the word reformare is ‘to transform an already existing thing’. 147 By the word 
‘reforming’, Kai Nielsen notes, we mean correction or improvements ‘through removing 
faults, abuses, malpractices, and the like’.148 Lastly, even in some other languages, the 
amending provisions carry the same meaning as amendment. For instance, the Israeli Basic 
Laws use the Hebrew term Tikun (ןוקית), which means ‘repair’. In any event, as Ashol 
Dhamija demonstrates in his comprehensive study on amendment procedures, the vast 
majority of states’ constitutions use the term amendment: 69% of 110 national 
constitutions and 100% out of fifty U.S. States’ constitutions.149  
 It is true that, self-standing, the textual argument is inconclusive. As Andrew Arato 
notes, it ‘needs to be supplemented by… a deeper argument’.150 However, taken as an 
element in the overall theoretical analysis as elaborated in the previous sections, it may 
provide additional support to the general claim that the amending power must operate 
within the existing constitutional framework.151 
III.    CONCLUSION 
The formal and substantive theories distinguishing between primary and secondary constituent 
powers are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing through the theory of 
delegation. Being a delegated authority, the amendment power may be explicitly 
(procedurally and substantively) limited. It must abide these limitations. However, even if 
it is not explicitly limited, even a ‘blank cheque’ which leaves everything to the judgment 
                                                          
145 Schmitt (2008, 152). 
146 Murphy (1992A, 351-352). 
147 Borucka-Arctowa (1991, 80). 
148 Nielsen (1979, 157). 
149 Dhamija (2007, 223).  
150 Arato (2011, 326). 
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and discretion of the constitutional amendment authority has to be for the achievement 
of a certain objective – amending the constitution and not destroying it, or replacing it 
with a new one. It is thus implicitly limited by its nature. ‘The theory of basic structure’, 
C. V. Keshavamurthy was correct to claim, ‘is not a creature of the Judges but a 
necessary consequence of the organisation of the amending power in the context of a 
limited government’. 152  This theoretical hypothesis is now increasingly becoming a 
common feature in comparative constitutionalism.  
 In the next chapter, it is argued that these limitations are not eternal and can be 
changed through the exercise of the primary constituent power. Moreover, not all 
amendment powers are equally limited: a scale of amendment powers exists depending 
upon the proximity of the primary constituent power’s appearance through the amendment 
process.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE SPECTRUM OF AMENDMENT POWERS 
 
In the previous two chapters, it was argued that the amendment power is limited by its 
nature. It was also argued that the growing practice in comparative constitutional law to 
limit the amendment power (Part I) is based upon a solid theoretical ground.  
This is the final chapter in Part II. It aims to complete the journey towards a 
theory of unamendability. It comprises three sections. In the first section, it is argued that 
the people are free to change even unamendable fundamental elements of the 
constitution; yet this power resides not in the amendment power but in the exercise of 
the primary constituent power. Various notions of that power are analysed. This section 
completes the circle that I began to draw in Chapter 4 with the distinction between 
primary and secondary constituent powers. The second section constitutes a bridge between the 
first section and the last section by describing and analysing the current trend of 
prescribing a constitutional process for exercising primary constituent power. This method, it 
is argued, is a fallacy. The third section sketches a spectrum of constitutional amendment 
powers. It considers whether the amendment power is equally limited in jurisdictions 
where the amendment process attempts to imitate the re-emergence of the primary 
constituent power, by incorporating elements such as referendums, constitutional 
conventions, as in jurisdictions where it is more similar to regular legislative power. It 
argues that the more similar the characteristics of the secondary constituent power are to those 
of a democratic primary constituent power (‘strong amendment power’) – i.e., inclusive, 
deliberative, and time-consuming – the less it should be bound by limitations, and vice 
versa. This examination thus links the limitations that ought to be imposed upon the 
amendment power and the amendment’s procedure. It allows us to advance toward a 
general theory of the limited nature of the constitutional amendment power. 
I. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF PRIMARY CONSTITUENT POWER  
A. Unamendability and Primary Constituent Power  
 
For Richard Parker, ‘the first truth about the law’ is that ‘nothing lasts forever’. Parker 
argues that constitutions are embedded within the idea of populism – the liberty of 
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people to shape and reshape their society.1 Indeed, it is the argument of this thesis that 
unamendability is not an absolute entrenchment. Unamendability limits the delegated 
amendment power, the secondary constituent power, but it cannot block the primary constituent 
power from its ability to amend even the basic principles of the constitutional order. Recall, 
once a constitution is constituted and the primary constituent power has accomplished its 
task, a constitutional organ – the amendment authority – is granted with the legal 
competence of revising the constitution. But what happens to the constituent power? In 
Chapter 4, I rejected an approach according to which constituent power is exhausted after 
the constitution’s establishment and maintained that the people always possess the power 
to establish and change their constitutional order. As Carl Friedrich notes, ‘no matter 
how elaborate the provisions for an amending power may be, they must never … be 
assumed to have superseded the constituent power’.2 Take the extreme example of a 
constitution that does not prescribe an amendment process or even explicitly states that 
it is completely unamendable. Would that mean that future generations are bound to live 
under an unamendable constitution? Surely the people possess the power (or, the right) 
to constitute a new constitution.3 As James Wilson declares, ‘as our constitutions are 
superior to our legislatures; so the people are superior to our constitutions. … the people 
may change the constitutions, whenever, and however they please. This right, of which 
no positive institution can ever deprive them…’.4  
Therefore, constituted organs, including the amendment process, neither 
represent the primary constituent power nor consume it. This primary constituent power is neither 
exhausted nor is it bound by the existing constitutional limitations – including 
unamendable provisions (explicit or implicit). Put differently, the secondary constituent power 
is limited by unamendability. But as a delegated authority, it can be set aside, just as it can 
be created. 5  The authorising primary constituent power remains in the constitutional 
background and can re-emerge to take its role. The primary constituent power, the 
‘sovereignty at the back of the Constitution’, can change even the constitution’s basic 
structure. 6 The U.S. Constitution itself was adopted in violation of the Articles of the 
Confederation, which were virtually unamendable since they required agreement in 
                                                          
1 Parker (1993, 583). 
2 Friedrich (1937, 117). 
3 Han (2010, 79); Willoughby (2009, 215-218).  
4 Wilson (1792, 38-39).  
5  Da Cunha (2013, 22): ‘through constituent power, the people preserve their natural and essential 
freedom; therefore the power of rulers (and also of the ruling laws, even of the highest ones, the 
Constitutions), are delegated powers. People in those high positions may be removed…and laws may be 
changed.’ 
6 Keshavamurthy (1982, 80-81). 
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Congress and confirmation by the legislatures of every state in the Union. 7  What 
unamendability (explicit or implicit) means is that certain amendments establishing a 
‘new constitution’ cannot be achieved through the regular amendment procedure, but 
require a different constituent process.8  
 ‘The people’ are free to change the constitution’s fundamentals, yet this power 
resides not in the amendment procedure, but in the primary constituent power of the 
sovereign people.9 As Vicki Jackson argues, the idea of unamendability can basically be 
defended on process-based grounds; it should not be viewed as blocking all the 
democratic avenues, but rather merely proclaiming that one such avenue – the 
amendment process – is unavailable. In order to legitimately achieve the sought 
constitutional change, other procedures (perhaps more demanding) ought to be used.10 
The power to change the constitution’s basic principles is appropriately part of the 
primary constituent power, and, like the adoption of a new constitution, should flow from 
‘the people’, in which ultimate sovereignty rests and from which all legitimate authority 
springs.11  
Since even the constitution’s basic principles can be changed through the avenue 
of the primary constituent power, they are not permanently entrenched or truly eternal; they 
are solely unamendable in the sense that they cannot be altered by means of an exercise 
of the secondary constituent power. 12  This approach was advanced, for instance, by the 
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, which held that in order to preserve the identity and 
continuity of the constitutional text as a whole, the framers created ‘immutable 
provisions’ that impose limits on the secondary constituent power, but these provisions do not 
subordinate the primary constituent power itself.13  
Bruce Ackerman regards America as a dualist democracy, a two-track democracy. 
In a dualist democracy, ‘the people’ are mainly passive and do not play an active role, 
except in certain exceptional ‘constitutional moments’ – the second track of democracy – 
during which they rise up and play an active role in creating and revising their 
constitution. Whereas the Constitution is the arena for this higher law-making track, the 
                                                          
7 Whereas art. VII of the U.S. Constitution provided that it would take effect when nine of the thirteen 
states ratified it. See generally Kay (1987, 57); Ackerman and Katyal (1995, 475). On this extra-legality and 
the pople’s constituent power see Frank (2007, 103). 
8 Smith (2011, 375-376).   
9 Harris (1993, 193).  
10 Jackson (2013, 47).   
11 Machen (1909-1910, 170).  
12 Guha and Tundawala (2008, 537). 
13 ADIN nº 815-3/DF, DJU de 10/05/96, p. 15131, cited in Melo (2008, 48). 
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transformative change may take place outside Article V.14 According to Ackerman, the 
U.S. system is dualist because constitutional constraints on the government are 
democratically open to revision. In contrast, monism describes democratic power as 
vested in the elected Parliament. The British Constitution may thus be labelled as a 
monist system since according to the notion of parliamentary supremacy, fundamental 
principles cannot limit legislative decision-making. Foundationalism, which places certain 
rights and basic principles above the democratic political (and even constitutional) 
process, describes the German Basic Law. 15  These models, Ackerman claims, ‘better 
illuminate the constitutional ideals and practice of other Western systems.’16  
In its broad contour, Ackerman’s theory distinguishing between normal politics 
and constitutional moments seems to be consistent with this thesis’s understanding, with 
an important distinction: within a constitutional democracy, one has to recognise three 
(rather than two) kinds of powers: primary constituent power, secondary constituent power 
(amendment power), and constituted power (e.g. legislative power).17 The legislative track is the 
ordinary track of political life in which the legislature and executive bodies enact, enforce, 
and implement political decisions through ordinary legislation. This is a sub-
constitutional level.  
The amendment track is an ordinary track of constitutional politics, through which 
the bodies entrusted with the authority to amend the constitution may enact, add, annul, 
or amend constitutional provisions. This is a constitutional level. Like constituted powers, 
the amendment power is itself established in the constitution, yet it is superior to 
constituted powers. This track usually involves a different – and separate – process from the 
legislative track. Also, as noted further in this chapter, it often includes various 
constitutional organs apart from the legislature, and may include different procedures for 
amending different provisions or principles. However, being a delegated power, the 
amendment power cannot change the basic features of the constitutional order so as to 
change the constitution’s identity and transform it into a new constitution. Such an 
exercise ought to be done by the primary, rather than secondary, constituent power. Therefore, 
                                                          
14  Ackerman (1991, 195, 285). Ackerman described three such moments: the founding moment, 
Reconstruction and the New Deal. See id., 58. See also Ackerman (1989, 453); Ackerman (1984, 1013); 
Ackerman (1990, 53); Ackerman (1995, 63). 
15 Ackerman (1991, 6-16). 
16 Ackerman (1990, 53). 
17 Cf., Weintal (2005); Weintal (2011, 449); Weintal (2013, 288-292); Klein (1997, 341); Kalyvas (1999-2000, 
1525); Prateek (2008, 458-461).    
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all constitutions are foundational in the sense that they are built upon certain 
fundamental principles – what I have termed foundational structuralism.18 
Finally, the primary constituent track is the third track of democracy. It is not part of 
ordinary constitutional politics; rather, it is exercised in extraordinary constitutional 
moments. It is not bound by prior constitutional rules and – contrary to the amendment 
authority – may change the basic principles of the constitutional system and even create a 
new constitutional order. The constitution cannot restrict the exercise of primary 
constituent power, which resides outside of it and can ‘exercise its authority de novo’.19  
Therefore, the secondary constituent power should not be confused with the primary 
constituent power, as the former is a power established in the constitution, which is bound 
by explicit and implicit limitation (see Chapters 4 and 5). Hence primary and secondary 
constituent powers are related but distinct powers.20 True, the thin line between primary and 
secondary constituent power is blurred in contemporary constitutional societies.21 As Giorgio 
Agamben writes, within the current trend of legalisation, ‘constituent power is more and 
more frequently reduced to the power of revision foreseen in the constitution’. 22 
Constitutional practice demonstrates that constitutional amendments are often used in 
order to fundamentally transform the constitutional order, establishing in effect a new 
constitution. 23 For instance, the Hungarian transformation from communism was 
employed by way of constitutional amendments to the 1949 Constitution. 24 Whereas 
such a transformation may well carry various benefits,25 this complete reform, which 
                                                          
18 Ackerman (1991, 13) claims that the U.S. Constitution is dualist and not rights foundationalist since ‘it 
has never…explicitly entrenched existing higher law against subsequent revision by the People’. If 
American Constitutionalism indeed prioritises democratic decision-making over certain rights and 
principles, and is thus dualist and not foundationalist, then arguably it is itself foundationalist, for its 
constitutional system reflects the constitution’s foundational commitment to the democratic principle. This 
rational equally applies with regard to the UK’s monist system. If British constitutionalism is indeed based 
upon the notion of parliamentary sovereignty, then it can also be described as foundationalist since its 
constitutional system is based upon certain foundations which give it its unique constitutional system (But 
see Weill (2003, 474); Weill (2004, 380), who argues that British Constitutionalism in the 19th and 20th 
centuries was governed not by parliamentary sovereignty but by popular sovereignty). 
19 Saunders (2011, 870). 
20 Baxi (1978, 136). 
21  See Thornhill (2012, 374) (claiming that ‘the strict functional division between constituent and 
constituted power has become blurred); Kay (2011, 723): ‘It is, admittedly, impossible to draw a precise line 
between amendment and replacement and the procedures established for the former are sometimes 
employed in effecting the latter.’ 
22 Agamben (1998, 40). 
23 Arato (1992-1993, 676) notes that such a constitutional change ‘would signify a constitutional break 
merely disguised by procedural continuity’. See also Kay (1997, 161). 
24 Arato (1995, 45).   
25  See, for example, Arato (1992-1993, 676) (arguing that ‘the semblance of constitutional continuity 
provided for a transition within unchallenged rules that allowed both sides to agree upon the terms that 
would … largely eliminate… the powers of one of them’); Arato (2000, 255–56); Parlett (2012, 46): ‘The 
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brought about a new constitution, suffered ‘legitimacy problems and clashes of 
identification’.26 By the same token, the authoritarian regime in Chile was transformed 
into a democratic one in the early 1990s through a series of constitutional amendments. 
While this experience may show how an authoritarian constitution can change to a 
democratic one, Amaya Alvez Marin describes how ‘the use of constitutional 
amendments, as the path chosen to legitimise the content of the Constitution’, was 
neither inclusive nor deliberative and in effect held up the progress of rights-based 
constitutionalism. The transformation, which was effected through amendments that 
were based on the previous constitution, created an element of continuity with the 
previous authoritarian regime, which hindered the democratization and liberalization 
process.27 When amendment provisions are used for creating new constitutional regimes, 
not only are important issues of legitimacy raised,28 but there is also a difficulty in clearly 
breaking with the past regime’s constitution (often associated with wrongdoings). Thus 
nations may favour completely replacing an old constitution.29  
If it is ‘the people’ in their capacity as holders of the primary constituent power who 
should decide upon fundamental constitutional transformations, not the instituted 
amendment authorities, this raises the questions where does this power rest? How can it 
manifest itself? The following section presents different approaches to these challenges.  
 
B. Conceptions of Primary Constituent Power 
 
So far, I have explained unamendability based on the understanding that amending the 
constitution through the delegated amendment power so as to destroy the constitution 
and replace it with a new one, would be an act ultra vires. The power to constitute and re-
constitute the constitution resides within the people’s primary constituent power. This 
understanding is perfectly compatible with commitment to democratic self-government. 
The problem with this approach, however, is that ‘there may be contest over who is it 
that speaks for the people. “The people”, that is, in a sense cannot exist, in an 
                                                                                                                                                                      
use of an inherited constitutional order is just one method of ensuring a stable institutional basis for 
constitution making’. 
26 Szoboszlai (2000, 188). 
27 Marin (2012, 253). 
28 Klein and Sajó (2012, 437). See also Arato (1993-1994, 352).  
29  Dupre and Yeh (2013, 53): ‘some transnational democracies made new constitutions after democratic 
transitions had taken place. Facing the legitimacy crisis during transition, these countries preferred a brand-
new constitution to represent a break with the past regime and to construct needed legitimacy for the new 
one’. See also Ackerman (1992, 61) (urging post-communists countries not to conduct a series of 
constitutional amendments, rather ‘if the aim is to transform the very character of constitutional norms, a 
clean break seems desirable…’)  
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incontestably legitimate form, without having already been is some sense “constituted”’.30 
Indeed, the very idea of the people as holders of the primary constituent power is perplexing 
and has given rise to heated debates within constitutional theory.31 The idea of a ‘power 
of the people’ acting in an identifiable, comprehensible, and unmediated way in order to 
constitute for themselves a constitution is a kind of a myth, a fiction. 32  With old 
constitutions, the idea of ‘we the people’ as constitutional authors is problematic since 
the real constitution-makers (who doubtfully represented the people of their period) are 
long gone. For that reason, David Strauss remarks that we might be talking about ‘they 
(not we) the people’.33 Moreover, even with young constitutions, ‘the people’ simply 
cannot speak directly as a whole, and the will that we attribute to ‘the people’ ought to be 
revealed through some kind of representation and deliberation processes.34 In sum, even 
if we recognise ‘the people’ as holders of the primary constituent power, they do not 
necessarily take part in the constitution-making process.35  
 Nevertheless, this fiction of ‘the people’ carries actual power. It ‘create[s] ... 
pictures in our heads which make the structures of authority tolerable and 
understandable’.36 By telling ourselves this mythical story of ‘the people’, 37 we satisfy a 
‘sort of psycho-legal need’. 38  The idea of ‘the people’ thus describes the source of 
political authority, not necessarily the mode of its exercise.39 Constituent power should not 
therefore be viewed as an ‘actual aggregate entity in the real world’, but rather as ‘a 
concept that helps explain the normative basis for a constitution’s claim to authority’.40 
‘The people’ in which we locate constituent power are inevitably an ‘imaginary collective 
body of the group’, which represents the consent of the real people.41 Conceived in these 
terms, the claim of ‘the people’ as constitutional authorship is inevitably reflexive, a result 
of a retrospective self-attribution, self-identification, and a projection into the future.42 
The people conceive themselves as a single sovereign in order to attribute the 
                                                          
30  Jackson (2013, 65 fn 61). 
31  On the various challenges to the idea of constituent power see Loughlin and Walker (2007); Oklopcic 
(2008, 358); Oklopcic (2012B, 81). 
32 Cf. Morgan (1988, 14, 58); Formisano (2008, 17); Powell (1993, 200-201); Kay (2011, 747).  
33 Strauss (2013, 1969).  
34 Kay (2011, 739). 
35 Galligan (2013, 9-11). 
36 Rodgers (1998, 5). 
37 Anonymous (1995-1996, 1752 fn 27). On the roles of myths in the legal world see generally Loughlin 
(2000, 22-26). 
38 Darby (2002, 221). See also Michelman (1998C, 92); Michelman (1998-1999, 1628).  
39 Popular sovereignty, on that account, is different from, majority-rule. See Monaghan (1996, 165-166).  
40 Tushnet (2012-2013, 1987-1988). 
41 Kay (2011, 738, 743). 
42 Lindahl (2007, 19). See also Lindahl (2011, 121); Anonymous (1995-1996, 1753-1754); Preuss (2011, 
444); Oxman (2009). 
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constitution to a single act of will.43 Regardless of how historically accurate the story we 
tell ourselves about ‘the people’ as constitution-makers, ‘the very plenipotentiary scope of 
the people as the normative constitutional author provides the limits on the normal 
amending apparatus’.44 The people’s constituent power seems to be manifested by two main 
conceptions: immanent and transcendental.45    
 
1. Immanent Conception  
 
The first conception of primary constituent power can be described as immanent. It vests 
primary constituent power within the ‘living members of the body politic’, thus refusing to 
accept the people’s constituent power as mythical.46 Accordingly, ‘the People’ as a collective 
entity are similar to ‘the people’ as the collections of persons of a certain polity.47 In its 
extreme form, the people, exercising their primary constituent power, may trump the written 
constitution, including its unamendable provisions. As noticeable throughout this thesis, 
the foremost proponent of the idea of immanent constituent power is Carl Schmitt. For 
Schmitt, the primary constituent power is never exhausted but remains present ‘alongside and 
above every constitution’.48 According to Schmitt, whenever the people desire to exercise 
its constituent power, its decision overrides the legal order: ‘It is part of the directness of the 
people’s will that it can be expressed independently of every prescribed procedure and 
every prescribed process’. 49  Interestingly, in that respect, one can find similarities 
between Schmitt’s idea of the immanent constituent power and Ackerman’s theory of higher 
law making.50    
 Another modern version of the immanent conception of constituent power is 
expressed in the theory of Akhil Amar. According to Amar, through Article V, the 
people, who are the source of the constitution, delegated the amendment power to 
ordinary government, without limiting themselves. Article V thus supplements but does 
                                                          
43 Loughlin (2010, 224); Levinson (2011A, 193-194). 
44 Harris (1993, 193). 
45  For a different conceptualisation of constituent power see Colón-Ríos (2014) (distinguishing between 
parliamentary sovereignty; the crown and parliament; the right to instruct representatives; the right of 
resistance; and popular sovereignty). Both my immanent and transcendental conceptions refer to popular 
sovereignty.  
46 Barshack (2006, 185). 
47 See, for example, Kramer (2004, 7) (referring in 253 to the people as ‘an actual authority…not some 
abstract “people”’).  
48 Schmitt (2008, 140). 
49 Id, 131. 
50  Arato (1999-2000, 1746-1747). See also Kalyvas (1999-2000, 1540 fn 61): ‘The similarities between 
Schmitt’s theory of the constituent power of the people and Ackerman’s notions of constitutional politics 
and dualistic politics are striking.’ 
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not replace popular sovereignty and majority rule. The people, by a majority of voters, 
via referendum or special convention, retain their reserved and inalienable right to revise 
the constitution themselves, even outside of the amendment process. Article V, therefore, 
must not be considered as exclusive since an appeal to the people for constitutional 
change always remains an option.51  
Similar to Amar, this thesis claims that the amendment power has to be viewed as 
a delegated power.52 Carlos Bernal maintains that a central challenge to my theory of 
delegation is with ‘identification of the delegator … The delegator is the people. 
Nevertheless, the concept of ‘the people’ is fuzzy’. 53  The immanent conception 
corresponds with the theory of delegation as it recognises that the power to constitute 
constitutional norms is held by the real people who, in turn, delegated it to a 
constitutional organ and may reclaim their authority at any time. According to the pure 
immanent conception, as conveyed by Amar, a majority vote in a simple count of votes 
would manifest a decision of the people and thus an expression of constituent power.54 
 
2. Transcendental Conception  
 
In contrast with the immanent conception, a second conception describes constituent power 
as transcendent, i.e. as vested not in the living people, but rather in the imaginary collective 
body of society (a corporate body), which resides outside the group to which it belongs.55 
This theory is based upon the mediaeval idea of ‘King’s Two Bodies’.56 According to this 
basic premise, the king’s body splits into two: a private (human) and a public (divine). 
While the private body is consumed, the public (corporate) body is perpetual.57 Various 
scholars adopt a modern view of ‘People’s Two Bodies’.58  
                                                          
51 Amar (1987, 1425); Amar (1988, 1054-8); Amar (1994, 457-500); Amar (1995, 89-101). It is interesting to 
compare Amar’s theory to Ackerman’s proposal that that the U.S. should permit the President to propose 
specific constitutional amendments, with ratification requiring a favourable vote in Congress, followed by 
the citizenry’s direct approval on ballot measures presented during two successive presidential election 
cycles. See Ackerman (2000A, 45). For a summary of the theories of Ackerman and Amar and their critics 
see Torke (1994-1995, 229). For counter theories to Amar see, for example, Dow (1990, 1); Vile (1991A, 
271). 
52 Levinson (2006, 177) (claiming that art. V places ‘limits on the agents of the people rather than on the 
general citizenry itself’). For an interesting position see Bacon (1929-1930, 782), who argued that based 
upon the Tenth Amendment, the people are the only source from which added powers over the people 
and their rights can be given to the Federal Government, and only they can ratify such an amendment. 
53 Bernal-Pulido and Roznai (2013).  
54 Michelman (1998B, 1728-30).  
55 Yack (2001, 517) argued that this conception contributed to the rise and spread of nationalism.  
56 Kantorowicz (1958). 
57 See Loughlin (2010, 41-46). 
58  To borrow from Wolin (1981, 9).  
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According to Marcel Gauchet, within a democratic legal system one ought to 
distinguish between the ‘real’ people and the ‘perpetual constituent people’. Real people 
can only express a momentary majoritarian will. Constituent people, in contrast, 
represent a mystical ‘trans-temporal’ body, which embodies popular sovereignty and is 
the true sovereign.59 Accordingly, the present majoritarian will is inferior to the ‘trans-
temporal’ will of the people: ‘those who choose and vote, are in themselves only the 
momentary representatives of the power of the eternal people who endure in self-identity 
through successive generations and are the veritable titularies of sovereignty’.60 Likewise, 
according to Dominique Rousseau, judicial review is based upon a distinction between 
the peoples’ will as constituent power and the majoritarian representatives’ will. When courts 
review legislation, they guarantee the people’s sovereign will as expressed in the 
constitution against the will of the political majority. Again, this represents two different 
notions: the will of the eternal people, which prevails over the will of the present people, 
as exercised through their representative.61 Judicial review thus reminds the people that 
they, and not their representatives, are the true holders of the sovereign power.62  
Like Gauchet and Rousseau, Jed Rubenfeld distinguishes between the present 
people and ‘generational people’ who live under trans-temporal commitments. According 
to Rubenfeld, freedom and democracy cannot be reduced to the mere immediate current 
will of the majority; rather, it is a complex project of living a set of commitments that 
people write themselves into over time.63 Since these commitments link past, present, 
and future generations, true sovereignty is generational. 64  This approach rejects the 
immanent conception of constituent power: ‘A people attains self-government not by 
perfecting a politics of popular voice, but by [its struggle] to live out over time, its own 
foundational commitments’.65 By upholding the constitution against the people’s present 
yet temporary desires, courts represent the people’s true, long-standing commitments.66  
This understanding of members of the generation-crossing society joined as one 
body is often used by American proponents of originalism, according to which society is a 
‘trans-temporal entity’ – composed of people succeeding generations. 67  From this 
conceptualisation of ‘identity across time and space’ derives the popular sovereignty 
                                                          
59 Gauchet (1995, 46-47), cited in Goldoni (2012, 222).  
60 Gauchet (1995, 45), cited in Troper (2003, 119-120). 
61 Rousseau (1999, 367, 374).  
62 See Rousseau (2007, 43).  
63 Rubenfeld (2001, 156). See also Rubenfeld (1997-1998, 1100). 
64 Id., 18–22, 177. 
65 Rubenfeld (1998, 217-218). 
66 Rubenfeld (2001, 168).  
67 Strang (2005, 924); McConnell (1998, 1134).  
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myth according to which the founders and subsequent generations form a one ‘political 
self’ that justifies the existing political order.68  
Michel Troper claims that the main difficulty of the transcendental conception is 
that the supra-temporal people can never express its will.69 It appears that the answer to 
this difficulty lies in the role of revolutions and constitutional moments. According to 
this understanding, during normal times the imaginary body of the people is in absentia 
and indeed cannot express its will. However, during significant constitutional moments, 
this mythical body is enacted and rendered present by the group to which it belongs. It is 
in these exceptional transformative moments when the transcendental power collapses 
into the present, traversing the polity’s past, present and the future.70   
As Paul Kahn explains, revolutions that break through ordinary time as a new 
moment of creation represent a ‘transcendent act of self-revelation’ upon which the 
modern democratic polity is founded and through which ‘we the people’ become the 
new sovereign. 71  In this revolutionary polity, ‘all individuals—present and future-
participate as members of the popular sovereign. For this reason, the actions of the 
Founders can continue to bind future generations: all are part of a single We’. 72 More 
recently, Kahn wrote that ‘the postrevolutionary state maintains this narrative of direct 
action by the popular sovereign, the people. Belief in the popular sovereign sustains a 
faith in the revolution as a kind of sacred presence’.73  
Lior Barshack best articulates this idea. Barshack criticises Schmitt’s immanent 
conception of the people’s will, which always remains alive, for denying the difference 
between constitutional moments and normal politics. 74  Schmitt’s idea of permanent 
immanence, Barshack claims, is dangerous since it permits permanent ruthlessness and 
regular violation of human rights.75 Sovereignty, according to Barshack, ‘belongs to the 
group as an immortal entity that retains its identity through past, present, and future 
                                                          
68 Kahn (1989, 512-515).  
69 Troper (2003, 119-120). 
70 See, for example, Grimm (2005, 201); Prateek (2008, 454).   
71 Kahn (2006, 266-268). For Kahn (2011, 142), ‘to succeed, revolution must transform itself into a regular 
political form, that is, it must produce a constitution’. See also Kahn (2012, 35): ‘A revolution that does not 
end in constitution would not mark the presence of the popular sovereign, but only chaos. A constitution 
that does not have its foundation in revolution would be illegitimate—the dead hand of the past binding 
the present’.  
72 Kahn (2006, 271). 
73 Kahn (2011, 140). 
74 Barshack (2012, 2-3).  
75  Id., 13. Likewise, Barshack (2009, 571) criticises Negri’s understanding of constituent power: ‘the 
absolute presence of constituent power negates present lives much as it erases the memory of past 
generations and the anticipation of future ones.’ 
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generations.’76 Therefore, this is not originalism.77 Again this conception is rooted in the 
corporate understanding of society. 78 Constituent power belongs – not to the living – but to 
the transcendent and absent corporate body. ‘The people’, as the sovereign in a 
democracy, remains a transcendent entity, which appears only during special 
constitutional moments (such as declarations of independence, revolutions, referenda). 
In these episodes (instances of ‘communitas’), the communal body ‘descend[s] back into 
the social and dissolves all structural boundaries’. 79  Thus, in certain periods of 
constitutional moments, which arrest ‘the flow of time’, the transcendence is collapsed 
into the immediate presence.80 In these periods, with the understanding of the past, 
present, and future as of the same essence of a collective body, all generations are 
present. 81  These extraordinary moments define the corporate group. 82  They carry a 
temporary character, and as such, sovereignty cannot be immanent.83 
Importantly, contrary to Amar’s understanding, Barshack emphasises that ‘it is not 
the democratic principle of popular sovereignty that places popular will above 
constitutional procedure, but the fact of sovereign incarnation and the concomitant 
relaxation of all principles. The communal body wields supreme legislative power 
whenever it is enacted, in democratic as well as non-democratic contexts…’.84 It is the 
suspension of political parties and a high degree of communal body’s involvement that 
allows sovereignty to step forward in constitutional moments such as referendums:   
The capacity of referenda to render sovereignty present is never guaranteed. 
When referenda are held too frequently without sufficient public interest, or 
                                                          
76 Barshack (2009, 554). 
77 Id., 564: ‘the prestige of the generation of the founders can be reconciled with the equal status of past 
and future in a temporal order that is based on the legal construct of corporate perpetuity…. it postulates 
genealogical links with past and future generations. The relations of the living with past and future 
generations are premised on, and mediated by, the legal fictions of an everlasting succession of generations 
and corporate perpetuity’. 
78 Id., 557: ‘The social body comprises not only living members of society. It is the common body of the 
dead, the living, and the yet-to-be born. All generations partake of the social body in either of the forms 
that it may assume: as a communal or a corporate body. When the social body is enacted, that is, when it 
appears as a communal body, the dead and the unborn are rendered present alongside the living. The 
communal body dissolves intergenerational as well as interpersonal boundaries.’ 
79 Barshack (2003, 1155, 1164). 
80  Barshack (2000, 82); Barshack (2012, 19). See also Barshack (2009, 559) (constitutional moments 
generate ‘an experience of permanent immediacy, an eternal present.’) 
81 Barshack (2009, 567): ‘the fiction of corporate perpetuity acquaints the living with the temporal horizons 
of past and future through the idea of cross-generational legal continuity as well as through representations 
of mythical episodes which interrupt and bracket historical time’. 
82 Id., 566-567: ‘Corporate perpetuity is grounded fictively in a prehistorical founding episode in which the 
corporate body was born and the law given. The moment of foundation presides over the horizon of the 
past but also gives society a future orientation, a destiny. … Between the imaginary moments of the 
beginning and end of history, the founding moment is periodically reenacted in order to sustain society’s 
adherence to time and to the corporate order as a whole.’    
83 Id., 551, 557. 
84 Barshack (2006, 202). 
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when voting patterns reflect factional loyalties and public discussion is 
dominated by sectarian campaigns, only a massive manipulation of the collective 
memory will make a referendum appear to future generations as an authentic 
manifestation of the general will.85  
 
The transcendent account of primary constituent power seems to fit with the idea of 
unamendability. As noted in Chapter 2, explicit limitations on the amendment power 
have various characteristics, such as the preservation of the past-cherished identity, the 
negation of past evils and an aspirational facet. Unamendable provisions look both to the 
past, present, and future. They aim to represent a certain constitutional identity superior 
to the present temporary political majority. This account seems compatible with the 
transcendent understanding of primary constituent power, which aims to link diverse 
generations and unite the nation under common basic principles.86 It invites the people 
to see themselves as part of something greater than their individuals – having a superior 
unamendable constitutional identity.87 
 
3. Primary Constituent Power and Democracy 
 
The two concepts of primary constituent power are distinct from each other not only in space 
(corporate body v. living people), but also in their temporal conception of constituent 
power (constitutional moments v. at any given moment). 88  Nonetheless, both 
conceptions respond to various objections to unamendability (see Chapter 8), since both 
allow the emergence of the primary constituent power, unbound by prior and existing 
constitutional rules. Moreover, both, at least conceptually, can be reconciled with a 
theory of delegation since both recognise a separate sovereign acting ‘at the back of the 
constitution’ – which can be regarded as the delegator. Once one accepts that there is a 
separation between ‘the people’ and their agents, these two conceptions quickly blur in 
actual constitutional practice. As a matter of fact, these two conceptions are not that 
different from each other in another sense: in Barshack’s transcendental conception of a 
corporate body, the transcendence collapses into the immanent present in those temporary 
constitutional moments. Likewise, Amar’s democratic popular sovereignty is manifested 
in special constitutional moments, such as referenda and constituent assemblies. It 
therefore seems that it is not necessary, for the sake of the argument advanced in this 
                                                          
85 Id., 212-3. 
86 Comella (2000, 51-52). 
87 Pettys (2008, 337). 
88 On time and authority see Hartog (2011, 33). 
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thesis, to choose between these two conceptions. Yet, what seems inevitable is to 
emphasise that both the transcendent account of primary constituent power, which refers to a 
mythical ‘we the people’, and the immanent account of primary constituent power, which refers 
to the ‘living people’, are both rooted in and deeply connected to the notion of 
democracy. This is in order to accentuate the democratic nature of the primary constituent 
power.   
‘The dirty little secret’ of contemporary jurisprudence, as Roberto Unger 
describes it, is the discomfort with democracy and fear of popular action. 89 Popular 
sovereignty’s understanding of the primary constituent power challenges this discomfort as it 
declares the people’s primary constituent power to re-emerge in ‘extraordinary moments, 
[when] politics opens up to make room for conscious popular participation and extra-
institutional, spontaneous, collective intervention’.90  
The understanding of a democratic primary constituent power seems to correspond with 
Sheldon Wolin’s conception of democracy as a political practice that involves the 
manifestation of popular sovereignty. Democracy, advocated by Wolin, is not a ‘form’, 
but rather, ‘a moment’. It is an episodic moment that dictates the constitution’s 
substance and thus a representative moment in the nation’s life. Resembling Barshcak’s 
notion of instances of ‘communitas’, in these rare and episodic ‘moments of 
commonality …through public deliberations, collective power is used to promote or 
protect the well-being of the collectivity’.91 In these exceptional moments, ‘power returns 
to “the Community” and agency to “the People”’.92 Democracy, thus understood is a 
‘mode of being’, ‘a political moment, perhaps the political moment, when the political is 
remembered and recreated’. 93 
If we believe that the source of political authority rests with the people, that ‘the 
ability to engage in constitutional change is a fundamental act of popular sovereignty’,94 
we also need to bridge the gap between the imaginary people and the real people. 
‘Constitutionalism’, Carl Friedrich writes, ‘and more especially democracy, presupposes 
an active group of citizens who are ready to assume responsibility and become the 
“constituent power”’. 95  Therefore, recent scholarship has called to develop direct 
democracy tools in order to ‘return the epicenter of sovereignty to the people’, especially 
                                                          
89 Unger (1996, 72). See also Waldron (1998, 521). 
90 Kalyvas (2008, 7). 
91 Wolin (1996, 39). 
92 Id., 41. 
93 Id., 43. See also Wolin (2004, 602-603). 
94 Schwartzberg (2009, 6).  
95 Friedrich (1950, 4). 
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in constitutional decisions.96 Ali Riza Coban, for example, argues that it is necessary to 
have legal arrangements that would ensure a maximum level of democratic participation 
of the people during constitution making.97 The recent proliferation of referendums is an 
indicator of the broader trend towards engaging the people themselves in constitutional 
manners.98 
Indeed, the modern conception of primary constituent power is strongly associated 
with the notion of popular democracy. According to studies of late, among current 
existing constitutions more than forty per cent were publicly ratified by referendums and 
many others involved different forms of popular participation in the constitution-making 
process. 99  The constitutional referendum, Richard Kay remarks, ‘has become a near 
staple of modern constitution-making’.100 As Jeffrey Lenowitz recently demonstrated, a 
common argument in favour of ratification is that this is ‘the only moment in the 
constitution-making process when the constituent power is able to act and make a 
constitution’. 101  Of course, there are many well-known difficulties associated with 
referendums, such as the designation of the individuals who qualify to participate; the 
drafting of the ballot question; the lack of knowledge of the voters; fear of tyranny of the 
majority; and, of course, the historical associations of the use of plebiscites as tools for 
supporting authoritarian regimes.102 Therefore, some, such as Antoni Ninet, claim that 
ratification is insufficient: ‘the legitimacy and validity of the constitution requires not only 
popular ratification, but also real (or true) democratic involvement. A constitution made 
through ordinary parliaments and representatives is unacceptable’.103 In other words, for 
constitutional moments to be democratic, a true manifestation of the people’s will, 
popular participation in constitutional moments should be before, throughout, and after 
the constitutional norms-creating process and not be limited to a solely ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote 
                                                          
96 Ninet (2010). 
97 Coban (2012, 56 fn 13).  
98 Tierney (2013, 2194). See also Versteeg (2014, 10) (noting that ‘today, 34% of all constitutions require 
ratification by popular referendum, while in 1950, only 7% did.’) 
99 See, for example, Blount (2011, 49); Elkins, Ginsburg and Blount (2008, 361). 
100 Kay (2011, 746). See also Saunders (2012) (popular participation is a distinctive feature of constitution-
making in the 21st century).  
101  Lenowitz (2013, 119, and at 202). In his doctoral thesis, Lenowitz demonstrates some of the 
complications behind this idea. See also Lenowitz (2011, 9).    
102 Butler and Ranney (1994, 17-21). On the plebiscites of Napoleon and ‘contemporary’ dictators see 
Friedrich (1937, 115-117). For recent examples of ‘abuses’ of referendums see European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (2009, 37).  
103 Ninet (2013).  
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in a referendum. 104  It is the manifestation of ‘we the people’, not simply ‘oui, the 
people’.105 
One notable proponent of the democratic constitution-making/changing 
approach is Joel Colón-Ríos. Colón-Ríos focuses on what he terms ‘the second 
dimension of democracy’, which is democracy at the level of fundamental law - the 
relationship between citizens and their constitution, especially in times of imperative 
constitutional changes. According to Colón-Ríos, significant constitutional changes 
require a process that endeavours to reproduce popular participation and democratic 
openness at the same degree presented during constitution-making moments. 
Democracy thus understood is an exercise of self-government that necessitates 
democratic openness and maximisation of popular actual participation.106 Therefore, in 
order to acquire democratic legitimacy, fundamental constitutional changes, episodical by 
their nature, should take place through the most participatory process possible, which 
allows citizens the opportunity to propose, deliberate, and decide upon such changes. 
Constitutional regimes must leave a door open for the constituent power to re-emerge 
through extraordinary mechanisms that work separately from the ordinary amendment 
procedure, such as constituent assemblies, elected by the people for fundamentally 
changing the constitution and whose outcomes shall be approved in a popular 
referendum. These participatory mechanisms facilitate the exercise of constituent power.107  
Together with Allan Hutchinson, Colón-Ríos argues that constitutional changes 
that take place outside of the scope of popular decision-making constrain the potential of 
democracy’s emancipation. If democracy is about self-government and self-rule, then 
fundamental constitutional rules should originate in an exercise of self-legislation by the 
people, who, in turn, ‘might identify more with the constitutional regime and think of it 
as their own, not simply as the embodiment of the collective will of a mysterious 
People’. 108  Their preferred method for this popular participation in important 
constitutional changes is through an elected constituent assembly, triggered by popular 
initiative, especially for changing the constitutional regime, and ratified by the people 
before coming into effect. Positive law would not limit such an assembly, in light of the 
                                                          
104 Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos (2011, 53); Coban (2012, 73). 
105 For an argument that in order to be democratically legitimate, constitutional reforms should be inclusive 
and robustly deliberative see Levy (2013, 566) (who proposes there to improve deliberative voting in 
constitutional referenda). According to Tierney (2009, 382) it ‘seems intuitively plausible that a referendum, 
carefully tailored to meet the specificities of a particular society, can help bring a populace together in a 
deliberative, constitutional moment.’  
106 Colón-Ríos (2009, 1). 
107 Colón-Ríos (2012C); Colón- Ríos (2010A, 199); Colón-Ríos (2011B); Colón-Ríos (2012A, 53).   
108 Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos (2011, 51). 
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unique character of the constituent power. Therefore, for them, constituent power should not 
be ‘muzzled and contained’; rather, it should allow popular agency to create and re-create 
constitutional regimes.109 This understanding allows the mythical people to re-activate its 
constituent power.110  
The primary constituent power is never exhausted or completely absorbed into 
constituted organs. This is not to deny that through an endless series of events that take 
place within constituted institutions, ‘the people’ continue to define and redefine 
themselves.111 It is only to claim that ontologically, primary constituent power maintains its 
energy ‘to bring about a fundamental break … in the nature of the governing regime’.112 
It ‘can never be definitively or permanently stabilised’.113 The conception of a democratic 
primary constituent power means that it must be committed to popular sovereignty. It may 
exercise itself in forms such as special constitutional assemblies and constitutional 
referenda.114 In order for the primary constituent power to be direct, these forms must have a 
special character, i.e. separate from other public functions, thereby replacing revolution 
with peaceful means incorporating actual, deliberate, free choice by society’s members.115 
Primary constituent power should not be merely grasped as a popular revolution, but as a 
means for realising a well-deliberated and thoughtful change.116 While it is true that ‘in 
the end, there can be no precise algorithm specifying the conditions for defining a people 
capable of exercising constituent authority’, 117  an exercise of primary constituent power 
should be inclusive, participatory, and deliberative. After all, the word constituere, Kalyvas 
reminds us, marks the act of founding together, jointly.118  
An important aspect is the maintenance of freedoms such as freedom of speech, 
free and fair election, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and freedom of assembly and 
association, the absence of which ‘spell[s] the death for the legal concept that is 
                                                          
109 Id., 52-53. 
110 Colón- Ríos (2010A, 240). 
111  For an argument of the people as process see Espejo (2011).  
112 Loughlin (2008, 64).  
113  Murphy (2006, 105). 
114 Barshack (2006, 190). Ackerman (2000B, 665-667) proposed that we should seek to distinguish between 
parliament and the people, the former managing routine governmental decisions and the latter expressing 
its will through a carefully constructed process of serial referenda. 
115 Conrad (1970, 404-410).  
116 Prateek (2008, 454). This might be compared to Ackerman’s ‘deliberative fora provided for higher 
lawmaking.’ Ackerman (1991, 6). 
117  Kay (2011, 742). Indeed, since there is no clear mechanism for the primary constituent power to be 
exercised, one major obstacle to this theory is that the decision whether a constitutional norm was indeed a 
true manifestation of the primary constituent power  must be given retrospectively, and would eventually be 
subject to the judiciary’s legitimation of the extra-constitutional. See Schwartzberg (2011, 1303, 1314).  
118 Kalyvas (2005, 235 and also at 238). 
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constituent power’.119 The latter understanding refuses to reduce primary constituent power 
to a mere acclamation – a ‘soccer-stadium democracy’, in the words of Holmes.120 This is 
similar to Christoph Burchard’s criticism of Schmitt’s conception of constituent power for 
‘there is no discourse, no rational consideration, only irrational masses cheering or 
booing’.121 Process matters. As Kostas Chryssogonos explains:   
A Constitution may be characterized as democratic, from the point of view of 
the holder of constituent power, when it has been elaborated and voted by a 
collective representative body (constituent assembly, national assembly, etc.), 
elected through universal, equal and secret suffrage by the people, occasionally 
with some form of direct participation of the latter…It should be emphasized 
that a Constitution, which has been elaborated by the organs of an authoritarian 
regime and submitted directly to a referendum, is not a “democratic” one, in that 
sense, since in this way the people are deprived of the possibility to have an 
influential impact on its content.122  
 
Rather than allowing abuse of the constituent power by actors who claim to 
represent the people and acting in their name,123 we should emphasise the democratic 
nature of the primary constituent power: ‘if there is a power that must be democratic, then it 
is in the first place constituent power’.124  
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIMARY CONSTITUENT POWER 
A. The Fallacy of Prescribed Constitution-Making Procedures 
 
In the previous section, I noted that even after the establishment of a constitution, the 
primary constituent power, the ‘sleeping giant’ so to speak,125 could awake and change even 
unamendable constitutional principles. Being external to the pre-existing constitutional 
order, this power cannot be bound by the prior and existing constitutional rules. 
Consequently, constitutions cannot (and most do not) regulate its emergence. 
Constitutions, in other words, ‘contemplate their amendment but almost never their 
replacement’. 126  
Nonetheless, some constitutions not only regulate the procedure of their 
amendment, but also attempt to regulate the re-emergence of the primary constituent power 
                                                          
119 Guha and Tundawala (2008, 543). See also Conrad (1977-1978, 12); Friedrich (1937, 116). 
120 Holmes (1996, 49).  
121 Burchard (2006, 13).  
122 Chryssogonos (2008, 1299-1316). 
123 Cristi (1999-2000, 1768).  
124 Gouveia (2011, 37). 
125 I borrow the description of the people’s constituent power as a ‘sleeping giant’ from Cyr (2007, 45 fn 74). 
126 Landau (2011-2012, 616-617). See also Winterhoff (2007, 150-151); Kay (2011, 745). 
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and establish the rules for their own replacement. 127 For instance, the Constitution of 
Venezuela of 1999 states that ‘The original constituent power rests with the people of 
Venezuela. This power may be exercised by calling a National Constituent Assembly for 
the purpose of transforming the State, creating a new juridical order and drawing up a 
new Constitution’ (Art. 347).128 Other constitutions prescribe a procedure for their ‘total 
reform’, ‘complete revision’, or ‘adopting a new constitution’. 129  These examples 
demonstrate the desire of constitution-makers to institutionalise the primary constituent 
power within the constitutional form.130  
Since by its nature, the primary constituent power is not bound by any constitutional 
rules, this method seems bizarre. Schmitt had thus argued that the constitutionalisation 
of constituent power is a fallacy: ‘no constitutional law, not even a constitution, can confer a 
constitution-making power and prescribe the form of its initiation’.131 If constituent power is 
considered superior and external to positive law, law cannot prescribe it. Therefore, 
Richard Kay claims that these attempts are not only ‘paradoxical’, but might also ‘be 
dismissed as rhetorical decoration’. 132 Instead of dismissing these provisions, it might be 
more valuable to regard them not as constituting, but rather as recognising or declaring, 
existing powers; hence different from amending provisions.  
Imagine that a new constitution is constituted through these constitutional 
mechanisms. What does that mean for constitutional theory? Two plausible answers exist. 
According to one approach, this process was an exercise of the instituted secondary 
constituent power rather than the primary constituent power.133 Accordingly, it might be argued 
that the new constitution, brought about by constituted powers, is illegitimate or even 
unconstitutional. This argument should be rejected according to the theory of delegation (see 
Chapter 4). Here, the primary constituent power delegated a secondary constituent power with the 
unique authority to replace the constitution and establish a new one.  
According to a second approach, it was indeed the primary constituent power that 
played the constitution-making role, yet it simply decided to act according to the existing 
                                                          
127 Kay (2011, 725-726); Tushnet (2012-2013, 1988). 
128 Articles 348-349 to the Constitution further regulate this process.  
129 E.g. Argentina Const. (1994), art. 30; Nicaragua Const. (1987), arts.191-193; Swiss Const. (1999), arts. 
138, 193, and Bulgaria Const. (1991), arts. 158-162. See Kay (2011, 725); European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (2009, 13).   
130 Coban (2012, 56).  
131 Schmitt (2008, 132). 
132 Kay (2011, 727-728).    
133 See, for example, Kalyvas (2005, 228); Guastini (2007, 305): ‘in no legal system can constituent power 
— which is not to be confused with the power of constitutional amendment — be regarded as an 
institutionalized source: otherwise, it would not be “constituent but “constituted.”’ 
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procedures rather than being obliged to them.134 Carl Friedrich gives the example of a 
constitutional change that occurred in Switzerland in 1874. The Constitution of 1848 was 
then ‘entirely overhauled and democratized’ through the ordinary amendment procedure. 
The constituent power, according to Friedrich: 
manifested itself through the amending power; but that does not mean that it is 
identical with it; in fact even to say that it manifested itself through it is 
something of a misstatement. It would be more accurate to say that the group 
which might otherwise develop into the constituent power manifests itself 
through, acts through the amending power.135  
 
Since the primary constituent power has extra-juridical dimensions, it cannot be fully 
regulated or stipulated legally.136 This, however, does not mean that a constitution cannot 
stipulate the means by which a new constitution would be constituted. It only means that 
by its nature, primary constituent power does not have to abide by it, although it can act 
accordingly if it so wishes. 137 ‘Like it or not’, Kay concludes this point, ‘a true constituent 
authority must act without the comfort of legal authorization’.138 These mechanisms can 
be viewed not as containing primary constituent power, but rather, simply as vehicles for its 
exercise.139  
 Not to be mistaken, these mechanisms may carry important benefits. Exercising 
primary constituent power behind ‘a façade of legality’ may serve significant political 
interests.140 Also, legally regulating a constitutional-replacement process, which would be 
relatively difficult to carry out, might be a suitable response to abuse of the amendment 
process that establishes a new constitution or ignoring any procedures whatsoever in the 
name of the pouvoir constituant.141 Since, as aforementioned, the people’s will is divided, 
such legal rules may create ‘organized, complex procedures of deliberation and voting’, 
                                                          
134 Lenowitz (2013, 87).  
135 Friedrich (1937, 118). 
136 Cristi (1999-2000, 1758, 1765). See also Goldoni and McCorkindale (2013, 2214-2215):  ‘new beginnings 
— the raison d’être of the constituent power — are an essential part of political action and by definition 
cannot be contained or fully announced by existing laws and institutions. … The constituent moment – 
when constituent power exercises this constitutive capacity - exceeds constituted powers in order to 
transform them, working as an ‘irritant’ against existing institutions and the ordinary modes of 
representative politics.’ 
137 Tushnet (2012-2013, 2006): ‘The constituent power can exercise itself through the forms of law, but 
those forms cannot ultimately constrain the constituent power.’ 
138 Kay (2011, 735). See also Kahn (2006, 268): ‘Constitutions may not have sunset clauses, but neither can 
they declare illegitimate an investment of the popular sovereign in a new constitution … is always deeper 
and richer than its particular terms of expression in a constitution.’ 
139 Cf., Tierney (2012, 133). 
140 Kay (2011, 733). For a discussion of the use of positive law argument in the justification of revolutions, 
see Kay (1997, 161). 
141 Landau (2013A, 189). Of course, such mechanisms are also open for abuses.  
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which would preserve the primary constituent power’s political credibility. 142  Lastly, the 
emergence of primary constituent power may be important according to a legal framework 
for legal certainty and continuity and may enhance the legitimacy of the new 
document.143 Therefore, a recent report by the Venice Commission ‘strongly endorse[d]’ 
the use of a legal procedure even for the adoption of ‘new constitutions’, since such a 
procedure would ‘strengthen the stability, legality and legitimacy of the new system’.144 
 
B. We The ‘Limited’ People? 
 
The German Basic Law of 1949 is an interesting example of an attempt to 
constitutionalise the primary constituent power. The final article of the Basic Law reads: ‘This 
Basic Law will lose its validity on the effective date of a constitution that has been chosen 
by the German people in a free decision’ (Art.146). This provision not only anticipated 
the Basic Law’s own destruction,145 but also reflects the legal positivisation of the primary 
constituent power.146 Contrary to some of the examples noted earlier, this provision – while 
recognising the people’s constituent power – did not stipulate conditions or procedures for 
its exercise. One may claim that this lack of stipulation seems as a confirmation of the 
primary constituent power’s extra-legal character.147  
This particular constitutionalisation of primary constituent power raises interesting 
questions as to the theory of unamendability. Recall, the German Basic Law includes in 
Art. 79(3) an unamendable provision (see Chapter 2). Is the emergence of a new primary 
constituent power, as acknowledged by Art. 146, restricted by the principles enshrined by 
Art. 79(3)?148 Some authors have opined that the unamendable principles also apply in 
such circumstances and thus would guide any future constitution-making. 149  Others 
remark in contrast that Art. 146 is a legal manner with which to overcome the 
unamendable provision,150 while another group claims that this question ought to be 
                                                          
142 Chryssogonos (2008, 1299-1316). 
143 Coban (2012, 56). 
144 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (2009, 15).  
145 In the acts of the reunification of 23.09.1990, art. 146 was amended as follows: ‘after the union and 
freedom of Germany have been finalized this constitution shall be valid for all the German people and will 
continue to be valid until the day when a new constitution is accepted by the free will of the German 
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was instead amended and was kept in place. See Kay (2011, 727). 
146 Möllers (2007, 97-98).  
147 Coban (2012, 58). 
148 For a debate see Kay (2011, 727); Möllers (2007, 97). 
149 Dreier (2000, art. 146, no.33), cited in Möllers (2007, 97). See debate in Murkens (2013, 173-175).   
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resolved by the Constitutional Court.151 Indeed, in the Lisbon Case, the Constitutional 
Court expressly left open the question of whether the German people’s constituent power 
might be restricted by the unamendable provisions: 
It may remain open whether, due to the universal nature of dignity, freedom and 
equality alone, this commitment even applies to the constituent power, i.e. to the 
case that the German people, in free self-determination, but in a continuity of 
legality to the rule of the Basic Law, gives itself a new constitution.152  
 
I agree with Jo Murkens that Art. 79(3) addresses only the amendment power – the 
secondary constituent power – dealing with Parliament’s changes to the Basic Law, whereas 
Art. 146 foresees a new constitution adopted by the primary constituent power, which by its 
nature cannot be bound by the rules of the prior constitution. The new constitution-
drafters may take Art. 79(3) into account, but that would depend on their own ‘goodwill’, 
rather than on the nature of the unamendable provision as a legal obligation. 153 
 Consequently, even though the primary constituent power is constitutionalised within the 
German Basic Law, Art. 79(3) is unable to bind later generations when exercising their 
primary constituent power. 154  Art. 79(3) guarantees are unamendable, not (as they are 
wrongfully referred to as) eternal.  
One often noted example to the claim that the exercise of primary constituent power 
is hardly bound by limitations, is the 1962 Amendment to the French Constitution over 
the form of presidential elections. This Amendment, which passed through a referendum 
initiated by President de Gaulle, took effect despite its violation of the amendment 
procedure (Art. 89).155 It was challenged before the French Constitutional Council, which 
held that it had no competence to review laws passed by the people in a referendum 
since they are a direct expression of national sovereignty.156 The Constitutional Council 
thus took the approach of le peuple-roi – ‘the people’ is the king; it is the new sovereign, 
implying that the people always retain the power to revise the constitution. As one 
advocate stated in 1849 before a Versailles court, ‘the people never violate the 
constitution’. 157  Since this constitutional change occurred outside of the instituted 
                                                          
151 Quint (1997, 49).  
152  The Lisbon Case, BVerfg, 2 be/08 of 30 June 2009, para. 217, 
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amendment process, and as such be regarded as a ‘constitutional violation’, 158  its 
authoritative legitimacy could be granted only retrospectively.159 Also, the employment 
process may establish a constitutional precedent for a new amendment procedure to be 
availed of in future occasions.160 This example is compatible with Barshack’s supposition 
that ‘the fuller the sovereign presence, the more relaxed the constitutional structure and 
the formal procedure that governs the referendum’.161 
This postulation raises a thorny question: what are the implications of an 
amendment process which includes the primary constituent power’s characteristics of 
directness and speciality, like popular referendums or elections for special constituent 
assemblies? Here the people are part of the delegated amendment power. Are the people 
in that capacity limited? Can an amendment approved by such a process be 
unconstitutional? A positive answer would subordinate not only decisions of the people’s 
representatives, but also those of the people themselves to the judiciary. It seems that 
there are two prevailing approaches to this challenge.162  
According to the first approach, when the amendment power is exercised by the people it is 
unlimited. This is the general approach of Irish jurisprudence. Due to the Christian 
character of the 1937 Irish Constitution, and its reference to man as possessing natural 
rights antecedent to positive law,163 there is a heated debate within Ireland on whether 
natural law sets limits to the constitutional amendment power. 164  In 1992, two 
amendments guaranteeing the rights to obtain information about abortion services 
abroad and to receive such services were adopted through a referendum, according to 
Art. 46(2) of the Constitution.165 In response, High Court Justice O’Hanlon, not wearing 
his judicial hat, argued that the amendment power is limited by basic natural rights, and 
since the two amendments conflicted with the natural right of the unborn to life, they 
should be invalidated.166 When the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the amendments 
in re Article 26 and the Information (Termination of Pregnancies) Bill, 1995, it rejected the claim 
                                                          
158 Carrozza (2007, 174).  
159 Kalyvas (2005, 231). 
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that natural law was superior to the Constitution, holding that the people, not God, are 
the creator of the Constitution and the supreme authority. Hence, amendments made by 
the people become the fundamental and supreme law of the land.167 The Court repeated 
the superior right of the people to amend the Constitution in various other decisions.168 
Aileen Kavanagh recently summarised the Court’s approach: ‘For the time being, the 
matter seems closed as a matter of legal doctrine: the Irish Supreme Court will not stand 
in the way of an amendment to the Constitution supported by the people in a 
referendum’.169  
Similarly, in Romania, although the 1991 Constitution grants the Constitutional 
Court an explicit authority to a-priori review proposed constitutional amendments,170 once 
an amendments is adopted by a referendum (as required by Art. 151), it is definit and 
final, and the Court has no control over it, since ‘such a law-expression of the original 
will-power is above the will of any power.’171  
This approach may be supported by the claim that logically, it would be 
incoherent to posit that a decision adopted by a referendum outside of the amendment 
process would not be deemed unconstitutional as long as it is a direct expression of the 
people, whereas a same decision, similarly adopted by a referendum, would be found 
unconstitutional merely because the referendum process is defined in the constitution. 
According to this approach, even if the primary constituent power rests with the people, 
albeit essentially anarchic and lawless, it may choose, so to speak, to be exercised within 
the constitutional framework of constitutional amendment.   
According to the second approach, the amendment power is limited even when exercised 
directly by the people. The people in that capacity of inclusion in the amendment process 
represent a legal organ of the state. As there can be no sovereign within the 
constitutional political order, the people’s power is necessarily limited. 172  As Jeffrey 
Lenowitz writes:  
While a constitutional amendment, even one produced by a popular referendum, 
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can alter the constitution, its process is dictated by the constitution and thus it 
leaves the normative superiority and sovereignty of the constitution intact. Since 
… constituent power is inherently unconstrained, derived constituent power is 
not constituent power at all.173  
 
The amendment power, accordingly, is simply a power constituted by the 
constitution regardless of its shape.174  
An example of this approach comes from Switzerland, where 100,000 people 
eligible to vote have the right to propose revisions to the Constitution (‘People’s 
Initiative’ - Volksinitiative). In 1996, both chambers of the Federal Assembly declared a 
Volksinitiative, according to which asylum seekers who enter the state unlawfully would 
be deported immediately and without the option of appeal, to be invalid for violating the 
internationally recognised peremptory norm of non-refoulement. 175  The Federal Council 
stated that respecting the fundamental norms of international law is inherent to the 
Rechtsstaat principle of ‘rule by law,176 and violation of said norms would undermine the 
Rechtsstaat and cause the state and the influenced individuals an irreversible damage. It 
therefore proposed that the Federal Assembly invalidate the Volksinitiative,177 which it did 
on 14 March 1996.178 In 1999, Switzerland granted explicit constitutional recognition to 
the proposition that jus cogens norms of international law were a limitation to 
constitutional reforms, whether total or partial (Arts. 193.4, 194.2). 179  Therefore, in 
Switzerland, even when the people are directly involved, and even when the constitution 
allows for its total revision, this faculty is still limited. According to this approach, ‘the 
people’ may be regarded in two distinct capacities: as a source of absolute power (primary 
constituent power) and as a constitutional organ established by the constitution for its 
amendment (secondary constituent power).180  
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175  Bundesbeschluss über die Volksinitiative ‘für eine vernünftige Asylpolitik und gegen die illegale. 
Einwanderung’. 14 March 1996, BBI 1996 I 1355, cited and elaborated in de Wet (2004, 101-5). See also 
Zimmermann (2008, 258). On the peremptory status of the non-refoulement principle see Allain (2001, 533). 
176 On the Swiss Rechtstaat principle see Fleiner, Misic and Töpperwien (2005, 28-30). 
177  Botschaft über die Volksinitiatieven ‘für eine vernünftige Asylpolitik und gegen die illegale 
Einwanderung’. In BBI 1994 III 1489, 1495-1500, cited in de Wet (2004, 101-105). 
178 This opinion of the Swiss Federal Council was somewhat contrary to a prior decision of 1953, in which 
it held that no external limitations exist upon the constitutional process that can be deemed superior to the 
people’s will (BBI 1954 I 72). In its later opinion, the Federal Council distinguished between treaty 
obligations, which state parties can legally terminate and were at issue in the 1953 initiative, and jus cogens 
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Stephen Tierney’s analysis appears lucid. Tierney claims that one has to 
distinguish between referendums that operate wholly within existing constitutional 
structures, thereby internal to the constitution, and referendums that transcend the 
existing order, which are external to the constitution. In the former case,  
the people are engaged directly in producing constitutional law, but it is highly 
debatable that they are engaged explicitly in “constituting power.” Rather, the 
use of the referendum is provided for by the constitution, its process is regulated 
by that constitution, and its result takes effect within the normative order of that 
constitution.  
 
In contrast, the latter case seems to be a different category as it includes the power to 
‘bring about a new order’.181 Tierney urges us to be cautious when referring to ‘people 
sovereignty’ simply due to an exercise of a referendum, and to pay attention to the mode 
of that exercise and the role that the people have played within it.182 On this account, it 
appears that when the people have a role within the amendment process, such an 
exercise does not represent the primary constituent power. Such referendums ‘are constrained 
to operate within mainstream representative democracy, subordinate to the constitutional 
rules and subject to constitutional institutions, including courts’.183 It is only when the 
people ‘act as original constitutional authors, bringing a clear break in the old order; the 
referendum manifests the “people’s” direct democratic capacity to act as the supreme 
source of constitutional law in foundational constitutional acts’.184 This dilemma is crucial 
for any theory of unamendability. It is here, Claude Klein remarks, where ‘the crux of the 
problem of the theory of the amending power’ lies.185 In the next section, I deviate from 
the dichotomy of the two approaches mentioned above and offer an even more subtle 
account, one of a spectrum of constitutional amendment powers.  
III. THE SPECTRUM OF AMENDMENT POWERS 
According to the dichotomy described above, there is a binary constitutional code of 
constitutional amendments: an amendment originating via the constitutional process 
through the secondary constituent power, which is limited (even if includes the people), and an 
                                                                                                                                                                      
… Article V amenders act as interpreters of the existing constitutional order; they operate within the rules 
and boundaries of the Constitution.’ 
181 Tierney (2012, 12).  
182 Id., 13. See also Tierney (2009, 360). 
183 Id., 13. 
184 Id., 14. See also Tierney (2009, 364): ‘the people’s direct democratic capacity to act as, or at least to 
infuence the location and distribution of, the supreme source of constitutional law within a polity, 
distinguishes constitutional referendums as, potentially at least, true conduits of popular determination.’  
185 Klein (1978, 213). 
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amendment that is constituted in a constitutional moment through the re-emergence of 
the primary constituent power and thus unlimited. Constitutional systems are more complex 
than this. They are polymorphic.186  
Just as in materials science, a solid material can exist in multiple forms, so does the 
amendment power. Constitutions have different procedures for constitutional 
amendments. 187  Not only do entire constitutions differ from one another in the 
mechanisms, actors, and procedures involved in the amendment process, but also a same 
constitution might incorporate different procedures for amending different provisions 
and principles. This section therefore argues that one ought to regard constitutional 
amendment powers not in a binary manner (limited/unlimited), but rather as a spectrum of 
scope, a spectrum of amendment powers. The more similar the democratic characteristics of 
the secondary constituent power are to those of the primary constituent power (‘strong amendment 
power’), the less it should be bound by limitations (including judicial scrutiny), and vice 
versa. The closer it is to a regular legislative power (‘weak amendment power’), the more it 
should be fully bound by limitations (and judicial scrutiny). This calls for an examination 
of the link between the limitations that ought to be imposed upon amendment powers 
and amendment procedures.  
 
A. Strong and Weak Constitutional Amendment Powers   
 
Comparative constitutional design demonstrates that there is no single unified method or 
process for amending constitutions. Constitutions differ between dissimilar degrees of 
amendability. Some are ‘flexible’ in that the amendment process is relatively easy, such as 
ordinary legislative majorities, and some are more ‘rigid’ in that they require high barriers, 
such as super-majorities, or additional requirements, such as constituent assemblies, 
intervening elections, and referendums.188 In most countries, parliament serves both as 
ordinary legislator and as holder of the amendment power, but the process of 
constitutional amendment is commonly subjected to special procedures and 
requirements. Jon Elster classifies six ‘main hurdles’ for constitutional amendments: 
unamendable provisions; a supermajority threshold in parliament; a higher quorum than 
                                                          
186 I use the term Polymorphic in a constitutional context different from that which is often used to 
describe constitutional interpretation, according to which legal terms can bear different meanings for 
different circumstances. For such a use see Siegel (2005, 339).  
187 See, for example, Andenas (2000); Oliver and Fusaro (2011), Contiades (2012); European Commission 
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ordinary legislation; time delays; state ratification in federal systems; and popular 
referendums.189 These hurdles not only make constitutional change more difficult than 
the way ordinary laws change, but also reflect the notion that the constitution is a special 
kind of law which should not be amended as easily as ordinary law.190   
As noted in Chapter 4, the amendment power is situated in a grey area between 
the ordinary legislative power and the extraordinary constituent power. In this grey area, a 
spectrum of amendment power exists. Some amendment procedures are weak amendment 
powers in the sense that the amendment process is similar (or relatively similar) to the 
ordinary legislative process in terms of the organs involved, and the temporal and 
procedural constraints. Others, which significantly deviate from the ordinary legislative 
process with regard to these features are strong amendment powers in the sense that their 
exercise resembles (or almost resembles) a constitutional moment – nearly an invocation 
of the primary constituent power.    
In order to demonstrate this spectrum, I use Edward Schneier’s analysis of 
amendment procedures and the Venice Commission’s ‘Report on Constitutional 
Amendment’ to exemplify various amendment procedures. 191  The weakest amendment 
powers are those states in which a simple legislative majority is enough to bring about 
constitutional amendments.192 An amendment power stronger than the ordinary majority 
is the one that requires a qualified majority in parliament for the adoption of 
amendments. Almost all European countries require a certain qualified majority.193 A 
requirement of multiple readings in parliament makes the amendment process longer and 
more difficult, and strengthens the amendment power.194 Time delays of one to twelve 
months between the initiative and the first debate in parliament 195  or between the 
readings196 is another technique often used. But all of these procedures are still ‘weak’ 
from the perspective of a democratic constituent power in the sense that they exclude the 
people from the process.  
These procedures of ordinary and qualified majorities in parliament may be 
reinforced, for instance with a requirement of a popular referendum, intervening 
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elections, convening a special constitutional convention or a combination thereof.197 As 
Madhavan Pillai claims in light of the Indian experience:  
The safeguard involved in the two-thirds requirement to amend certain 
provisions of the Constitution can be whittled down be the executive which 
tends to have a firm grip over Parliament and thereby reverse the very concept 
of accountability. Such disastrous situations can be averted by adhering to the 
referendum device. This will provide an insurance against a party with 
overwhelming powers playing ducks and drakes with the Constitution.198 
 
When constitutions require intervening elections for amendments, this is a strong 
amendment power. It is both inclusive and deliberative, putting the subject matter as an 
issue in the elections and thus asking the people’s opinion of it, and allowing enough 
opportunity for public and political debates on the proposed amendments. It also 
attempts to minimise an abuse of the amendment power – as the amending authority 
would not necessarily be the same before and after the amendment’s enactment. Similar 
strong amendment powers are those procedures that require elections to a special constituent 
assembly for the purpose of amending the constitution. This process is inclusive of the 
people (through the elections, at the very least) and supplies a deliberative setting.199 The 
U.S. Constitution is an interesting case. On one hand, Art. V’s process is very demanding 
and time-consuming (both a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress and ratification 
by three-quarters of the state legislatures).200 These demanding consensus requirements 
arguably label it as a strong amendment power.201 On the other hand, not only does this 
cumbersome procedure not directly involve the people, in fact, it is so demanding that 
some commentators note that ‘from the perspective of … the constituent power … the 
banishing of sovereignty from the internal life of the republic was perhaps too successful. 
… it is almost impossible to legally change the American constitution’.202 
 The argument that I wish to advance in the following section is simple: strong 
amendment powers should be awarded wider scope than weak amendment powers. This idea is 
compatible with certain existing constitutional arrangements, which utilise a 
‘constitutional escalator’. As noted earlier, some constitutions incorporate different 
procedures for constitutional amendments of different constitutional subjects. Those 
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201 Cf., Sager (1990, 951-53).  
202 Arato and Cohen (2009, 317). Critics as Dixon (1967-1968, 933); Griffin (1995, 171) and Levinson 
(2006, 159-166) have argued that the amendment procedure is the main democratic defects of the U.S. 
Constitution.  
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provisions that are deemed more fundamental or protection-worthy are more difficult to 
amend and enjoy a special protection.203 These procedures may include, again, increased 
qualified majorities in parliament, referendums, intervening elections, or convening a 
special constituent assembly.204 To mention some examples, certain principles may only 
be amended by referendum in Belarus (1994, Art. 140), Estonia (1992, Art. 162), Latvia 
(1992, Art. 77), Lithuania (1992, Art. 148), Singapore (1963, Art. 5), Serbia (2006, Art. 
203), and Vanuatu (1980, Art. 86). A different procedure exists in the Russian 
Constitution of 1993, in which amendments to fundamentals of the constitutional system 
require conveyance of a Constitutional Assembly (Art. 135). This is also often the case 
when the constitution allows for a ‘total revision’ of the constitution or its replacement 
with a new one. For example, the Austrian Constitution requires a popular referendum 
for its total revision (Art. 44.3). In Spain, a total revision of the Constitution or 
amendments to certain basic provisions demand a more robust process, including the 
dissolution of Parliament and a subsequent approval by a referendum (Art. 168.1).205 In 
Costa Rica, The Constitution’s general amendment can be effected only by a constituent 
assembly called for the purpose (1949, Art. 196),206 and in Bolivia, the total reform of the 
Constitution, or that which affects its fundamental premises, can take place through an 
original plenipotentiary constituent assembly, put into motion by popular will through 
referendum (2009, Art. 411.1).207 In line with my argument, except with the Russian 
Constitution, none of the above-mentioned constitutions includes unamendable 
provisions. 
 The rationale behind this constitutional escalator is clear; the more fundamental 
the principles of the constitutional order, the more they should be protected from hasty 
changes through heightened amendment requirements. 208 This ‘selective rigidity’ 
mechanism was recently advocated for by constitutional scholars, such as Richard 
                                                          
203 See e.g. South African Const. (1996), art. 74; Canada Constitution Act, 1982, Part V. See Corder (2011, 
270); Hutchinson (2013, 64-66); Albert (2014, 11-12).  
204 See Coban (2012, 57-66). 
205 See Comella (2000, 62 fn 42); Elvira (2011, 282-284); Ortega and Guijarro (2013, 302-308). 
206 In Resolución 2010-13313, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica (Constitutional Chamber) held 
that human rights of minorities cannot be subjected to a referendum process where majorities rule, but 
stated, in an obiter in part VI of the judgment, that even the derived constituent power cannot amend the 
constitution in a way that violates ‘the essence of fundamental human rights.’ 
207Interestingly, in June 1, 2004, before the adoption of the 2009 Constitution, the Bolivian Tribunal 
Constitucional Plurinacional declared that it had no jurisdiction to review constitutional norms or decide 
upon their validity. According to the Tribunal, once a reform has passed it becomes part of the 
Constitution. Since the Tribunal is the guardian of the Constitution, it has no jurisdiction to assess the 
constitutionality of a constitutional reform once becomes part of the Constitution. See Expediente 2004-
09014-19-RDI. 
208 Suber (1999, 31-32).   
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Albert209 and David Landau,210 for allowing greater protection to the core parts of the 
democratic order, thus reducing the possibilities of abusing the amendment process, 
while simultaneously easily allowing amendments of non-fundamental principles.211 The 
two scholars also emphasise the importance of the temporal dimension; i.e. intervening 
elections or time delays before the adoption of constitutional amendments, which resist 
the ability of powerful political forces to abuse their power and take advantage of their 
temporary popularity to amend the constitution in a way that would damage 
democracy.212  
However, these two scholars approach the issue from the standing point of 
constitutional design. I wish to approach this issue from the perspective of the theory of 
constituent power. The constitutional escalator is not only a practical safeguard for better 
protecting certain constitutional principles or institutions. Differentiated amendment rule 
is a device that aims to imitate, as much as possible, constitutional moments in which the 
primary constituent power is incarnated.213 As means for generating legitimacy for a particular 
amendment process, 214 it links amendment procedures to various degrees of 
unamendability.  
  
B. Linking Amendment Procedures and Unamendability 
 
Strong amendment powers attempt to imitate the re-emergence of primary constituent power. 
Through formal mechanisms, such as referendums, elections, and summoning 
constituent assemblies, they aim to create an environment in which the people are 
‘awaking’, in a sense, to resume their role as constituent authors. They attempt to create a 
constitutional moment. As Contiades and Fotiadou explain:  
The people are traditionally considered to have spoken during the exercise of the 
pouvoir constituant. Amending formulas may be described as replications of the 
constitutional moment where the pouvoir constituant was exercised, being 
attempted simulations of that primordial, constitution-making function. … This 
original constitution-making process is embellished with great symbolic force, 
the reproduction of which during every constitutional revision would be 
unfeasible. Yet, desire to somehow preserve the spirit of that moment is often 
                                                          
209 Albert (2010, 707-710); Albert (2013B, 225); Albert (2014).  
210 Landau (2013A, 189). 
211 As the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (2009, 36) noted, a requirement that all 
amendments be approved through a referendum risks creating an excessively rigid constitution. 
212 Landau (2013A, 189); Albert (2010, 711). For an argument (with regard to state constitutions) that 
selective rigidity distorts the balance between flexibility and stability see Plato (2007, 1489-1493). 
213  Here, the myth of the people as holders of constituent power serves as the guiding narrative for 
constitutional design, even if only formally. See Sajó (2009, 27). 
214 Arato (2011, 340). 
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apparent in constitutional arrangements that risk sacrificing practically for 
symbolism.215  
 
Such a process should not be considered as equally bound to restriction as weak 
constituent power, solely activated by one constitutional organ in the same procedure as in 
ordinary politics. This is because, as Barshack clarifies:  
Theoretically inelegant as this result may be, the binding force of constitutional 
procedure varies in every constitutional moment in proportion to the intensity of 
sovereign presence. … When the communal body asserts itself in the 
amendment of a constitution as intensely as it was involved in its original 
adoption, it is hardly bound by constitutional procedure at all and hardly subject 
to judicial review over the constitutionality of the amendment.216 
 
Therefore, from the perspective of the theory of constituent power, it is not merely the 
protected principle or the fear of abuse which justify the constitutional escalator; 
allowing the more fundamental principles to be amended only through more heightened 
procedures, it is also the notion that ‘the more exuberant the sovereign presence, the less 
bound is the collective body by … the non-amendability of certain constitutional 
principles...’.217 Different constitutional procedures can aim to create fuller bodies of 
‘sovereignty’. It is in this way that we can understand the Lithuanian Constitution of 1992, 
which requires, uniquely, that more than three-fourths of the electorate must participate 
in a referendum if Art. 1 of the Constitution, according to which ‘Lithuania is an 
independent democratic republic’, is to be amended. Further, ‘the fuller the enactment of 
sovereignty, the less justiciable the sovereign action’.218 When the Irish Supreme Court 
refuses to review constitutional amendments, declaring that in Ireland ‘the people’ is the 
sovereign, it does so because the amendment process directly involves the people 
through a referendum (albeit as a constitutional organ). The spectrum of the amendment 
powers links the process of constitutional amendment and the limitations that ought to 
be imposed upon the amendment power; the stronger the amendment power, the less 
limited it should be. This theoretical argument may be supported by two cumulative 
rationales.   
 The first rationale is a normative one. Owing to the democratic nature of the 
primary constituent power, amendments that are enacted through strong amendment powers carry 
greater legitimacy (this is social and political legitimacy, rather than a legal or moral one). 
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An author-based theory of ‘legitimacy’ considers a constitution as ‘respect-worthy’ in 
light of its maker, and the people are the most ‘legitimate’ authors of a democratic 
constitution. Recall that when the people are involved in the amendment process, they 
are part of the institutional process. They act in their capacity as a constitutional organ. 
Nonetheless, when the people are part of the amendment process, they act as a ‘political 
elevator’, increasing the legitimacy of a certain constitutional change. 219 For example, 
referendums are often seen as a crucial test of democratic legitimacy, 220and indeed, 
researches demonstrate that referendums maximise legitimacy. 221  Like referendums, 
special assemblies carry a higher degree of ‘popular legitimacy’ than ordinary 
legislatures. 222  A notable example is the South African constitution-making process, 
which was exceedingly participatory and enjoyed a high level of legitimacy.223  
Of course, it might be claimed that the binding power of the constitution does 
not rest solely on ‘procedural legitimacy’, but on other factors as well. But if the 
involvement of the people indicates that the current generation accepts the constitutional 
framework and that the constitution reflects its values, there is a greater claim for the 
constitution’s ‘democratic legitimacy’. 224  I am not claiming that a democracy cannot 
function without strong popular involvement.225 I am claiming that since ‘inclusiveness is 
the contemporary mechanism for ensuring that a constitution actually is an exercise of 
the constituent power’, 226  then citizens’ participation during exceptional moments of 
constitution-making increases the constitution’s democratic legitimacy. 
 The second rationale is a practical one. Presumably, the more deliberative, multi-
institutional and prolonged the processes of amendments are, the less the likelihood of 
abuse of the amendment power. 227  This echoes Jon Elster’s argument that special 
constituent assemblies should make constitutions, rather than ordinary legislatures that 
are more likely to be influenced by group and institutional self-interests.228 Due to their 
irregularity, constituent assemblies are presumed to be impartial bodies insulated from 
                                                          
219 Oklopcic (2009, 690). 
220 Oklopcic (2012A, 22). 
221  Butler and Ranney (1994, 14-15). 
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223 See, for example, Klug (1996, 18).  
224 Cf., Medina (2013, 8). 
225 See, for example, Vinx (2013, 124) (claiming that ‘the view that strong popular sovereignty is essential to 
democracy is false.’) 
226 Tushnet (2012-2013, 2000). See also Kalyvas (2005, 237): ‘In a democratic regime, the legitimacy of the 
fundamental norms and institutions depends on how inclusive the participation of the citizens is during the 
extraordinary and exceptional moment of constitution making.’  
227 Cf., Landau (2013A, 226).  
228 Elster (1995, 370–71, 395). See also Colón-Ríos (2012C, 159).  
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short-term political bargaining.229 Interestingly, a similar argument has been made with 
regard to direct democracy.230 
Some have argued that exceptional popular mechanisms, like referendums and 
constitutional assemblies, especially in the absence of ordinarily political institutions, 
have actually aided charismatic leaders to impose authoritarian constitutions.231 Others 
have pointed out that popular inclusiveness in a ‘we the majority’ form such as 
referendums, without observing super-majoritarian safeguards, puts minority rights at 
risk.232 This lack of safeguards to minorities might even justify strong judicial review of 
direct democracy.233 In contrast, others claim that ‘people are capable of respecting the 
rights of others en masse’.234 John Matsusaka points out that the question of risk to 
minorities in direct democracy lacks ‘rigorous empirical work on this issue, and the work 
that does exist rests on flawed methodologies’. 235  One recent collection of studies 
concludes that ‘direct democracy and the protection of minorities are not mutually 
exclusive’.236 Moreover, it has been argued that anti-minority laws are enacted at least as 
frequently by legislatures as by direct democracy. 237  Indeed, the question is not 
necessarily whether mechanism of direct democracy risk minority rights, but whether 
such mechanisms increase or reduce such risks compared to other representative 
mechanisms. Again, there is no clear answer.238   
 For our concern, the following matters should be emphasised: any arguments 
regarding ‘direct democracy’ should be taken with limited account since we are not 
                                                          
229 Elster (2006, 185); Elster (2000A, 419-420).  
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engaging with ordinary legislative referendums, but with constitutional referendums 
taking place in exceptional moments in order to create fundamental changes in the 
constitution. The two types of referendums are different. 239  More importantly, a 
referendum does not necessarily engender strong amendment powers, as I have described 
them. The referendum is an additional requirement within the political process.240 The 
strong amendment process is meant to be an inclusive, deliberative, and time-consuming 
process, which allows for a fuller body politic. An amendment procedure that rests solely 
on a referendum would be weaker than procedures that include a referendum in addition 
to a special constituent assembly. It is difficult to find circumstances, Colón-Ríos recently 
claimed, in which a participatory process of constitutional amendment (which takes place 
in a special extra-ordinary constituent assembly, activated by a popular referendum and 
whose outcome is also ratified by the people) has resulted in a violation of essential 
democratic rights. It is usually the government – not the people – that negatively affect 
such rights.241 Indeed, the risk of abuse of the amendment power arises especially with 
weak amendment powers, where the constitutional amendment body is the same body 
that decides the everyday political decisions:  
If politicians can decide on the framework in the same way they are allowed to 
act within the framework [determined by the people], the difference between 
constitution making and law making, and the difference between the 
constitutions for political decisions and these decisions themselves, disappears. 
The constitution loses its function.242  
 
Therefore, Dieter Grimm argues, ‘constitution making should differ from law making 
not only in terms of the quorum, but also in terms of actors and procedures’.243 The 
identity of bodies causes the mingling of functions and interests. But longer-range issues 
of constitutional planning should not be mixed with the short-term interests of political 
power.  As Dietrich Conrad writes:  
The culmination of government and constituent function, has always been 
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feared to lead, and has led in history, to tyrannical results. … It is the possibility 
of a Putsch by the legislature, depriving the people of either their constitutional 
rights of their exercise of constituent power, which has brought into sharp relief 
the exigencies for a functional limitation of the amending power.244  
 
Recent studies have demonstrated that ‘processes involving a referendum produce 
constitutions that are more likely to have virtually every category of right’,245 and ‘more 
representative and inclusive constitution building processes resulted in constitutions 
favouring free and fair elections, greater political equality, more social justice provisions, 
human rights protections and stronger accountability mechanisms’.246 This may mutatis 
mutandis apply to constitutional change. As Blount, Elkins, and Ginsburg remark, ‘higher 
levels of participation are presumed to function like supermajority rules, restricting the 
adoption of undesirable institutions and protecting prospective minorities in the 
democratic processes that are established’.247 This is not necessarily a matter of difficulty 
of the constitutional change,248 but of inclusiveness and deliberations. As Christopher 
Eisgruber notes, ‘by establishing a separate and [more] difficult track for some political 
issues, the constitution may focus public attention upon those decisions and improve 
deliberation about them’. 249  A more inclusive and deliberative process is aimed at 
improving the quality of the legislative process’s outcome.250  
Amendment procedures that incorporate inclusive and deliberative mechanisms and 
allow time for public and institutional deliberations reduce the possibility of abuse and 
enhance the legitimacy of the endorsed constitutional change. 251 Such procedures, which 
almost fully represent the primary constituent power, should be given a greater margin of 
change: 
Since some parts of the Constitution may be more important than the others 
while others much more important than the rest, constituent power is invoked to 
effect any change that may be brought to the most important features of the 
Constitution. The more significant a change may be, more likely is it that the 
procedure for affecting it would be more arduous, difficult and demand a higher 
level of deliberative legitimacy.252 
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Importantly, even strong amendment powers still act as delegated authorities – 
constitutional organs – and are thus limited. Yet, like the amendment power, this 
limitability is not one-dimensional, but rather moves on a spectrum: ‘not all amending 
routes are equal. The closer amending routes are to the citizenry, the more freedom there 
is to alter the foundational terms of our political life’.253 As the nature of amendment 
powers are directly linked to their scope, so are amendment processes linked to 
unamendability:  
The nature of the amending power as well as the level of deliberative legitimacy 
which the amending process imbibes in itself jointly [determines] … what is 
allowed to be changed and what is not through an amendment. So it is not that 
the limits on amending power are sketched without any reference to the 
procedure of amendment. Both the nature and procedure of amendments are 
critically important to truly understand what these limits may be.254 
 
Considering the idea of a spectrum of amendment powers, William Harris’s 
constitutional theory carries much force. Similar to my thesis, Harris distinguishes 
between the people’s sovereign power and the instituted amendment power. While the 
people have an unlimited constituent power, the amendment authority is a constitutional 
agent, holding its power in trust and thus bound by limits: ‘the attempt to incorporate a 
full-scale amending power within the document may subject the integrity of the whole 
design to the unrestrained will of those who hold power in trust for the sovereign 
people’.255 Harris links limitations on the amendment power with the issue of wholeness: 
‘the matter of the wholeness of the Constitution as a design is connected with the 
wholeness of the collective people as the source of the design’s authority’.256 Therefore, 
the more amendments seek to influence people’s rights and power, or large scale 
revisions, the more necessary it becomes to seek popular approval through what he 
terms ‘sovereignty-reinforcing’ mechanisms such as special constituent conventions.  Put 
differently, there is a reciprocal relationship between the ‘wholesale’ of the sought change 
and the ‘wholesale’ of the required sovereignty’s presence. The popular sovereign is 
identified through the criteria of ‘wholeness and deliberateness’. It is external to the 
constitution and can reconstitute the constitutional order. 257 Harris’ theory is akin to my 
understanding of a spectrum of amendment powers – the argument for a systematic 
                                                          
253 Anonymous (1995-1996, 1762-1763). 
254 Prateek (2008, 472). 
255 Harris (1993, 167). 
256 Id., 195. 
257 Id., 194-203. 
 ~169 ~ 
 
hierarchy of amendment powers based upon the proximity of a democratic primary 
constituent power, and acknowledging the possibility of the primary constituent power to re-
emerge.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The basic theoretical presupposition behind the theory of unamendability is the 
distinction between the people’s primary constituent power and the instituted secondary 
constituent power. The secondary constituent power is (explicitly or implicitly) limited. Certain 
constitutional decisions require the re-emergence of the primary constituent power 
(committed to the notion of popular sovereignty). They force ‘the real sovereign to 
return from its retirement in the clouds’ 258  in certain extraordinary constitutional 
moments.  
 Amendment procedures often try to imitate these constitutional moments by 
creating inclusive and deliberative extraordinary procedures, such as referendums and 
constituent assemblies, which would distinguish these constitutional politics from 
ordinary ones.259 These are strong secondary amendment powers. This chapter argued that the 
more an amendment process contains inclusive and deliberative democratic mechanisms, 
the closer it resembles the people’s primary constituent power. Congruently, since primary 
constituent power is by its nature unlimited, strong secondary constituent powers, which present a 
fuller presence of peoples’ sovereignty – while still limited – should be allowed greater 
latitude of constitutional changes. Therefore, the introductory chapter began by 
highlighting that the debate regarding limits to constitutional amendments can be 
regarded as a deeper conflict between substantive and procedural notions of 
constitutionalism, the theory of spectrum of amendment powers, which links 
amendment procedures to unamendability, manages to reconcile both substance and 
procedure.260  
The spectrum of amendment powers is not merely a theoretical model. It has 
additional aspects: first, a constitutional design aspect directed at constitution-makers and 
urging them to design constitutional amendment-rules in an escalator way. In doing so, 
the more basic constitutional principles would be amendable in a more participatory 
                                                          
258 Id., 203.  
259 Tierney (2009, 367) (referendums can be regarded ‘as some kind of reversal of the original act of 
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260  See Brandon (1995, 228): ‘Harris’s constitutionalism harmonizes substance (embodied in the notion of 
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process, which is time-consuming, deliberative and inclusive. This is in contrast with the 
less foundational provisions of the constitution, which should be amendable relatively 
easily. Second, it is aimed at the judiciary. In cases of weak amendment powers, there 
should be a greater willingness to accept the exercise of judicial review as compared to 
places where amending the constitution is formidable and involves various bodies, 
including the people. Put differently, since the spectrum of amendment power is linked 
to the question of unamendability, the mirror picture of the spectrum of amendment 
power is the spectrum of intensity of judicial scrutiny and restraint, which should be 
exercised over constitutional amendments. This is the issue examined in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 7: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
 
In 1921, Edouard Lambert argued that owing to two features of American judicial review 
– the common law technique of judging and substantive jurisprudence, which elevates 
individualism above social values – the practice of judicial review would extend not only 
to ordinary legislation, but also to constitutional amendments.1 At that time, the ‘threat’ 
of the possibility that judicial review could extend to constitutional amendments hit the 
French readers with stupefaction.2 Seven years later, Carl Schmitt argued that Lambert’s 
core thought is correct and ‘will sooner or later show its practical significance’.3 It seems 
that this prediction was spot on. Today, the issue is no longer a mere theoretical 
hypothesis. Judicial review of constitutional amendments is an existing practice in various 
jurisdictions.4  
 In Part I, it was demonstrated how both explicit and implicit limitations may be 
imposed on the amendment power. In Part II, I developed a theory of unamendability, 
which establishes the ground in favour of a limited amendment power. Yet, it is one 
thing to claim that the amendment power is limited; it is quite another question as to 
whether such limitations are legally enforceable, in the sense that they are subject to 
substantive judicial review by courts.5 One can certainly make the claim that even if the 
amendment power is limited, whether a particular amendment oversteps those 
limitations is not a decision for courts to make. 6  Constitutional limitations on the 
amending power would then constitute a rule without a legal sanction (but perhaps with 
a political or social sanction) to prevent the amendment authority from exceeding its 
limits.  
 This chapter directly follows Part II in that it deals with the practical implications 
of a theory of unamendability. In other words, if there are limitations on the scope of the 
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amendment power, what does this mean for the role of the courts in a constitutional 
democracy? In light of the theoretical approach advanced so far, this chapter begins by 
explaining the rationales behind the practice of judicial review of constitutional 
amendments.7 It then describes the existing role of courts in enforcing limitations on the 
amendment power through a comparative prism. Since the case law concerning judicial 
review of constitutional amendments is relatively sparse, I use available cases in order to 
sketch a scale of legal legitimacy of substantive judicial review of amendments. In the 
third section, I engage with the practical issue of how the review of constitutional 
amendments – once the authority and legitimacy of such a practice is recognised – 
should be exercised. I develop a theoretical model for judicial review of constitutional 
amendments since I believe that there should be guidelines for the sound practice of 
judicial review of constitutional amendments, due to the importance of this task.8 
 
I. THE RATIONALES BEHIND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS 
Against the backdrop of the theory regarding the limited scope of the amendment power, 
this section explains the main rationales behind the practice of judicial review of 
constitutional amendments. In the process, it reveals that some of the major theoretical 
arguments in favour of judicial review of legislation are equally persuasive when applied 
to substantive judicial review of amendments. 
  
A. Separation of Powers 
 
At first look, judicial review of constitutional amendments seems as a violation of the 
principle of separation of powers. Invalidating an amendment on the grounds of 
unconstitutionality is constitutive in its functional meaning. It is similar to enacting 
constitutional legislation, which is an activity that is imposed upon the constituent 
authorities (primary or secondary) and not upon the judiciary. A deeper look reveals 
otherwise. In Part II, this thesis established the position that the amendment power is 
                                                          
7  My paradigmatic jurisdiction is one in which the practice of judicial review is recognised, although 
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limited in scope by its nature as a delegated power. As we have seen in Part I, it may be 
limited explicitly or implicitly. Judicial review of amendments serves as a mechanism to 
enforce those limitations. Eugene Rostow claims that:  
The power of constitutional review, to be exercised by some part of the 
government, is implicit in the conception of a written constitution delegating 
limited powers. … The limitation and separation of powers, if they are to survive, 
require a procedure for independent mediation and construction to reconcile the 
inevitable disputes over the boundaries of constitutional power which arise in 
the process of government.9 
 
Correspondingly, judicial review of constitutional amendments fulfils the vertical 
separation of powers, which exists between the primary and secondary constituent power (see 
Chapter 4).10 The amending authority bears the function set upon it by the constitution: 
to amend the constitution according to the amendment procedure and its possible 
limitations. It must obey any explicit limits set upon it and preserve the constitution. 
Amending the constitution is different from destroying it and reconstituting a new 
constitution (see Chapter 5). The vertical separation of powers between the primary and 
secondary constituent powers means that the amending authority is independent within its 
margins as long as it acts within its authority. But it also necessitates a mechanism for 
determining if the amending authority surpassed its limits.11  
This mechanism ought to exist outside of the authority that allegedly surpassed its 
limits. While it does not necessarily have to be within the judiciary, as I state in the 
following section, this mechanism fits naturally within the judicial process. Judicial review 
of amendments by an unbiased organ thus ensures that the authorised amending 
authority does not exceed its delegated power.12 As such, it protects the principle of 
separation of powers (between the primary and secondary constituent powers). 
 
B. The Essence of Judicial Duty 
 
One of the standard arguments Chief Justice John Marshall made in favour of judicial 
review of legislation in the celebrated Marbury v. Madison case13 was that judicial review is 
                                                          
9 Rostow (1952, 193). 
10 See, for example, Guha and Tundawala (2008, 544). 
11 Prateek (2008, 474). 
12 Weintal (2013, 289). 
13 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Troper (2005, 37-38) (claiming that Marbury 
contains almost all the arguments that could be raised (and have been, historically) in favor of judicial 
review).  
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‘of the very essence of judicial duty’. 14 According to this argument, those who apply the 
law (naturally, courts) must determine what the law is. Hence, when courts confront a 
case in which a law conflicts with the constitution, they must determine which of the 
conflicting norms governs the case. A similar argument can be made with regard to 
judicial review of constitutional amendments. The main function set upon the judiciary is 
to decide conflicts based upon the constitution and legislation. In order to carry out its 
constitutional role, the court has to interpret the constitution. Hans Kelsen argues that 
‘[i]f the constitution contains no provision concerning the question who is authorized to 
examine the constitutionality of statutes, then the organs competent to apply statutes, 
that is, especially, the courts, have the power to perform this examination’.15 Likewise, if 
the constitution is silent on the organ that is authorised to review constitutional 
amendments, courts – which apply the constitution – should possess this power. 
Accordingly, as in conflicts between ordinary law and the constitution, when courts face 
a conflict between constitutional norms, they have to determine, as part of the judicial 
process, what is the legal norm according to which the conflict is to be resolved. It 
therefore has to conduct some form of judicial review.  
Analytically, there is also a great resemblance between judicial review of ordinary 
legislation and that of constitutional amendments. Both are done in light of normative 
obliged standards (whether explicit or implicit). As Claude Klein notes, at least when it 
comes to unamendable provisions, judicial review of amendments seems to be a similar 
intellectual operation as ordinary judicial review; it is an examination of the compliance 
of a given legal standard to a superior standard. In that respect, it does not matter 
whether the examination is a regulation vis-à-vis a law, a statute vis-à-vis the constitution, or 
a constitutional amendment vis-à-vis an unamendable provision. 16  Therefore, it would 
only seem natural, as Ulrich Preuss states, that ‘the institution best suited to verify an 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment is the constitutional court, which has the 
authority to review the constitutionality of legislative acts’.17 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
15 Kelsen (1978, 272). 
16 Klein (2010).  
17 Preuss (2011, 441-442). 
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C. The Rule of the Constitution  
 
According to the ‘rule of constitution’ justification, government’s activities – including its 
constitutional amendment activities – must be conducted according to the law, according 
to the constitution. Judicial review ‘is necessary (or at least extremely important) to 
maintaining a disinterested eye on the conduct and activities of government’.18 When 
courts declare an amendment as unconstitutional, they thus accomplish the principle of 
the rule of the constitution.  
But should not the review of amendments be left to the political and social spheres? 
Surely, the political body entrusted with the amendment power is aware of its 
constitutional limitations. Self-restraint is, unfortunately, not always enough. If we care 
about the constitution, do we truly want to entrust the role of guardian to the same body 
that might infringe upon it? In his brief in the case of Feigenspan v. Bodine, Elihu Root 
claimed that: ‘it would certainly be vain for a constitution to declare or imply limitations 
upon the power to amend it, if those limitations could be transgressed at will by the very 
persons who were intended by the people to be restrained and confined within fixed 
prescribed limits’.19 Since the judiciary may impartially determine if the governmental 
organs observe their constitutional limitations,20 judicial review is vital to the rule of the 
constitution. Judicial review of constitutional amendments is a powerful mechanism for 
protecting the rule of the constitution, in both the formal and substantive senses. In the 
formal sense, it maintains the constitutional limits, which bind the secondary constituent 
power. In the substantive sense, it aims to protect the basic fundamentals of the 
constitution, to preserve the constitutional in its totality.   
 
D. The Supremacy of the Constitution 
 
One of the main arguments in favour of judicial review that appeared in the Marbury v. 
Madison was that the Constitution is supreme law, superior to ordinary legislation. 
Therefore, an ordinary law contrary to the Constitution is void. The purpose of creating 
a written constitution, according to Marshall, was to create a government with defined 
                                                          
18 Rodriguez et al (2010, 1476-77). 
19 P. 128 of the brief, as cited in Dodd (1921, 323).  
20 Pushaw (1996, 503).  
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and limited legislative powers. Judicial enforcement of a law repugnant to the 
constitution would undermine this purpose.21  
A parallel rationale may apply to judicial review of constitutional amendments, 
once we accept the proposition that the amendment power is, like any other power under 
the constitution, limited and defined. A central idea in the development of judicial review 
of amendments is that the principle of constitutional supremacy requires courts to ensure 
that the legislature exercises all of its powers, including its constitutional amending 
powers, in accordance with the constitution. In that way, judicial review of constitutional 
amendments accomplishes the supremacy of the constitution. Neither the legislature nor 
the judiciary are supreme. What is supreme is the constitution. The amendment power is 
itself a power granted to a constitutional organ by the constitution: ‘it is not and cannot 
be the whole of Constitution’.22  
A further argument of Marshall is that the people have an ‘original right’ to 
establish their government and fundamental principles according to which they wish to 
be governed. The people’s ‘original and supreme will’ organises the government and may 
define its limits. If limited authorities can eradicate their own limits at will, there is no 
purpose for such limitations, as the distinction between a limited and unlimited 
government would simply be abolished.23  This argument is particularly relevant with 
regard to amendment provisions, through which the people delegated their constituent 
power to secondary constitutional organs and prescribed the specific procedure by which 
these organs may exercise this power, and often under which explicit limitations. In 1931 
Carré de Malberg offered a similar idea when he linked the possibility of judicial review 
and the separation of constituent and constituted power.24 Viewed in this regard, the existence 
of judicial review in order to control constitutionality of amendments is a condition sine 
qua non of a rigid constitution, which is essential for the effective distinction between 
primary and secondary constituent powers.25 Judicial review of amendments assures normative 
superiority of the primary constituent power’s decisions – the people’s supreme will.  
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-178 (1803). 
22 Baxi (1978, 123).  
23 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
24 Carré de Malberg (1984, 126), cited in Troper (2003, 103). 
25 Da Cunha (2007, 11).  
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E. Political Process Failure 
 
Judicial review, as famously developed by Alexander Bickel, faces a ‘counter majoritarian’ 
difficulty since it undermines the will of the majority by allowing unelected and 
unaccountable judges to overrule the law making of the people’s elected representatives.26 
One of the responses to this charge is provided by ‘political process’ justification. This is 
best represented by John Hart Ely’s theory of representation-reinforcing.27 Ely admits the 
charge that judicial review is prima facie incompatible with democracy as it is counter-
majoritarian.28 Yet, he advances a theory according to which judicial review should focus 
on the political process and ensure equal representation in the political process. Courts 
should intervene when (and only when) the political process fails, when either power-
holders obstruct it to preserve the status quo, or when the government denies minorities 
the protection that it grants the majority. By judicial intervention, the court is preventing 
the tyranny of the majority.29 Process arguments such as Ely’s, attempt to outline the 
types of circumstances in which the political process is likely to be untrustworthy, hence 
justifies judicial intervention.30 
 According to the process argument, in a democratic system of government courts 
should have an inherent authority to protect basic freedoms of the minority against 
attempts by the majority to violate them, whether by ordinary or constitutional legislation 
enacted by majority of the elected representatives, since such a violation would contradict 
the basic principles upon which the system is based. Courts are the appropriate 
institution to carry the counter-majoritarian role, since contrary to parliaments they are 
not directly and immediately dependent on an approval or support of the public’s 
majority for their decisions.31  
Similar to this familiar argument, it may be argued that in a democratic society a 
court ought to have the authority to annul even constitutional amendments when a 
failure exists in the work of the democratic institutions. For such a failure to occur, 
usually two conditions need to be fulfilled: the work of the amendment authority 
contradicts basic principles of the democratic system, and the nature of this failure is 
such that its correction cannot be made through the political institution itself, but must 
                                                          
26 Bickel (1962).  
27 Ely (1977-1978, 451); Ely (1980, 73-104).  
28 Ely (1980, 4-12).   
29 Id., 102-103. See Cox (1981, 640). 
30 Dorf (2003, 895-897).  
31 On the countermajoritarian role of courts with regard to constitutional amendments see Erickson (2011, 
1242-1244). 
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be made through an independent agent, detached from the ordinary representative 
political system, i.e. courts. The usual example is of a situation in which the parliament, 
which was elected for a limited time period, amends the constitution according to the 
amendment procedure in order to prolong its term. 32  This is not an imaginary 
hypothesis.33 In such a scenario, it is clear that no one can expect the elected institution 
to correct this failure, as it is itself its very source. A court’s authority to review such a 
case and to decide its merits cannot solely depend on the wording of the constitution 
(although as I mention bellow, such wording can definitely increase the legitimacy of 
such a review), but one can certainly claim that the court absorbs its authority to review 
such conflicts from the basic principles of the constitutional order itself.   
 Indeed, as ordinary legislation, constitutional amendments raise the ‘majoritarian’ 
problem. The argument according to which judicial review is necessary in order to 
protect minorities from the majority’s abuse of power, as the people’s institutionalised 
self-control,34 applies to constitutional amendments to the same extent, if not all the 
more so. When enacting ordinary legislation, the government is explicitly limited from 
violating protected constitutional rights (for instance through limitation clauses). This 
protection, however, limits only the ‘ordinary legislative’, not the constitutional 
legislative.35  In other words, while limitation clauses set the parameters according to 
which right’s violation would be deemed constitutional, this is a sub-constitutional 
activity. They do not apply when the constitution itself limits rights. Therefore, if a 
constitutional norm infringes a constitutional right, the former would not be void merely 
due to the constitutional protection granted to the right, since this infringement takes 
place at a similar normative level – the constitution. Limitation clauses do not establish 
the criteria for a constitutional violation by constitution provisions.36 The latter case is 
conditioned by the terms that are set upon the amendment power by the amendment 
                                                          
32 Cf. Dotan (1996, 152-153). 
33 In June 2006, the National Assembly of Benin, in a parliamentary session which was closed for the 
public, amended art. 80 of the Constitution by Constitutional Law No. 2006-13, which extended the 
duration of the parliamentary term (retrospectively to the existing legislature) from four to five years. A 
month later, the Beninese Constitutional Court declared the amendment to be unconstitutional, holding 
that due to the importance of the principle of ‘national consensus’, which is a principe à valeur constitutionnelle, 
constitutional amendments should follow a public and open process. See Decision DCC 06-074 of the 
Beninese Constitutional Court of 08.07.2006, http://ddata.over-blog.com/1/35/48/78/Benin-2/CC-
Benin-censure-revision-2006.pdf; Adjolohoun (2013, 250-251, 273-274); Kante (2008, 167). See also the 
abuse of power by the Taiwanese Third National Assembly as elaborated in Chapter 3IIID2. 
34 Black (1960, 106-107).   
35 Cf., Israeli Supreme Court: HCJ 1368/94 Porat v. The State of Israel, 57 (5) PD 913. 
36 See Barak (2010B, 11, 128-130); Barak (2004, 10-11 fn 29). It may be argued that if the constituent 
authority would be prevented from amending constitutional rights, this would have put an end to the 
constituting process. See Barak (1995, 281-282). 
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clause or unamendable provisions. Therefore, when courts refuse to review 
constitutional amendments, Denis Baranger claims with regard to the French experience, 
‘human rights are worse off than they were initially. The normativist legal culture is such 
that they are not understood as of being exempt from abrogation, while the court 
acknowledges that a constitutional amendment can curtail or suppress them. … the 
constitution is shown as being unable to protect liberties’. 37  Judicial review of 
amendments may be a useful tool for protecting minorities’ rights and preventing more 
general human rights abuses.  
One of the dangers embodied in acts of delegation (here delegation from the 
primary constituent power to the secondary) is that those to whom power is delegated will 
abuse it.38 As noted in Chapter 5, the abuse of power is not to be feared only from the 
legislative branch, but also from the amendment authority.39 As David Landau recently 
demonstrated, amendment procedures are increasingly being abused in order to erode 
the democratic order. 40  Judicial review in this context can be regarded as a useful 
mechanism to protect democracy from usurpation by transient majorities.41 In fact, it was 
suggested that judicial review of amendments was developed precisely because of the fear 
of abuse of the amendment power and the recognition that ordinary judicial review was 
insufficient:    
What if the “amending power” would try to bypass the constitution by 
amending it in order to allow the adoption of problematic laws, such as those 
that had already been declared unconstitutional? There thus appeared to be a 
need for “super-protection” or “superentrenchment.”42 
 
The governmental nature of the legislative amendment power and the dangers of 
coupling governmental interest with fundamental constitutional decisions justify judicial 
intervention when the amendment authority abuses its power. 43  Judicial review of 
amendments may seem valuable, especially in weak democracies. As Samuel Issacharoff 
writes, ‘with the aim of protecting democracies from collapsing into autocratic power, 
the oversight of constitutional courts provides a constitutional remedy for a latent 
democratic disability’.44 
                                                          
37 Baranger (2011, 424).  
38 Lupia (2001, 3375-3377).  
39 Ponthoreau and Ziller (2002, 139). 
40 Landau (2013A, 189). 
41 Mehta (2002, 193-195). 
42 Klein (2011, 318-319). 
43 Landau (2013A, 231-239).  
44 Issacharoff (2012, 45). Compare with Bernal (2013, 352) (judicial review of amendments may ‘protect the 
integrity of constitutional guarantees of rights and democracy from the risk of manipulation within a 
hyper-presidential environment.’) 
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II. LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
The power to declare a constitutional amendment unconstitutional is no less remarkable 
than the amendment power itself. Due to their special status, constitutional laws 
generally enjoy broader and deeper legitimacy than any specific piece of legislation. 45 
Accordingly, judicial review of constitutional amendments seems even less legitimate 
than that of ordinary legislation. In this section, I wish to assess the legitimacy of the 
judicial review of amendments. Legitimacy, as used in this section, refers to legal legitimacy 
(in contrast with moral or sociological legitimacy) as explained by Richard Fallon.46 In 
brief, I assess whether the exercise of judicial review conforms to the legal norms 
applicable to the issue at hand.47 I argue that when assessing the legal legitimacy of such 
judicial exercise, three main variables should be considered: (1) the authority of courts to 
review constitutional amendments; (2) the existence or non-existence of unamendable 
provisions; and (3) the constitutional amendment procedure. These variables influence 
the legal legitimacy of the judicial review of amendments, making a strong case or a weak 
case for judicial review, and thus creating a legitimacy scale. 
 
A. Authority to Review Constitutional Amendments  
 
The first variable concerns the authority of a court to review constitutional amendments 
on substantive grounds. A constitution may expressly vest a court with such an authority. 
This is the case in Romania,48 Ukraine,49 Kyrgyzstan,50 and Kosovo.51 This is a relatively 
                                                          
45 Gavison (2006, 198).  
46 Fallon (2004-2005, 1819): ‘The concept of legal legitimacy appears to function somewhat analogously to 
the concepts of discretion and jurisdiction when applied to judicial decisionmaking. More particularly, a 
claim of judicial legitimacy characteristically suggests that a court (i) had lawful power to decide the case or 
issue before it; (2) in doing so, rested its decision only on considerations that it had lawful power to take 
into account or that it could reasonably believe that it had lawful power to weigh; and (3) reached an 
outcome that fell within the bounds of reasonable legal judgment.’ 
47 Cf., Krishnaswamy (2010, 167).  
48  For example, the Romanian Constitution empowers the Constitutional Court to adjudicate ex officio 
initiatives for revising the Constitution. Such judicial adjudication is a piori (‘judicial preview’) to the 
amendment’s adoption. See Romania Const. (1991), art. 146(a); Deleanu (1995, 120, 124); Deleanu (1996, 
63). Indeed, the Romanian Constitutional Court has on several occasions reviewed ex officio the 
constitutionality of revision initiatives. See Gözler (2008, 5-7); Popa (2004).  
49 In Ukraine, a preliminary opinion of the Constitutional Court regarding the conformity of proposed 
amendments with the requirements of arts. 157 and 158 of the Constitution is an essential stage of the 
procedure, in order for a constitutional amendment to be adopted by the Verkhovna Rada (art. 159). In 
September 30, 2010 the Constitutional Court nullified constitutional amendment No. 2222-IV of 
December 8, 2004 (Opinion No. 20-rp/2010). While the Constitutional Court was asked to deliver its 
opinion (Opinion No. 3-v/2004 of December 10, 2003, and Opinion No. 2-v/2004 of October 12, 2004), 
on earlier drafts of the amendment (Law No. 4180), the modified draft amendment was not submitted to 
the Constitutional Court for providing an Opinion, but instead was adopted on December 8, 2004 as Law 
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easy case, as it raises no question with regards to the courts’ authority. 52  This 
authorisation is a straightforward formal legal justification for such a review. Here, the 
legal legitimacy to review constitutional amendments is at its peak.  
 A constitution may expressly vest courts with competence to formally review 
amendments, i.e. only with regard to their form or procedure of adoption. 53  This 
authorisation undermines the legitimacy of substantive judicial review. The Turkish 
example is a fascinating one with which to demonstrate this. Following prior events 
under the 1961 Constitution, when the Turkish Constitutional Court declared itself 
competent to substantively review constitutional amendments, the 1982 Constitution 
specifically regulated the adjudication of constitutional amendments. Art. 148 
empowered the Constitutional Court to review amendments, but explicitly limited this 
review to their form and procedural enactment. Prior to 2008, the Turkish Constitutional 
Court ruled three times on the constitutionality of constitutional amendments under the 
1982 Constitution. In all three decisions, the Court declined to substantively review 
amendments, basically holding that it did not have the authority to review amendments 
on any grounds other than those stipulated in Art. 148(1). 54  Nonetheless, the 
Constitutional Court revised its opinion in its headscarf decision of June 5, 2008. In this 
case, the Constitutional Court examined the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments to the principle of equality and the right to education. Although not 
specifically mentioned in the amendments, the Parliament’s intention was to abolish the 
headscarf ban in universities. The Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments 
infringed upon the unamendable principle of secularism and were therefore 
unconstitutional and null. When establishing its authority to review the amendments, the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
No. 2222. Since the amendment was revised and approved by the Verkhovna Rada without the obligatory 
Opinion of the Constitutional Court, its procedure violated the Constitution, hence it was declared 
unconstitutional and void. See Garlicki and Garlicka (2011, 347-348 fn 8). A summary of the judgment is 
available at http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/list?currDir=91909 
50 In Kyrgystan, the Constitutional Court annulled in September 14, 2007, without explicit authority, two 
constitutional amendments on formal grounds. See Anonymous (2007, 15). In 2011, a constitutional 
amendment endowed the Constitutional Court with an authority to provide its opinion during a 
preliminary review of constitutional amendments. 
51 In Kosovo, arts. 113(9) and 144(3) of the Constitution explicitly grant the Court authority of an apriori 
review of proposed amendments, in abstracto, and to examine whether proposed amendments diminish 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by Chapter II of the Constitution. If the Court declared any proposed 
amendment as unconstitutional, the Assembly cannot vote on it. See Hasani (2003, 106 fn 188); Hasani 
(2013, 128). 
52 Gözler (2008, 4-7). 
53 See for instance, the Chile Const. (1980), art. 82(2); Pfersmann (2012, 97). 
54 Constitutional Court decisions, E.1987/9, K.1987/1518 June 1987, Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], 4 
September 1987 no. 19564; E.2007/72,K.2007/68, 5 July 2007, Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], 7 August 
2007, no. 26606; E.2007/99, K.2007/86, 27 November 2007, Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], 16 February 
2008, no. 26792; See Özbudun (2009, 537 fn 6); Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009, 4–5, 47–49, 109).  
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Constitutional Court broadly interpreted its competence to formally review amendments 
as to include examination as to whether these are a ‘valid proposal’, i.e. whether the 
amendments are contrary to the unamendable characteristics of the republic as provided 
in Art. 2 of the Constitution.55   
 This reasoning can be criticised on three main grounds.56 First, the Court’s notion 
of ‘form’ seems ill founded. Formal review means that the court ignores the content of 
the amendment. It must be content-neutral.57 Clearly, an inquiry whether an amendment 
conflicts with the republic’s characteristics is not a procedural inquiry; it must be 
undertaken with reference to an amendment’s substance. Second, the constitution’s text 
and purpose lead to a similar conclusion: in response to the Constitutional Court’s overly 
broad interpretation of its powers during the 1970s, the framers of the 1982 Constitution 
intentionally and expressly adopted a narrow definition of the term ‘review in respect of 
form’ in Art. 148(2), thus explicitly restricting judicial review only to form.58  
 Moreover, as Gary Jacobsohn correctly notes, this limited jurisdiction is in contrast 
with the Court’s explicit authority to conduct both formal and substantive review of 
ordinary legislation (Art.148.1).59 Therefore, this is not a lacuna, but rather a conscious 
negative arrangement.60 According to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,61 the 
existence of the explicit grant of authority to formally review amendments, coupled with 
the explicit authority to formally and substantively review ordinary legislation, provide 
evidence that the constitution-makers had considered substantive review of amendments 
(which had already occurred in prior years); that the omission of substantive review was 
intentional; and that, therefore, judicial review of an amendment’s substance should be 
excluded.  
 Third, ironically, in establishing parliament’s limited amendment power, the 
Constitutional Court states that the legislature, as a constituted power, must remain within 
the constitutional limits provided by the primary constituent power. Yet, it appears that the 
Court has forgotten that it itself is a constituted power bound by the limits imposed upon it 
by the primary constituent power. Therefore, some have argued that due to its judicial 
activism, the Turkish Constitutional Court was ‘pushing its limits’ in terms of 
                                                          
55 Turkish Constitutional Court decision, June 5, 2008, E. 2008/16; K. 2008/116, Resmi Gazete [Official 
Gazette], October 22, 2008, No. 27032, pp. 109, 138.  
56 Roznai and Yolcu (2012, 195-202). 
57 See Saygili (2010, 131). 
58 Gözler (2008, 47–48). 
59 Jacobsohn (2009, 5).   
60 On negative arrangements see Barak (2011B, 108-109). 
61 On this maxim see Williams (1930-1931, 191); Mureinik (1987, 264). 
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legitimacy.62 To conclude, explicit authority to review amendments merely with regard to 
their form and process severely casts doubts on the legitimacy of substantive judicial 
review of amendments.  
 At the bottom of the legitimacy scale are those cases where the constitution 
expressly negates any authorisation of judicial review of amendments. Take, for example, 
clauses 4 and 5 of Art. 368 of the Indian Constitution of 1950, according to which: ‘no 
amendment of this Constitution … made or purporting to have been made under this 
article… shall be called in question in any court on any ground’; ‘there shall be no 
limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, 
variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this Article’.63 This provision 
was added to the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment, in response to prior events when 
the Supreme Court had declared itself competent to nullify constitutional amendments 
that contradict the Constitution’s basic structure. This provision was reviewed before the 
Indian Supreme Court in the case of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, in which the 
Supreme Court declared that since the limited nature of the amendment power is part of 
the Constitution’s basic structure, the 42nd amendment violated this basic structure and it 
was therefore unconstitutional (see Chapter 3).64  
 Gözler notes that in light of this provision, as of 1976, the Indian Supreme Court 
was precluded from reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. He 
further criticises the Court’s opinion in Minerva Mills, arguing that the Court did not have 
any jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of amendments, and because the basic 
structure doctrine lacks any textual basis in the constitution.65 I differ from Gözler on 
this point. If this limitation had been imposed on the judiciary by the primary constituent 
power, then the Court would not possess an authority to review the amendments. 
However, in the Indian example, the negation of the authority to review the amendment 
was imposed by the secondary constituent power. Here, the amending authority was 
attempting to extend its limits so it would be limitless. This it could not do. The 
amendment power – limited by its nature (see Chapter 4) – cannot determine that it is 
unlimited. This would be ultra vires. Hence, the Indian example is not the optimal 
                                                          
62 Saygili (2010, 138-39). On the Turkish Constitutional Court’s eroding legitimacy see Köker (2010, 328). 
63 Compare this with art. 239(6) to the Pakistan Constitution: ‘No amendmen of the Constitution shall be 
called in question in any Court on any ground whatsoever’, and art. 239(7): ‘For the removal of doubt, it is 
hereby declared that there is no limitation whatever on the power of Majlis-e-Shoora [Parliament] to 
amend any of the provisins of the Constituiton’; both inserted to the Constitution by Presedential Order 
No. 14 of 1985. Cited in Lau (2006, 83).  
64 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C., 1789, 1981. 
65 Gözler (2008, 8-9).  
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scenario for explicit negation of the authority to review constitutional amendments. If 
such negation had appeared in the original constitution, then surely the legitimacy of 
judicial review would be the weakest.  
 Lastly, a constitution may be silent on this point; it might simply not regulate this 
issue. This is the case of most current constitutions. Confronted with such a question, a 
court cannot avoid a decision arguing non liquet – ‘it is not clear’.66 It has to fill this gap 
and interpret this silence.67 Is this silence a lacunae or a negative arrangement? Whereas a 
constitutional acknowledgment of judicial review over ordinary legislation would point to 
the latter, this silence, as I shall demonstrate, was not necessarily interpreted as negating 
an authority to review amendments. Courts in states such as Germany, Brazil, and the 
Czech Republic have declared themselves competent to substantively review 
amendments, even without any expressed authority. 68  Other courts, for example the 
Hungarian 69  and Slovenian, 70  held that constitutional norms are not within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
 When the constitution is silent with regard to the authority of courts to review 
amendments, the legal legitimacy of judicial review of amendments is questionable. What 
is clear is that the lack of any explicit grant of authority to courts to review amendments 
is not the ‘end of the story’, but merely the beginning of the inquiry. Here, the second 
variable – the existence or absence of any unamendable provisions – proves critical.  
 
B. Existence or Absence of Unamendable Provisions 
 
As elaborated in Chapter 2, many constitutions include unamendable provisions. Such 
inclusion, I argue, strengthens the case for judicial review. The argument is plain: when 
unamendable provisions exist, the judicial enforceability of these explicit limitations 
seems, if not self-evident, then at least less contentious. As we know from Marbury v. 
Madison, an ‘effectiveness presumption’ exists according to which the constitution-drafter 
does not waste words: ‘it cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is 
intended to be without effect’.71 Of course, this is merely a presumption that may be 
                                                          
66 On ‘non liquet’ see: Rabello (1974, 63). 
67 See Barak (1990, 267). 
68 Gözler (2008, 100); Williams (2011, 33).  
69 See Hungarian Constitutional Court decisions 23/1994. (IV. 29.), No. 1260/B/1997; Decision 61/2011. 
(VII. 13). For a review see Halmai (2012, 191-199); Gözler (2008, 16). 
70 See Slovenian Constitutional Court’s decision of 11 April 1996, number U-I-332/94. See Mavčič (2009, 
60 fn 48); Gözler (2008, 17).  
71 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).  
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rebutted;72 nonetheless, it equally applies to the argument that unamendable provisions 
are not to be judicially enforced. If the constitution-makers declared certain provisions as 
unamendable, the interpreter – commonly the court – ought to supply the mechanism’s 
effectiveness.73 As Aharon Barak writes:  
Judicial review is a natural mechanism for protecting eternity clauses in the 
constitution. Judicial review provides (legal) “teeth” to the eternity clause. In this 
respect, there is no substantive difference between a regular statute that violates 
the constitution and an amendment to the constitution that violates the eternity 
clause. Just as judicial review is recognized in the first case (a regular statute that 
violates the constitution) it should also be recognized in the second case (a 
constitutional amendment that violates the “eternity clause”).74 
 
If unamendable provisions are not legally enforced, their protective function is 
dramatically undermined. This position can be illustrated by several courts’ decisions, 
most notably, in Germany, Brazil, and the Czech Republic.  
The first notable example comes from Germany. As elaborated in Chapter 2, Art. 
79(3) of the German Basic Law (1949) prohibits amendments affecting the division of 
the Federation into Länder, human dignity, the constitutional order, or basic institutional 
principles describing Germany as a democratic and social federal state.75 Moreover, as 
elaborated in Chapter 3, German jurisprudence in the post-Nazi regime was 
characterized by endorsement of natural law ideas, according to which even 
constitutional norms are limited by a ‘higher law’. Nevertheless, after 1953, the Federal 
Constitutional Court declined to refer to supra-positive principles and concentrated on 
the explicit limitations to the amendment power. 76 In the Klass case, the Constitutional 
Court considered the constitutionality of an amendment that permitted violations of 
communication privacy for the purpose of protecting national security, and substituted 
judicial review with parliamentary review of any alleged violation of this right. Although 
the Constitutional Court sustained the amendment’s validity, three dissenting judges were 
persuaded that the amendment infringed the principles of human dignity, separation of 
powers, and the rule of law, and should therefore be annulled.77 In the 2004 Electronic 
Eavesdropping case, the Constitutional Court held that an amendment permitting 
eavesdropping in homes does not affect the inviolable human dignity and therefore 
                                                          
72 Amar (1998-1999, 3). 
73 Weintal (2005, 30). 
74 Barak (2011A, 333). 
75 On the German unamendable clause see Goerlich (2008, 397); Benda (2000, 445); Preuss (2011, 439-
440); Schwartzberg (2009, 153-83).  
76 Troper (2003, 102 fn 5).  
77 30 BVerfGE 1, 24 (1970); see Kommers (1991, 852); O’Connell (1999, 55). An English translation of the 
case is available in Murphy and Tanenhaus (1977, 659).  
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accords with Art. 79(3). 78  The Constitutional Court has so far not invalidated 
constitutional amendments for conflicting with Art. 79(3), which has been narrowly 
interpreted;79 yet it is clear that it possesses the authority to review the substance of 
amendments in light of the unamendable provision, even without any expressed 
authority in the Basic Law.80  
The second example is Brazil, in which not only the judicial review of ordinary 
legislation is an established practice, 81  but also that of constitutional amendments, 
although the Brazilian Constitution does not expressly provide for such an authority.  
The Brazilian Supreme Court has adopted deductive reasoning from the idea of 
constitutional supremacy and normative hierarchy, according to which when a conflict 
arises between an unamendable provision (on the Brazilian unamendable provision, see 
Chapter 2) and a constitutional amendment, the court can declare the amendment 
unconstitutional and therefore null and void.82 In ADIMC 466/91, the Supreme Court, 
in a majority opinion by Justice Celso de Mello, held:  
Constitutional amendments … not being original constitutional norms, are not 
excluded from the ambit of a successive or repressive control of constitutionality. 
National Congress, when exercising its derived constituent power, and 
performing its reforming function, is legally bound by the original constituent 
power, which has laid down, besides circumstantial entrenchment to reform, an 
immutable clause, immune to parliamentary revision. Explicit material limitations, 
defined by paragraph 4 of Art. 60 of the constitution constrain reforming power 
conferred upon the legislative. The immutability of such thematic nucleus, 
eventually violated, may render legitimate an abstract normative control and 
even a concrete control of constitutionality.83  
 
Hence, a constitutional norm deriving from the primary constituent power and not 
from the amending power cannot be considered unconstitutional.84 In a similar vein, in 
ADIMC 981/93 PR, the Supreme Court held: 
Revisions and amendment, as procedures to introduce constitutional changes, 
are expressions of an instituted constituent power, thus, limited by nature. The 
revision … is subject to the limits established by … the constitution.  
Constitutional changes deriving from a revision are subject to judicial control 
and scrutiny, as regard the petrous clauses.85  
 
                                                          
78 109 BVerfGE 279 (2004); See Nohlen (2005, 680); Stender-Vorwachs (2004, 1337). 
79 Gözler (2008, 61). 
80 See Kommers (2012, 58-59). 
81 Rosenn (2000, 293).  
82 Maia (2000, 69-72); Brewer-Carías (2004, 22); see ADIMC 926/1993. 
83 ADIMC 466/91 DF; Celso De Melio, J.; RTJ 136/1, 25, quoted in Maia (2000, 72). See also Galindo 
(2006, 17).  
84 Galindo (2006, 17).  
85 ADIMC 981-8/600/93 PR; Neri da Silveira, J.; Dec. 1993; Lex JSTF 192/56, quoted in Maia (2000, 72). 
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It thus seems that when examining amendments vis-à-vis the unamendable 
provision, the Supreme Court applies the same logic it uses when examining the 
constitutionality of ordinary laws. As ‘guardian of the constitution’, it can declare 
amendments derived from the secondary constituent power ‘unconstitutional’, when they 
violate the original constitution.86  
 The third example is the Czech Republic. At first glance, it seems that the Czech 
Constitutional Court lacks the authority to review constitutional acts since according to 
Art. 87 of the 1992 Constitution, ‘(1) The Constitutional Court resolves: a) the 
nullification of laws or their individual provisions if they are in contradiction with a 
constitutional law’.87 Moreover, Art. 88(2) stipulates that ‘In decision-making, judges of 
the Constitutional Court are bound only by constitutional laws’. This was confirmed in a 
case in 2002 in which the Constitutional Court stated that, ‘the Constitutional Court is 
not authorized to review (let alone abolish) the provisions contained in constitutional 
acts; its task is only – in concrete cases – to interpret them’.88 This approach was later 
reversed. 
 On 10 September 2009, the Czech Constitutional Court delivered a decision on the 
constitutionality of the Constitutional Act no. 195/2009 Coll., on Shortening the Fifth 
Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies. The Court ruled that the Constitutional Act 
is unconstitutional and thus annulled.89 In its reasoning, the Court particularly relied on 
Art. 9(2) of the Czech Constitution, according to which ‘any changes in the essential 
requirements for a democratic state governed by the rule of law are impermissible’. The 
Constitutional Court stated that protection of the Constitution’s material core, i.e. the 
essential requirements for a democratic state governed by the rule of law under Art. 9(2), 
is not a mere slogan or proclamation, but an actually enforceable constitutional provision. 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court is competent to review acts designated as 
constitutional acts in terms of their conformity to the essential requirements of a 
democratic state governed by the rule of law. Otherwise, the protection of 
constitutionality would be illusory, since a constitutional act could be used to do 
practically anything. After deciding that the ad hoc constitutional act violates the 
                                                          
86 See, e.g. ADIN 939-7 DF, in which the Supreme Court invalidated Constitutional Amendment 3 of 
February 17, 1993, cited in Maia (2000, 73). See also Mendes (2005, 455-456); Barbosa (2013, I-32-I-33).  
87 See Glos (1993-1994, 1066).  
88  Case Pl. ÚS 21/01, in Sbírka zákonů part 42 (11 March 2002), at 2328, cited in Williams (2011, 38). 
89 Czech Republic Constitutional Court Judgment 2009/09/10 - Pl. ÚS 27/09: Constitutional Act on 
Shortening the Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies, 
http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=468&cHash=44785c32dd4c4d1466ba0
0318b1d7bd5; For reviews of the case see Williams (2011, 33);  Kudrna (2010, 43); Tomoszek (2011, 64-
66); Dragomaca (2010, 183); Koudelka (2010); Roznai (2014). 
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principle of generality, which is considered to be an essential requirement of a state 
governed by the rule of law, the Constitutional Court concluded that ‘even the 
constitutional framers cannot declare constitutional an act that lacks the character of a 
statute, let alone of a constitutional act’. Such a process, according to the Constitutional 
Court, is unconstitutional arbitrariness. The Court rejected the claim that it could not 
review constitutional acts since this would completely erase its role as guardian of 
constitutionality.  
 The court’s decision naturally attracted criticism within both the political and legal 
scenes.90 Some claimed that invalidating a constitutional act that was enacted by the 
qualified majority using the correct procedure, and without any expressed authority for 
such a review in the Constitution, conflicts with the constitutional command, according 
to which the Constitutional Court is bound by the constitution, and seriously violates 
legal certainty.91 It seems to me that the Court was correct in holding that it is competent 
to substantially review constitutional acts. ‘Under communism’, Cass Sunstein notes, 
‘constitutional guarantees were not worth the paper on which they were written; leaders 
felt free to ignore them if the situation so required’. 92  Therefore, especially in post-
communist states, the enforceability of the unamendable provisions is vital for protecting 
constitutionalism.93 
In contrast with these examples, in some states the existence of unamendable 
provisions does not necessarily lead to the power of judicial review over the content of 
constitutional amendments. In these states, one may argue, unamendable provisions are 
merely declarative.94 They might have a political or social importance, but they are not 
enforceable in courts. Norway, France, and the U.S. may exemplify this idea.  
The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 states in Art. 112 that constitutional 
amendments ‘must never . . . contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution, but 
solely relate to modifications of particular provisions which do not alter the spirit of the 
Constitution’. 95  Therefore, at least in theory, the Norwegian courts hold ‘the most 
comprehensive power of judicial review found anywhere’, since they are, ‘de jure the final 
                                                          
90 See in Kokeš (2009). 
91 Koudelka (2010, 2).  
92 Sunstein (1995, 51). For a general argument that in the new democracies after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, courts are assigned a central role in preserving the democratic order, see Issacharoff (2012, 43). 
93  Although I think the court’s reasoning for holding the constitutional act unconstitutional was 
unconvincing on its merits. See Roznai (2014). 
94 Brooke (2005, 68-71).  
95 On this provision see Smith (2011, 369). 
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arbiters of constitutional limitations’.96 Nevertheless, it seems that this explicit limitation 
is only a directive for the Parliament, not granting the courts any authority.97 In nearly 
two hundred years of practice, courts have never adjudicated a conflict between 
amendments and the unamendable provision, despite the fact that the constitution has 
been amended more than two hundred times, including some major reforms.98  
Accordingly, although it was once considered to be of a ‘binding nature’,99 it 
seems that the Parliament – the Storting – has the final word in the interpretation of the 
constitution’s ‘spirit’ and ‘principles’, and thus it defines the limits of the amendment 
power. Therefore, in Norway, the practice of judicial review, which is today undisputed 
with regard to ordinary legislation, 100  does not comprise substantive review of 
amendments.101 Even if not justiciable in courts, the unamendable provision may play a 
role when debating constitution amendments and thus it has a certain political 
importance.102 
France is another interesting example. Notwithstanding the fact that France (like 
Norway) was one of the originators of unamendable provisions (see Chapter 2), the 
French system took a rather restrained position with regards to Art. 89, which protects 
the republican form of government from amendments. While some scholars argue that 
Art. 89 is a ‘paper barrier’ so that even the republican form can be repealed by the 
constituent power,103 others have argued that it is not ‘an empty shell’, but rather an 
enforceable limitation that extends to fundamental principles of the republican legal 
order. 104  Indeed, in 1992, supporters of the latter approach anticipated that the 
unamendable provision would be enforceable in courts, as the Conseil Constitutionnel 
specified that subject to the temporal and substantive restrictions provided in the 
constitution, the constituent power is sovereign.105 From this statement, it was clear that the 
amendment power has to observe those substantive limitations imposed upon it by the 
constitution. This anticipation, however, vanished in 2003 when the Conseil 
                                                          
96 Cappelletti and Adams (1965-1966, 1217). 
97 Conrad (1970, 380); Klein (1996, 181); Smith (2011, 385). 
98 Smith (2011, 383-384); European Commission for Democracy Through Law (2009, fn 153). 
99 Smith (2011, 384). 
100 Risa (1989, 4.100.17); Ryssdal (1981, 530-535). 
101 Bugge (1995, 308-309). See, importantly, Cappelletti and Adams (1965-1966, 1217) (‘[t]he definitely 
modest role that judicial review has played in the constitutional history of Norway attests to the sobriety of 
the Storting and to a general desire to proceed in a legal and orderly manner, rather than to the courts’ 
abdication of their constitutional responsibility.’) 
102 Opsahl (1969, 164). 
103 Luchaire (1992, 1591). 
104 Specchia (2008, 19).  
105 See Decision No. 92-312 DC of 2 September 1992 (Maastricht II); See Wright (2005, 498); Rousseau 
(1993, 19-20); Wright (1994, 71); Baranger (2011, 394-396).  
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Constitutionnel laconically held that judicial review of constitutional amendments is not 
considered within its competence.106  
Lastly is the intriguing situation in the U.S. As widely mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the scope of the amendment power under the U.S. Constitution was given extensive 
attention during the 1920s and 1930s. After the adoption of the 18th Amendment, it was 
argued before the courts that the amendment was void for it conflicted with the 
constitution’s fundamental principles and spirit. In the National Prohibition case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, without refuting the arguments in detail, held that the amendment 
prohibiting the manufacturing and distribution of alcohol was within the amendment 
powers.107 Similarly, in Leser v. Garnett, the Supreme Court held that the 19th amendment 
regarding women’s right to vote had been constitutionally established.108 However, this 
willingness to review amendments was later rejected in Coleman v. Miller, in which the 
majority deemed the amendment process a political question not subject to judicial 
review. 109  Judge Black wrote: ‘Article v…grants power over the amending of the 
Constitution to Congress alone… the process itself is political in its entirely, from 
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and it is not subject to 
judicial guidance, control or interference at any point’.110 While the court has not directly 
dealt with amendments that conflict with the unamendable provision of Art. V, it could 
be inferred from the Court’s general approach to the amendment process that it would 
refrain from adjudicating constitutional amendments, treating them as a ‘political 
question’ and thus under the auspices of the political arena.111  
  This approach raises the following question: if unamendable provisions are not 
justiciable, can they truly be effective? Denis Baranger was correct to ask, with regard to 
the French case:  
How, if the Conseil Constitutionnel refuses to review amendments, can such 
limitations be enforced? The answer is clear: de lege lata they cannot, at least in 
the course of constitutional review as exercised by the Conseil Constitutionnel. 
This might appear as a blunt disregard of the blank letter of the Constitution, 
and indeed it might well be just that.112  
                                                          
106 French Constitutional Council No. 2003-469 DC, March 26, 2003; French Constitutional Council No. 
1962-20DC, November 6, 1962. See Le Pillouer (2009, 4-5); Wright (2005, 495); Baranger (2011, 396). 
107 State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); see Pierson (1925, 54).  
108 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 
109 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939); see Fleming (1994-1995, 375); Dellinger (1983-1984, 389-92).  
110 307 U.S. 433, 459 (1939).  
111 See, for example, Dodd (1931-1932, 89-90) (‘determination of what ought to go into an amendment … 
is necessarily committed to the discretion of the bodies proposing amendments…’). For debates on this 
issue see Haddad (1995-1996, 1685); Rees (1976-1977, 896); Anonymous (1978-1979, 1259); Vile (1986, 
21).  
112 Baranger (2011, 398).  
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 Explicit limits on constitutional amendments are aimed to secure the constitution 
from what was considered by the constitution-makers as undesirable amendments, for 
various reasons (see Chapter 2). As this chapter claimed earlier, judicial review is a natural 
mechanism to protected unamendable provisions. In this respect – notwithstanding the 
major theoretical difficulties associated with unamendability, which I analyse in the final 
chapter – judicial review of an amendment that violates an unamendable provision 
should be recognised, just as it is recognised when an ordinary law violates the 
constitution.113 
 The situation becomes much more complicated when it comes to implicit limits on 
the amendment power. The absence of explicit limits on constitutional amendments 
significantly undermines the legitimacy of judicial review of amendments. From the fact 
that the constitution does not contain any limitations, it may be concluded that the 
amendment power is intended to be very wide.114 Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
courts in places such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Singapore, expressly rejected any notion 
of implicit limitations. In Pakistan, even though the Supreme Court acknowledged a set 
of ‘salient features’ of the constitution, which cannot be amended, it drew a distinction 
between implicit limitations on the amendment power and their judicial enforcement, 
holding that limitations on the amendment power are to be enforced by the body politic 
through the ordinary mechanisms of parliamentary democracy, rather than by the 
judiciary. 115  On the other hand, as our tour d’horizon of the basic structure doctrine 
demonstrates, judicial enforceability of implicit limitations is in many cases possible. 
Courts around the world, in countries such as India, Bangladesh, Kenya, Colombia, Peru, 
Belize and Taiwan, have held that the amendment power is inherently limited, even in 
the absence of any explicit limitations, and that the court – as the guardian of the 
constitution – has the duty to enforce such implied limitations (see Chapter 3).  
 Thus, the non-existence of unamendable provisions does not necessarily mean that 
judicial review of constitutional amendments is impossible. The language of the 
constitution is not only explicit, but also implicit. Every constitution, it was argued in 
Chapter 5, has an implicit unamendable core, which cannot be amended through the 
delegated amendment power, but demands appealing to the primary constituent power. Of 
                                                          
113 See Barak (2011A, 333).  
114 Conrad (1977-78). 
115 Judgment on Seventeenth Amendment and President’s Uniform Case (2005) [Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. 
Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2005 SC 719].  
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course, facing silence regarding limitations on the amendment power, any court’s 
decision regarding a limited amendment power may only derive from judicial activism 
coupled with ‘judicial daring and courage’.116  
 
C. Different Procedures for Constitutional Amendments 
 
As noted in Chapter 6, in some constitutions a general procedure exists for ordinary 
amendments, while a more difficult procedure is required for amendments that entail a 
‘total revision’ of the constitution or that affect specific ‘basic principles’ of the 
constitution. The Constitution of Venezuela, for example, distinguishes between an 
amendment (Art. 340) and a reform of the Constitution (Art. 342), and has regulated 
different mechanisms for each in separate chapters, to reflect on the distinctive features 
of each method (Arts. 340-346). 117  These formal distinctions allow for judicial 
intervention when the amending authority amends certain principles that demand the 
onerous procedure, but were amended by the ordinary one.118  
 Austria may be the prime example of this. The Austrian Constitution of 1920 does 
not include any substantive limits on constitutional amendments, yet it draws a 
procedural distinction between partial and total revision, the former requires enactment 
by Parliament and the latter requires both enactment and a referendum (Art. 44). 
According to the Austrian Constitutional Court, a total revision of the Constitution takes 
place when the Constitution’s leading principles (leitender Grundsatz) are altered or 
seriously affected. These principles include democracy, separation of powers, the rule of 
law, fundamental liberties, and federalism. The Constitutional Court thus created a 
hierarchy of constitutional norms. The Court’s broad interpretation of the concept of 
‘total revision’ allows it to conduct a substantive judicial review of amendments by 
examining whether amendments alter one of these principles, which would therefore 
                                                          
116 Weintal (2005, 50-51). Indeed, the Indian basic structure doctrine is considered to be one of the most 
significant examples for judicial activism. See Chowdhury (2011, 1055); Sathe (2002); Sen (2009, 63). 
117 In Opinion No. 53, February 3, 2009, http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/febrero/53-3209-2009-
08-1610.HTML, the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela (Constitutional Chamber), explained that 
while amendment involves a minimal alteration, a constitutional reform, is more comprehensive and may 
comprise the partial revision of the Constitution and the replacement of one or more of the provisions 
which do not alter the structure and principles of the constitutional text.   
118 One example is Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P. 2d 1077 (1990), in which the Supreme Court of California 
prohibited an amendment from appearing on the ballot for a referendum on the grounds that it was much 
fundamentally transformative than an amendment such that it amounted to a revision, which requires 
different procedure. See Galie and Bopst (1996, 30). In the recent ‘Proposition 8’ case of May 2010, the 
Supreme Court of California rejected the claim that violating the right of same-sex couples to marry is a 
revision rather than an amendment. See Strauss et al v Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364 (2009); Eskridge (2010, 1235). 
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require a referendum; otherwise, it would violate the Constitution.119 In a decision of 
2001, the Constitutional Court annulled a constitutional amendment that stated that 
specific states’ laws, which were previously declared unconstitutional, could not be 
deemed unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court held that this deprival of the 
Constitution’s normative authority violates the basic Rechtsstaat (rule of law) principle, 
and therefore deemed the amendment as a ‘total revision’, requiring a referendum. Since 
the amendment was adopted by Parliament without a referendum, it was declared 
unconstitutional and was annulled.120 
 This procedural distinction as a basis for judicial review has also taken place in 
Nicaragua. The Constitution of Nicaragua of 1987 allows for a ‘total’ and ‘partial’ reform 
in its amendment process, and each demands a different process. A partial reform 
demands a 60% majority in the National Assembly and an approval in two successive 
sessions, while a total reform requires a two-thirds approval in the Assembly and a final 
approval by a special elected Constituent Assembly (Arts. 191-195). In 2005, when the 
National Assembly approved a set of constitutional amendments that limited the 
president’s power, deeming them to be a partial reform, the Central American Court of 
Justice held that these amendments undermined the executive’s independence and 
attempted to transform Nicaragua from a presidential system to a parliamentary one. 
Since such a transformation could be effected solely through the process of a ‘total 
reform’, the amendments were unconstitutional and invalid.121  
 More recently, the Philippine Supreme Court successfully blocked a referendum on 
a major alteration to the Constitution of 1987, which changed, among other things, the 
presidential system to a parliamentary one. The Supreme Court held that the use of 
popular initiative is limited to propose only ‘amendments’ to the Constitution, and more 
extensive constitutional revisions require an approval by a constitutional convention.122  
                                                          
119 See Stelzer (2012, 15-18, 26-28); Gözler (2008, 34-39); Somek (1998, 567); Cede (2010, 61).  
120 Decision of Mar. 10, 2001, G 12/00, G 48-51/00; see Gözler (2008, 38-39); Val’o (2010, 29); Pfersmann 
(2012, 81); Stelzer (2012, 27). 
121  The Central American Court of Justice, record 69-01-03-01-2005 (decision of 29/03/2005), 
http://cendoc.ccj.org.ni/Documentos/69-01-03-01-2005/0933/Exp%201-3-1-2005Pieza2s.pdf 
Interistingly, that same day, the Supreme Court of Nicaragua delivered its ruling on the case, holding that 
the decision of the Central American Court of Justice was granted without jurisdiction and was invalid. 
Nicaragua was left with ‘two constitutions’: valid nationally and invalid internationally. Eventually, the 
president and the Assembly reached an agreement to reconsider the amendments by the next elections and 
to suspend their application until after that time. Indeed, after the elections, the new government 
suspended the implementation of the new amendments indefinitely. See Sentencia [s.] No. 15, 9 March 
2005 [Supreme Court of Justice] No. 19, 24 May 2005, p. 51, Pir Tanto, Punto IV (Nicar.). For a detailed 
review see Schnably (2007-2008, 461-73).  
122 Lambino v. Comm’n on Elections, G.R. No. 174153 (Oct. 25, 2006), cited in Kay (2011, 731). 
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 When a separate procedure exists for partial and total revisions, courts must first 
theorise what would comprise a ‘total revision’ and then examine the content of the 
amendment in question and whether it indeed alters certain basic principles so as to be 
deemed a total revision of the constitution. This is in fact substantive judicial review 
dressed as a formal or procedural review. Yet, it demonstrates that Joel Colón-Ríos was 
right to claim that ‘in the context of constitutional reform, procedure and substance 
overlap with each other’.123 This exercise of judicial review is thus positioned between 
substantive and procedural forms of judicial review (what Vicki Jackson terms 
‘substantive-procedural’ review), aiming to insure that certain constitutional changes take 
place through a particular popular-democratic or consensual rooting.124  
 To conclude this section, judicial review – and even the annulment of 
constitutional amendments, i.e. the phenomenon of ‘unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments’ – is no longer merely a theoretical hypothesis, but rather an existing 
practice in many jurisdictions. This practice, I argued in the first section, rests on a solid 
theoretical ground.  
III. EXERCISING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
Even after the authority to review a constitutional amendment is established and the 
legitimacy of such an exercise is recognised, the remaining question is: how should such a 
review be exercised? Since there is a growing trend towards reviewing constitutional 
amendments, the implications of such an exercise ought to be considered. This section 
therefore develops guidelines for the judicial review of constitutional amendments.125  
 
A. Interpretation of Constitutional Amendments and of Unamendable Principles 
 
1. Identification of Unamendable Principles or Rules 
 
The first phase of judicial review of constitutional amendments is identifying what the 
unamendable principles or rules are. With regards to explicit limitations on the amendment 
power, this is a relatively simple task. When analysing unamendable provisions, one has 
to consider their structure. As noted in Chapter 2, different techniques for protecting 
                                                          
123 Colón-Ríos (2012C, 134).  
124  Jackson (2013, 58-62). See also Tushnet (2012-2013, 2005-2006) (linking the idea of substantive 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments with the notion of ‘inadmissibility’). 
125 For the importance of such guidelines see Dragomaca (2011).  
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constitutional subjects from amendments exist. The majority of unamendable provisions 
explicitly refer to certain constitutional subjects (principles or institutions). Others refer 
specifically to certain constitutional provisions, prohibiting any amendments to them.126 
Still others combine these two approaches to unamendability.127  
The examination of what is the limit to constitutional amendments is even more 
formidable when it comes to implicit limitations. Even if we acknowledge the existence 
of implicit limitations, a central difficulty is from where one draws them? Since implicit 
limitations have an ambiguous nature, their demarcation is not an easy task. 128  The 
constitution’s ‘spirit’ or fundamental principles ‘cannot be isolated with scientific 
accuracy’. 129 On the other hand, Indian judges have argued:  
The basic structure of the Constitution is not a vague concept and the 
apprehensions … that neither the citizen nor the Parliament would be able to 
understand it are unfounded. If the historical background, the Preamble, the 
entire scheme of the Constitution, the relevant provisions thereof including 
Article 368 are kept in mind there can be no difficulty in discerning that the 
following can be regarded as the basic elements of the constitutional structure.130 
In order to ‘find’ unamendable basic principles, one has to resort to foundational 
structuralism and interpret the constitution as a whole (see Chapter 5.II.A).131 Structuralism, 
as an interpretive theory, ‘emphasizes coherent designs and wholes’.132 According to this 
approach, the language of the constitution is not merely the explicit one, but also the 
implicit one.133 As advocated by Charles Black, by using structural interpretation, the 
interpreter can discern the implicit from the constitution’s internal architecture – 
interactions and connections between different constitutional structures – and the text as 
a whole.134 Structuralism can give an implicit meaning to whatever is written between the 
                                                          
126 See, for example, Armenia Const. (1995), art. 114; Azerbaijan const. (1995), art. 158; Ghana Const. 
(1969), art. 169(3); Honduras Const., (1965), art. 342.  
127 See, for example, Bahrain Const. (1973), art. 120c; Greek Const. (1975), art. 110(1); Guatamala Const. 
(1985), art. 281. 
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and structure see Schauer (2005, 40). On inferring constitutional unenumerated rights from the 
constitution as a whole see Crump (1995-1996, 795). 
134 Black (1969, 7). See also Bobbit (1982, 74-78).  
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lines.135 It is, as Akhil Reed Amar describes it, reading ‘the document holistically and 
attend[ing] to its overarching themes’. 136  Since holistic interpretation considers the 
constitution’s values and basic structure,137 constitutional history, preambles, and ‘basic 
principles’ provisions can provide ‘justifying reasons in support of a conclusion 
adequately supported by the constitutional text’.138 In other words, implicit limits can be 
deduced from the constitution itself, its basic structure, and surrounding values and 
principles. At the end of the day, I agree with Sudhir Krishnaswamy that ‘the task of 
identifying basic features is inherently prone to disagreement’,139 and this is a central 
criticism against structural interpretation as advocated for in this thesis. 140  However, 
foundational structuralism is a feature of ‘holistic constitutionalism’ which is ‘a method of 
constitutional articulation and engagement in which the authority and meaning of the 
various parts are understood and treated as dependent on the integrity of the whole.’141 
Without lengthily expounding on its role, a note on the importance of 
constitutional preambles is warranted.142A constitution’s preamble commonly sets forth 
the constitution’s most important objectives.143 It is ‘the first words of “the people”, their 
raison d'être and their cri de coeur’.144 In the U.S. debate, ‘Brutus’ stated in 1788 that in order 
to discover the constitution’s spirit, it is important first to review its principles, ends, and 
designs as expressed in the preamble.145 True, according to general principles of statutory 
interpretation, preambles do not create substantive rights or powers. Nonetheless, it is 
                                                          
135 See Tribe (2000, 40): ‘The constitution’s “structure” is … that which the text shows but does not 
directly say. Diction, word repetitions, and documentary organizing forms (e.g., the division of the text into 
articles, or the separate status of the preamble and the amendments), for example, all contribute to a sense 
of what the Constitution is about that is as obviously ‘constitutional’ as are the Constitution’s words as 
such’. For debates on unwritten principles see Walters (2008, 245); Goldsworthy (2008, 277); Mullan (2004, 
9). 
136 Amar (2000, 30). For Amar’s version of holism, see Amar (1999, 747). For an argument that one has to 
distinguish Black’s structural method from holism see Dorf (2003-2004, 832). 
137 Jackson (2001, 1281). 
138 Krishnaswamy (2010, 157). See also Keshavamurthy (1982, 80-81): ‘the basic features are identifiable in 
those provisions devised to realise the value objectives of the Constitution. For this identification recourse 
may have to be had to the heritage of the community, history and the events setting the stage for the 
enactment of the Constitution. This analysis would serve to identify the basic structure of any Constitution. 
… assistance can be had from the Preamble of the Constitution identify the basic features of the 
Constitution.’   
139 Krishnaswamy (2010, 160).  
140 Haris (2013, 683). 
141 Walker (2010B, 297-298). 
142 See generally Orgad (2010, 714); Frosini (2012); Rubinstein and Orgad (2005, 38).  
143 Carrasco and Rodino (1989-1990, 503-509). 
144 McKenna, Simpson and Williams (2001, 382). 
145 Brutus (2003, 300). There is no evidence that the constitutional convention regarded the preamble as 
carrying legal weight. See Peaslee (1929), 11-14. Also, following the proposition of Story (1833, 443-444) 
that the preamble should not be deemed to create any substantive rights or powers not granted in the 
constitution’s body, the Supreme Court held that the preamble alone is an insufficient source of rights. See 
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), cited in Axler (1999-2000, 431-432).  
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doubtful whether the argument is consistent with constitutional interpretation. 146  More 
importantly, it is not argued that the preamble confers any power per se or that it has any 
binding legal status; merely that it is a valuable source from which inferences may be 
drawn about the constitution’s fundamental principles. Carl Schmitt claimed that it is a 
mistake to view preambles as ‘mere statements’ since they ‘constitute the substance of 
the constitution’.147 Thus, the preamble is the part in the constitution that best reflects 
the society’s ‘fundamental political decisions’.148 It expresses ‘the ostensible “essence” of 
the people or nation in whose name the constitution has been drafted’.149  The best 
examples for the approach, according to which unamendable principles may be drawn 
from the preamble, is in constitutions that include in their preambles unalienable 
principles150 or entrench ‘the spirit of the Preamble’ or its fundamental tenets.151 This is 
not to deny the problems with reliance on preambles. Preambles are often drafted in an 
abstract, multi-faced, open-ended, or even a contradictory manner.152 While this poses a 
problem for a judge attempting to resolve the tension between competing values, it is less 
problematic when one embarks on the task of discovering principles enshrined in the 
preamble. 153  As the Supreme Court Appellate Division of Bangladesh stated: ‘our 
preamble contains the clue to the fundamentals of the Constitution.’ Likewise, the 
Preamble of the Constitution of Belize was crucial to the recent adoption of the basic 
structure doctrine, as Judge Oswell Legall claimed, the Constitution’s Preamble is ‘the 
root of the tree from which the provisions of the Constitution spring, and which forms 
the basis of the intent and meaning of the provisions’154 (see Chapter 3).  
Whereas the doctrine of implicit limitations on the amendment power could 
empower courts to include almost anything under the scope of the ‘spirit’ or ‘principles’ 
of the constitution, from a legal legitimacy point of view, it is preferable for a judge to 
refer to the basic principles as expressed in the preamble, to which the people yearn and 
wish to be governed under, 155  than to her own perception or amorphous supra-
                                                          
146 Cf., Pace (1933, 295).  
147 Schmitt (2008, 78-79). 
148 Orgad (2010, 715, 726). 
149 Levinson (2011B, 177). Of course, like other parts of constitutions, preambles borrow from each other. 
See Ginsburg, Foti and Rockmore (2014). 
150 Estonia Cost. (1992); Bosnia and Herzegovina Const. (1995); Czech Republic Const. (1992); Croatia 
Const. (1990); Poland Const. (1997); Slovakia Const. (1992).     
151 Nepal Const. (1990); Turkey Const. (1982).  
152 Stith (1996, 48, 54); Himmelfarb (1991-1992, 203-209); Bork (1990, 35). 
153 Abdul Mannan Khan v. Government of Bangladesh, Civil Appeal No. 139 of 2005 with Civil Petition For 
Leave to Appeal No. 569 of 2005 (10.05.2011), 383. 
154 British Caribbean Bank Ltd v AG Beliz (Claim No. 597 of 2011), para. 50.  
155 Reilly (1998, 904). 
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constitutional values.156 It is also claimed that declaring principles enshrined within the 
preamble to be unamendable would mean that this is a ‘one-way street. Once something 
is built into the basic structure of the Constitution through inclusion in the preamble, it 
cannot be removed in the future—it may only be augmented’.157 Even if one accepts this 
objection, such criticism is not unique to preambles, but a basic opposition to the entire 
idea of unamendability (see Chapter 8). 
 
2. Developing a Theory of Unamendable Principles 
 
Enforceability of unamendable principles is not an easy task, as interpreters (be it courts 
or any other institution for that matter) need to develop a theory of the unamendable 
principles. For the Germans – a theory of human dignity; for the French and Italians – a 
theory of republicanism; for the Norwegians– a theory of the ‘spirit’ of the constitution; 
and so on.158 This is the second phase of the exercise of judicial review of amendments, 
and it is a crucial one. The lack of knowledge as for what precisely is an unamendable 
principle causes a high degree of uncertainty and with it a great deal of discretion to the 
judiciary when interpreting unamendable principles. 159  Protected principles, such as 
‘democracy’ and ‘the rule of law’ have a myriad of different formal and substantive 
aspects, and the various interpretations of these principles carry significant implications 
for the scope of the amendment power.160 For instance, if one conceives a ‘republican’ 
form of government as merely juxtaposed with ‘monarchy’, this is hardly an obstacle. 
However, if one conceives the term to include various elements of ‘constitutional 
democracy’, this places greater limits on the amendment power.161   
An interesting example comes from Venezuela. Art. 6 of the Constitution states 
that the Venezuelan government system ‘is and always will be ... alternative.’ The 
Constitutional Court observed that this provision demonstrates that the only way to 
modify these principles would be through a national constituent assembly, by which the 
                                                          
156 McKenna, Simpson and Williams (2001, 398-399). 
157 Twomey (2013, 340).  
158  Murphy (1992A, 349). For an analysis of interpretation of unamendable provisions in various 
jurisdictions such as Germany, France, Greece and Italy see Rigaux (1985, 53-94).  
159 Albarello (2012, 82-84). 
160 A related problem is of course is there (and can there be) any consensus on the meaning of vague 
unamendable principles. On how complex and contested ideas such as ‘the rule of law’ can be see Waldron 
(2002, 137); Fallon (1997, 1). 
161 Friedrich (1959, 812).   
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whole structure and principles enshrined in the Constitution can be changed. 162 
Moreover, according to Art. 340, constitutional amendments cannot alter the 
Constitution’s basic structure. In 2009, the Supreme Court was required to deliver an 
interpretation on these provisions and to clarify what is meant by the term ‘basic 
structure’ of the Constitution, and more specifically, whether an amendment can 
determine unlimited presidential reelection, even though one of the Constitution’s basic 
principles is the principle of alternation. This request was submitted to the Court, in light 
of proposals to amend Art. 230 (according to which the Presidential term is six years and 
the President may be re-elected immediately and only once), so as to allow unlimited re-
election of President.  
In its opinion, the Court held that the term ‘basic structure’, should be 
understood not only from a formal perspective as a systematic order of the text, but also 
from a material point of view, as a body of fundamental policy decisions with an 
axiological load that feeds and legitimises its realisation by the state and the citizens who 
live in it.163 As for the specific question, the Court held that the possibility of continuous 
re-election does not alter in any way democratic values that inform the constitutional 
legal system. The principle of alternation requires that the people, holder of sovereignty, 
have regular opportunity to choose their leaders or representatives. If this possibility is 
prevented by avoiding or not holding elections, then the principle of alternation is 
violated.164  
In these two phases (identifying unamendable principles and developing a theory 
of unamendable principles) the formulation of unamendable provisions, whether as rules 
that demand strict compliance or as principles that are more generalised guidelines, has 
decisive importance.165 The basic distinction between rules and principles is that ‘rules are 
applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion’,166 designed as legal directives that demand a strict 
compliance, and require a yes-or-no decision on their breach. Principles, in contrast, are 
                                                          
162 Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela (Constitutional Chamber), Opinion No. 53, February 3, 2009, 
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/febrero/53-3209-2009-08-1610.HTML; This resembles the 
Court’s reasoning in an earlier case of 1999, under the Constitution of 1961, in which the Court held that 
limitations which are imposed upon the amendment power and which regulate the amendment procedure 
do not – and cannot – apply to the people in their capacity as holders of the constituent power. See Opinion 
No. 17 of the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela, 19.01.1999; Colón-Ríos (2011A, 369-372). 
163 Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela (Constitutional Chamber), Opinion No. 53, February 3, 2009, 
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/febrero/53-3209-2009-08-1610.HTML 
164 Id.  
165 Conrad (2003, 194).  
166 Dworkin (1967-1968, 25); Dworkin (1978, 24).  
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more general guidelines, which permit balancing and may be realised in various 
degrees.167  
Some unamendable provisions, as shown in Chapter 2, take the form of a general 
protection of principles, while others protect concrete provisions or a detailed list of 
constitutional subjects. Karl Loewenstein states that ‘unhappily, but perhaps inevitably’, 
the German unamendable provisions ‘are not concrete and specific articles, but general 
principles subject to different interpretation’.168 On the one hand, a protection of general 
principles is a far more flexible approach. The elasticity and the semantic openness of 
these terms allow their content to evolve as changes occur in a social context.169 On the 
other hand, vague limitations such as a general protection of principles arguably provide 
only indirect protection for basic rights.170 A general provision allows courts a greater 
margin of discretion and interpretive recreation. From an institutional perspective, this 
might grant courts more power vis-à-vis the political branches. 171  From a normative 
perspective, it is hard to tell whether a general prohibition poses a greater or a more 
modest limitation on the amendment power, as it depends on the given interpretation – 
narrow or broad – of the provision. It thus seems that precise, extensive, and detailed 
provisions could be considered leaving the amending authorities a narrower discretion 
for amendment. Such provisions, while imposing a stricter margin of interpretation to 
the courts,172 grant added legitimacy for their judicial enforcement.  
 
3. Identifying the Prohibition 
 
After identifying what are the protected constitutional subjects, and once there is an 
established theory of the unamendable principles, the third phase is examining what the 
prohibited act is. The act that is prohibited by unamendable provisions varies among 
different constitutions. While most constitutions simply prohibit ‘amending’ or ‘revising’ 
certain constitutional subjects, some constitutions state that amendments must ‘respect’ 
or ‘safeguard’ certain constitutional subjects.173 Often, the prohibited act is not ‘amending’ 
                                                          
167 Alexy (2000, 295). 
168 Loewenstein (1954-1955, 829). 
169 Pedra (2009, 232).  
170 Sajó (1996, 72 fn 32). 
171 Friedman (2011, 93). 
172 Mohallem (2011, 766-767).  
173 See, for example, Angola Const. (2010), art. 236; Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288.  
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certain subjects, but rather the mere ‘proposal’ of amendments.174 Whereas the ultimate 
result of these two limitations seems similar, presumably the latter limitation positions 
the barrier to the prohibited change at an earlier phase than the actual act of amendment, 
i.e. at the beginning of the political process, so that the proposed change cannot even be 
debated. A provision prohibiting a proposal to amend certain subjects seems more like a 
directive to the amending authority that hinders a court’s intervention, as it would 
necessitate judicial intervention at an early stage of the political process, often within 
inter-parliamentary proceedings. 
 
4. Interpreting the Constitutional Amendment 
 
Once unamendable principles are identified, and the interpreter recognises a collision 
between a constitutional amendment and unamendable principles, the fourth phase in 
the exercise of judicial review of amendments is interpreting the amendment under scrutiny. An 
annulment of a constitutional amendment by courts should be the means of last resort. 
Therefore, before annulling a constitutional amendment, other judicial remedies, such as 
interpretation, must be considered. Consequently, as an interpretive principle, the 
secondary constituent power must be put under the presumption of safeguarding the 
constitution’s basic structure and constitutionally-protected human rights. The general 
presumption of constitutionality, which applies in the case of ordinary legislation, must 
operate with greater force to constitutional amendments.175 Therefore, every interpretive 
effort must be made to reconcile amendments with protected rights and basic 
constitutional principles. This is the German method of ‘interpretation in conformity 
with the Constitution’ (Verfassungskonforme Auslegung). Using such an interpretive method, 
courts may choose the interpretation that is most compatible with the constitution 
without annulling the entire amendment. This is thus another ‘line of defence’ of the 
constitution, which avoids the remedy of annulment.176 This doctrine, resembling what 
Ronald Dworkin refers to as ‘the principle of charity’,177 is compatible with the theory of 
‘foundational structuralism’ as advanced in Chapter 5, since, as Sanford Levinson puts it, 
                                                          
174 See, for example, the difference between the French protections of the republican form of government 
in the Const. (1958), art. 89(5) and Const. (1946), art. 95.   
175 Conrad (1977-78). 
176 Livneh (1978, 255).  
177 Dworkin (1986, 53); Dworkin (2006, 220). See generally Marmor (2005, 44). 
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‘one cannot begin to engage in constitutional interpretation without having in mind a 
model of the point of the entire constitutional enterprise’.178  
The recognition of limits on the amendment power in the form of unamendable 
(explicit or implicit) basic principles of the constitution necessitates the setting of limits 
to the doctrine’s own boundaries. 179  Surely not every constitutional amendment falls 
within these boundaries. This brings us to the final phase of the exercise of the judicial 
review of constitutional amendments – scrutiny of the amendment in light of the 
protected unamendable principle.  
 
B. Standard of Review 
 
Even if we acknowledge that certain basic constitutional principles are unamendable, 
what is considered an impermissible amendment remains unclear. Is every deviation, 
violation, or infringement of that sacred principle prohibited? Or is a more severe 
standard required? When considering the appropriate standard of reviewing 
constitutional amendments vis-à-vis unamendable principles, one can suggest three 
different levels of standards: 
 
1. Minimal Effect Standard 
 
The first option is the Minimal Effect Standard. This is the most stringent standard of the 
judicial review of amendments. According to this standard, any violation or infringement 
of an unamendable principle is prohibited no matter how severe the intensity of the 
infringement is, including amendments that have only a minimal effect on the protected 
principles. On the one hand, one may claim that the importance of the protected 
unamendable principles – as pillars of the constitution – necessitates the most stringent 
protection. If the aim of unamendability is to provide for hermetic protection of a certain 
set of values or institutions, then any violation of these principles ought to give rise to 
grounds for judicial intervention. On the other hand, such a standard would not only 
grant great power to courts, but also would place wide – perhaps too wide – restrictions 
on the ability to amend the constitution. The theory of unamendability should not be 
construed as a severe barrier to change. It should be construed as a mechanism enabling 
constitutional progress, permitting certain flexibility by allowing constitutional 
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179 Krishnaswamy (2010, 131).  
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amendments, while simultaneously shielding certain core features of the constitution 
from amendment, thereby preserving the constitutional identity. Moreover, an adoption 
of the Minimal Effect Standard would often lead to an absurd result: take, for example, the 
unamendability of fundamental rights that exists in various constitutions (see Chapter 2). 
According to the Minimal Effect Standard, any amendment that would infringe upon an 
unamendable right would be unconstitutional. At the same time, the ordinary legislature 
exercising its ordinary legislative powers would be able to violate fundamental rights as 
long as the violation was proportionate according to the different test of each state’s 
constitutional law. This would grant a lower authority (the legislative) greater powers 
than those possessed by a higher normative authority (the amending). For all these 
reasons, the Minimal Effect Standard should be rejected. 
 
2. Disproportionate Violation Standard 
 
The intermediate standard of review is the Disproportionate Violation Standard. It is an 
examination of the proportionality of the violation. The principle of proportionality is 
nowadays becoming an almost universal doctrine in constitutional adjudication. 180 
Proportionality generally requires that a violation of a constitutional right have a ‘proper 
purpose;’ that there is a rational connection between the violation and that purpose; that 
the law is narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose; and that the requirements of the 
proportionality stricto (balancing) test are met. 181  A disproportionate violation of a 
constitutional right would be considered unconstitutional and thus void. This standard 
emphasises the balancing of conflicting interests. Following the Czech Constitutional 
Court’s decision, mentioned earlier in this chapter, Maxim Tomoszek argued that the 
proportionality test is also suitable for the judicial review of amendments. Just as 
ordinary law may limit the scope of fundamental rights, he claims, so constitutional 
amendments may limit protected principles. Tomoszek sees no ‘technical’ obstacle to 
using the principle of proportionality in review of amendments since the nature of 
proportionality allows the balancing between conflicting principles. In the case of 
constitutional amendments, the balance would be between the protected ‘unamendable 
principle’, and the pursued interest and means taken by the amendment. 182  
                                                          
180  See Schlink (2012, 291); Stone Sweet and Mathews (2008, 72); Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2013, i) 
(describing proportionality as ‘the most important constitutional doctrine worldwide.’)   
181 See Barak (2012, 245-445). 
182 Tomoszek (2010).  
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While there is great force in this claim, I submit that the Disproportionate Violation 
Standard should be rejected when it comes to constitutional amendments. Technically, 
proportionality applies to fundamental rights. It measures or balances the disadvantage 
caused to an individual or a group’s rights against the means employed to achieve a 
certain public interest or a conflicting right, and whether the damage caused by said 
means is proportionate. It is questionable to what extent the same test can apply to 
evaluate a disadvantage to principles or constitutional institutions. What is a 
disproportionate violation of the rule of law, secularism, or the monarchy?  Even if one 
can weigh these principles within the proportionality test, this standard would grant 
courts a very broad discretion to determine what a proportionate violation is and is not.  
Most importantly, the aim of unamendability is not to balance between conflicting values. 
Limitation clauses and unamendable provisions carry different functions. Limitation 
clauses aim at the legislature and direct it to take the consideration of fundamental rights 
in everyday politics to the maximum possible.183 Unamendability, in contrast, is intended 
to preserve the core nucleus principles of the constitution, its identity.184 Therefore, the 
Disproportionate Violation Standard is not suitable to the exercise of reviewing constitutional 
amendments. 
 
3. Fundamental Abandonment Standard 
 
Fundamental Abandonment Standard is the lowest level of scrutiny. According to this 
standard, only an extraordinary infringement of unamendable principles, one that 
changes and ‘fundamentally abandons’ them, would allow judicial annulment of 
constitutional amendments. This seems to be the approach taken by the German 
Constitutional Court. The debate between the German judges in the abovementioned 
Klass case of 1970 is fascinating in that respect.185 Recall, Art. 79(3) of the German Basic 
Law (1949) prohibits amendments to the Basic Law that affect the division of the 
Federation into Länder, human dignity, the constitutional order, or basic institutional 
principles describing Germany as a democratic and social federal state. In its judgment, 
the Court repeated earlier decisions according to which a constitutional provision must 
be interpreted so that it is consistent with the Basic Law’s fundamental principles and 
                                                          
183 This is an ‘optimisation requirement’. See generally, Alexy (2009). 
184  On the relation between limitations on constitutional amendments and constitutional identity see 
Jacobsohn (2010A, 34-83). 
185 30 BVerfGE 1, 24 (1970); an English translation of the case is available in Murphy and Tanenhaus 
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system of values, as expressed in Art. 79(3). However, when interpreting Art. 79(3), the 
majority of the court gave the word ‘affect’ a narrow meaning: 
The purpose of [the unamendable provision] … is to prevent both abolition of 
the substance or basis of the existing constitutional order, by the formal legal 
means of amendment … and abuse of the Constitution to legalize a totalitarian 
regime. This provision thus prohibits a fundamental abandonment of the 
principles mentioned therein. Principles are from the very beginning not 
“affected” as “principles” if they are in general taken into consideration and are 
only modified for evidently pertinent reasons for a special case according to its 
peculiar character… Restriction on the legislator’s amending the Constitution… 
must not, however, prevent the legislator from modifying by constitutional 
amendment even basic constitutional principles in a system-immanent manner.186  
While the majority of the court took the Fundamental Abandonment Standard, the 
minority favoured the stricter Minimal Effect Standard. Sections of the minority’s opinion 
are worth full citation: 
[the unamendable provision] … limits constitutional amendments. Such an 
important, far-reaching, and exceptional provision must certainly not be 
interpreted in an extensive manner. But it would be a complete 
misunderstanding of its meaning to assume that its main purpose was only to 
prevent misuse of the formal legal means of a constitutional amendment to 
legitimize a totalitarian regime… Art. 79, par. 3 means more: Certain 
fundamental decisions of the basic Law makers are inviolable … The wording 
and meaning of Art. 79, par. 3, do not merely forbid complete abolition of all or 
one of the principles. The word “affect” means less… The constituent elements 
are also…to be protected against a gradual process of disintegration…’187 
While the Constitutional Court’s Fundamental Abandonment approach can be 
criticised on the grounds that Art. 79(3) prohibits the constitutional legislator from even 
affecting the unamendable principles, not merely abandoning them, 188  this is the 
appropriate standard to be used when adjudicating constitutional amendment. 
Unamendability is not aimed at preventing minor changes that contradict unamendable 
principles or deviate from them. Its main function is to preserve the constitutional order 
and to protect against revolutionary changes. It insures that amendments do not destroy 
the constitution and replace it with a new one. Unamendability thus applies to those 
extraordinary and exceptional circumstances in which the constitutional change strikes at 
the heart of the constitution’s basic principles, depriving them of their minimal 
conditions of existence. The impact of the conflict between the amendment and the 
unamendable basic principle must be of such intensity and to such extent that it modifies 
                                                          
186 See Murphy and Tanenhaus (1977, 661-662). 
187 Id., 662-664. 
188 See Nohlen (2005, 684).  
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the principle’s essence. After its amendment, the unamendable principle would no longer 
be the same, but essentially modified. Therefore, amendments to unamendable principles 
that preserve the state’s constitutional identity do not justify the annulment of 
constitutional amendments.189 The basic question is: ‘if this amendment is upheld, are we 
still going to live under the same constitution?’190 
This standard is compatible with the Colombian Constitutional Court’s test for 
deciding whether a constitutional amendment amends the constitution or replaces it with 
a new one (see Chapter 3). An amendment is considered a constitutional replacement if it 
replaces an element defining the identity of the constitution.191 Relating to the Colombian 
constitutional replacement doctrine, Carlos Bernal recently proposed that proportionality 
could be used in order to determine whether an amendment infringes a central element 
of deliberative democracy, which would then be considered as a constitutional 
replacement.192 At first sight, this might be an approach that supports the proportionality 
standard. But a closer reading of Bernal’s argument reveals that his approach resembles 
more the Fundamental Abandonment Standard. Bernal claims that an amendment would 
count as a ‘replacement of the constitution if, and only if, the infringement is of such 
magnitude that the political system can no longer be consider as an institutionalization of 
deliberative democracy’.193 In other words, an amendment has to fundamentally abandon the 
principle of deliberative democracy in order to be deemed unconstitutional.   
The Fundamental Abandonment Standard raises two main problems: first, it grants 
relatively weak protection to unamendable principles, compared to the other two 
standards; and second, it allows, at least in theory, for a gradual deconstruction of the 
constitutional system, brought about piece by piece via constitutional amendments.194 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Fundamental Abandonment Standard should be 
supported both from normative and institutional perspectives. Normatively, it fulfils the 
purpose of unamendability. The relatively narrow limitations it imposes on the 
amendment power allow for progress and concurrently for the preservation of the 
                                                          
189 Roznai and Yolcu (2012, 205-206) and the references cited therein.  
190 Baranger (2011, 425).    
191 See judgment C-970/2004; Bernal (2013, 343-344). See also Opinion C-1040/05, cited in Bonilla and 
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192 Bernal (2013, 357). 
193 Id. 
194 This recalls the work of Bernstein (1909), who believed that socialism would be achieved not through 
capitalism’s revolutionary destruction, but through steady advance.  
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constitution’s core principles. It allows for their ‘development and suitable modification 
in consonance with the constitutional system’.195 Institutionally, it mandates the courts to 
use their extraordinary power of declaring amendments unconstitutional cautiously. This 
understanding of what might be considered an unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment succeeds in reconciling two of Edmund Burke’s concerns: first, protection 
of the constitutional identity reminds each generation that it is not autonomous, but 
rather remains linked to its past, and, simultaneously, it allows the people to alter the 
basic principles as a means of conservation.196   
 
C. Judicial Restraint  
 
The theory proposed in this thesis explains judicial review of amendments based upon 
the nature of the amendment power. It thus allows for the placement of great power in 
the hands of the judiciary. Simultaneously, the guidelines proposed in this chapter imply 
a call for judicial restraint.197 As a general rule, courts should not overturn the policy 
choices of the amendment authority. Therefore, any interpretive effort must be made to 
interpret constitutional amendments in conformity with the constitution. Moreover, only 
the clearest cases of transgression would justify judicial intervention. Such cases will be 
apparent either by an element of abuse of power, of some hidden or collateral purpose 
appearing behind the purported scope of amendment, 198  or when an amendment 
fundamentally abandons a basic feature of the constitution by changing its essence, thus 
threatening the constitution’s fundamental structure. Presuming that this power of 
judicial review is exercised according to these guidelines, this theory is compatible with 
the principle of separation of powers, for it ensures that exercise of this extreme power 
would be undertaken only in the most aggravated cases.199 
Importantly, the willingness to review amendments and the intensity of judicial 
scrutiny must be connected to the amendment process. Even once conceiving the 
amendment power as a delegated power, as an agent, fiduciaries’ duties are enforced with 
different degrees of strictness, depending on the nature of the specific relationship under 
consideration.200 We have already noted that the amendment power is unique in its nature. 
                                                          
195 Conrad (2003, 197). 
196 Burke (2001, 170, 181). 
197 For a similar call see Dragomaca (2011). 
198 Conrad (1977-78, 18). 
199 Prateek (2008, 477). 
200 Leib, Ponet and Serota (2013, 93). 
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It is sui generis (Chapter 4). But not all amendment powers are similar. A spectrum of 
amendment powers exists. Some are weak amendment powers, which resemble ordinary 
legislation, some are strong amendment powers, which allow for popular participation and 
deliberations in their process mechanisms, and involve a great deal of time (Chapter 6). 
One can naturally expect (although this is not always the case) that the easier the 
amendment process, the higher the rate of formal amendments.201 A very weak secondary 
constituent power, and an overly flexible amendment process, coupled with short-term 
political interests and temporary majorities increase the fear of abuse of the amendment 
power.202 It is here where the strictest judicial oversight is required. Even Lester Orfield, 
normally an antagonist of the notion of limitations on the amendment power, states that 
‘undoubtedly, where a simple majority is required, it is not an especially serious matter 
for the courts to supervise closely the amending process both as to procedure and as to 
substance. But when so large a majority as three-fourth has finally expressed its will in 
the highest possible form outside of revolution, it becomes perilous for the judiciary to 
intervene’.203 Therefore, the legitimacy of the judicial review of amendments depends, at 
least in part, on the relative ease or difficulty of amending the constitution. 204 Since 
strong amendment power carries greater legitimacy and minimises risks of abuse (see 
Chapter 6), courts should be less willing to intervene in cases of amendments adopted 
through a strong amendment process. As the Venice Commission noted, amendments 
that were adopted following special procedures, such as qualified majorities and 
additional requirements, enjoy a very high degree of democratic legitimacy; therefore, 
courts should be particularly hesitant to overrule them.205  The more the amendment is 
the product of inclusive and deliberative democracy, the less intensive the judicial review 
of the constitutional amendment should be, and vice versa.206 It has been remarked that 
jurists ‘must either learn to trust the amending process or repose their faith in non-
                                                          
201 Fombad (2007, 59); Ackerman (1999, 423). Rate of amendments depends also on other criteria such as 
the size of the voting/decision-making body. See Dixon and Holden (2012, 195).   
202 Conrad (1970, 415). This is, of course, a general theory, which can have some exceptions. The UK is an 
obvious one, as it is an example for a state which its constitution can be altered by a simple majoritarian 
vote in Parliament, yet it has a tradition of self-restraint and of a stable constitutional order. See Tomkins 
(2000). It is important to note that in his later writings, Dicey (1894, 69) himself proposed that Bills which 
affect fundamental aspects of the constitution should be submitted to the UK’s electors for their approval 
prior to becoming a law. This idea of a referendum, Dicey claimed, would emphasis ‘the difference 
between any ordinary law and the fundamental laws of the realm’. See also Dicey (1890, 505): ‘the 
Referendum supplies, under the present state of things, the best, if not the only possible, check upon ill-
considered alterations in the fundamental institutions of the country’. See, in general, Weill (2003, 480). 
203 Orfield (1942, 120). 
204 Jacobsohn (2006A, 487); Orfield (1929-1930, 558). 
205 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (2009, 47-47). 
206 Bernal (2013, 357); Prateek (2008, 465-467). 
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elected judges who will monitor every exercise of the plenary power of amendment with 
a yardstick which is, in the ultimate analysis, of their own choosing’.207 I claim that these 
two variables – judicial scrutiny and the amendment process – are connected. 
To conclude this point, if the amendment power is extraordinary, then judicial review 
of amendments is all the more an extraordinary power, and the court ought to restrain 
itself and use it carefully.208 It was claimed that the adoption of the ‘basic structure 
doctrine’ turned the Indian Supreme Court into the ‘strongest wing of the state’,209 and 
arguably, the most powerful court in the world. Nonetheless, since its adoption, the 
doctrine has been successfully invoked only a small number of times to invalidate 
amendments.210 One can cogently argue that the Supreme Court has used this power 
cautiously. While judicial review of constitutional amendments, as the Indian experience 
teaches, might prevent abuse of power, adjudication of amendments should be a remedy 
of last resort, as the ‘judgment day weapon’. 211  The task of judicial review of 
constitutional acts is a delicate one, which must be approached with great caution. The 
hands of a judge writing a judgment annulling a constitutional act may shake due to the 
seriousness of the exercise, but will be stable enough if he is certain that the 
circumstances are right.212  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The formal positivistic framework of judicial review is that the constitution is 
simultaneously the source of authority granted to the courts to review legislation, and the 
source of substantial criteria and mechanism through which courts conduct the task of a 
review.213 Such an approach might reject judicial review of constitutional amendments, 
not the least without any clear authority or explicit constitutional limitations on the 
amendment power. Such a framework, notwithstanding its simplicity, is insufficient to 
encompass the complicated relationship between basic concepts such as democracy, 
constitutionalism, and judicial review.  
The formalistic framework has to be set aside in favour of a new one that examines 
the relationship between legal institutions, and the fundamental principles and 
                                                          
207 Dhavan (1978, 178). 
208 Dellinger (1983-1984, 414-416). 
209 Rao (2006, 73).  
210 Jacobsohn (2003-2004, 1795-1796); Krishnaswamy (2010, 129). 
211 For a last resort defense of constitutional review in general see Tuori (2011, 365). 
212 Roznai (2014, 52). 
213 Kelsen (1945, 162).  
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procedures that stand at the basis of the system of government within which these 
institutions work. Such a framework, which considers the distinction between the primary 
and secondary constituent powers, assists in explaining the judicial review of constitutional 
amendments. Nevertheless, the theory of unamendability in general and judicial review of 
constitutional amendments in particular raises many objections. In the next (and final) 
chapter, I engage with the various objections to the theory of unamendability.  
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CHAPTER 8: ASSESSING OBJECTIONS TO 
UNAMENDABILITY 
 
The main ideas advanced in the previous chapters – the acknowledgment of the limited 
scope of amendment powers and the case for judicial review of constitutional 
amendments – raise many complications and objections on various grounds.  
This chapter engages with the main objections to the theory of unamendability. It 
devotes a section to the contentious issue of judicial review of constitutional 
amendments, since the vast majority of criticism against unamendability is only 
applicable if limitations on amendment power (explicit or implicit) are enforceable. 1 In 
the literature (mainly, but not only, in the U.S.), there is a dispute regarding the 
justification for judicial review of ordinary legislation. 2 As I demonstrate, the 
disagreement surrounding the practice of judicial review, and the familiar democratic 
challenges that judicial review faces, are intensified when it comes to judicial review of 
constitutional amendments. 
This chapter demonstrates that the approach taken in this thesis, mainly building 
upon the distinction between the primary and secondary constituent power (Part II) and the 
guidelines regarding the proper exercise of judicial review of constitutional amendments 
(Chapter 7), manage to mitigate the difficulties associated with unamendability. 
I. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO UNAMENDABILITY 
A. The ‘Dead Hand’ Objection 
 
A society should abide by a set of values that it believes in. At the same time, it should 
not accept any set of values as taken for granted, but critically examine them and modify 
them if it believes that some elements are either unjustified or ought to be changed with 
developments of the society. Thus, unamendability poses an obstruction to what some 
view as healthy social development. When a change in a society’s world-view of values 
takes place without the ability to accordingly amend the constitution, the constitution 
does not then protect the values that that society believes in, but simply binds the current 
                                                          
1 Vile (1995, 198-199). 
2 See, for example, Solove (1999, 941); Zurn (2002, 467); Tremblay (2003, 525); McDonald (2004, 1); 
Waldron (2006, 1346); Alexander (2008, 119); Fallon (2008, 1693); Law (2009, 723); Harel and Kahana 
(2010, 227).  
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generation to the values of previous generations.3 This is a known problem according to 
which present (and future) generations are ruled by the ‘dead hand’ of their ancestors.4  
The amendment process, which serves as a mechanism for the constitution-
makers to share part of their authority with future generations, is Janus-faced. It both 
creates the ‘dead hand’ difficulty by requiring an often-formidable procedure for 
amending the constitution and manages to relax it by allowing future generations to 
change the constitution. 5  Unamendability aims to prevent future generations from 
amending certain parts of the constitution; therefore, it exacerbates the ‘dead hand 
difficulty’ and may also be contested on this ground.6 One can only recall Art. 28 of the 
French Declaration of Rights of Men and Citizens of 24 July 1793, according to which ‘A people 
have always the right of revising, amending and changing their Constitution. One 
generation cannot subject to its laws future generations’. Thomas Jefferson7 and Thomas 
Paine8 pronounced similar ideas. Therefore, the idea that a generation can perpetually tie 
the hands of another and impose its own values upon it is contentious.9 Elisha Mulford 
gave an acute expression for this idea, describing an unamendable constitution as:  
The worst tyranny of time, or rather the very tyranny of time. It makes an earthly 
providence of a convention which has adjourned without day. It places the 
sceptre over a free people in the hands of dead men, and the only office left to 
the people is to build thrones out of the stones of their sepulchres.10 
 
Those hostile to unamendability would simply claim that unamendable provisions 
may be repealed or ignored at will,11 and all the more so should not be enforceable in 
courts. One possible reply to the ‘dead hand’ objection is that it is founded on a fallacy: 
the purpose of the constitution is not to empower past generations, but to maintain and 
reform the fundamental political institutions in a self-conscious manner.12 A practical 
                                                          
3 Sapir (2010, 178-179). 
4 See McConnell (1998, 1127-1128); Ely (1980, 11); Klarman (1997B, 382); Samaha (2008, 606).  
5 Sager (1995-1996, 275); Pettys (2008, 332). 
6 Albert (2010, 667). 
7 In a famous correspondence between James Madison and Thomas Jefferson from September 6, 1789, 
Jefferson argued that constitutions should be rewritten every generation (every 19 years according to him), 
declaring that the dead should not govern the living, since ‘the earth belongs always to the living 
generation’. Yarbrough (2006, 176). For an analysis of Jefferson’s thesis see Rubenfeld (1997-1998, 1085). 
In contrast, in Federalist No. 49, Madison contended that frequent ‘recurrence to the people’ would 
endanger ‘the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions’ and ‘deprive the 
government of that veneration which time bestows’ and on which every government depends for stability. 
See Madison (1817, 274).   
8 Paine (1998, 91-92) claimed that ‘[E]very age and generation must be as free to act for itself ... [I]t is the 
living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated.’  
9 Fombad (2007, 57-58).    
10 Mulford (1870, 155).  
11 See generally Linder (1981, 717). 
12 Eisgruber (1997, 1616). 
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reply is that when considering the simple fact that a national constitution’s median 
lifespan is a mere nineteen years,13 any argument regarding unamendability as binding 
future generations to the ‘dead hand of the past’ is relaxed.  
The main reply is that unamendability does not entirely restrict future generations 
who may exercise their primary constituent power and alter even unamendable provisions. As 
Jason Mazzone claims, ‘limitations on constitutional amendments are ... consistent with 
democratic government. The people may change each and every provision of their 
Constitution, but not every change can be accomplished through a constitutional 
amendment’.14 Unamendability limits only the secondary – and thus limited – constituent 
power. It is entirely consistent with the people’s sovereignty as manifested by the primary 
constituent power, through which ‘the people’ can constitute a new constitutional order. 
Thus, it would be inaccurate to claim that unamendability is inconsistent with the 
people’s sovereign power or extinguishing sovereignty.15 On the contrary, unamendability 
is not only in accord with the people’s sovereignty, as it allows them to reform their 
constitution, but it is also a sovereignty-reinforcement mechanism, as it creates a space of 
decision-making (that of the fundamental principles of the polity), which is reserved 
solely for the people.   
 
B. The Revolutionary Means Objection  
 
One of the most serious objections to unamendability is that it might lead to 
revolutionary means in order to change unamendable principles or rules.16 Limitations on 
the amendment power aim to supply stability, to ‘freeze’ certain principles or institutions. 
However, paradoxically, they may lead to revolutions. Generally, by restraining public 
authority and establishing its parameters, constitutions attempt to serve as ‘hedges against 
the unintended consequences of public policy decisions’. 17  Unamendability, however, 
might itself lead to unintended consequences. Of course, in every complex social 
environment, unexpected consequences may arise. Revolutionary means can be recourse 
even in places where the constitution does not enshrine certain provisions or where 
implicit limitations on the amendment power are not judicially recognised. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
13 See Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton (2009, 129). 
14 Mazzone (2004-2005, 1843). See also Goerlich (2008, 4040); Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos (2011, 43). 
15 Orfield (1929-1930, 581); McGovney (1920, 511-513); Albert (2010, 676).  
16 Tushnet (2012-2013, 2007). 
17 See Kyvig (2000A, 2). 
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it seems that unamendability as a mechanism almost forces a society to recourse to extra-
constitutional means for changing unamendable principles: 
By resorting to entrenchment to preserve constitutional structure and values, the 
founding charter leaves citizens with revolution as their only recourse if they 
ever wish to amend their constitution – an unusually unsavory position that is a 
vast departure from normal constitutional conditions. 18 
 
The amendment process is meant inter alia, to forestall, as far as possible, revolutionary 
upheavals. Yet, unamendability blocks any constitutional manner to amend certain 
principles. It is thus potentially dangerous; citizens might find unamendability to be an 
intolerable obstacle to political and social change, thus resorting to extra-constitutional 
means, such as a forcible revolution, in order to change it.19 ‘Ulysses’, in the words of Jon 
Elster, ‘would have found the strength to break the ropes that tied him to the mast’.20 
In other words, if courts can enforce limitations on the amendment power and 
invalidate unconstitutional amendments, they might ‘invalidate the last institutional route 
the will of the majority has to make itself heard’.21 Once the court has said its final word 
regarding an unamendable principle, this might create a situation according to which a 
revision of that decision can take place only by forcible revolutionary means. 22 
Unamendability might therefore invite and encourage extra-constitutional means in order 
to obtain the desired modification of prohibited content. It follows that, in terms of 
constitutional dynamics, unamendability serves the exact opposite of its original purpose: 
not only does it not prevent the changes, but it also encourages the realisation of that 
change in a revolutionary manner.23 This might be especially dangerous in developing 
countries or weak democracies that lack established democratic traditions, or countries 
with an apparent history of coups, where the temptation to use extra-constitutional 
measures might be irresistible. 24  To that effect, one might suggest that resorting to 
unamendability is a ‘constitutional stupidity’ that might lead to a ‘constitutional tragedy’.25  
The risk that judicial enforcement of unamendability could threaten society’s stability, 
as the constitutional change may be pursued through violent means, raises the inevitable 
question: if the change were to occur regardless of the temporary hindrance by a few 
judges, would it not be better to allow the change to occur by peaceful constitutional 
                                                          
18 Albert (2010, 684-685). 
19 See Friedrich (1968, 138, 143, 145-146); Suber (1999, 31-32); Fombad (2007, 57). 
20 Elster (2000B, 95-96). 
21 Mendes (2005, 461). 
22 Id., 456; Esquirolo (2008-2009, 721). 
23 Vanossi (2000, 188).  
24 See Friedman (2011, 93-96). 
25 I borrow these terms from Eskridge and Levinson (1998).  
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means? 26  As Mark Tushnet suggests, ‘perhaps constitutional theory should treat an 
unconstitutional amendment as a pro tanto exercise of the right to revolution through 
the form of law, a form that allows fundamental change to occur without violence’.27 
This objection relates to another issue which is the effectiveness of 
unamendability. A famous Yiddish phrase states hot er gezogt (‘so what if he said so’), 
reflecting doubts on the power of words alone. In a similar vein, it appears that the main 
issue with regards to unamendable provisions is their effectiveness. In 1918, Lawrence 
Lowell wrote that ‘the device of providing that a law shall never be repealed is an old one, 
but I am not aware that it has ever been of any avail’.28 One sceptic author argued that 
unamendable provisions are pointless:  
One understands that we deal here with provisions which the respective 
constitution-makers hold in particular esteem and to which they would like to 
give added protection. But if this esteem is shared by the rest of the politically-
active groups, this by itself should ensure that the standard procedure for 
constitutional amendments would protect them sufficiently; if, on the other hand, 
the demand for change were to become so strong that it could overcome these 
standard procedure, it is hardly imaginable that its protagonists would renounce 
their objectives only because the Constitution says that the provision is 
inviolable.29  
 
Two premises underlie the effectiveness problem. First, unamendability cannot 
block extra-constitutional activity. ‘In a conflict between law and power’, Arendt wrote, 
‘it is seldom the law which will emerge as victory’. 30  To give two examples, the 
prohibition of the 1824 Mexican Constitution on altering the form of government did 
not prevent a coup d’état, in which the conservatives came into power and in 1836 
replaced the Constitution with a new one that rejected federalism.31 Likewise, in Greece, 
notwithstanding the unamendability protection of the democratic system of government 
in the Constitution of 1952, the Constitution was suspended in April 1967 by a military 
putsch, which established a military dictatorship that lasted until July 1974.32 Hence, the 
ability of physical power to force prohibited changes is unquestionable. From a legal 
perspective, the question is whether such changes would be valid according to the 
constitutional system’s standards.33  
                                                          
26 Linder (1981, 723). 
27 Tushnet (2012-2013, 2007). 
28 Lowell (1918, 103).   
29 Akzin (1967, 1).   
30 Arendt (2006, 142). See also Akzin (1956, 332): ‘no Constitution ... can be expected to survive intact the 
social cataclysm involved in a true revolution.’ 
31 Roel (1968, 256-259); Moses (1891, 4).  
32 Spiliotopoulos (1983, 467). See also Venizelos (1999, 100 especially fn 3). 
33 Murphy (1992A, 348). 
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Second, the effectiveness of unamendability is directly linked to the effectiveness 
of the entire constitution. Where the constitution is mostly ignored, regarded as a mere 
parchment, one cannot expect unamendable provisions to be any more effective or 
operative than the constitution’s other provisions. Likewise, unamendable provisions 
could be de jure valid, but de facto ignored. For example, the Brazilian Constitutions of 
1891 and 1946 protected the republican form from amendments, but in the third (1937-
1945) and fifth (1964-1988) republics, the republican principle was suppressed as the 
right to vote (among other rights) was severely violated.34 Therefore, those objecting to 
unamendability would simply treat it as ‘pointless impediments, permissibly ignored’.35 
The issue of unamendable provisions can thus be both a question of norm and fact.36  
Admittedly, there is no easy answer for these questions, which might seem to be 
legitimate objections to the theory of unamendability. Especially, unamendability might 
be counter-productive; it aims to avoid the appearance of revolutionary change but, 
paradoxically, cannot overcome times of crisis and critical contingencies. Hence, it leads 
by its own nature to revolutionary means in order to override them. Nevertheless, one 
has to consider the following claims:  
First, the fact that unamendability can be overridden by violent and extra-
constitutional means should not severely undermine its usefulness in normal times and in 
states where political players understand that they have to play according to the 
democratic rules of the game. In that respect, unamendability can be explained, to 
borrow from Benjamin Akzin, by the metaphor of a lock on a door. A lock cannot 
prevent housebreaking by a decisive burglar equipped with effective burglary tools, and 
even more so, the lock cannot prevent its own – and the entire door’s – destruction by 
sledgehammer or a fire. On the other hand, there is no need for the safety-measure of a 
lock if we are dealing solely with honest people, because then there is no fear that any of 
them will attempt to break into one’s house. The lock’s utility is in impeding and 
deterring those who usually obey the accepted rules when said rules are accompanied by 
effective safety-measures, but with the absence thereof and facing an easy opportunity to 
improve their condition at the expense of fellowmen, might not overcome the 
temptation to exploit this opportunity. Similarly, unamendability cannot block extra-
constitutional measures and is also not needed once the socio-political culture is that of 
self-restraint, since there is no fear of an attempt to change the political system’s 
                                                          
34 Maia (2000, 60). 
35 Tushnet (2012-2013, 2007).  
36 Muñiz-Fraticelli (2009, 379-380). 
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fundamentals or to abuse powers. No constitutional schemes – even such that expressly 
attempt to - can hinder for long the sway of real forces in public life.37 Unamendability is 
aimed at preventing the temptation. Karl Loewenstein was not mistaken in his 
observation that in times of crisis, unamendable provisions are just pieces of paper which 
political reality could unavoidably be disregarded or ignored. But in normal times, 
unamendable provisions can be a useful red light to violation inspired by the political 
parties to change the constitution and stand firm in the normal development of political 
momentum.38 Hence, unamendability should not be underestimated. 
Second, whereas it is true that protecting basic principles from amendments 
cannot serve as a complete bar against movements aiming to abolish them, 39 
unamendability is not completely useless. Unamendability mandates political deliberation 
as to whether the amendment in question is compatible with society’s basic principles or 
not. Hence, unamendability and its institutional enforcement may provide sufficient 
additional time for the people to reconsider their support for a change contrary to their 
fundamental values and thereby impede the triumph of the revolutionary movements.40 
Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte remark that the framers of the German Basic Law 
believed that if an unamendable provision ‘had been presented in the Weimar 
constitution, Hitler would have been forced to violate the constitution openly before 
assuming virtually dictatorial power. … given the traditional orderly and legalistic 
sentiment of the German people, this might have made the difference’.41  
Lastly, the idea that unamendability limits only the secondary constituent power and not 
the primary constituent power need not necessarily result in a call for violent changes. On the 
contrary, understanding a democratic constituent power simply calls for further development 
of how the primary constituent power may peacefully ‘resurrect’ (see Chapter 6).  
II. OBJECTIONS TO IMPLICIT LIMITATIONS 
The argument for implicit limitations raised in Chapter 5 invites various objections based 
upon the ambiguous and vague nature of the doctrine of implicit limitation (such as the 
basic structure doctrine). It is often argued that this nature would grant courts sweeping 
                                                          
37 Zweig (1909, 324). See also Vile (1991A, 295): ‘No mere parchment barrier can prevent the people from 
exercising the right to propose a new constitution if sufficient numbers insist upon doing so and have the 
necessary power to back up their demands.’ 
38 Loewenstein (1972, 169, 180-181). 
39 Conrad (1970, 394). 
40 Ackerman (1991, 20-21). 
41 Fox and Nolte (1995, 19). 
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powers to decide what the basic principles of the constitution are and might impose 
severe impediments on the amending power.42 These issues will be dealt in the next 
section regarding the objections to judicial enforcement of unamendability. In this 
section, I focus on the unique objection to the very existence of implicit limitations.  
A. The Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius Objection 
 
The mere recognition of the existence of any implicit limitations on the amendment 
power is contentious. Had a constitution’s framers intended to prohibit certain 
amendments, one could reasonably expect them to have included a provision to that 
effect.43  This problem obviously exists with regards to silent constitutions, i.e. those 
constitutions that lack any unamendable provisions. It is aggravated when the 
constitution contains certain unamendable provisions. Indeed, according to the maxim 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (‘The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another’), 
the existence of explicit limitations provides evidence that the constitution-makers 
considered limits on the amendment power, the omission of other limitations was 
intentional, and, therefore, implicit limitations should be excluded.44 John Vile argues that 
this is ‘perhaps the strongest argument against implicit limits on the amending process’.45 
In 1871, George Helm Yeaman attacked the notion of implicit limitations on the 
amendment power:  
We cannot have two constitutions, one of the letter and one of the spirit, the 
letter amendable and the spirit not. Letter, spirit and approved judicial 
construction all go to make up the constitution. That constitution by its own 
terms is susceptible of amendment, and the amendments, when adopted in the 
way pointed out, are binding and must be obeyed.46  
 
This is akin to David Dow’s argument that Art. V of the U.S. Constitution is 
exclusive and that its words ‘mean what they say’.47 Likewise, Kemal Gözler defends a 
formalistic approach according to which, if the constitution does not include any explicit 
                                                          
42 See, for example, Schwartzberg (2009, 15); Desai (2000, 90); Mehta (2002, 97); Shankardass (2006, 137).    
43 The rejection of the Indian basic structure doctrine in Singapore was based upon this argument. See 
above Teo Soh Lung v. The Minister for Home Affairs [1989] 2 M.L.J. 449, 456-7.   
44 Pillsbury (1909, 742-743); Williams (1928, 544); Orfield (1942, 115-116); Orfield (1929-1930, 553-555); 
Linder (1981, 730); Da Silva (2004, 459). 
45 Vile (1985, 383).  
46 Yeaman (1871, 710-711).  
47 Dow (1990-1991, 1); (1995, 127). See also Baker (2000-2000, 3).  
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substantive limitations, all of the constitution’s provisions may be amended. Without 
explicit limitations, no other limitations exist.48 
 
B. Reply: Reductio ad Absurdum 
 
These arguments are important, but they are not entirely resounding. First, I share Otto 
Pfersmann’s position that the approach taken by Gözler is too narrow. ‘Many things’, 
Pfersmann notes, ‘are indirectly explicit, i.e. they are contained in the meaning of the 
norm-formulation, accessible through interpretation’.49 CJ Sikri’s opinion in Kesavananda 
takes a similar approach: ‘in a written constitution it is rarely that everything is said 
expressly. Powers and limitations are implied from necessity or the scheme of the 
Constitution’.50 
Second, and more importantly, according to the delegation theory distinguishing 
between the primary and secondary constituent power, any organ established within the 
constitutional scheme to amend the constitution cannot modify the basic principles 
supporting its constitutional authority; even in the absence of any explicit limitations (see 
Chapter 5).51 Explicit and implicit limitations are not mutually exclusive; the existence of 
explicit limitations does not negate the existence of implicit limits, and vice versa. The two 
are mutually reinforcing. Explicit limitations on the amendment power should be 
regarded as confirmation, a ‘valuable indications’ in the words of Conrad, that the 
amendment power is limited, but not as an exhaustive list of limitations. Other principles 
may be analogous or equally fundamental. 52  
Examples from comparative law strengthen this presumption. For instance, in 
Turkey, under the 1961 Constitution, there was only one explicit substantive limitation 
on the amendment power: the unamendability of the republican form of government. 
Even so, the Turkish Constitutional Court held in 1965 that the amendment power was 
limited not only by this explicit limitation, but also by implicit limitations:  
                                                          
48 Gözler (2008, 102). 
49 Pfersmann (2012, 103). 
50 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, para. 210.  
51 Keshavamurthy (1982, 51): ‘To take a view…that limitations on amending power should be read only if 
they are expressly provided could be to miss the basic reality underlying the fact that the lesser Sovereignty 
owes its existence and powers to a grant by the Sovereignty at the back of the Constitution which grant as 
between the principal and the agent is smaller in the absence of express stipulations otherwise’. 
52  Conrad (1970, 379). See also Schmitt (2008, 152) and compare with Fleming (1994-1995, 366) 
(constitutional entrenchment of certain compromises should not deny unalienable rights held by the 
people). 
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It is clear that the Constituent Assembly…adopted the Article 155 [amendment 
procedure] in order to enable only the amendments which are conform to the 
spirit of the constitution. The Constitutional amendments which…destroy the 
basic rights and freedoms, rule of law principles …. Demolish the essence of the 
1961 Constitution…cannot be made in application of the Article 155.53 
In 1971, the Court reaffirmed its competence to examine whether amendments do 
not damage the ‘coherence and system of the constitution’.54  
In Italy, Art. 139 of the Italian Constitution of 1947 includes an explicit limitation 
according to which ‘The republican form of the state may not be changed by way of 
constitutional amendment’. Italian scholars have further elaborated upon the substantive 
theory presented above, contending that the amendment procedure (Art. 138) cannot be 
used to deny fundamental norms (principi supremi) propounded and protected by the 
constitution. 55  Among these principles that are to be considered as implicitly 
unamendable, Italian scholars mention: democracy, inviolable rights, and the rigidity of 
the constitution itself.56 The Italian Constitutional Court accepted this approach in its 
decision 1146/1988, which stated that:  
The Italian Constitution contains some supreme principles that cannot be 
subverted or modified in their essential content…. Such are principles that the 
Constitution itself explicitly contemplates as absolute limits to the power of 
constitutional revision, such as the republican form … as well as principles that, 
although not expressly mentioned among those not subject to the principle of 
constitutional revision, are part of the supreme values on which the Italian 
Constitution is based.57 
In other words, notwithstanding the unamendable provision, the Constitutional Court 
recognised further implicit limitations on the amendment of other supreme principles 
upon which the constitution is based.58 
Similarly, in Switzerland, the constitution includes an explicit limitation to respect 
the mandatory rules of international law (Art. 193.4). Nevertheless, constitutional 
scholars repeatedly call for recognising further implicit limitations, such as the 
fundamental norms of the Federal Constitution.59 
                                                          
53 Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision of September 26, 1965, No. 1965/40, 4 AMKD 290, 329 (obiter 
dicta), cited in Gözler (2008, 95-96).  
54 Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision of April 3, 1971, No. 1971/37, 9 AMKD 416, 428-429, cited in 
Gözler (2008, 96-97). 
55 Carrozza (2007, 174-75); Groppi (2012, 210). For such opinions see also Galizzi (2000, 241); Fusaro 
(2011, 215). 
56 Comella (2009, 107).  
57 Corte Const. judgment no. 1146 of Dec. 15, 1988, quoted in Del Duca and Del Duca (2006, 800-801). 
See also Groppi (2012, 210-211).  
58 Escarras (1993, 112-116); Luciani (1993, 130-138).   
59 See Biaggini, (2011, 317). 
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 Lastly, in Brazil, while the 1891 Constitution (no longer in force) protected the 
republican and federal form and the equality of representation of the states in the senate, 
some authors claimed that other features, such as the federation state’s territory, 
separation of church and state, judicial review, and bill of rights, were also implicitly 
unamendable. 60  In contemporary Brazilian constitutional debate, others have also 
advocated in favour of implied limitations. For example, while mentioning some 
important scholarly positions in the opposite direction (such as Manoel Goncalves and 
Ferreira Filho), Adriano Sant’ana Pedra argued that the existence of substantive 
limitations expressly provided in Art. 60(4) of the Constitution of 1988 does not exclude 
implied substantive limitations, which must be read between the lines of the 
constitutional text.61  
It is with this understanding that one can accept Maurice Hauriou’s claim, as 
elaborated in Chapter 3, that there are always implicit supra-constitutional principles: ‘not 
to mention the republican form of government for which there is a text, there are many 
other principles for which there is no need to text because of its own principles is to exist 
and assert without text’. 62 Even Georges Burdeau, who took a formal approach in his 
doctoral thesis,63 later changed his mind to claim: ‘to say that the power of revision is 
limited, is to support, not only that it is bound by the terms of form and procedure made 
its exercise by the text – which is obvious – but also that it is incompetent, basically, to 
repeal the existing constitution and develop a new one… by repealing it, it would destroy 
the basis of its own jurisdiction’.64  
I am fully aware that my argument in favour implicit limitations on the amendment 
power (whether explicit limits exist or not) may seem contradictory in that it both 
upholds and rejects the constitution; in one breath it views the constitution as so sacred 
that interference with its basic principles is prohibited, while in the next breath it claims 
that the constitution’s own amendment procedure must be ignored or recognised only to 
a limited extent.65 However, to demonstrate the absurdity of relying solely on explicit 
limitations, imagine the extreme examples of amendments providing that the constitution 
has no legal validity, or that the Parliament extends its term indefinitely without 
                                                          
60 See Maia (2000, 61-62).   
61See Pedra (2009, 222-232).  
62 Hauriou (1923, 297) (my translation).  
63 Burdeau (1930, 78-83).  
64 Burdeau (1983; 231-232), quoted in Gözler (1999, 94) [my translation]. 
65 Williams (1928, 543). 
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elections.66 Such amendments undermine the entire legitimacy of the constitutional order. 
Restricting ourselves to a formal theory, according to which the amendment power is 
solely limited by explicit limitations, would mean that such amendments would be 
‘constitutional’ in the absence of express limitations to the contrary. Yet, it would be 
absurd to include in every constitution a provision stating that it is prohibited to use the 
amendment process to destroy the constitution itself, because it is evident that the 
delegated amendment power cannot destroy the fundamental political system to which it 
owes its existence. Just as in private law, no action may be founded on illegality or 
immorality (ex turpi causa non oritur action), so too, the constitutional process cannot be 
used to undermine the constitutional regime itself.67 To claim otherwise would lead to an 
illogical outcome. As Ringera J stated in the case which adopted the basic structure 
doctrine in Kenya:  
Parliament has no power to and cannot in the guise or garb of amendment either 
change the basic features of the Constitution or abrogate and enact a new 
Constitution. In my humble view, a contrary interpretation would lead to a 
farcical and absurd spectacle. 68 
 The all-encompassing idea underlying amendment provisions in the first instance 
was the desire to preserve the constitution.69 While infallibility is not an attribute of a 
constitution, its fundamental character and basic structure cannot be overlooked. 
Otherwise the power to amend may include the power to destroy the constitution, and 
that would be reductio ad absurdum.70  Thus, the best response to the expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius argument is that ‘what is logically impossible does not need to be positively 
prescribed’.71 
 In reply to this ‘amendophobia’, the fear that the amendment power will be abused 
to subvert democracy or constitutionalism, Lester Orfield has argued that the possibility 
of abuse of power should not be the test for the power’s existence.72 Moreover, even if 
an abuse of the amendment power occurs, ‘it occurs at the hands of a special 
organization of the nation…so that for all practical purposes it may be said to be the 
                                                          
66 As Black (1963, 959) once wrote, ‘these are (in part at least) cartoon illustrations. But the cartoon 
accurately renders the de jure picture, and seems exaggerated only because we now conceive that at least 
some of these actions have no appeal to anybody.’ 
67  Cf., Judge Landau’s opinion in Israeli Supreme Court decision Yeredor v. Chairman, Central Election 
Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19 P.D. 365. (1965). See Guberman (1967, 457). 
68 Njoya & Others v. Attorney General & Others, [2004] LLR 4788 (HCK), high Court of Kenya at Nairobu, 25 
March 2004, para 61, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-subject/336-kenya-njoya-and-
others-v-attorney-general-and-others-2004-ahrlr-157-kehc-2004-.html 
69 Harris (1993, 183).  
70 Iyer (2003, 2).  
71 Da Silva (2004, 459). 
72 Orfield (1942, 123). 
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people, or at least the highest agent of the people, and one exercising sovereign 
powers…. it seems anomalous to speak of “abuse” by such a body’. 73 These claims 
should be refuted. While it is true that the mere possibility of abuse should not be the 
test to the mere existence of a power, it is unclear why it should not be a test for its 
scope, especially if ignoring limitations on scope may not only bring  absurd results, but 
may also subvert the entire notion of constitutionalism. Furthermore, it is the basic 
proposition of this thesis that the amendment power, although an extraordinary one, is 
not sovereign. It is indeed different from ordinary governmental power, but it is still an 
agent of the people, an agent that is capable of abusing its power. This should not be 
dismissed as a mere ‘argument of fear’. The Indian basic structure doctrine proved to be 
‘the only bulwark to prevent the basic tenets of a liberal social justice constitution from 
being totally obliterated’.74 Even those who reject the notion of implicit limitations, have 
to admit that the Indian basic structure doctrine was created as a response to abuse of 
the amendment power, and proved that a limited amendment power may avoid 
unauthorised usurpation of power and preserve democracy.75 True, implicit limitations 
on the amendment power and their judicial enforcement may be seen as ‘an imperfect 
response to imperfections’;76 yet it could be seen, at the very least, as a necessary evil.  
III. OBJECTIONS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
A. The Logical Subordination Objection  
 
The constitution creates courts and grants them authority. All powers possessed by 
constituted organs derive from the constitution. This simple postulation raises the prima 
facie difficulty of logical subordination: how can courts – an organ created by the 
constitution and subordinated to its provisions – rule upon the constitution’s validity? As 
Joseph Ingham concluded:  
If the Supreme Court, created by, and owing its authority and existence to the 
Constitution, should assume the power to consider the validity or invalidity of a 
constitutional amendment … it would be assuming the power to nullify and 
destroy itself, of its own force, a power which no artificial creation can 
conceivably possess.77  
                                                          
73 Id., 124. 
74 Sripati (1998, 480). See also Nahar and Dadoo (2008, 571). 
75 Katz (1995-1996, 273); Lakshminath (1978, 159); Keshavamurthy (1982, 82).  
76 Garlicki and Garlicka (2012, 185).  
77 Ingham (1928-1929, 165-166).  
 ~225 ~ 
 
The subordination difficulty only arises if one conceives of the amendment 
power as equivalent to the primary constituent power. Indeed, if the court reviewed a 
provision of an original constitution that established its own authority, this might involve 
the logical subordination difficulty. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an 
interesting case study. In two cases before the Constitutional Court, certain constitutional 
provisions that granted privileges for the three constituent people (Bosnians, Serbs, and 
Croats) were challenged before the Constitutional Court for conflicting with the principle 
of equality. The majority of the Constitutional Court held that it lacked the competence 
to decide upon the constitutionality of the Constitution. Otherwise, if it decided that part 
of the constitution was ‘unconstitutional’, it would fail its duty under Art. VI(3)(a) of the 
Constitution to ‘uphold this Constitution’. 78  This differs from the example of South 
Africa, in which the Constitutional Court declared the Constitution of 1996 to be 
unconstitutional. 79  As elaborated in Chapter 3, the Interim Constitution of 1993 
entrusted the constituent assembly to work within a framework of thirty-four agreed-
upon principles, and empowered the Constitutional Court to review the compliance of 
the draft Constitution with those principles. Therefore, in observing the constitution-
making process, the Court acted within its competence, exercising an explicit delegated 
authority.  
An analogy from the distinction between constituent power and legislative power may 
elucidate this problem: in ordinary judicial review, the acts of a lawmaker operating under 
the constitution are reviewed against the background provided by the constitution-
maker.80 Similarly, a constitutional amendment adopted by the secondary constituent power 
may be reviewed against the background provided by the primary constituent power. In 
acknowledging the distinction between the primary and secondary constituent power, it is 
                                                          
78  Case No U-5/04 Request of Mr Sulejman Tihić, Decision of 31 March 2006, 
http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/CODICES/full/eur/bih/eng/bih-2006-1-003; Case No U-
13/05, Request of Mr Sulejman Tihić, Decision of 26 May 2006, 
http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/CODICES/full/eur/bih/eng/bih-2006-2-005. See 
Feldman (2011, 142-144); Feldman (2012, 164). Contrary to the Constitutional Court, the ECtHR held that 
it has the jurisdiction to decide upon the issue. In Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 
27996/06, Eur. Ct. H. R., Judgment of Dec. 22, 2009, the ECtHR held that the constitutional provision 
limiting the right to be elected in parliamentary and presidential elections to people belonging to Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Serbs (the ‘constituent peoples’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina) is discriminatory, and the 
disqualification of Jewish and Roma origin candidates constitutes a breach of the ECHR. See Milanović 
(2010, 281); Bardutzky (2010, 309); Tran (2011, 3).  
79 Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South-Africa, 1996(4) SALR 744. See Sachs 
(1996-1997, 1249); Brooke (2005, 3-14).  
80 Suksi (1995, 6).  
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possible to grasp that by the exercise of the judicial review of constitutional amendments 
the judiciary does not act in contradiction of the constitution, but as its preserver.81  
 
B. The Undemocratic Objection   
 
The ability to amend the constitution seems an essential element of any democratic 
society, since a self-governing people ought to be able to challenge, revise, or reform its 
basic commitments.82 Unamendability positions certain rules or values not only above 
ordinary politics, but also above constitutional politics. By not allowing majorities – even 
super-majorities – to modify these rules or values, unamendability is in clear tension with 
democratic principles. Critics argue that unamendability ‘betrays one of democracy’s 
most attractive legacies: the ability to modify law’,83 or ‘deny citizens the democratic right 
to amend their own constitution and in so doing divest them for the basic sovereign 
rights of popular choice and continuing self-definition’.84  Hence, it is no wonder that 
some might view unamendability as a ‘constitutional dictatorship’ or ‘a legal 
authoritarianism’. 85  For Carlos Bernal, since the people should have the authority to 
decide upon the their constitution’s essential elements, it is judicial review of 
constitutional amendments which poses a severe democratic challenge, since ‘if the 
people themselves, directly or through their representatives, have agreed to pass a 
constitutional amendment, it is because they have decided that the amended element is 
not an essential element. This decision should be final’.86 
Whether unamendability and its judicial enforcement are ‘undemocratic’ involves, 
I believe, four separate aspects. The first is unamendability itself, i.e. whether the 
absolute entrenchment itself of any subject (regardless of its content) is undemocratic. 
The second is whether the content of the protected unamendable subject is 
undemocratic. The third is the scope of the unamendability, and the fourth is its judicial 
enforcement. Any answer to these different questions depends on what one considers 
‘democracy’. If one considers democracy as purely procedural, i.e. simply as a system of 
self-government in which citizens have the ability to make majority collective decisions, 
then surely unamendability is ‘undemocratic’ in some respects. But if one conceives 
                                                          
81 Beaud (1994, 345).    
82 Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos (2011, 43). 
83 Schwartzberg (2009, 2).  
84Albert (2010, 667). 
85 Nogueira (2004, 7); Da Cunha (2007, 18). 
86 Bernal (2013, 349).  
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democracy to include protection of certain basic rights and principles, this adds a 
substantive pre-condition for a democracy.87 In that respect, entrenching certain principles 
and values that characterise modern democracy in the substantive sense is not necessarily 
undemocratic. Therefore, the argument that any pre-commitments constraining the 
amendment power present a challenge to democracy relies on a narrow view of 
democracy. It confuses democracy with a mere majority. Thus, unamendability may 
accord with a theory of democracy that conceives democracy as more than merely a 
people’s majority, but rather a system of government that is based on certain values and 
fundamental rights.88 
There is no doubt that the unamendability of clauses or principles, which places 
them beyond the reach of any legislative power, exacerbates the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty.89 But then again, unamendability, as a counter-majoritarian institution, aims to 
neutralize the dangers of majoritarianism.90 Unamendability could thus be viewed not as 
undemocratic, but rather as a tool forestalling the possibility of a democracy’s self-
destruction.91 Moreover, if we recognise constitutionalism as a system of ‘higher law’, 
according to which democratic majoritarianism must give way to certain commitments to 
principles, 92  or as indispensable legal limits to governmental power, 93  unamendability 
simply takes this idea to its extreme. But this is only a matter of a degree, not of a kind.  
With regard to the content of the unamendable subject, a clear answer cannot be 
given categorically, and every case must be judged on its own merits. As noted in 
Chapter 2, some unamendable provisions can hardly be considered a pre-condition for 
democracy in the substantive sense. 94  Clearly, unamendability can protect issues that 
would reasonably be considered ‘desirable’ democratic values, such as fundamental rights 
or the rule of law. But they can also protect ‘undesirable’ principles or practices, from a 
democratic perspective, such as the Corwin Amendment, which was proposed in 1861 
and aimed to protect slavery (see Chapter 5).   
With regard to the scope of unamendability, the more the unamendable 
provision covers and the wider its scope, the greater its tension with democracy, because 
                                                          
87 See Dworkin (1990, 35); Dworkin (1995, 2); Barak (2009, 23-26); Rostow (1952, 195); Bishin (1977-1978, 
1099); Michelman (1998A, 419).  
88 Rousseau (1994, 273-282). 
89 See Mohallem (2011, 766-767). 
90 Albert (2010, 675). 
91 Cf. Holmes (1993C, 239). 
92 Dow (1995, 121-130).  
93 See McIlwain (1975, 132). 
94 For example, Portugal Const. (1976), art. 288(e), which protects from amendments ‘The rights of the 
workers, workers’ committees, and trade unions.’  
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it would place a larger number of principles or rules beyond the reach of any majority. 
Without the ability of citizens to participate in debates with regards to society’s basic 
values, and in the absence of any mechanism to modify these values, civil motivation to 
participate in any decision-making process would probably deteriorate, and the public 
debate would be replaced by apathy. By that, unamendability risks impoverishing 
democratic debates.95 In response to this concern, it has to be noted that unamendability 
does not necessarily completely impoverish popular debates regarding society’s values. 
First, the mere act of unamendability of certain values might place them at the centre of 
public debate when otherwise such values might not have been even open for dispute. 
Second, unamendability creates a ‘chilling effect’ leading to hesitation before repealing an 
unamendable constitutional subject. This chilling effect can afford time for political and 
public deliberations regarding the protected constitutional subject and puts it at the 
centre of the public agenda.   
As for the fourth issue, judicial review of amendments, the theory of 
unamendability acknowledges the problem of an unelected and unaccountable judiciary 
overriding the people’s representatives’ decisions. Surely, endowing courts with authority 
to declare constitutional amendments unconstitutional enhances the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty embodied in the situation of a non-elected court invalidating legislation enacted 
by a legislature.96 How can a small, often divided, set of judges replace the democratic 
judgment of the people and their representatives? As Rory O’Connell correctly notes, 
allowing courts to review constitutional amendments might turn the ‘people’s guardian of 
the constitution against politicians’, into ‘a guardian of the constitution against all 
comers’.97 Of course, at least with regard to explicit limits on the amendment power, 
Michel Rosenfeld was right to state that ‘any countermajoritarian difficulty would have to 
be ascribed to the constitution itself rather to judicial interpretation’.98 
One reply to this objection is that when courts review amendments vis-à-vis the 
constitution’s unamendable fundamental principles, they are not acting in a completely 
counter-majoritarian manner, for they have the support of the high authority of the 
primary constituent power. In other words, judicial review expresses the democratic base of 
the constitution, i.e., it gives expression to the will of ‘the people’ as a superior legal 
norm. When judges enforce unamendability, they are vindicating, not defeating, the true 
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96 Bickel (1962, 16-23).   
97 O’Connell (1999, 51).  
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will of the people as expressed in constitutional moments contra to the everyday political 
process. This will of ‘the people’ conflicts with the present will of the political majority as 
expressed by the amending power.99  
From the perspective of the transcendental conception of the primary constituent 
power (see Chapter 6), judicial review of amendments articulates a different will, a deeper 
or more basic one, if you like, from the current political majority. The conflict that the 
court then decides is between the will of the people (exercised by the primary constituent 
power) – a supra temporal will that lasts for long terms (and thus represents past super-
majorities) – expressed in the basic principles of the constitution, and the temporary will 
of the people as expressed in a constitutional amendment. According to this rationale, 
judicial review of constitutional amendments is not only not undemocratic (or even anti-
majoritarian in a way), but rather, it is an expression of the will of the people as 
manifested in the constitution’s basic principles.100  
Most importantly, the theory of unamendability does not necessarily prevent the 
people from engaging in the political process and deliberations. 101  As proposed in 
Chapter 6, via the emergence of the primary constituent power (regardless of whether one 
endorses a transcendental or immanent conception of that power), even the most basic 
principles of society can be reformed. That makes the people in their primary constituent 
power capacity, not the courts, the final arbiters of society’s basic values.  
 
C. Enhancing Judiciary’s Power Objection  
 
The ability of courts to substantively review constitutional amendments allegedly grants 
them the last word on constitutional issues. It is the ultimate ‘judicialisation of mega-
politics.’ 102  Enforceability of unamendability shifts the locus of constitutional change 
from those authorities entrusted with the amendment power toward the courts.103 Courts 
can use unamendability as a strategic trump, applying it selectively, and overall elevating 
their powers vis-à-vis other branches. 104  This problem is accentuated with regards to 
implicit limitations on the amendment power, where, in contrast with situations in which 
the textual standard provides guidance and constraints, the judiciary has sweeping power 
                                                          
99 Cf. Freeman (1990-1991, 353-354). 
100 Compare with Barak (1996, 403) and echoing Hamilton (1817, 421).  
101 Cf. Tushnet (1995, 299-301) (claiming that minimal judicial review provides an opportunity to the 
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to determine the ‘spirit’, ‘basic structure’, or ‘basic principles’ of the constitution.105 This 
could be demonstrated by the experience of Nepal and India. In Nepal, before the 
Nepalese Constitution of 1990 was drafted, debate focused on the idea of creating a list 
of basic constitutional features that would require for their amendment ratification by a 
referendum, in addition to adoption by a majority in both houses. Eventually, this idea 
was rejected in favour of a general unamendability formula, according to which: ‘any bill 
purporting to amend or repeal any Article of this Constitution may be introduced, 
without contravening the spirit of the Preamble of this Constitution ... Provided that this 
Article shall not be subject to amendment’ (Art. 116.1). 106  It is argued that this 
compromise only exacerbated the debate as to what exactly is the ‘spirit of the 
Preamble’.107 Similarly, the Indian basic structure doctrine has been heavily criticised for 
its open-ended nature and the wide discretion that it grants judges.108 
Judicial review of amendments may not only lead to a power imbalance by 
elevating the judiciary’s power vis-à-vis the executive and legislature branches, but might 
also fracture the fragile balance of judicial review:109 One of the arguments justifying the 
judicial review of ordinary legislation is that courts do not necessarily possess the last 
word, since unpopular judicial decisions may instigate constitutional amendments to 
overturn these decisions.110 In the French constitutional debate, Georges Vedel famously 
compared constitutional amendments to the ancient institution of ‘lit de justice’ by which 
the sovereign king could appear before the court and overturn a judicial decision. 
Similarly, in a sort of lit de justice, the people can overturn a court’s ruling through 
constitutional amendments.111 This democratic check would arguably disappear if courts 
                                                          
105 Schwartzberg (2009, 15-6); Landau (2013A, 189). 
106 Thapa (2005, 237); Stith (1996, 47). On the drafting process of the Constitution, see Hutt (1991, 1028-
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(2007), art. 148, for several reasons: First, this document was supposed to be a temporary one and to 
provide the basis for the work of the Constituent Assembly without binding ‘constituent power’ to any 
principles; Second, the Preamble of the Interim Constitution was devoid of ethno-cultural narratives; 
Third, the Maoists - together with other more moderate leftist parties which had greater influence and 
representation in the Commission that drafted the 2007 constitution - do tend to support a stronger notion 
of popular sovereignty and oppose granting courts a main role in policing the boundaries of constitutional 
politics, hence the abandonment of the basic structure limitation. For further studies on the post-1990 
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could review constitutional amendments; therefore, it is arguably inappropriate for a 
court to rule upon the validity of an amendment overturning a judicial decision.112  
 Judicial review of constitutional amendments undeniably enhances the judiciary’s 
power. The theory proposed in this thesis manages to moderate this concern. Again, 
even if courts have the power to review amendments, they do not possess final decision-
making power. Recall, it is not suggested that decisions by the primary constituent power be 
submitted to judicial review, but rather merely those decisions adopted by the more 
limited secondary constituent power.113 Consequently, the judicial branch is not sovereign and 
can still be overridden by an exercise of the superior primary constituent power.  
Not only that, but the theory proposed here manages to maintain a proper 
balance of powers. Presuming that the judicial review of amendments is exercised 
according to the standard review proposed in Chapter 7 – the ‘fundamental 
abandonment standard’ – this ensures that the exercise of this extreme power would be 
undertaken only in the most aggravated cases. Moreover, as noted in that chapter, the 
theory of unamendability calls for judicial restraint. A review of amendments that 
overturn prior judicial decisions might damage the court’s legitimacy.114 Therefore, courts 
would be inclined to restrain themselves and refrain from adjudicating the issue of 
amendments that overrule judicial decisions, especially ones adopted through strong 
amendment powers (see Chapters 6-7). This, however, should not exclude the recognition of 
the power of judicial review of amendments itself.  
In addition, one should not be overly petrified by the possibility of courts 
annulling constitutional amendments. Commonly, courts can interpret amendments, 
which have become part of the constitution once adopted, during their ordinary judicial 
review of legislation.115 If courts have the authority to interpret the constitution, and in 
doing so to grant to a constitutional provision a very narrow or broad interpretation, 
then allowing it to invalidate an amendment is not such a drastic step. True, in the case 
of interpretation, it would be open to another court to choose a different interpretation 
in the future. Nevertheless, the results of an interpretation that differs significantly from 
the legislative intent, or is detached from the provision’s wording, could often be more 
severe than the act of annulment.116 Otto Pfersmann describes provisions that were given 
a different meaning from what they actually mean (because otherwise they would be 
                                                          
112 Tribe (1983, 442-443); Favoreu (1994, 581); Vedel (1993, 96).  
113 Ponthoreau and Ziller (2002, 140). 
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invalidated by the court) as ‘norms without texts’.117 Such application of interpretation 
may conflict with principles of legal certainty and separation of powers.118 As Christine 
Landfried remarks:  
A clear-cut invalidation of a law can give the legislature more room for political 
manoeuvring, in that a new law can be enacted. However, the declaration that 
only one particular interpretation of a law is constitutional often entails precise 
prescriptions and can quite easily result in law-making by the Constitutional 
Court.119 
In the case of annulment, the ‘ball returns to the hands’ of the amending 
authority, which can re-constitute the amendment according to the court’s decision or 
otherwise. In the case of interpretation, if the amending authority is not satisfied with the 
new meaning of the amendment, it would have to annul the amendment through the 
amendment process, which often includes stubborn obstacles to overcome; 120 only this 
time, the ‘ball has left the hands’ of the amending authority. It is now in the public 
sphere shaped by the hands of the judiciary until its abolishment or replacement with a 
new amendment. 
Lastly, at least when it comes to unamendable provisions, judicial review can be 
viewed as a useful mechanism for relaxing the main abovementioned difficulties 
associated with unamendability (anti-democracy, the ‘dead-hand’ problem, and 
revolutionary means). This is because enforceability of unamendable provisions allows 
courts to interpret the protected principles and give them modern meaning. What 
republicanism meant in France in 1848 is infinitely different from what it means 
nowadays,121 and the Norwegian Constitution’s spirit and principles are not necessarily 
those of 1814, but the present ones.122 Indeed, constitutional identity is never a static 
thing.123 It can always be reinterpreted and reconstructed.124 The courts’ ability to review 
amendments can have important benefits in that respect. While unamendability is aimed, 
inter alia, to provide stability for society, it might cause constitutional stagnation, at least 
regarding those unamendable values or institutions. The ability of courts to review 
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unchanging core of the law, in fact, also changes over time. While the social body and fundamental law are 
represented, at any given moment, as eternal, they undergo constant developments.’ 
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amendments and to interpret (and reinterpret) unamendable provisions manages 
simultaneously to preserve the core elements of the protected principles while allowing a 
certain degree of change, and in so doing mitigates the problem of rigidity with the 
changing needs of society.125  
  In the same vein, albeit suffering from uncertainty, some view the vagueness of 
implicit limitations on the amendment power as an advantage. 126  Unlike explicit 
limitations, implicit limitations do not specify ex-ante what are precisely the protected 
principles. Being judicially formulated, implicit limitations contain an inherent flexibility 
as they leave space for subsequent future judicial interpretation, clarification, and public 
and political deliberations.127  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are many objections to the idea of unamendability. Noah Webster, writing a series 
of articles in the American Magazine in 1787-1788 (as ‘Giles Hickory’), criticised any 
attempt to create an unamendable constitution. This attempt is not only ‘arrogant and 
impudent’ since it means to ‘legislate for those over whom we have as little authority as 
we have over a nation in Asia’, but it would also be useless since ‘a paper declaration is a 
very feeble barrier against the force of national habits, and inclinations’.128 I agree that 
unamendability is a ‘complex and potentially controversial constitutional instrument, 
which should be applied with care, and reserved only for the basic principles of the 
democratic order’.129 
Even more objectionable than the mere mechanism of unamendability is the idea 
that courts may rule upon the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. As 
elaborated in this chapter (and in Chapter 7), this practice involves significant theoretical, 
conceptual, and practical issues. It bears weighty implications for the principles of judicial 
discretion, independence, and accountability, 130  and has institutional significance as it 
engages with the status and role of the court in a democratic society and with its relations 
vis-à-vis other governmental branches.131  
                                                          
125 Gören (2009, 12-13).   
126 Stith (1996, 65-66).  
127 Abraham (2000, 204); Issacharoff (2012, 45).   
128 Hickory (1787-1788, 138-139, 140-141), cited in Wood (1998, 379).   
129 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (2009, para. 218).  
130 Collett (2009, 327); Dixon (2011A, 1).  
131 Barak (2008, 62); Barak (2010A, 361); Barak (2011A, 321).   
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It appears that most arguments against judicial review of amendments are really 
reopening the traditional case against judicial review. But such arguments, as Dietrich 
Conrad wrote, ‘tend to overlook the limited, essentially corrective and marginal, function 
of judicial review, if kept within its proper sphere and exercised with judicial discipline’.132 
If judicial review of amendments is exercised with care according to the guidance and 
standard of scrutiny provided in this thesis, many of the objections against 
unamendability are relaxed. Most importantly, the theoretical distinction between the 
primary and secondary constituent powers supplies an adequate reply to many of the objections 
to the theory of unamendability.  
                                                          
132 Conrad (1977-78, 17). 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
I. A THEORY OF UNAMENDABILITY  
In 1948, Kurt Gödel, the famous Austrian logician, applied for naturalisation as an 
American citizen. Preparing for the citizenship examination, Gödel thoroughly studied 
the American history and Constitution. One day, Gödel called his friend, Princeton 
University mathematician, Oskar Morgenstern. Years later, Morgenstern described the 
conversation that he had with Gödel:  
[Gödel] rather excitedly told me that in looking at the Constitution, to his 
distress, he had found some inner contradictions and that he could show how 
in a perfectly legal manner it would be possible for somebody to become a 
dictator and set up a Fascist regime never intended by those who drew up the 
Constitution.1 
 Morgenstern told him he should not worry since such events were unlikely to 
ever occur. Since Gödel was persistent, Morgenstern and another mutual friend – 
Albert Einstein – tried to persuade Gödel not to bring this issue up at the citizenship 
examination. On the examination day, Einstein and Morgenstern both accompanied 
Gödel to his interview at the Immigration and Naturalization Service as witnesses. 
After the examiner questioned both witnesses, the following exchange occurred, 
according to Morgenstern’s own account of the hearing:  
Examiner: ‘Now, Mr. Gödel, where do you come from?’ 
Gödel: ‘Where I come from? Austria.’ 
Examiner: ‘What kind of government did you have in Austria?’ 
 Gödel: ‘It was a republic, but the constitution was such that it finally was 
changed into a dictatorship.’ 
 Examiner: ‘Oh! This is very bad. This could not happen in this country.’ 
Gödel: Oh, yes, I can prove it.’ 
Examiner: ‘Oh God, let’s not go into this…’2  
  
Einstein and Morgenstern were horrified during this exchange, but the examiner 
swiftly quietened Gödel on this point until Gödel finished his interview. What was the 
‘inner contradiction’ that Gödel discovered within the U.S. Constitution? This will 
                                                          
1 Morgenstern (2006, 7).   
2 Id.   
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remain a riddle as Gödel left no clues. Some scholars who have studied Gödel suggest 
that Gödel realised that an unlimited amending power possessed the risk of a tyranny. 
Since the U.S. Constitution amending provision has no substantive limitations apart 
from equal representation in the Senate, the amendment power might be utilised to 
subvert the democratic institutions designated in other provisions of the Constitution, 
including the amendment provision itself.3 Is the amendment power sufficiently broad 
so as to destroy the very basis of the constitution?  
A focal point of the thesis is that comparative constitutional law reveals a pattern of 
behaviour, according to which, in exercise of their powers, amendment authorities are 
increasingly bound by certain limitations. My survey of unamendable provisions 
demonstrates that an increasing percentage of world constitutions contain explicit 
limitations on the constitutional amendment power (Chapter 2). Even in states where 
the constitution is silent with regard to explicit limitations on the amendment power, I 
revealed a growing tendency of courts, following the Indian courts’ development of the 
‘basic structure doctrine’, to acknowledge a set of implicitly unamendable core 
principles (See Chapter 3). The global trend in constitutionalism is inclining towards 
accepting substantive limitations on constitutional amendment powers.4  
This unamendability is at the centre of the tension between democratic and 
constitutionalist approaches.5 Democrats regard unamendability as an obstacle in the 
way of democratic decision-making. A democratic society, according to this approach, 
should be able to change any law whatsoever. This notion conflicts with the 
constitutionalist approach. Certain principles, a constitutionalist would claim, should be 
above democratic decision-making. Therefore, constitutionalists would generally 
approve of unamendability.6  
This thesis seems to be positioned on both sides of the debate. The central 
theme of the theory of unamendability, as advanced in this thesis, is strongly 
constitutionalist; it defends a broad and robust concept of limitations to the 
amendment power, which includes both explicit and implicit substantive limitations. 
These limitations on the constitutional amendment power are based upon a solid 
theoretical ground. They are compatible with the nature of amendment powers. The 
amendment power is not an ordinary constituted power, but a sui generis one. However, 
                                                          
3 Suber (1990, Sec.16); Guerra-Pujol (2013, 637).  
4 Albarello (2012, 67). 
5 A tension that is inherent within a constitutional democracy. Cf., Habermas (2001, 766). 
6 See, generally, Gümplová (2011, 9-22).  
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it is still a defined constitutional authority. As such, it is (and must be) a limited power 
(Chapter 4). The secondary constituent power, which is a delegated power acting as a trustee 
of the primary constituent power, cannot destroy the constitution or replace it with a new 
one. Unamendability thus restricts the amending authorities from amending certain 
constitutional fundamentals. Underlying it rests the understanding that a constitution is 
built upon certain principles, which grant it its identity. I termed this theory foundational 
structuralism according to which the foundations that hold the constitutional structure 
are unamendable, since amending them would bring an end to the constitution and 
create a new one instead (Chapter 5).  
The protection of a certain core through the theory of unamendability emphasises 
the thin line between constitutional success and constitutional failure. On the one hand, 
in order to maintain itself and progress with time, a constitution must be able to change 
and include an amendment procedure to that effect. An unamendable constitution is 
bound to fail.7 On the other hand, certain constitutional changes can themselves be 
regarded as constitutional failures. Amendments that alter the constitution’s basic 
principles so as to change its identity signal a breakdown of the existing constitutional 
regime and its replacement with a new one.8  
An unlimited amendment power collapses the distinction between 
constitutional-making and constitutional-amending. Consequently, it can also extinguish 
the people’s primary constituent power. If amendment powers were unlimited, what would 
be kept for the people? 9  But amendment powers are not unlimited, and this 
unamendability limits only governmental organs – those authorities delegated with the 
competence to amend the constitution – rather than the people themselves. 10  The 
people retain the primary constituent power; and through its exercise they may amend and 
establish the political order and its fundamental principles.11 Primary constituent power is 
manifested through a democratic appearance of popular sovereignty in extraordinary 
constitutional moments. In these moments, politics moves from the second track of 
constitutional politics to the third track of extraordinary politics in which the present 
people, through broad and deep public deliberations, may reshape the polity’s 
                                                          
7 Barber (2010, 27). 
8 Fleming (2010, 40). 
9 Bacon (1929-1930, 778). 
10 Harris (1993, 193-196). 
11 Katz (1995-1996, 278, 288-290); Harris (1993, 174-201). 
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constitutional identity.12  Understood in this way, the doctrine of limitations on the 
amendment power can be seen as a safeguard of the people’s primary constituent power 
(Chapter 6).  
Therefore, the second theme of this thesis takes a strong democratic approach. 
It is democratic not only in arguing that the nation’s fundamental constitutional 
decisions belong to the people in their primary constituent power, but also that in such 
capacity, the people are not bound by prior constitutional rules, not even by 
unamendability. Constitutionalists would not support this idea.  
The theory of unamendability also explains the controversial practice of judicial 
enforcement of unamendability mechanisms. Strong democrats would not approve of 
this scheme. However, properly understood, judicial enforcement of limitations on the 
amendment power, actually serves as a mechanism for ensuring the vertical separation 
of powers between the primary and secondary constituent powers (Chapter 7). It should 
therefore not be regarded as completely preventing democratic deliberation on a given 
‘unamendable’ matter, but as making sure that certain changes take place via the proper 
channel of higher-level democratic deliberations (Chapter 8).13  
Although destined to be attacked (but also supported) by both democratic and 
constitutionalist schools of thought, this thesis presents a coherent and consistent 
position with regard to procedural and substantive dimensions of amendment rule: the 
non-exclusiveness of amendment provisions and their substantively (explicitly and 
implicitly) limited nature.14  
II. RAMIFICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis advances the study of the nature and scope of constitutional amendment 
powers, clarifying the doctrine of the ‘unconstitutional constitutional amendment’. Yet, 
it exposes other questions for further study:  
                                                          
12 Prateek (2008, 462): ‘The legitimacy of constituent power is premised on the indisputably higher nature 
of collective authority that is wielded when “people” as a whole engage themselves with political 
decision-making. This power is the power to constitute afresh, re-organise thoroughly and to reconsider 
the direction which constitutional form itself might take in future. In exercise of this power lies the 
realization of the “of the people, by the people, for the people” sentiment of political organisation. The 
activity of political organisation and the consequences that flow from it are all judged on how effectively 
they imbibe and correspond to this participatory sentiment. This participatory sentiment hides in it a 
great measure of deliberative legitimacy and popular consensus, two important starting points for the 
activity of political organisation.’ 
13 Cf., Tushnet (2012-2013, 2006-2007). 
14  Compare with Michelman (1995, 1306) (highlighting incoherences in various constitutional 
amendment theories). 
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First, the distinction between the secondary constituent power and the primary 
constituent power is not as neat as advocated in this thesis. Who are the people? How do 
we recognise them? And through which mechanisms can the people speak in one 
voice? Remain open questions.15 The theory of unamendability blocks certain changes 
through the channel of constitutional amendments. Yet is creates another challenge by 
allowing powerful actors to invoke the terminology of primary constituent power to achieve 
the prohibited change, thus by-passing unamendability. In that respect, it might be true 
that ‘the unconstitutional constitutional amendments doctrine may achieve less than 
one would hope’.16 The conceptual difficulty that ‘a people’ adopting a constitution 
simply does not exist from the point of view of concrete constitutional practice, does 
not undermine the argument. Important constitutional decisions ought to be accepted 
through extraordinary mechanisms, which include wide popular participation and 
deliberation, in a way that imitates, or at least comes as close as possible to, an episode 
of emergence of primary constituent power. What is needed is a ‘reliable metric for 
distinguishing genuine exercises of the people’s will from fake or manipulated 
exercises’.17 The fear of abuse of primary constituent power should not hinder our efforts to 
further develop constitutional theory but encourage us to pursue future research. 
 Second, according to the theory of unamendability, the primary constituent power 
may re-emerge and, being an ‘original, inherent and unlimited’ power, is not bound by 
unamendability. 18  That is why constitution-making moments are described in the 
literature as a kind of ‘wild-west’. 19  The theory of unamendability thus encourages 
another area of research: does the fact that the primary constituent power is not bound by 
prior rules mean that it is unlimited in the sense that it can disregard any basic 
principles or should we endorse Benjamin Constant’s declaration that ‘sovereingty of 
the people is not unlimited’? 20 According to some naturalist or foundationalist 
approaches to constitution-making powers, there must be certain limitations even on 
the primary constituent power. 21 In fact, Sieyès himself remarked that ‘prior to and above 
                                                          
15 See, for example, Agné (2012, 836).   
16 Landau (2013C); Landau (2013A, 49-56). See also Landau (2013B, 959). 
17 Landau (2013C). See also Landau (2013A, 49-56). 
18 Keshavamurthy (1982, 12). See also Tushnet (2012-2013, 1988-1989). 
19 Landau (2011-2012, 616). 
20 Constant (1996, 6).   
21 See, for example, Murphy (2007, 514-517); Murphy (1992A, 352); Murphy (1995, 178-179) (even if the 
whole population agreed to destroy the democratic order and replace it with a new order that would deny 
them democracy’s basic values, this might be prohibited in order to protect themselves and future 
generations) and Weintal (2005, 18, 20-21); Weintal (2011, 449) (democracy reflects a universal ‘definite 
virtue’, which deserves to be a truly eternal principle).  
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the nation, there is only natural law’, 22 which implies that Sieyès viewed constituent power 
as limited by certain principles.23 If the goal of constitution-making is not to produce a 
written constitution, but to promote constitutionalism,24then a plausible argument is 
that constitutionalism and constitutions are inseparably linked so that an exercise of 
constituent power cannot undermine constitutionalism but must be linked to certain 
common principles of law.25 Also, the very concept of constituent power may carry certain 
inherent limitations, since in order to be consistent with the idea of ‘the people giving 
itself a constitution’, it must observe certain fundmanetal rights which are necessary for 
constituent power to preserve itself and reappear in the future.26 In contrast, one may claim 
that the recognition of the ability of constituent power to overthrow regimes must be two-
sided: whereas the transition from fascist regimes to democracy is always welcome, by 
accepting said transition we must acknowledge the power of a transition in the other 
direction.27 This important question is not the pivotal issue under investigation in this 
work, which is primarily concerned with the nature and scope of amendment powers. 
Further research should focus on the precise procedural and substantive limitations that 
are associated with the modern concept of primary constituent power and their 
enforcement.28 
Third, this thesis’ claim that since the amendment power is a delegated limited 
authority, and therefore certain constitutional amendments which replace the 
constitution with a new one might be unconstitutional, presents an interesting question; 
as noted in the introductory chapter, constitutions change not only through 
amendments, but also – and mainly – through judicial interpretation and constitutional 
practice. Since courts are also constituted authorities, according to the rationale 
advanced in this thesis, they are similarly limited in their scope of action. Thus, if 
certain principles are unamendable, does this mean that courts cannot interpret the 
constitution in a manner that ‘revolutionises’ it? Can courts change the essence of core 
basic principles, an action that requires resorting to the primary constituent power? In other 
                                                          
22 Sieyès (2003, 137). 
23 Scheuerman (1997, 149). If one takes Sieyès’ understanding of the nation as ‘the mass of associated 
men…all equal in rights’, it may well be that constituent power is bound to respect certain rights that 
belong to all peoples. See Sieyès (1795, 95). 
24 Jackson (2008, 1254). 
25 Compare Heller (2002, 279); Widner and Contiades (2013, 58); Gatmaytan (2010, 22).  
26 See, for example, Colón-Ríos (2012C, 111, 117-118); Colón-Ríos and Hutchinson (2012, 608); Harris 
(1993, 203); Prateek (2008, 464).     
27 Klein (1999B, 33). 
28 Elster (1995, 374-75) acknowledges that external constraints may be placed upon constitution-making 
process, but such constraints, he claims, are unlikely to work in practice. See also Orfield (1942, 125); 
Bates (1926, 147).  
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words, what are the limitations that are imposed upon the judiciary when it conducts 
constitutional interpretation and can a constitutional interpretation be considered 
unconstitutional?29  
These questions are beyond the perimeters of this thesis, which focuses solely 
on formal constitutional amendments, but owing to the advances promoted in this 
thesis they can adequately be addressed.  
III. SOLVING THE PARADOX  
The question of whether a constitutional amendment could be unconstitutional seems 
to be a paradox, as presented in the introductory chapter. This thesis demonstrates that 
the phrase ‘unconstitutional constitutional amendment’ does not entail a paradox, but 
merely a misapplication of presuppositions. Once the nature of the amendment power 
is correctly construed, the paradox disappears.  
The significance of the contribution to be made by this thesis is two-fold.  
First, it draws upon the rich vein of jurisprudential thinking from judiciaries around 
the world to analyse the puzzle of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment. 
Nowadays, comparative analysis of constitutional law on the subject is missing. In 
recent years, the debate has been expanding, but the jurisdictions covered are usually 
the same (Germany and India are the paradigm models for explicit and implicit 
limitations on the amendment power, respectively). The experience of other 
jurisdictions is neglected. This thesis takes a broad approach. It does not focus on one 
single jurisdiction, not even on one type of legal system (i.e. common or civil law) since 
a theory of unamendability should hold for most contemporary developed 
constitutional democracies.  
Second, existing theory is lacking. It does not sufficiently address the basis of 
unamendability and the connection between unamendability and judicial review. This 
thesis advances constitutional understanding by proposing a theoretical framework for 
unamendability.   
In 1895, A. V. Dicey remarked that ‘the plain truth is that a thinker who explains 
how constitutions are amended inevitably touches upon one of the central points of 
constitutional law’.30 Over one hundred years later, this remark remains true. At any 
given year, according to one assessment, four or five constitutions are replaced and ten 
                                                          
29 Dragomaca (2011); Grimm (2013, I-8). 
30 Dicey (1895, 388). 
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to fifteen constitutions are amended. 31  Therefore, the nature and scope of 
constitutional amendment powers is exactly where constitutional scholarship should 
focus its energies. Nevertheless, this area is still under-studied and under-theorised. 
This thesis advances the comparative and theoretical understanding in this area one 
step forward.  
                                                          
31 Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount (2009, 5.1–5.23).  
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APPENDIX: EXPLICIT SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS 
ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
 
State Year Article Limits 
1.Afghanistan  
 
2004 149 (1) The provisions of adherence to the 
fundamentals of the sacred religion of Islam and the 
regime of the Islamic Republic cannot be amended. 
(2) The amendment of the fundamental rights of 
the people are permitted only in order to make 
them more effective. 
1990 -  [Art. 2: … no law shall run counter to the principles 
of the sacred religion of Islam and other values 
enshrined in this Constitution.  
Art. 141: amendment of the Constitution in a state 
of emergency is not allowed] 
1987 - [Art. 2: … no law shall run counter to the principles 
of the sacred religion of Islam and other values 
enshrined in this Constitution.  
Art. 141: amendment of the Constitution in a state 
of emergency is not allowed] 
1980 -  
1964 120 Adherence to the basic principles of Islam, 
Constitutional Monarch in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution, and the values 
embodied in Article 8 [rights and duties of the 
King] shall not be subject to amendment. 
1952, 
1931, 
1925 
-  
2.Albania 1998, 
1991, 
1976, 
1950, 
1946, 
1939 
-  
1928 224 In the case of articles 1, 2, 6, 50, 51, 52 and 70 of 
the present statute, no proposal for revision can be 
made or accepted. 
[Art. 1. Albania is a democratic, parliamentary and 
hereditary monarchy.  
Art. 2. Albania is independent and indivisible, its 
integrity inviolable, and its territory inalienable. 
Art. 6. The capital of Albania is Tirana. 
Art. 50. The King of the Albanians is His Majesty 
Zog I, of the illustrious Albania family of Zogu. 
Art. 51. The Heir to the Throne shall be the King’s 
eldest son, and the succession shall continue 
generation after generation in the direct male line. 
Art. 52. Should the Heir die or lose his rights to the 
Throne, his eldest son shall succeed.  
Art. 70. The Throne of the Albanian Kingdom 
cannot be united to the Throne of any other 
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Kingdom]. 
1925 141 Only the republican form of government cannot be 
modified.  
3.Algeria 1989 178 No constitutional revision may infringe on:  
1) the republican character of the State;  
2) the democratic order based on multi-party 
system;  
3) Islam as the religion of the State;  
4) Arabic as the national and official language;  
5) fundamental liberties, and citizen's rights;  
6) integrity and the unity of the national territory. 
7) the national emblem and the national emblem as 
the symbols of the Revolution and of the Republic. 
1976 195 No project of constitutional revision can infringe 
upon: 
1) the republican form of government; 
2) the state’s religion; 
3) the socialist option; 
4) the fundamental freedoms of man and citizen; 
5) the integrity of national territory. 
1963, 
1958, 
1947 
-  
4.Andorra 1993 -  
5.Angola 2010 236 Alterations to the Constitution must respect: 
a) The dignity of the human person; 
b) National independence, territorial integrity and 
unity; 
c) The republican nature of the government; 
d) The unitary nature of the state; 
e) Essential core rights, freedoms and guarantees; 
f) The state based on the rule of law and pluralist 
democracy; 
g) The secular nature of the state and the principle 
of the separation of 
church and state; 
h) Universal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage in 
the election of 
officeholders to sovereign and local authority 
bodies; 
i) The independence of the courts; 
j) The separation and interdependence of the bodies 
that exercise sovereign 
power; 
k) Local autonomy. 
1975 159 Amendments to and approval of the Constitution 
of Angola shall comply with the following: 
(a) Independence, territorial integrity and national 
unity; 
(b) The fundamental rights and freedoms and 
guarantees of citizens; 
(c) A State based on the rule of law and party 
political pluralism; 
(d) Universal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage for 
the appointment of the elected office holders of 
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sovereign bodies and local government; 
(e) The secular nature of the State and the principle 
of separation between the State and churches; 
(f) The separation and interdependence of the 
courts. 
1928 -  
6.Antigua and 
Barbuda 
1981 -  
7.Argentina 1853 
(am. 
1994), 
1949 
-  
1826  [Art. II. (The Argentine Nation) shall never be the 
patrimony of any Person or Family]. 
8.Armenia 1995 114 
 
Articles 1, 2 and 114 of the Constitution may not be 
amended 
[Art. 1: The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign, 
democratic state, based on social justice and the rule 
of law; Art. 2: In the Republic of Armenia power 
lies with the people.  The people exercise their 
power through free elections and referenda, as well 
as through state and local self-governing bodies and 
public officials as provided by the Constitution. The 
usurpation of power by any organization or 
individual constitutes a crime]. 
9.Australia    
10.Austria 1920 -  
11.Azerbaijan 1995 158 
 
There cannot be proposed the introduction of 
additions to the Constitution of Azerbaijan 
Republic with respect to provisions envisaged in 
Chapter I of the present Constitution [regarding the 
people as the source of power; Sovereignty of 
people; questions solved by way of nation-wide 
voting referendum; Right to represent the people; 
unity of people; Inadmissibility of usurpation of 
power. 
12.Bahamas 1973 -  
13.Bahrain 1973 120(c)  It is not permissible to propose an amendment to 
Article 2 of this Constitution, and it is not 
permissible under any circumstances to propose the 
amendment of the constitutional monarchy and the 
principle of inherited rule in Bahrain, as well as the 
bicameral system and the principles of freedom and 
equality established in this Constitution. 
[Art. 2: The religion of the State is Islam. The 
Islamic Shari'a is a principal source for legislation. 
The official language is Arabic]. 
14.Bangladesh 1972 -  
15.Barbados 1966 -  
16.Belarus 1994 - [Art. 140: Sections 1, 2, 4, 8, of the constitution may 
be reconsidered only be means of a referendum 
(principles of the constitutional system; individual 
rights and liberties; the President, Parliament, 
Government, the Courts; the application of the 
constitution and its amendment)]. 
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1978, 
1937 
-  
17.Belgium 1994, 
1831 
-  
18.Belize 1981 -  
19.Benin 1990 156 No revision procedure may be instituted or 
continued if it adversely affects the integrity of the 
territory. The republican form of State and laïcité 
are not subject to revision 
1977 154 Amendments or revisions shall not hand into 
question the socialist orientation of the Republic 
1970 -  
1964 99 The republican form of Government may not be 
the subject of amendment 
20.Bhutan 2008 -  
21.Bolivia 2009 - [Art. 411(1): The total reform of the Constitution, 
or that which affects its fundamental premises, 
affects rights, duties and guarantees, or the 
supremacy and reform of the Constitution, shall 
take place through an original plenipotentiary 
Constituent assembly, put into motion by popular 
will through referendum]. 
1967, 
1961, 
1947, 
1945, 
1938, 
1880, 
1878, 
1871, 
1868, 
1861, 
1851 
-  
1843 82 The power which the Chambers posses of 
reforming the Constitution does not extend to the 
form of Government, or to the independence 
proclaimed by the Republic. 
1839 146 The power of Congress to reform this Constitution 
will never extend to Articles 1 and 2 [Art. 1. The 
Bolivian nation is free and independent, and its 
government is popular representative. Art. 2. The 
name Bolivia is unalterable].  
 1834, 
1831, 
1826 
-  
22.Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1995 X(2)  No amendment to this Constitution may eliminate 
or diminish any of the rights and freedoms referred 
to in Article II of this Constitution or alter the 
present paragraph 
1910 -  
23.Botswana 1966 -  
24.Brazil 
 
 
1988 60(4) No proposed constitutional amendment shall be 
considered that is aimed at abolishing the following;  
I. The federalist form of the National Government;  
II. Direct, secret, universal and periodic suffrage;  
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III. Separation of powers;  
IV. Individual rights and guarantees 
1946 217(6) Bills tending to abolish the Federation or the 
Republic shall not be admitted as subject for 
discussion 
1937    
1934 178(5) Proposed bills tending to abolish the federative 
republican form shall not be admitted as an object 
of deliberation.  
1891 90(4) Proposals tending to abolish the republican federal 
form or the equality of representation of the states 
in the senate may not be made the subject of 
consideration by the congress. 
1824 -  
25.Brunei 
Darussalam 
1959 -  
26.Bulgaria 1991 - [Art. 158 specifies certain topics that only the 
Grand National Assembly can amend].  
1971, 
1947, 
1879 
-  
27.Burkina Faso 1991 165 No bill or proposal of revision of the Constitution 
is receivable when it effects: the republican nature 
and form of the State; the multiparty system; the 
integrity of the national territory. 
1970 106 No amendment procedure may be undertaken or 
pusrued which threatens the integrity of the 
territory. The Republican form of Government may 
not be the subject of amendment. 
28.Burundi 2005 299 No procedure of revision can be accepted if it 
undermines national unity, the cohesive people of 
Burundi, secularism of the State, reconciliation, 
democracy, and the territorial integrity of the 
Republic.  
1992 182 No procedure of revision can be accepted if it 
undermines national unity, the republican and 
secular form of the State, and the territorial integrity 
of the Republic. 
1981 78 No revision procedure may be accepted if it 
infringes the republican form, national unity and 
integrity of the republic. 
1974 63 The republican form of government cannot be the 
object of a revision.  
1962 -  
29.Cambodia 1993 153 
(prev. 
134) 
Any revision or amendment affecting the system of 
liberal and pluralistic democracy and the regime of 
constitutional monarchy shall be prohibited. 
1981 -  
1947 115 The Provisions relating to the monarchical form 
form of the State, the representative character of 
the regime and the principles of liberty and equality 
guaranteed by this Constitution may not be 
thesubject of any proposed amendment.  
116 No amendment may have the effect of restricting 
the rights reserved to Toyalty by this Constitution.  
 ~248 ~ 
 
30.Cameroon 
 
1972 63 No procedure for the amendment of the 
Constitution affecting the republican form, unity 
and territorial integrity of the state and the 
democratic principles which govern the republic 
shall be accepted. 
1961 47 Any proposal for the revision of the present 
Constitution which impairs the unity and integrity 
of the Federation shall be inadmissible. 
31.Canada  1982 - [Arts. 38-49 stipulate different procedures for 
amending different provisions] 
1867 -  
32.Cape Verde 1992 313 1. The following shall not be the object of a 
revision:  
a) The national independence, national territorial 
integrity and unity of the state; 
b) The republican form of the government; 
c) The separation and interdependence of the 
organs of sovereignty; 
e)The autonomy of local power; 
f) The independence of the courts; 
g) The pluralism of expression and of political 
organization and the right of opposition. 
2. The revision laws also shall not retain or limit the 
rights, liberties and guarantees enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
1980/1 -  
33.Central 
African 
Republic 
2013 101 Expressly excluded from the review are: 
- republican and secular state form; 
-ineligibility of the Head of State of Transition, 
Transition Prime Minister , members of the 
Transitional Government and members of the 
Office of the National Transitional Council 
Presidential and legislative elections held during the 
transition period; 
-disqualification of Judges Constitutional Transition 
and members of the High Council of Information 
and Communication Transition presidential and 
legislative elections; 
-irrevocability and reduced powers of the Prime 
Minister; 
-incompatibilities functions of Head of State of 
Transition, Transition Prime Minister, Chairman of 
the National Transitional Council, Constitutional 
Judge Transition and member of the High Council 
of Information and Communication Transition; 
-fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens; 
-this article. 
2004 108 Expressly excluded from constitutional revision: 
The republican form and secularism of the state; the 
number and duration of presidential terms, and 
conditions of eligibility; the incompatibilities for the 
office of Head of State; the fundamental rights of 
the citizen. 
1994/5 101 The republican form of the state cannot be the 
object of revision. 
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1986 42 The republican form of the state cannot be the 
object of a revision.  
1976 60 The monarchical form of the Empire cannot be the 
object of a revision.  
1964/5 -  
1959 37 No amendmen procedure may be retained if it 
violates the republican form of the government and 
the democratic principles which govern the 
Constitution.  
34.Chad 1996 223 No amendment is allowed when it threatens the 
territorial integrity, independence or national unity 
of the state; the republican form, secular nature of 
the state, or the principle of separation of powers; 
the liberty and fundamental rights of the citizens; or 
political pluralism. 
1989 202 No procedure of revision can be undertaken or 
continued if it adversely affects: the national unity 
or independence, the republican form of 
government and the principle of separation of 
powers, fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
citizen. 
1962 75 No amendment procedure may be undertaken or 
continued which affects the integrity of the 
territory. The republican form of government shall 
not be subject to amendment.  
1960 68 No procedure of amendment can be committed or 
continued if it interferes with the integrity of the 
territory. The republican nature of the Government 
is not subject to revision. 
35.Chile  1980, 
1925, 
1833, 
1828, 
1823, 
1822, 
1818 
-  
36.China 1982, 
1978, 
1975, 
1954, 
1946/7
, 1931 
-  
1923 1 The Republic of China shall be a unified republic 
forever. 
138 The form of government shall not be a subject for 
amendment. 
1912 -  
37.Chechnya  
 
 
2003 112(3) 
 
Proposals about amending and reviewing parts of 
the Constitution of the Chechen Republic, creating 
conflict with the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, disturbing the rights and liberties of 
individuals and citizens, attempting to infringe on 
the Republican form of the government and 
foundations of the Constitutional order of the 
Chechen Republic, are not allowed to be accepted 
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by the Constitutional Assembly of the Chechen 
Republic through its review and carrying out 
through referendum. 
38. Colombia 1991, 
1886, 
1863, 
1858, 
1853  
-  
1843 172 The power of Congress to amend this Constitution 
shall never extend to the articles in Title III, which 
relates to the form of government. 
1832 218 The power of Congress to amend this Constitution 
shall never extend to the articles in Title III, which 
concerns the form of government.  
1830 164 The power of Congress to amend the Constitution 
shall not include the power to change the form of 
government, which shall always be republican, 
popular, representative, and responsible.  
1821 190 …. But the provisions contained in Section 1 of 
Title I and in Section 2 of Title II may never be 
amended [sec.1, title I: the Colombian nation; sec. 2, 
title II: Government of Colombia].  
39.Comoros 2001 42 No procedure of revision may be initiated or 
pursued when it infringes the unity of the territory 
and the inviolability of the internationally 
recognized frontiers as well as the autonomy of the 
Islands. 
1996 68 No procedure of revision may be initiated when it 
infringes the integrity of the Republic or rights of 
people. The republican and Islamic character of the 
state cannot be the object of a revision.  
1992 82 No procedure of revision may be initiated or 
pursued when it infringes the integrity of the 
Republic, national unity and multipaty system. The 
republican and Islamic character of the state cannot 
be the object of a revision. 
1978 45 No procedure of revision may be initiated or 
pursued when it infringes the integrity of the 
Archipel. The republican, federal and Islamic 
characters of the state cannot be the object of a 
revision.  
40.The Republic 
of Congo 
2002 185 The republican form, the secular character of state, 
the number of presidential terms and the rights set 
forth in Title I and II cannot be object of revisions. 
1992 178 No procedure of amendment shall be engaged in or 
followed when it attempts to touch the integrity of 
the territory. The republican form, the secularity of 
the State, and the number of mandates of the 
President of the Republic shall not be the object of 
any amendment. Amendment shall not have the 
object of the reduction or the abolition of 
fundamental rights and liberties enunciated in Title 
II. 
1979, 
1973, 
-  
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1969  
1963 83 The republican form of Government may not be 
the subject of amendment. 
41.The 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
2006 220 Prohibits all constitutional amendments that have as 
a goal or effect, the diminution of individual rights 
and liberties or to reduce the prerogatives of the 
provinces and other decentralized entities. 
1967, 
1964 
-  
42.Costa Rica 1949 - [Art. 196: The general amendment of this 
constitution can be effected only by a constituent 
assembly called for the purpose. A law calling such 
an assembly must be approved by a vote of at least 
two-thirds of the total membership of the legislative 
Assembly and does not require the approval of the 
executive power].  
1917 -  
1871 - [Art. 135: The general reformation of this 
Constitution … can only be effected by a 
constituent assembly convoked for the purpose]. 
1869 - [Art. 148: The general reform of this Constitution 
… can only be effected by a constituent assembly 
convoked for the purpose]. 
1859 - [Art. 141: The general reform of this Constitution 
… can only be effected by a constituent assembly 
convoked for the purpose]. 
1848 -  
1847 - [Art. 187: …the whole of the Charter cannot be 
repealed, except when the republic having been 
reorganized, it is found that the general laws of the 
nation require an absolute reform].  
1844 -  
43.Cote d’Ivoire 2000 127 No procedure of revision can be undertaken or 
pursued if it carries affects to the integrity of the 
territory. The republican form and the secular 
[form] of the State cannot be made the object of a 
revision. 
1960 73 No revision procedure can be undertaken or 
continued when it affects the territorial integrity. 
44.Croatia 1990 -  
45.Cuba 1976 ‘Specia
l 
Provisi
on’ 
The people of Cuba, almost in their totality, 
expressed on the 15th and 18th days of the month 
of June of 2002, the most decided support to the 
Bill of constitutional reform proposed by the 
organizations of the masses in extraordinary 
assembly of all the national locales that were held 
on  the 10th day of the same month of June, on 
which was ratified in all of its parts  the 
Constitution of the Republic and its proposed text 
that the socialist character and the political and 
social system contained in it have been declared 
irrevocable, with a dignified and categorical 
response to the demands and threats of the 
imperialist government of the United States on the 
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20th of May of 2002. All has been approved by 
unanimity, by way of Accord No. V-74 adopted in 
extraordinary session of the Vth Legislature, 
celebrated on the 24th, 25th and 26th days of the 
month of June 2002. 
1940 - [Art. 286: In the case in which the reform is integral 
or concerns the national sovereignty  or Articles 22, 
23, 24 and 87 of this Constitution, or the form of 
Government, after fulfilling the requirements 
previously specified, according to whether the 
initiative originates from the people or in the 
Congress, elections of Delegates to  a Plebiscitary 
Assembly will be convoked, which will take place 
six months  after [it is] agreed on, which will be 
limited exclusively to approve or reject the 
proposed reforms]. 
1901/2 
1897, 
1895, 
1878 
-  
1869 - [Art. 29: This Constitution may be amended when 
the Chamber unanimously so determines it]. 
46.Cyprus 1960 182(1) The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution 
set out in Annex III hereto which have been 
incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th 
February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this 
Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, 
whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. 
47.Czech 
Republic 
1992 9 (1) The Constitution may be amended or altered 
solely by constitutional laws. 
(2) Any change of fundamental attributes of the 
democratic law-observing state is inadmissible. 
(3) Legal norms cannot be interpreted as warranting 
the removal or threatening of the foundations of 
the democratic state. 
1960, 
1948, 
1920, 
1918 
-  
48.Denmark 1953, 
1915, 
1866, 
1863, 
1849, 
1834, 
1831 
-  
49.Djibouti 1992 88 No revision procedure can be engaged if it calls into 
question the existence of the State or to infringe the 
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integrity of the territory, the republican form of 
government or the pluralistic character of Djibouti 
democracy.  
50.Dominica 1978 -  
51.Dominican 
Republic 
2010 -  
2002/3 119 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1994 119 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1966 119 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which shall always be civil, republican, 
democratic, and representative.  
1961 114 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1960 117 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1955 117 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1947 111 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1942 111 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1934 106 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1929 106 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1924 107 No amendment may be made of the form of 
government, which should always be civil, 
republican, democratic and representative. 
1908 110 The Constituent Assembly shall consider and adopt 
or reject in the first instance the amendment, it 
being understood that such amendment shall in no 
way affect the form of government, which latter 
shall always remain civil, republican, democratic, 
and representative. 
1907 109 The Constituent Assembly shall consider and adopt 
or reject in the first instance the amendment, it 
being understood that such amendment shall in no 
way affect the form of government, which latter 
shall always remain civil, republican, democratic, 
and representative. 
1896 111 The faculty held by Congress to reform the 
Constitution does not extend to the form of 
government, which shall always be Republican and 
democratic, and representative, alternative, and 
responsible. 
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1887 112 The faculty held by Congress to reform the 
Constitution does not extend to the form of 
government, which shall always be Republican and 
democratic, and representative, alternative, and 
responsible. 
1881 110 The option is to reform Congress the Constitution 
does not extend to the form of government, which 
shall always be Republican, Democratic, under the 
representative form alternative, and responsible. 
Nor may relate the reform on dilatation of the 
presidential term. 
1880 107 The faculty held by Congress to reform the 
Constitution does not extend to the form of 
government, which shall always be Republican, 
Democratic, under the representative form 
alternative, and responsible. Nor may relate the 
reform on dilatation of the presidential term. 
1879 120 The faculty held by Congress to reform the 
Constitution does not extend to the form of 
government, which shall always be Republican, 
Democratic, under the representative form 
alternative, and responsible. 
1878 118 The faculty held by Congress to reform the 
Constitution does not extend to the form of 
government, which shall always be Republican, 
Democratic, under the representative form 
alternative, and responsible. 
1877 -  
1875 107 The power conferred on the Legislature to 
reform the Constitution does not extend to the 
form of government that will always be 
Republicans, Democrats, under the representative 
form and responsible alternative 
1874 106 The power conferred on the Legislature to 
reform the Constitution does not extend to the 
form of government that will always be 
Republicans, Democrats, under the representative 
form and responsible alternative.  
1872 -  
1866 103 The power which the Congress has for the 
reformation of the Constitution does not extend to 
the form of Government, which shall always be 
Republican, democratic, alternative, and 
responsible.  
1865 139 The power conferred on the chambers to 
reform the Constitution does not extend to the 
form of government that will always be 
Republicans, Democrats, under the representative 
form and responsible alternative. 
1858, 
1854, 
1844, 
1821 
-  
52.Ecuador 2008 441 The amendment of one or various article of the 
constitution that does not alter the fundamental 
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structure or the nature and constituent elements of 
the state, does not set constraints on right and 
guarantees, and does not change the procedure for 
amending the constitution shall be carried out as 
follows. 
1998, 
1984, 
1978 
-  
1967 258 Ordinary Congress can discuss any proposed 
constitutional amendment, subject to observe the 
procedures established for the elaboration of laws. 
However, Congress may not introduce any change 
to replace the republican form of government or 
the democratic form of state of Ecuador. 
1946, 
1945, 
1929, 
1906, 
1897, 
1884, 
1878, 
-  
1869 115 At whatever time Congress may judge it convenient 
to reform some Articles of this Constitution, that 
reform may be proposed in order that it may be 
again taken into consideration in another ordinary 
Legislative Session, and should it then also be 
ratified by the majority of each Chamber, 
proceeding with the formalities prescribed in 
Section 6, Title VI, the reform shall be valid if the 
majority of voters approve it, voting by “Yes” or 
“No.” But the bases contained in Articles IX., XIV, 
and XV, can never be altered [IX. The religion of 
the Republic is Catholic Apostolic Roman…; XIV. 
The government of Equator is republican, elective, 
representative, alternate and responsible; XV. The 
supreme power is divided into legislative, executive, 
and judicial. Each is to exercise the functions which 
the present constitution assigns to it, without 
overstepping the bounds prescribed thereby].  
1861 132 At any time that two thirds of each of the chambers 
judge should reform some articles of the 
Constitution, Congress may again propose to take 
into account where it has been renewed at least half 
the members Chambers who proposed the reform, 
and if then it may also ratified by two-thirds of 
each, proceeding with the formalities prescribed in 
Section VI of Part VI, shall be valid and will be part 
of the Constitution, but can never alter the bases 
contained in Articles 12, 13 and 14. 
[Art 12. The Religion of the Republic is Catholic, 
Apostolic, Roman, to the exclusion of any other. 
The political authorities are obliged to protect and 
enforce it; [Art. 13. The Government of Ecuador is 
popular, representative, elective and responsible 
alternative; Art. 14. The Supreme Power is divided 
into Legislative, Executive and Judicial. Each 
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exercise the powers assigned to him by this 
Constitution not to exceed the limits which it 
prescribes]. 
1852 143 The power of Congress to reform the Constitution, 
there never will be extended to Article 13 of Title 
III, which refers to the religion of state. 
1851 139 The power of the National Assembly to amend this 
Constitution, shall not extend ever to Article 11 
which speaks of the religion of the State or to vary 
the requirements of Article 12 [article 12. The 
Government of Ecuador is republican, popular, 
representative, elective and responsible alternative].  
1843 110 The power of Congress to reform the Constitution 
does not extend to the third article discusses the 
form of government (Article 3 - The Government 
of the Republic of Ecuador is a popular, elected, 
representative, alternative, responsible, and 
distributed to its exercise in three branches, 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, each 
shall be exercised separately, and within the limits I 
said this Constitution can never be together in one 
person). 
1835, 
1830 
-  
53.Egypt 2013 226 In all cases, texts pertaining to the principles of 
freedom and equality stipulated in this Constitution 
may not be amended, unless the amendment brings 
more guarantees. 
2012, 
1971, 
1958, 
1956 
-  
54.El Salvador 1983 248 Under no circumstances, may the articles of this 
Constitution, which refer to the form and system of 
government, to the territory of the Republic, and to 
the principle that a President cannot succeed 
himself (alternabilidad), be amended. 
1962, 
1950, 
1948 
-  
1945 171 But it is hereby declared that in no case shall 
Articles 80, 81, and 82 prohibiting the reelection of 
the President, Vice-President, and designados, and 
concerning the duration of the presidential term, be  
amended. 
1939 - [Art. 188(3): It is enacted that in this manner the 
articles comprised in Parts I, V, VI, VII, VIII and 
XII, and in this same Part XV may not be altered in 
any way, but may be modified only by a constituent 
assembly]. 
1886 148 Nevertheless, it is established that in no case shall 
there be power to reform  Articles 80, 81, and 82, 
which treat of the prohibition of the re- election of 
the President, Vice-President, and ‘Designados’, and 
of the duration of the Presidential period. 
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1880, 
1883, 
1872, 
1871, 
1841 
-  
55.Equatorial 
Guinea 
1991 104 The republican and democratic system of the state 
as national unity and territorial integrity shall not be 
subject to any reforms. 
1982  134 The Republican and Democratic Regime of the 
State of Equatorial Guinea, the National Unity, and 
the Territorial Integrity may not be the object of any 
reform.  
 1973 157 The Republican and Democratic Regime of the 
State of Equatorial Guinea, the National Unity, and 
the Territorial Integrity may not be the object of any 
reform. 
56.Eritrea 1997 -  
1952 91(2) Article 16 of the Constitution, by the terms of 
which the Constitution of Eritrea is based on the 
principles of democratic government, shall not be 
amended. 
57.Estonia 1992 - [Art. 162: Chapter I ‘General Provisions’ and 
Chapter XV ‘Amendments to the Constitution’ may 
be amended only by referendum]. 
1937, 
1920 
-  
58.Ethiopia 1995 10 (1) Human rights and freedoms, emanating from 
the nature of mankind, are inviolable and 
inalienable. 
(2) Human and democratic rights of citizens and 
peoples shall be respected. 
1992, 
1991, 
1987, 
1955 
-  
1952 91(2) Article 16 of the Constitution, by the terms of 
which the Constitution of Eritrea is based on the 
principles of democratic government, shall not be 
amended. 
1936, 
1931 
-  
59.Fiji 2013 - [Art. 160(7): In this section, the use of the word 
‘amend’ or ‘amendment’ is intended to be 
understood broadly, so that the section applies to 
any proposal to repeal, replace, revise, or alter any 
provision or provisions of this Constitution]. 
1997  -  [Art. 190 sets certain restrictions on majorities for 
amending certain provisions]. 
1990 164(5) This section shall not be reviewed or amended by 
Parliament [Immunity Provisions - Immunity of 
Members of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
(including the Naval Division), the Police Force and 
the Fiji Prison Services]. 
1970 - [Art. 67 sets certain restrictions on majorities for 
amending certain provisions].  
 ~258 ~ 
 
60.Finland 1999, 
1928, 
1919 
-  
61.France 1958 89(5) The republican form of government shall not be 
subject to amendment. 
1946 95 The republican form of government may not be the 
subject of any proposal to amend the Constitution. 
1875 
(added 
in 
1884) 
8(3) The republican form of government shall not be 
made the subject of a proposed revision. 
1852, 
1848, 
1830, 
1815, 
1814, 
1804, 
1802, 
1799, 
1795, 
1793, 
1791 
-  
62.Gabon 
 
1991 117 The Republican form of the State, as well as the 
pluralist character of the democracy are intangible 
and cannot be the subject of any revision. 
1990 72 The republican and democratic form of state cannot 
be object of any revision. 
1961 70 No amendment procedure can be undertaken or 
continued when it threatens the integrity of the 
territory. The Republican and democratic form of 
the State may not be the subject of amendment.  
63.Gambia 1996, 
1970 
-  
64.Georgia 1995  -  
1921 148 Changing the form of government of the 
Democratic Republic Georgia cannot be subject of 
any proposed revision of the Constitution. 
65.Germany 1949 79(3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the 
division of the Federation into Länder, their 
participation on principle in the legislative process, 
or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall 
be inadmissible [Art. 1: Human dignity/Human 
rights/Legally binding force of basic rights; Art. 20: 
Constitutional principles (The Federal Republic of 
Germany is a democratic and social federal state)]. 
1919, 
1871, 
1867, 
1820, 
1815 
-  
66.Ghana 1992 - [Art. 290 sets different procedures for amending 
different articles].  
1979 - [Art. 210 sets different procedures for amending 
different articles]. 
1969 169(3) Parliament shall have no power to amend this cause, 
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the preceding clauses of this article, any provision 
of Chapter One, and articles 127 and 153 of this 
constitution [Chapter one: the constitution; art. 127: 
taxation; art.153: the institution of chieftaincy]. 
1960 -  
67.Greece 1975 110(1) The provisions of the Constitution, save those 
which determine the basis and the form of 
government as a Parliamentary Republic with a 
President as Head of State and those of Articles 2 
(1), 4 (1), (4) and (7), 5 (1) and (3), 13 (1) and 26 
shall be subject to revision. 
1952 108 Revision of the entire Constitution is prohibited. 
The provisions of the present Constitution, which 
determine the regime as that of a crowned 
democracy as well as its fundamental provisions, 
shall under no circumstances be revised. 
1927 125 Only non-fundamental provisions of the 
Constitution may be revised after five years 
according to the procedure. 
1911 108 The revision of the whole of the Constitution is not 
permitted. 
Ten years after this provision has taken effect a 
revision of the non-fundamental provisions of the 
Constitution is permitted. 
1864 107 The Constitution may not be revised in its entirety. 
However, constitutional provisions, not 
fundamental, which must be designated, may, 10 
years after the enactment of the Constitution be 
revised if the need is duly found. 
1844 -  
68.Grenada 1973 -  
69.Guatemala 1985 281 In no case can Articles 140, 141, 165 (paragraph g), 
186, and 187 be amended, nor can any question 
relating to the republican form of government, to 
the principle of the non-re-electability for the 
exercise of the Presidency of the Republic be raised 
in any form, neither may the effectiveness or 
application of the articles that provide for 
alternating the tenure of the Presidency of the 
Republic be suspended or their content changed or 
modified in any other way [art.140: Guatemala is a 
free State, independent and sovereign, organized to 
guarantee to its inhabitants the enjoyment of their 
rights and liberties. Its system of government is 
republican, democratic, and representative; art. 141: 
Sovereignty is rooted in the people who delegate it 
for its exercise to the Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial Organs. Subordination among them is 
prohibited; art 165(g): The Congress will have the 
power to refuse to recognize the President of the 
Republic if, his constitutional term having expired, 
he continues in the exercise of his office. In such a 
case, the Army will automatically 
fall under the authority [depender] of the Congress; 
art. 186 (Prohibitions Against Running for the 
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Positions of President or Vice President of the 
Republic); art. 187 (Prohibition of Re-Election). 
1965 267 Amendment of Articles 14, section 4; 33; 166, 
section 10; 182, and 185, or any article referring to 
the principle of non-re-election of the president of 
the republic may never be made. Likewise, the 
effect of these articles may not be suspended not 
may their effectiveness or force be lessened in any 
manner [14(4):the following rights and duties are 
inherent in citizenship: to defend the principle of 
rotation and non-re-election in the office of the 
presidency of the republic, in any manner that it 
may be exercised, as an invariable rule in the 
political system of the state; 33:any activity in favor 
of the reelection of the person occupying the 
presidency of the republic, or in any other way 
intended to prolong the term fixed by the 
constitution for that office, or of violating the 
principle of rotation and non-re-election for the 
presidency, is subject to punishment; 166(1):it is the 
duty of Congress to open and close its sessions;182: 
the president of the republic shall be elected by the 
people, by universal suffrage, by an absolute 
majority of votes and for a term of four years, 
which may not be extended; 185: A person who at 
any time has held office as president of the republic 
by popular election or who has held such office for 
more than two years as a replacement of the elected 
president, may not again hold such office for any 
reason. The reelection or prolongation of the term 
of the presidential office by any means is punishable 
under the law. Any mandate so intended is null and 
void ipso jure]. 
1956 - [Art. 245: Different provisions for amending certain 
provisions]. 
1945 - [Art. 206: Different provisions for amending certain 
provisions]. 
1879, 
1825, 
1823 
-  
70.Guinea 2010 154 The republican form of government, the principle 
of secularism, the principle of unity of the state, the 
principle of separation and equilibrium of powers, 
political pluralism and syndical, the number and 
duration of Presidential terms may not be the object 
of revisions.  
1990 91 The republican form of government of the State, 
the principle of secularity and the principle of 
separation of powers shall not be the object of 
revision. 
1958 50 The Republican form of the State shall not be 
object of an amendment. 
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71.Guinea-
Bissau 
1984 102 No proposal for revision may impose upon: 
a) the unitary structure or republican form of the 
State; 
b) the Laic Statute of the State; 
c) the integrity of national territory. 
1973 -  
72.Guyana 1980, 
1966 
-  
73.Haiti 1987 284(4) No amendment to the Constitution may affect the 
democratic and republican nature of the state.   
1964 -  
1946 -  
1935, 
1918, 
1889 
1874, 
1846, 
1806 
1805, 
1801 
-  
74.Honduras 1982 374 The foregoing article, this article, the articles of the 
Constitution relating to the form of government, 
national territory, the presidential term, the 
prohibition on re-election to President of the 
Republic, the citizen who has served as President 
under any title, and to persons who may not be 
President of the Republic for the subsequent period 
may not be amended. 
1965  In no case may Articles 4, 192, 193, 196, and this 
article be amended by the forgoing procedure [art.4: 
the government is republican, democratic, and 
representative; is it composed of the three 
complementary and independent branches: 
legislative, executive, and judicial, and is based upon 
the principle of national integration; Art. 192: The 
presidential term shall be six years and shall begin 
on June 6; Art.193: A citizen who has held the 
office of president under any title for more than 
half of the constitutional term may not again be 
president of the republic or hold this office under 
any title; art.196 (persons who may not be President 
of the Republic for the subsequent period)].  
1957 339 In no event shall amendments to sections 4° 
195,196,199, and this may be done by the above 
procedure. 
1936 - [Art. 200 sets different procedures for certain 
provisions].  
1924 180 An amendment which may be made to the Articles 
of the Constitution wherein the re-election of the 
President or of the individuals who take his place is 
prohibited. 
1904, 
1894, 
1880 
1873, 
-  
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1865 
1848 91 Partial reforms regarding guarantees can never be 
allowed, unless it be to extend existing ones; nor 
can any change be introduced in the division of 
powers. 
1839, 
1831, 
1825 
-  
75.Hungary 2011  -  
1949 -  
76.Hong Kong 1990 159(3) 
 
Before a bill for amendment to this Law is put on 
the agenda of the National People's Congress, the 
Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region shall study it and 
submit its views. No amendment to this Law shall 
contravene the established basic policies of the 
People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong. 
77.Iceland 1944, 
1941, 
1940, 
1920, 
1918, 
1874, 
1871 
-  
78.India 1950 -  
79.Indonesia 1945 -  
80.Iran 1979 177 The contents of the articles of the Constitution 
related to the Islamic character of the political 
system; the basis of all the rules and regulations 
according to Islamic criteria; the religious footing; 
the objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the 
democratic character of the government; the holy 
principle; the Imamate of Ummah; and the 
administration of the affairs of the country based on 
national referenda, official religion of Iran and the 
religious school are unalterable. 
1907 2 This Article [according to which laws must never be 
contrary to the sacred precepts of Islam – y.r] will 
not be liable to change until the advent of the 
Twelfth Imam. 
1906 -  
81.Iraq 2005 126(4) Articles of the Constitution may not be amended if 
such amendment takes  away from the powers of 
the regions that are not within the exclusive powers 
of  the federal authorities, except by the approval of 
the legislative authority of the  concerned region 
and the approval of the majority of its citizens in a 
general  referendum. 
1970, 
1964, 
1958, 
1932, 
1924/5 
-  
82.Ireland 1937,1
922 
-  
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83.Israel (basic 
laws) 
-  
84.Italy 1947 139 The republican form of the state may not be 
changed by way of constitutional amendment. 
1848 -  
85.Jamaica 1962 -  
86.Japan 1946 - [important: Art. 9: Aspiring sincerely to an 
international peace based on justice and order, the  
Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or  use 
of force as means of settling international disputes.  
Art. 97: The fundamental human rights by this 
Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are 
fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they 
have survived the many exacting tests for durability 
and are conferred upon this and future generations 
in trust, to be held for all time inviolate]. 
1889 -  
87.Jordan 1952 126(2) No amendment of the Constitution affecting the 
rights of the king and the succession to the Throne 
may be passed during the period of Regency. 
1946, 
1928 
-  
88.Kazakhstan 1995 91(2) The unitary status and territorial integrity of the 
Republic, the forms of government may not be 
changed. 
1993 129 [Different procedure for amendments concerning 
the bases of the constitutional system]. 
89.Kenya 2010 - [Arts. 255-257: Different procedure for different 
provisions]. 
1969, 
1963 
-  
90.Kiribati 1979 -  
91.Democratic 
People's 
Republic of 
Korea (north) 
1972, 
1948 
-  
92.Republic of 
Korea (south) 
1948 -  
93.Kosovo 2008 144(3) Amendments to this Constitution may be adopted 
by the Assembly only after the President of the 
Assembly of Kosovo has referred the proposed 
amendment to the Constitutional Court for a prior 
assessment that the proposed amendment does not 
diminish any of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
Chapter II of this Constitution. 
94.Kuwait 1962 175 The provisions relating to the Amiri System in 
Kuwait and the principles of liberty and equality, 
provided for in this Constitution, may not be 
proposed for revision except in relation to the title 
of the Amirate or to increase the guarantees of 
liberty and equality. 
95.Kyrgyzstan 2010 97(3) The constitutional chamber shall conclude on the 
draft law on changes to the present constitution.  
2007 - [Art. 98(2) Amendments and supplements to the 
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present Constitution adopted by the Jogorku 
Kenesh may be examined in the light of a 
conclusion of the Constitutional Court.] 
1993 - [Arts. 85(3)(5); 98: The constitutional court shall 
render conclusions on a draft amendment to the 
constitution (chapters 3-8) adopted by the Jogorku 
Kenesh [not by referendum – y.r.]. If the conclusion 
is negative, the draft amendment shall be returned 
to its initiator and may be resubmitted no earlier 
than one year later].  
96.Laos 1991 -  
1947 43 The provisions relating to the monarchical form, 
indivisible unitary state, the representative character 
of the regime and the principles of liberty and 
equality guaranteed by this constitution may not be 
the object of any proposal for revision. 
97.Latvia 1922 - [Art. 77: If the Parliament has amended Articles 1, 
2, 3, 4, 6, or 77 of the Constitution, such 
amendments, in order to come into force as law, 
shall be submitted to a national referendum]. 
98.Lebanon 1926 
[Restor
ed to 
Force 
1937 
and 
1943] 
-  
99.Lesotho 1993, 
1966 
-  
100.Liberia 1984/6 
1847 
-  
101.Libya 2011, 
1969 
-  
1951 197 No proposal may be made to review the provisions 
relating to the monarchial form of government, the 
order of succession to the Throne, the 
representative form of government or the principles 
of liberty and equality guaranteed by this 
Constitution. 
102.Liechtenstei
n 
1921, 
1862, 
1818 
-  
103.Lithuania 1992 - [Art.148 (1) The provision of Article 1 that the State 
of Lithuania is an independent democratic republic 
may only be amended by a referendum in which at 
least three-fourths of the electorate of Lithuania 
vote in favor thereof. 
(2) The provisions of Chapter 1 [The State of 
Lithuania] and Chapter 14 [Amending the 
Constitution] may be amended only by referendum.] 
1938, 
1928, 
1922, 
1919 
-  
104.Luxembourg 1868 - [Art.115: During a regency, no change can be made 
to the Constitution concerning the constitutional 
prerogatives of the Grand Duke, his status as well 
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as the order of succession [originally: No change in 
the Constitution can be made during a  regency]]. 
1856 - [Art. 115: No change in the Constitution can be 
made during a regency].  
1848 - [Art.119: No change in the Constitution can be 
made during a regency]. 
1841 -  
105.Macedonia 1991 - [Art. 131 sets different procedures for amending 
certain provisions].  
106.Madagascar 2010 163 The republican form of government, the principle 
of national territorial integrity, the principle of 
separation of powers, the principle of autonomy 
Communities Decentralized Territorial, duration 
and number of office of President of the Republic,  
may not be subject to revision 
1992 152 The republican form of the State shall not be 
subject to amendment.  
1975 108 The republican form of government and the 
socialist regime of cannot be the object of a revision 
1959  66 The republican form of the State shall not be 
subject to amendment. 
107.Malawi 1994, 
1966, 
1964 
-  
108.Malaysia 1963, 
1957 
- Different procedures for different provisions. 
109.Maldives 2008, 
1997/8 
1969 
-  
110.Mali  1992 118 No procedure of revision may be engaged in or 
pursued when it undermines the integrity of the 
territory. The republican form and the secularity of 
the State as well as multipartyism may not be made 
the object of revision. 
1974 73 No procedure of revision can be initiated or 
continued when it violates the integrity of the 
territory. The republican form of government may 
not be subject to revision. 
1960 49 No procedure of revision can be initiated or 
continued when it violates the integrity of the 
territory. The republican form of government may 
not be subject to revision. 
111.Malta 1964 - Different procedures for different provisions. 
112.Marshall 
Islands 
1979 - Different procedures for different provisions. 
113.Mauritania 1991 99(3) No procedure for revision may be initiated if it 
challenges the existence of the State or undermines 
the integrity of the territory, the republican form of 
government, or the pluralist character of 
Mauritanian democracy. 
1961 54 The amendment procedure may not be undertaken 
if the bill threatens the existence of the State or the 
integrity of the territory or the republican form of 
government.  
114.Mauritius 1968 - Different procedures for different provisions.  
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115.Mexico 1917, 
1857, 
1835 
 
-  
1824 171 The Articles of this Constitution, and of the 
Constituent Act, which establish the Liberty and 
Independence of the Mexican Nation, its Religion, 
Form of Government, Liberty of the Press, and 
Division of the Supreme Power of the 
Confederation, and of the States, shall never be 
altered. 
3 The Religion of the Mexican Nation is, and shall be 
perpetually, the Apostolical Roman Catholic 
116.Micronesia 1978 -  
117.Moldova 1994 142 (1) The provisions regarding the sovereignty, 
independence and unity of the State, as well as 
those regarding the permanent neutrality of the 
State may be revised only by referendum based on a 
majority vote of the registered voting citizens. 
 (2) No revision shall be performed, if it implies the 
infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms of 
citizens, or their guarantees. 
 (3) The Constitution may not be revised under a 
state of national emergency, martial law or war. 
118.Monaco 1962, 
1911 
-  
119.Mongolia 1992, 
1960 
1940, 
1924 
-  
120.Montenegro 2007, 
1992, 
1905 
-  
121.Morocco 2011 175 No revision may infringe the provisions relative to 
the Muslim religion, on the monarchic form of the 
State, on the democratic choice of the Nation or on 
[those] acquired in matters of [the] freedoms and of 
fundamental rights inscribed in this Constitution 
1992 100 The monarchic form of the State as well as the 
provisions relating to the Islamic religion cannot be 
the object of a constitutional revision. 
1972 106 Neither the State system of monarchy nor the 
prescriptions related to the religion of Islam may be 
subject to a constitutional revision. 
1970 100 The Royalist system, and provisions relating to 
Islam, shall not be subject to revision.  
1962 108 The monarchic form of the State as well as the 
provisions relating to the Moslem religion may not 
form the subject of a constitutional amendment. 
122.Mozambique  2004 292 1. Constitutional amendment laws shall have to 
respect the following:  
a) the independence, the sovereignty and the unity 
of the State;  
b) the republican form of Government;  
c) the separation between religious denominations 
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and the State;  
d) the fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees;  
e) universal, direct, secret, personal, equal and 
periodic suffrage for the appointment of elective 
sovereign public offices and elective offices of local 
administration;  
f) pluralism of expression and of political 
organisation, including political parties and the right 
of democratic opposition;  
g) the separation and interdependence of the 
sovereign public offices;  
h) the scrutiny of constitutionality;  
i) the independence of the judiciary;  
j) the autonomy of local authorities;  
k) the rights of workers and trade unions;  
l) the rules governing nationality, which cannot be 
amended in such a way as to restrict or remove 
rights of citizenship.  
2. Amendments pertaining to the matters listed in 
the preceding paragraph must, obligatorily, be 
submitted to a referendum 
1990 - [art.199: amendments which imply fundamental 
changes in the rights of citizens or in the 
organization of public power must be submitted, 
after adoption by the Assembly, to a referendum]. 
1975 -  
123.Myanmar 
(Burma) 
2008, 
1974, 
1947 
- Different procedures for different provisions.  
124.Namibia 1990 131 No repeal or amendment of any of the provisions 
of Chapter 3, in so far as such repeal or amendment 
diminishes or detracts from the fundamental rights 
and freedoms contained and defined in that 
Chapter, shall be permissible under this 
Constitution, and no such purported repeal or 
amendment shall be valid or have any force or 
effect. 
125.Nauru 1968 -  
126.Nepal 2063 
[2007] 
-  
2047 
[1990] 
116(1) Any bill purporting to amend or repeal any Article 
of this Constitution may be introduced, without 
contravening the spirit of the Preamble of this 
Constitution, in either House of the Parliament. 
Provided that this Article shall not be subject to 
amendment.  
1962, 
1948 
-  
127.Netherlands 1983, 
1953, 
1948 
1922 
-  
1887 - [Art. 196: No change shall be made in the 
succession to the throne during a regency]. 
1848 - [Art. 198: No amendment to the Constitution or the 
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law of succession can take place during a regency]. 
1815 - [Art. 233: No change to the fundamental law or the 
order of succession can take place during a regency]. 
128.New 
Zealand 
 -  
129.Nicaragua 1987 - Art.191-195 distinguish between partial and total 
reform. 
1974 - Art. 334-338 distinguish between partial and total 
reform. 
1950 - Art. 326-328 distinguish between partial and total 
reform. 
1948 -  
1939 -  
1911 - Art.163-164 set special procedure for ‘fundamental 
amendments’. 
1905 - Art. 119 sets a different procedure for absolute 
reform.  
1893 - Art. 156 sets a different procedure for absolute 
reform. 
1858 - Art. 103-104 distinguish between partial and total 
reform. 
1826 -  
130.Niger 2010 177 The republican form of government, a multiparty 
system, the principle of separation of state and 
religion and the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Article 47 and Article 187 of this Constitution can 
be no revision. No procedure of revision of this 
section is admissible [Art.47: The President of the 
Republic is elected by universal, free, direct, equal 
and secret a term of five (5) years, renewable (1) 
only once. (2) In any case, no person may serve 
more than two presidential terms or extend the 
mandate for any reason whatsoever. Art.187: An 
amnesty is granted to perpetrators, sponsors and 
accomplices of the coup of eighteen of February 
2010]. 
2009 152 The republican form of government, a multiparty 
system, the principle of separation of state and 
religion and the provisions of Article 154 and 159 
of this Constitution can be of no revision [art.154: 
The President of the Republic shall hold office until 
presidential election to be held in December 2012; 
art.159: Law n. 2000-001, of January 24, 2000 
granting amnesty on coup of 27 January 1996 and 
April 9, 1999, remains in force in all its provisions].  
1999 136 The republican form of government, the multiparty 
system, the principle of separation  state and 
religion and the provisions of Articles 36 and 141 of 
this Constitution can not be subject to revision 
[presedential term limits and the office of the 
President of the Republic and amnesty granted to 
perpetrators of coups 27 January 1996 and 9 April 
1999]. 
1996 125 The republican form of government, the principle 
of separation of state and religion, a multiparty 
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system, can be of no revision. 
1992 124 The republican form of government, the principle 
of separation of state and religion, a multiparty 
system, can be of no revision. 
1989 108 The republican form of government can be of no 
revision. 
1960 73 No procedure of amendment may be undertaken or 
pursued if it threatens the integrity of the territory. 
The republican form of Government may not be 
the subject of amendments.  
131.Nigeria 1999, 
1989, 
1979, 
1963, 
1960 
-  
132.Norway 1814 112(1)  Such amendment must never, however, contradict 
the principles embodied in this Constitution, but 
solely relate to modifications of particular 
provisions which do not alter the spirit of the 
Constitution, and such amendment requires that 
two thirds of the Parliament [Storting] agree 
thereto. 
133.Oman 1996 -  
134.Pakistan 1973, 
1962, 
1956 
-  
135.Palau 1981 -  
136.Panama 1972, 
1946 
1940, 
1904, 
1875, 
1873, 
1870, 
1868, 
1865, 
1863, 
1855, 
1853  
-  
1841 163 The power of Congress to amend this Constitution, 
never extends to vary the form of government, 
which it provides, which will always be popular, 
republican, representative, elective, alternative, and 
responsible. Nor extends to destroy the freedom of 
the press. 
137.Papua New 
Guinea 
1975 -  
138.Paraguay 1992 - [Arts. 289-290 distinguish between reform and 
amendments].  
1967 - [Arts. 219-231 distinguish between reform and 
amendments]. 
1940 - [Art. 94 distinguishes between general and partial 
reform]. 
1870, 
1844, 
-  
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1842, 
1816, 
1814, 
1813, 
1811 
139.Peru 1993, 
1979, 
1933, 
1919, 
1867, 
1860, 
1856 
-  
1839 183 The form of a popular Representative Government 
consolidated in unity, responsible, and alternative; 
and the division and independence of the 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers is 
unalterable. 
1836, 
1834, 
1828 
1826, 
1823, 
1822 
1821 
-  
140.Philippines 1987, 
1973, 
1935 
-  
141.Poland 1997 - [Art. 235 sets different procedure for different 
provisions].  
1952, 
1935, 
1921, 
1832, 
1815, 
1791 
-  
142.Portugal 1976 288 The laws revising the Constitution safeguard: 
a) National independence and the unity of the State; 
b) The republican form of government; 
c) The separation of the Churches from the State; 
d) The rights, freedoms, and safeguards of the 
citizens; 
e) The rights of the workers, workers' committees, 
and trade unions; 
f) The co-existence of the public, the private, and 
the cooperative and social sectors, with respect to 
the property of the means of production; 
g) The existence of economic plans within the 
framework of a mixed economy; 
h) Universal, direct, secret, and periodical suffrage 
for the appointment of the elected members of the 
organs of supreme authority, the autonomous 
regions, and the organs of local government, as well 
as the system of proportional representation; 
i) Plurality of expression and political organization, 
including political parties and the right to a 
democratic opposition; 
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j) Separation and interdependence of the organs of 
supreme authority; 
l) The scrutiny of legal provisions for active 
unconstitutionality and unconstitutionality by 
omission; 
m) The independence of the courts; 
n) The autonomy of local authorities; 
o) The political and administrative autonomy of the 
archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira. 
1933 -  
1911 82(2) Bills for the revision of the Constitution which do 
not define precisely the alterations projected cannot 
be admitted to discussion, nor can those the 
purport of which is to abolish the republican form 
of government. 
1838, 
1826, 
1822 
1821 
-  
143.Qatar 2004 145 Provisions pertaining to the rule of the State and its 
inheritance thereof may not be subject to 
application for amendment. 
146 Provisions pertaining to rights and public liberties 
may not be subject to amendment save for the 
purpose of granting more rights and guarantees for 
the interest of the citizen. 
147 The functions of the Emir set forth in this 
Constitution may not be subject to an application 
for amendment during the term of his deputation. 
1972 -  
144.Romania 1991 148 (1) The provisions of this Constitution with regard 
to the national, independent, unitary, and indivisible 
character of the Romanian State, the Republican 
form of government, territorial integrity, 
independence of the judiciary, political pluralism, 
and official language shall not be subject to revision. 
(2) Likewise, no revision shall be made if it results in 
the suppression of the citizens fundamental rights 
and freedoms, or the safeguards thereof. 
1965, 
1948, 
1938, 
1923, 
1866 
-  
145.Russian 
Federation 
1993 135 (1) The provisions of Chapters 1 [Fundamentals of 
the Constitutional System], 2 [Rights and Liberties 
of Man and Citizen] and 9 [Constitutional 
Amendments and Revisions] of the Constitution 
may not be revised by the Federal Assembly. 
(2) In the event a proposal to revise any provisions 
in Chapters 1, and 9 of the Constitution is 
supported by three-fifths of the total number of 
deputies of the Federation Council and the House 
of Representatives [State Duma], a Constitutional 
Assembly is convened in accordance with the 
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federal constitutional law. 
(3) The Constitutional Assembly may either confirm 
the inviolability of the Constitution or develop a 
new draft of the Constitution which is adopted by 
two-thirds of the total number of deputies to the 
Constitutional Assembly or submitted to popular 
voting. The Constitution is considered adopted 
during such poll if more than half of its participants 
have voted for it, provided more than half of the 
electorate have taken part in the poll. 
1978 - [Art. 185. Amendment to articles pertaining to the 
federal structure of the Russian Federation may not 
be made unilaterally]. 
1947, 
1937, 
1936 
1925, 
1923/4 
1918, 
1917, 
1906, 
1833 
-  
146.Rwanda 2003 193 If the constitutional amendment concerns the term 
of the President of the Republic or the system of 
democratic government based on political pluralism, 
or the constitutional regime established by this 
Constitution especially the republican form of the 
government or national sovereignty, the 
amendment must be passed by referendum, after 
adoption by each Chamber of Parliament. 
No amendment to this article is permitted. 
1991 96(2) No revision bill or proposal may be taken into 
consideration if it infringes upon the republican 
form of government, national territorial integrity, or 
democratic principles ruling the Republic. 
1978 91 No proposal for revision can be considered if it 
undermines the republican form of state, the 
integrity of national territory or the democratic 
principles that govern the republic. 
1962 107 No proposal for revision can be considered if it 
undermines the republican form of state, the 
integrity of national territory or the democratic 
principles that govern the republic. 
1961 -  
147.Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 
1983 -  
148.Saint Lucia 1978 -  
149.Saint 
Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines 
1979 -  
150.Samoa 1960 -  
151.San Marino 1974 
(declar
ation 
-  
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of 
rights) 
152.Sao Tome 
and Principe 
 
1975 154  Limits on matters of revision: there cannot be 
constitutional revision to: 
  a) the independence, integrity and unity of the 
national territory 
  the state; 
  b) the status of the secular state; 
  c) The republican form of government; 
  d) The rights, freedoms and guarantees of 
cidaddos; 
  e) the universal suffrage, direct, secret and periodic 
for electing holders of the organs of sovereignty and 
of regional and local levels; 
  f) The separation and interrelationships of the 
organs of sovereignty; 
  g) The autonomy of regional and local levels; 
  h) Independence of the courts; 
  i) pluralism of expression and political 
organization, including 
  political parties and the right to democratic 
opposition. 
153.Saudi Arabia 1992, 
1926 
-  
154.Senegal 2001 103 Forbids any amendments affecting the republican 
form of the state. 
1963 89 The republican form of the state cannot be the 
object of revision. 
1960, 
1959 
-  
155.Serbia 2006 - [Art. 203: The National Assembly shall be obliged 
to put forward the act on amending the 
Constitution in the republic referendum to have it 
endorsed, in cases when the amendment of the  
Constitution pertains to the preamble of the 
Constitution, principles of the Constitution, human 
and minority rights and freedoms, the system of 
authority, proclamation the state of war and 
emergency, derogation from human and minority 
rights in the state of emergency or war or the 
proceedings of amending the Constitution]. 
1963, 
1903 
-  
1901 - [Art. 103 sets different procedure for different 
provisions].  
1888, 
1869 
-  
156.Seychelles 1993, 
1979 
-  
157.Sierra Leone 1991, 
1978, 
1971, 
1961 
-  
158.Singapore 1963 - [Art.5(2a): Unless the President, acting in his 
discretion, otherwise directs the Speaker in writing, 
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a Bill seeking to amend this clause, Articles 17 to 22, 
22a to 22o, 35, 65, 66, 69, 70, 93a, 94, 95, 105, 107, 
110a, 110b, 151 or any provision in Part IV or XI 
shall not be passed by Parliament unless it has been 
supported at a national referendum by not less than 
two-thirds of the total number of votes cast by the 
electors registered under the Parliamentary 
Elections Act]. 
159.Slovak 
Republic 
1992 -  
160.Slovenia 1991 -  
161.Solomon 
Islands 
1978 - [Art. 61 sets different procedure for different 
provisions].  
162.Somalia 1979 112(3) Amendments to the constitution shall not affect the 
following: 
a) The Republican system of the country; 
b) The adoption of the principle of socialism; 
c) Territorial unity; 
d) The fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
citizen and individual.  
1960 105 The Constitution shall not be amended under the 
terms of the preceding article for the purpose of 
modifying the republican and democratic form of 
government or for restricting the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the citizen and of man 
guaranteed by the Constitution.  
163.South Africa 1996 - [Art. 74 sets different procedure for different 
provisions].  
1993 74(1) No amendment or repeal of - 
 (a) this section or the Constitutional Principles set 
out in Schedule 4; or 
 (b) any other provision of this Chapter in so far as 
it relates to - 
 (i) the Constitutional Principles; or 
 (ii) the requirement that the new constitutional text 
shall comply with the Constitutional Principles, or 
that such text shall be certified by the Constitutional 
Court as being in compliance therewith, shall be 
permissible. 
[Art. 63 sets different procedure for different 
provisions]. 
1983 - [Art. 98 sets different procedure for different 
provisions]. 
1961 -  
164.South Sudan 2011 -  
2005 206(2) Any amendment affecting the provisions of the 
Comprehensive Peace agreement shall be 
introduces only with the approval of both Parties 
signatory to the Comprehensive Pease Agreement. 
165.Spain 1978 - [art.168(1): When a total revision of the 
Constitution is proposed, or a partial revision 
thereof, affecting the Preliminary Title, Chapter II, 
Section 1 of Title I, or Title II, the principle shall be 
approved by a two-thirds majority of the members 
of each Chamber, and the Parliament shall 
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immediately be dissolved. 
(2) The Chambers elected must ratify the decision 
and proceed to examine the new Constitutional text, 
which must be approved by a two-thirds majority of 
the members of both Chambers. 
(3) Once the amendment has been passed by the 
Parliament, it shall be submitted to ratification by 
referendum]. 
1945, 
1931, 
1876 
1869, 
1845, 
1837, 
1812, 
1808 
-  
166.Sri Lanka 1978, 
1946 
-  
167.Sudan 2005 224(2) Any  amendment affecting  the  provisions  of the  
Comprehensive Peace Agreement shall be 
introduced only with the approval of both Parties 
signatory to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
1985, 
1973/4 
-  
168.Suriname 1987 -  
169.Swaziland 2005, 
1968 
- [Different procedures for different provisions]. 
170.Sweden 1986, 
1974, 
1954, 
1809 
-  
171.Switzerland 1999 193(4) The mandatory provisions of international law must 
not be violated [total revision]. 
194(2) The partial revision must respect the principle of 
cohesion of subject matter and must not violate 
mandatory provisions of international law [partial 
revision]. 
1874  [Art. 118-122 distinguishes between partial and total 
revision]. 
1848, 
1802 
(Helvet
-ic)  
-  
1798 
(Helvet
-ic) 
2 The form of government, whatever modifications it 
may undergo, shall at all times be a representative 
democracy. 
172.Syrian Arab 
Republic 
1973, 
1964, 
1950 
-  
173.Taiwan  1948, 
1946/7 
-  
174.Tajikistan 1994 100 The form of public administration, the territorial 
integrity, and the democratic, Law-governed, secular 
and social nature of the state shall be irrevocable. 
175.Tanzania, 1977 - [Art.98 sets different procedures for different 
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Republic of provision].  
1965, 
1962 
-  
176.Thailand 2007 291(1) A motion for amendment which has the effect of 
changing the democratic regime of government 
with the King as Head of the State or changing the 
form of the State shall be prohibited. 
1997, 
1991, 
1978, 
1977, 
1976, 
1974, 
1968, 
1959, 
1952, 
1949, 
1932 
-  
177.Timor-Leste 
(East Timor) 
 
2002 156 1. Laws revising the Constitution shall respect:  
a) National independence and the unity of the State; 
 b) The rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens; 
 c) The republican form of government; 
 d) The separation of powers; 
 e) The independence of the courts; 
 f) The multi-party system and the right of 
democratic opposition; 
 g) The free, universal, direct, secret and regular 
suffrage of the office holders of the organs of 
sovereignty, as well as the system of proportional 
representation; 
 h) The principle of administrative deconcentration 
and decentralisation; 
 i) The National Flag; 
 j) The date of proclamation of national 
independence. 
 2. Paragraphs c) and i) may be reviewed through a 
national referendum, in accordance with the law. 
178.Togo 1992 144 The republican form and secularism of the state 
cannot be the subject of a revision. 
1979 53 The republican form of government cannot be an 
object of revisions. No revision procedure may be 
instituted or continued when it undermines the 
integrity of the territory. 
1963 85 No revision procedure may be instituted or 
continued when it undermines the integrity of the 
territory. The republican form of government 
cannot be an object of revisions.  
1961 -  
179.Tonga 1875 79 It shall be lawful for the Legislative Assembly to 
discuss amendments to the Constitution provided 
that such amendments shall not affect the law of 
liberty the succession to the Throne and the titles 
and hereditary estates of the nobles. 
180.Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1976 - [art. 54 sets different procedure for different 
provisions].  
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1962 -  
181.Tunisia 1959 76 The initiative of revision of the Constitution 
belongs to the President of the Republic or to one-
third at least of the members of the Chamber of 
Deputies, under reserve that it does not infringe on 
the republican form of the State. The President of 
the Republic can submit the Bills of revision of the 
Constitution to referendum. 
182.Turkey 1982 4 The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution 
establishing the form of the state as a Republic, the 
provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of the 
Republic, and the provision of Article 3 shall not be 
amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed. 
[Art. 1. The Turkish State is a Republic; Art. 2.  The 
Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and 
social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in 
mind the concepts of public peace, national 
solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal 
to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the 
fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble; Art. 3. 
The Turkish State, with its territory and nation, is an 
indivisible entity.  Its language is Turkish. Its flag, 
the form of which is prescribed by the relevant law, 
is composed of a white crescent and star on a red 
background. Its national anthem is the 
“Independence March”. Its capital is Ankara].  
1961 9 The provision of the Constitution establishing the 
form of the state as a republic shall not be amended 
nor shall any motion therefore be made.  
1945 102 An amendment or a modification of Art. 1 of the 
present law, stating that the form of Government of 
the Country is a Republic, cannot be proposed 
under any circumstances or in any form whatsoever.  
1924 102 No proposal may be made in an effort to change 
Article 1 of the Constitution relative to the form of 
government.  
1921, 
1876 
-  
183.Turkmenista
n 
1992 115 The provisions of the Constitution concerning a 
republican form of government may not be 
amended. 
184.Tuvalu 1986, 
1978 
-  
185.Uganda 1995, 
1967, 
1962 
- [Different procedures for different provisions].  
186.Ukraine 1996 157 The Constitution of Ukraine shall not be amended 
if the amendments foresee the abolition or 
restriction of human and citizens’ rights and 
freedoms, or if they are oriented toward the 
liquidation of the independence or violation of the 
territorial indivisibility of Ukraine.  
1978 -  
187.United Arab 
Emirates 
1971 -  
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188.United 
Kingdom 
   
189.United 
States of 
America 
1789 5 Provided that no Amendment which may be made 
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and 
eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth 
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and 
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
190.Uruguay 1966, 
1951, 
1934,  
1917, 
1830 
-  
191.Uzbekistan 1992 -  
192.Vanuatu 1980 - [Art. 86: A bill for an amendment of a provision of 
the Constitution regarding the status of Bislama, 
English and French, the electoral system, or the 
parliamentary system, passed by Parliament under 
Article 85, shall not come into effect unless it has 
been supported in a national referendum]. 
193.Vatican City 
State 
   
194.Venezuela 1999 6 The government of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and of the political organs comprising 
the same, is and shall always be democratic, 
participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, 
responsible and pluralist, with revocable mandates. 
340 The purpose of an amendment is to add to or 
modify one or more articles of the Constitution, 
without altering the fundamental structure of the 
same. 
342 The purpose of constitutional reform is to effect a 
partial revision of this Constitution and replacement 
of one or more of the provisions hereof, without 
modifying the fundamental principles and structure 
of the text of the Constitution. 
1961 - [Art. 245-246 distinguish between amendments and 
reform]. 
1953, 
1947, 
1936, 
1925, 
1914, 
1909, 
1904, 
1893, 
1891 
1881, 
1874, 
1864 
-  
1858 164 The power granted to Congress by the preceding 
Article does not extend to any alteration of the 
form of Government, which shall always be 
republican, popular, representative, responsible, and 
alternative. 
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1830 228 The authority possessed by Congress to modify the 
Constitution does not extend to the Form of 
Government, which shall always continue to be 
republican, popular, representative, responsible, and 
alternate. 
1819, 
1811 
-  
195.Vietnam 1992, 
1980, 
1965, 
1960, 
1959, 
1946 
-  
196.Yemen 1991 - [Art. 158 sets different procedures for different 
provisions].  
1974, 
1971, 
1962 
-  
197.Yugoslavia 1992 - [139-141 set different procedures for different 
provisions]. 
1974, 
1963, 
1953, 
1946, 
1931, 
1929, 
1921 
-  
198.Zambia 1991 - [Art. 79 sets different procedures for different 
provisions]. 
1973, 
1964 
-  
199.Zimbabwe 2013, 
1979, 
1969 
-  
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   State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) 
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921) 
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   Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) 
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) 
   Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) 
Supreme Court of California, Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894) 
Supreme Court of California, Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P. 2d 1077 (1990) 
Supreme Court of California, Strauss et al v Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364 (2009) 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Berríos Martínez v. Roselló González II, 137 d.p.r. 195 
(1994) 
Venezuela: 
Supreme Court of Justice, Opinion No. 17 of 19.01.1999 
Supreme Court of Justice (Constitutional Chamber), Opinion No. 53 of 03.02.2009  
CONSTITUTIONS  
[This section mentions only those constitutional texts which appear in the body of the 
thesis, i.e. excluding the appendix] 
 
Afghanistan (2004) 
Algeria (1976); (1989) 
Angola (1975); (2006); (2010) 
Argentina (1994)  
Armenia (1995) 
Austria (1920) 
Azerbaijan (1995)  
Bahrain (1973) 
Bangladesh (1972) 
Belarus (1994) 
Bolivia (2009)  
Bosnia and Herzegovina Const. (1995) 
Brazil (1891); (1946); (1988) 
Bulgaria (1991) 
Burkina Faso (1991)  
Burundi (1992); (2005)  
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Camaroon (1972)  
Cambodia (1993)  
Canada (1982) 
Cape Verde (1992) 
Central African Republic (2004)  
Chad (1989)  
Chile (1980) 
China (1923); (1982) 
Colombia (1991) 
Congo (1992); (2002) 
Costa Rica (1949)  
Cote d’Ivoire (1960); (2000);  
Croatia (1990)  
Cuba (1940); (1976) 
Cyprus (1960) 
Czech Republic (1992)  
Democratic Republic of Congo (2005)  
Djibouti (1992)  
Dominican Republic (1865); (1866); (1874); (1875); (1878); (1879); (1879); (1880); (1881); 
(1887); (1896); (1907); (1908); (1924); (1929); (1934); (1942); (1947); (1955); (1960); 
(1961); (1966); (1994); (2002/2003)  
Ecuador (1843); (1851); (1861); (1869); (1967); (2008) 
El Salvador (1886); (1945); (1983)  
Equatorial Guinea (1991)  
Eritrea (1952)  
Estonia (1992)  
Ethiopia (1952) 
Fiji (1990) 
France (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789); (1791); (Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1793); (1875); (1946); (1958)  
Gabon (1990); (1991) 
Germany (1919); (1949) 
Ghana (1969) 
Greece (1884); (1864); (1911); (1927); (1952); (1975) 
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Guatemala (1965); (1985)  
Guinea (1990); (2010)  
Guineau-Bissau (1984)  
Haiti (1987)  
Honduras  (1848); (1965); (1982) 
Hong Kong (1990) 
Hungary (1949) 
India (1950) 
Iran (1907); (1979)  
Iraq (2005) 
Ireland (1937) 
Italy (1947) 
Japan (1889); (1946)  
Jordan (1952) 
Kazahkstan (1993) 
Kenya (1963); (2010) 
Kosovo (2008) 
Kuwait (1962)  
Kyrgyzstan (1993) 
Laos (1947) 
Latvia (1992) 
Libya (1951); (1969) 
Lithuania (1992)  
Madagascar (1975); (2010)  
Malaysia (1957)  
Mali (1992)  
Mauritania (1991); (2006) 
Mexico (1824) 
Moldova (1994) 
Morocco (1970); (1972); (1992); (2011)  
Mozambique (1990); (2004)  
Namibia (1990)  
Nepal (1990); (2007) 
Nicaragua (1987) 
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Niger (1989); (1992); (1996); (1999); (2009); (2010)  
Norway (1814) 
Pakistan (1973) 
Peru (1839); (1993) 
Philippine (1987)  
Poland (1997)  
Portugal (1911); (1933); (1976)  
Qatar (2004)   
Romania (1991)  
Russia (1978); (1993)  
Rwanda (1962); (1978); (1991); (2003) 
Sao Tome and Principe (1975)  
Senegal (2001)  
Serbia (2006) 
Singapore (1963)  
Slovakia (1992)  
Somalia (1960); (1979) 
South Africa (1993); (1996) 
South Korea (1948) 
Sri Lanka (1972); (1978) 
Sudan (2005)  
Switzerland (1798); (1848); (1999) 
Taiwan (1946) 
Tajikistan (1994)  
Tanzania (1965); (1977) 
Thailand (2007) 
Timor Leste (East Timor) (2002) 
Togo (1992)  
Tonga (1875) 
Turkey (1961); (1982)  
United States, Articles of Confederation (1781); Constitution (1787); Carolina (1669); 
Pennsylvania (Charter of Privileges 28 October 1701); New Jersey (1776); Virginia 
(1776); Pennsylvania (1776), Maryland (1776), Delaware (1776); Georgia (1777); 
Vermont (1777); Massachusetts (1780); the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (1952) 
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Vanuatu (1980) 
Venezuela (1830); (1858); (1961); (1999) 
